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WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT PARIS

THE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1918–1919

BY AMERICAN DELEGATES

EDITED BY

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AND

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WITH MAPS

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IN EXPLANATION

When the Academy of Music in Philadelphia was taken under lease, in the autumn of 1920, for a term of years by a group of public-spirited citizens, it was for the purpose of acquiring the building so as to dedicate it to the public good. Its sixty-three years of service had given the Academy a wonderful history in which every President of the United States since Franklin Pierce had figured: practically every great orator, artist, and distinguished publicist in the United States and every illustrious visitor from foreign lands had appeared on its stage.

It was determined to recreate the Foyer in the building into a beautiful auditorium of intimate size which would serve as a Public Forum. In discussing this project with Colonel Edward M. House, he expressed his conviction that the time had come to tell the American public, for the first time, the inside story of the Peace Conference at Paris. It was decided that instead of following the customary method of publishing the material, it should be first spoken in a series of talks to be given in the Academy Foyer and thus the idea of dedicating the room as a public forum would be launched. Fifteen of the most salient subjects of the Conference were selected, and fifteen of the most authoritative speakers chosen, and a series of fifteen weekly talks explaining "What Really Happened at Paris" was announced. Tickets were sold only for the entire series, and when the first talk was delivered every seat in the auditorium was sold to the most intellectually distinguished audience ever brought together in Philadelphia.

The series was given under the auspices of *The Philadelphia Public Ledger*, and it was arranged that each talk should be sent out in advance of delivery to the

subscribing newspapers of the United States and Europe of its syndicate for simultaneous publication the morning after its delivery in the Academy Foyer. By this method, the word spoken in Philadelphia reached, the following morning, a world audience.

On Friday evening, December 10, 1920, the first talk was delivered and the series was continued for fifteen consecutive weeks. Each talk was limited to one hour; and was followed by a half-hour questionnaire, giving those in the audience who desired the opportunity to ask any relevant question not covered in the speaker's talk. Each talk began promptly at half after eight o'clock, when the doors were closed and no late-comers were admitted, insuring uninterrupted attention for the speakers. By this method the sessions never exceeded, in time, an hour and a half.

The talks were successful from the first. No series of such length on one subject extending for fifteen weeks had ever been attempted in Philadelphia, and some misgivings were felt as to the sustaining public interest; the result proved that never in the history of Philadelphia had a series been given in which not only had the interest been sustained, but had constantly deepened.

Edward W. Bok
President
The Academy of Music Corporation.

Philadelphia, March, 1921.

FOREWORD

The voice of the United States during the memorable Conference at Paris in 1918–19 finds its first comprehensive and authoritative expression within these pages. Here is told, by those who sat in conference day by day with the heads of states, the story of the negotiations which brought about the Peace with the Central Empires. Here are the facts and not the rumors and gossip picked up like crumbs from a bountiful table, and which many put into books in order to meet the hunger for information concerning one of the momentous events in history.

The final decisions rested with others, but these decisions were largely based upon facts and opinions furnished by those who tell the story of "What Really Happened at Paris." The narrators do not always agree as to the value of the results, nor in their estimates of the men who brought them about, but this lends an interest to the account which it could not otherwise have.

There were great and complex characters at this gathering of the world's foremost men, and there is a wide difference of opinion as to their purposes and their mental and temperamental equipments. Statesmen, soldiers, men of the sea, artists, financiers, and writers of all kinds and sorts touched elbows with one another. The settlements to be made were interwoven with every

human interest, and brought the best from every land to participate in or advise as to the final adjustment.

There were some who towered above their fellows, and these became centres of groups from which policies and opinions radiated. Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Paderewski, Venizelos, Smuts, Makino, and Wellington Koo were among the statesmen having distinct and enthusiastic followers. Clemenceau stands out the clearest-cut figure of them all. No doubt or mystery surrounds him. He fought in peace as he fought in war, openly, intelligently, and courageously for his beloved France. No one in that notable gathering had so well within grasp the gift of accomplishment. He inspired the affection of many—the admiration of all.

Paderewski and Wilson had about them something of romance and spirituality lacking in others. The one had gathered together the fragments of a broken kingdom and had moulded it into a virile and liberty-loving republic. He came as the spokesman of an ancient people whose wrongs and sorrows had stirred the sympathies of an entire world. This artist, patriot, and statesman awakened the Congress to do justice to his native land, and sought its help to make a great dream true. His fervored eloquence brought about the renascence of Poland, and added new lustre to a famous name.

Wilson, on the other hand, had aroused the conscience and aspirations of mankind, and when he stood at the peak of his influence and power, there was never a more commanding figure, for he was then the spokesman

of the moral and spiritual forces of the world. His work at Paris was tireless and unselfish, and it was not until he returned to America to render an account of his stewardship that disaster overtook him, and wrecked the structure built in co-operation with our allies with such painstaking care.

Until Wilson went to Europe he did not know how deep and terrible were her wounds, or how close they came to us. Until he could see for himself he could not realize how a torn and distracted Continent was seeking help from the only source from which help could come. If there was ever need for a "Good Samaritan" surely the time was then. He voiced the unselfish and courageous spirit of America, and our hearts quickened as the pent-up emotions of many peoples broke forth to do him and our country homage.

But that day is gone, gone in that hour when we left our task unfinished. It was a *volte face* for which we have dearly paid in the world's esteem. If our gallant dead who lie beside their comrades in the fields of France had done likewise at Château-Thierry and the Argonne, we could not have reached our high estate. Never before has a nation tossed aside so great a heritage so lightly.

But even now there springs to life the faith that we may yet recover something of what we have lost, and if this book can add to this purpose it will meet the hopes and expectations of its authors.

EDWARD M. HOUSE.

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I

PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE

BY SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES

The Inquiry

In September, 1917, five months after the United States entered the war, Colonel House, at the request of President Wilson, began to gather a body of experts to collect and collate data that might be needed eventually at the Peace Conference. The President felt that the United States was especially in need of such specialists at the Conference because of its traditional policy of isolation and the consequent lack, in its governmental departments, of a personnel thoroughly conversant, through intimate contact, with the inter-relations and internal composition of the European and Asiatic powers and their various dependencies. It was the desire of the President that this work of preparation should be carried forward with as little publicity as possible (hence the uninforming name), in order that premature expectations of peace should not be excited and thus, to however slight a degree, slow down the war-making activities of the nation.

Mr. David Hunter Miller, of the New York bar, was made treasurer of The Inquiry, and early in 1918 Mr. Walter Lippmann, previously of the editorial staff of the *New Republic*, was named secretary. Headquarters were set up in the home of the American Geographical Society, in New York, by courtesy of its board of trustees.

Throughout the existence of The Inquiry it was under the supervision of Colonel House, and was in close touch with the Department of State and the President.

The first practical contribution of The Inquiry to the problems of peace was made early in 1918, when the President, through Colonel House, asked for a report on the main outlines of an equitable settlement. This report, prepared by the director, treasurer, and secretary, was the basis from which the President started in formulating his Fourteen Points, which were later incorporated in the armistice conditions imposed on Germany. This step on the part of the President foreshadowed his practice at the Peace Conference in Paris, where the staff of The Inquiry, there known as the territorial and economic section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, was called on for similar and also for more detailed and responsible assistance throughout the sessions of the Conference.

Two main tasks confronted The Inquiry, the delimitation of its field of work and the selection and training of its personnel. The United States had had no part in a general peace conference, and both tasks were new to us. Moreover, while it was clear that the Conference would have to deal with settlements involving a large part of the world, what issues would be dealt with in various regions, and what regions would be excluded from consideration was far from clear. And the isolation of the United States and its lack of intimate interest in and touch with other countries, especially in the eastern hemisphere, left our government without any accumulation of information and with too small and scattered a trained personnel to deal with such information as might be gathered. Great Britain, France, Germany, and, to a

lesser extent, Italy had maintained close relations, as their interests required, with other European countries, with the Turkish Empire, with colonial Africa, with the Far East, and with the Pacific Islands. Their foreign and colonial services were made up of permanent employees who had lived in these regions, come in contact with their officials and leading men, and in many cases made reports on these lands and the peoples inhabiting them. Moreover, travellers, traders, and scientists were also available, and were intimately acquainted with those lands and their peoples from personal observation and investigation, and could correct the second-hand evidence of books and published reports by first-hand knowledge of eye-witnesses. No such resources were at our command in this country. It was only recently that our diplomatic and consular services had been organized on a permanent basis with secure tenure, and the incumbents in these services had dealt chiefly with governments and with business agencies, and had little training or interest in questions of geography, history, ethnology, economics, strategy, etc., that would be the chief considerations at the Peace Conference. And few of these regions had been visited more than casually, or studied with any thoroughness by American travellers, traders, or scientists.

It was natural, under these circumstances, and in view of the uncertainties regarding the questions that would be decided at the Peace Conference, that some groping in the dark and some unnecessary work should have been undertaken. It may be interesting and elucidating to give a few instances in point.

Would South American questions be dealt with by the Conference? It seemed improbable, but was not impos-

sible, and if they should be included in the settlement the United States would be expected to take a leading part in their consideration. A careful study was therefore made of all South American boundary disputes, of South American history, and of the land, the people, and the economic resources and organization of South America. None of this material was used at the Peace Conference, though it has been and will be of value to the Department of State.

Would Russian questions be dealt with by the Conference? It was impossible to tell, but it seemed not improbable during the first half of 1918. A systematic study of Russia, especially along its western borders, was therefore made—a study of agriculture, industry, railways, political habits and customs, racial affiliations, and the like. Aside from the training the staff received from such work, the material collected and the conclusions drawn from it were of little use at the Conference, for Russia was not then and is not yet ripe for settlement.

Would Africa and the islands of the Pacific come up for consideration? There we seemed to be on safe ground. Undoubtedly they would, and much data were collected for these regions—their geography, the simple tribal organizations of their backward peoples, their products and the value of these products to the great powers, the customs of the natives, the history of the dealings of European nations with them, and much else that, it was thought, might be helpful. As it turned out, these regions were considered by the Conference, but the consideration was along such general lines of political expediency and practicality that the detailed data collected had little bearing on the decisions reached.

As a final illustration, mention may be made of maps.

Base maps were constructed for the whole of Europe and the Near East, and for various sections of the continent that would surely be involved in the settlements of the Conference. In volume this was one of the largest undertakings of The Inquiry, and it had educative value for its staff, aiding, as it did, toward an understanding of the most contentious regions the Conference had to consider. But at the Conference these maps were hardly used at all. Some of the cases containing them were not opened. The world series of millionth maps proved to be sufficient for all needs. They constituted a sort of international currency, readily accessible, familiar to all participants, and inexpensive.

But the bulk of the work of The Inquiry dealt with Mittel Europa, indeed, with the distracted areas of Central Europe and the Near East on either side of the much-heralded Hamburg-Bagdad Railway, stretching from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and the data gathered proved to be indispensable when the Conference met. And as the spring and summer of 1918 advanced, the exact nature of the data required grew clear. It became evident, namely, that many kinds of information bearing on the drawing of boundary-lines would be needed, and that no information that did not bear on such settlements, excepting general economic information that would be needed in drafting the economic clauses of the treaty, would be of any value. In August, therefore, the staff of The Inquiry was asked to confine its consideration to such data, and soon thereafter the work clarified and definite objectives were established. Only the regions along or adjacent to probable boundary-lines were now studied. Others could be dismissed from consideration.

By the middle of October tentative boundaries for the whole of Mittel Europa had been worked out, and in November these were sent to Colonel House, who was then in Paris, representing our government in the armistice negotiations and the arrangements for the Peace Conference that followed. In January, 1919, a "Black Book," illustrated by maps, was prepared for our plenipotentiaries, laying down and discussing revised boundaries; and in February, after conferences with our colleagues of other delegations, a "Red Book," with further revision, was made ready for them. With this report The Inquiry, renamed the Territorial Section of the Peace Conference, practically dissolved as an organization, although most of its members continued to render service as individuals for some months longer.

As to personnel, the problem proved to be less difficult than at first it threatened to be. Policies would, of course, be determined, and the culminating negotiations conducted by our plenipotentiaries. The Inquiry staff would thus be limited to the rôle of gathering and evaluating facts, and of digesting them for prompt and handy use. Work of such detail could not be expected of statesmen and diplomats, nor would they have been competent for it. The need was for men expert in research. Consequently the staff was in the main recruited from strong universities and colleges but also from among former officials, lawyers, and business men. The studies that were made during the winter, spring, and autumn of 1918 in the geography, history, economic resources, political organization and affiliations, and ethnic and cultural characteristics of the peoples and territories in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the islands of the Pacific, served as tests for the selection and elimination

of workers; the men making these studies and reporting thereon were under constant observation, and as a result the best fitted among them emerged and were put in charge of various subdivisions of the work and assigned groups of assistants. As a consequence, by the fall of 1918 The Inquiry was thus organized:

Director, Dr. S. E. Mezes; College of the City of New York.
Chief Territorial Specialist, Dr. Isaiah Bowman; American Geographical Society.[1]
Regional Specialists:
For the northwestern frontiers—Dr. Charles H. Haskins; Harvard University.
For Poland and Russia—Dr. R. H. Lord; Harvard University.
For Austria-Hungary—Dr. Charles Seymour; Yale University.
For Italian boundaries—Dr. W. E. Lunt; Haverford College.
For the Balkans—Dr. Clive Day; Yale University.
For Western Asia—Dr. W. L. Westermann; University of Wisconsin.
For the Far East—Capt. S. K. Hornbeck, U. S. A.
For Colonial Problems—Mr. George L. Beer, formerly of Columbia University.
Economic Specialist, Dr. A. A. Young; Cornell University.
Librarian and Specialist in History, Dr. James T. Shotwell; Columbia University.
Specialist in Boundary Geography, Maj. Douglas Johnson; Columbia University.
Chief Cartographer, Prof. Mark Jefferson; State Normal College, Ypsilanti, Michigan.

Besides The Inquiry proper, and affiliated with although distinct from it, were the experts in international law, Mr. David Hunter Miller and Major James Brown Scott.

This body of men proceeded to Paris at the opening of December, 1918, except Mr. Miller, who had gone in

[1] Dr. Bowman was named executive officer in the summer of 1918, after Mr. Walter Lippmann resigned as secretary to undertake intelligence work for the army in France.

October. In Paris they assisted the commissioners plenipotentiary with data and recommendations, and themselves served on commissions dealing with three types of problems: First, territorial; second, economic questions and reparation; third, international law and the League of Nations, as is told more fully in later chapters.

As it turned out, the staff of The Inquiry were concerned in Paris, as members of commissions, with delicate questions of policy, and it may be noted that the decisions which they had a part in negotiating were only in the rarest instances modified by the supreme council.

Armistice Negotiations [1]

When, early in October, 1918, Bulgaria's armies crumbled and she sued for peace, competent observers knew that the greatest of wars was ending, and the longed-for peace was at last in sight. Austria-Hungary, opened to attack from south and east, distracted by dissension, torn apart by revolt, could not long stand. Germany, too, must fall. The time and manner of her overthrow she might, within limits, elect. She might hold out to the last, and fight until spring—at the cost of frightful casualties and sacrifices for herself and for her enemies. But fall she must. The gamble for world dominion was lost.

President Wilson acted at once, and within a week Colonel House was on his way to France to represent our government in the culminating armistice negotiations.

He reached Paris barely in time to take part in settling the conditions to be imposed upon Austria-Hungary,

[1] Among other data, the writer has examined evidence made available by Colonel House, who vouches for the facts stated, but is not responsible for the views expressed.

which in the meantime had applied to the Italian commander, General Diaz, for an armistice. These conditions were very severe. As in the case of Bulgaria, which had also applied through military channels, they amounted to unconditional surrender, even to the point of allowing Allied troops to occupy the country and use it for military operations. Germany could be attacked from the south.

In this instance Colonel House did not ask that the President's Fourteen Points or other policies be accepted in the armistice, largely because that point which affected Austria-Hungary, number ten, no longer applied; it was not autonomy, but independence of Austria and Hungary, that the north and south Slavs, Rumanians, and Italians demanded, indeed were already asserting. The American representative did insist, however, in harmony with our government's policy, upon engagements to furnish food and other succor designed to alleviate the misery of the misguided peoples within the falling monarchy.

But a greater decision was pending. On October 5, the new Chancellor of Germany, Prince Maximilian of Baden, speaking for the German Government, requested President Wilson to "take in hand the restoration of peace" and accepted as a basis the "program set forth in the President's message of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements." But the President would not undertake the task until he was assured that the German Government accepted the very terms laid down in his message and addresses, leaving for discussion only practical details of their application, and that it was ready to evacuate occupied territories, and to abstain during the process from "acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation" on sea and on land. He warned Germany that

the armistice terms must give "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy . . . in the field" of our armies and those of our associates, and further, failing to receive satisfactory proofs of the democracy and the permanence of the German Government, he wrote: "If it [the government of the United States] must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender."

With the situation thus clarified, President Wilson communicated the correspondence to the Allies, and referred the German Government to Marshal Foch.

It is in this setting that the Versailles Conference, intrusted with the heavy responsibility of exacting from Germany the amplest hostages for good behavior, or continuing the war, must be pictured. The personnel is interesting—Clemenceau already acclaimed *Père de la Victoire*, the grim Tiger, sparing of words, ominous in his deep silences, hard and cynical save only in his devotion to France; Lloyd George, most sensitively representative and nimble-minded of the world's greater statesmen, who had organized disjointed Britain, and firmly taught her the hardest lesson for British heads, how, in place of muddling through, to employ foresight and prearrangement; Orlando, learned, eloquent and warm-hearted, who had led Italy to triumph after and in spite of Caporetto; and House, skilled negotiator, experienced and sagacious, speaking for the strongest and most idealistic nation, the well-trusted representative of its powerful President, who stood forth the first man in the

long annals of history to be spontaneously accepted as their leader by men of all nations.

These men had met in conference before; notably, a year earlier, when the Allies were facing their darkest hour, these same conferees had effected a co-ordination of the four nations' war-making activities, without which a stern armistice could not have been imposed upon Germany in 1918. The four usually met in the morning at American headquarters, 78 rue de l'Université, Paris, while in the afternoon formal conferences were held at Versailles, in the quarters of the Supreme War Council, where other notables met with them, Balfour, Milner, Sonnino, Venizelos, among others, and, at times, the military and naval chiefs as advisers.

In asking an armistice of President Wilson and the Allies, and in accepting his conditions, Germany admitted that she had lost the war. But, as secure safeguards against a recurrence of indescribable horrors and world-wide disorganization, and as a decent approach to repair of countless damages wantonly inflicted—how much could be exacted from Germany in these respects? Victory for her had been all but in sight in May and June. Then her fall from this place of high hope had been swift and stunning. Her people and her leaders were in an ugly mood. Would they pursue *Realpolitik*, accepting the inevitable now and saving what they could from the wreck; or, desperate, ruthless to the last, would they, if they thought the terms impossibly humiliating and severe, elect to endure a time longer, on a desperate gambler's chance, and with this certainty, at least, that their enemies too must continue to pay in effort, suffering, and sacrifice of lives, or else soften their conditions.

It is easy to answer such questions now, but it was hard

to answer them then. I can do no better than to quote Colonel House's description of the situation.

"There came into our counsels at different times the military and naval chiefs who had directed the Allied forces to victory. Foch, Pétain, Haig, Pershing, Bliss, Benson, Wemyss, and their like, and we made careful assessments of their views and advice. We were confronted by a situation full of possibilities for harm, full of potentiality for good. It was our task to weigh carefully these military and naval opinions and accept the responsibility for decisions.

"The outstanding problem was to have the terms cover what must be practically unconditional surrender without imperiling peace itself. The military spirit in the United States was at its height during this period, and this feeling could not be ignored. With the Entente, the situation was quite different. They were war-worn and war-weary. They had been bled white. Germany was retreating in an orderly fashion and no one could say with certainty that she would not be able to shorten her line and hold it for months. If she had done this and we had failed to make peace when she had accepted the President's terms there would have been a political revolution in every Allied country save the United States. The people would almost of certainty have overthrown the existing governments and would have placed in power ministers instructed to reopen peace negotiations with Germany upon the basis of the President's fourteen points, and with the offer of more moderate armistice conditions.

"This was all known to us in Paris, and it was as delicate and dangerous a situation as was ever given to a group of diplomats to solve. As it was, the European military and naval advisers were satisfied, and the outcome was the ending of the world war." [1]

Captain Paul Mantoux, then, and later at the Peace Conference, official interpreter, a man with a memory of extraordinary fidelity, throws important light on the views of Marshal Foch, in a letter of July 6, 1920, to Colonel House, from which I quote in part:

"You asked him this question, 'Will you tell us, Marshal, solely from a military point of view and apart from any other consideration,

[1] *The Public Ledger*, November 11, 1920.

whether you would prefer the Germans to reject or sign the armistice as outlined here?'

"Marshal Foch's answer was: 'Fighting means struggling for certain results (on ne fait la guerre que pour ses résultats): if the Germans now sign an armistice under the general conditions we have just determined, those results are in our possession. This being achieved, no man has the right to cause another drop of blood to be shed.' . . .

"One of the prime ministers, I think it was Mr. Lloyd George, asked him what would happen if the Germans refused to sign and how long it would take to drive them back across the Rhine. He answered, opening both arms, a familiar gesture with him, 'Maybe four or five months—who knows?'

"He never alluded to a final blow in the next few days when he brought from Versailles his draft of the military terms of the armistice convention. He simply said this: 'The terms your military advisers are agreed upon are those we should be in a position to enforce after the success of our next operation.' . . .

"Neither the soldiers nor statesmen knew then all we have learned since about the condition of Germany and of the German army. Our losses, which were so great at the end of four years of hostilities, had become particularly heavy during the weeks of intense and continuous fighting and marked the last stage of the war. Apart from purely military considerations, there was in the minds of the statesmen a strong feeling that the populations, after showing themselves ready to accept every sacrifice for a just cause, would never forgive their leaders if they thought the fighting had been prolonged beyond the limits of necessity."

In conclusion, a word on the political clauses of the armistice. That the Entente finally accepted President Wilson's Fourteen Points with one addition and one subtraction, both by the British, is known: how they were induced to accept and incorporate them in the armistice must be told elsewhere. The addition was a requirement that Germany make reparation for damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany at sea and from the air, and not on land only; and this Germany was notified that

President Wilson accepted. The subtraction reserved decision on point two, dealing with the freedom of the seas, on the ground that the phrase "the freedom of the seas" is open to various interpretations, some of which could not be accepted.

In sum, the armistice agreement, concluding the World War, that took effect on the stroke of the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of nineteen hundred and eighteen, constituted a substantial basis for a peace of justice and of healing.

II

THE ATMOSPHERE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

BY CLIVE DAY

As soon as the armistice had put an end to open war and brought peace in sight, people naturally began to speculate on the manner in which the terms of peace would be drawn. The average citizen assumed an august assembly, a sort of Parliament of the World, which would announce the bases of a just and lasting settlement: amended territorial frontiers, reparation of damages, and a revised code of international law. The Allies were united in purpose, and were now at last in a position to translate into fact the ideals which would make the world safe for democracy.

Over against this vague forecast of the man in the street it is interesting to set the picture of the Conference which has been drawn after the event by some of its critics. They picture a melodrama. Here in the gloom meet the three leading actors who determine the whole action of the play. Other figures make their entrances and exits, but serve merely as foils to set off the three great characters. These are heroic figures, great in their abilities and ambitions, but great also in their human weaknesses. The audience cannot hear their voices, which are so low that they do not carry across the footlights, but it follows the course of the plot by their actions. In the last scene the critic conceives force and guile prevailing over the weaknesses of the character who

should have been the hero of the play—evil triumphing over ineffective virtue. The spectator has been assisting at a tragedy.

Between the two accounts of the Conference sketched above, the reader must make his choice according to his taste in fiction. They are both products of the imagination, and are equally valueless for an understanding of what actually happened at Paris. The form of the Conference was greatly affected, without question, by the demand of the public for the spectacular. Each little country that had associated itself with the Allies against the Central Powers, demanded a place for its representatives in a scene adequate in dignity and impressiveness to the World War. Persons skilled in such matters arranged halls at palaces on the Quai d'Orsay and elsewhere with trappings that satisfied the senses; pictures were painted; the cinematograph was allowed to approach the fringe of the assemblies. All this part of the Conference, designed for show, formed a protective shell, within which the vital parts of the organization could function with no regard to appearance, and with no distraction from serious business.

The responsible directors of the Powers at war with Germany had realized from the beginning that a study of the terms of peace could not profitably be made in a debating society. Some of the Powers, for example those of Central America, had made contributions so slight and had interests so little affected, that they would certainly not be asked to share in the preliminary deliberations. Some of the great Powers as certainly must be included. At what point was the line to be drawn? It could readily be seen that France, England, Italy, and the United States would recognize no superior. Was

Belgium or Serbia or Japan to be grouped with them above the others? The decision finally announced by the four major Powers, that they would choose but one additional associate, Japan, inevitably gave rise to heart-burnings, and had a material effect on the terms of settlement. It recognized the practical political influence of Japan and neglected such ideal measures as are expressed in national spirit and sacrifice. At least it allowed the Conference to proceed. Two months had passed since the armistice was signed, and the American delegation had already been waiting a month for the beginning of organized business.

The organ of the Conference thus established by informal negotiation of the great Powers was termed the Council, and followed the model of the Supreme Inter-allied War Council that had been acting on matters of military policy at Versailles during the last part of the war. Two representatives of each of the five great Powers, normally the premier and the foreign minister, composed the body and hence it came to be known as the Council of Ten. For more than two months (January 13 to March 25), the Council was recognized as the official source of authority of the Conference. It called the Plenary Assembly into being, regulated the activities, and when it saw fit reviewed the action of that body. It created commissions to study special subjects in detail and prepare them for the consideration of the Conference. It had to face the questions of fact and policy that rose constantly in central and eastern Europe.

As was to be anticipated, the Council was a somewhat formal body. It conducted itself with the ceremony and solemnity which the world would expect of such a gathering. It had a meeting-place worthy of its dignity, in

the study of the French foreign minister in the palace on the Quai d'Orsay. Double doors on the side of entrance prevented the escape of any sound; high windows on the opposite side looked out on a formal lawn, often drenched with rain or covered with snow. Within, all was luxurious comfort. At one end of the room, with his back to an open fire of great logs, sat the presiding officer, Clemenceau, and near him his colleague Pichon; ranged at little tables on their right and facing them were the other delegates; on their left were secretaries and a place where might be stationed officials or representatives who had to address the Council. A second row of chairs about the room gave a place in the background for special secretaries of the different Powers, and for experts who might thus be readily consulted by their principals. Altogether there might be thirty individuals, more or less, in the room.

Much of the business which occupied the attention of the Council was formal in character. The smaller states, excluded from its deliberations, demanded at least the opportunity to present to it their claims, and many hearings were granted to their representatives. Every one knew that the arguments and facts which they stated would soon be printed, and would be turned over for study to specialists, who would sift them critically and so prepare them for the consideration of the principal representatives. Every one recognized the extravagance and unreality of many of the nationalist demands. To illustrate the artificiality of these proceedings may be cited the occasion on which the claims of Albania to national independence were put before the Council. The Albanians are a people apart, who for centuries have lived a free life in their wild country, and to the present day

have preserved the virtues and defects of a primitive population. Their spokesman before the Council was a broken-down old Turk who had no interest in Albania, who enjoyed no respect or following there, who got his place at Paris because he was willing to sacrifice the aspirations of the Albanians to the ambitions of Italy to extend her power across the Adriatic. He read from a manuscript which had doubtless been prepared for him, and with the contents of which he was certainly not familiar, for he stopped long at every page until he could find the continuation of his sentence on the next. The reading was lifeless, it seemed interminable. "How much longer is this going on?" asked one of the American plenipotentiaries, very audibly, of the interpreter. And all this took place while almost hourly reports were coming in of war, famine, and pestilence in stricken Europe, and while the people of northern Albania itself were fighting a desperate struggle against the harsh Serbs. Surely no greater contrast is conceivable than that between the idle words which filled M. Pichon's luxurious study in the palace on the Quai d'Orsay and the grim reality of life in the mountains of High Albania, where people were being massacred by thousands.

Such scenes as this appeared, to those who were on the spot as well as to those who viewed them from a distance, unprofitable, but they appeared inevitable. The truth is that people demanded of the Conference something of a show. Even though the meetings of the Council were supposed to be secret sessions, and though the subjects considered and action taken were announced to the public, if at all, only by brief and formal statements, still it was some satisfaction to an aspirant people to know that its representatives had appeared before the Council, to be

able later to read the arguments and claims that had been advanced, and to hear something of the manner of their reception.

For spectacles, such as those indicated, the Council was very well fitted. The spectacular, however, is always superficial, and when the Council was called upon for more substantial action, for definite policies, and for vigorous decisions, its weakness became apparent. A survey of the more serious kinds of work which the Conference was called upon to do will make more clear the reasons for a change in its organization.

Some of the questions which came before it for decision did not admit delay. When the term of the armistice expired, the Council must fix the conditions on which it was to be renewed. Marshal Foch was summoned to describe the military situation, and to propose arrangements which would safeguard the interests of the Allies. Throughout central and eastern Europe armies were still in the field, engaged in formal war; the Council must define its attitude toward the interests which they represented, must seek to curb the fighting and to stabilize the political situation. The revolution in Russia presented a whole complex of problems. The Powers found themselves in a labyrinth, in which, turn and twist as they might, they found always the path to the outlet blocked before them. Revolution in Hungary added to their difficulties. Constantly, moreover, they must seek to further the work of salvaging what could be saved from the wreck of Europe. Mr. Hoover would appear before the Council with proposals for relief which involved intricate questions of shipping and finance and raised often also questions of a military and political kind.

The work of the Council cannot be appreciated justly without recognizing the burden of the administrative duties which were imposed upon it. Assembled to draw up terms of peace, it found itself still in the midst of war, and faced by conditions which demanded active treatment if society were to be saved from dissolution. Whether it would or not it had for a time to attempt to govern a large part of Europe, managing affairs which in a modern state are handled by organized departments of foreign affairs, of war, of commerce, of finance. According to general opinion the Council managed this administrative business rather badly. Indeed, there would be occasion for surprise if it had succeeded; even the Council of Four later did not achieve a notable success in this part of its work. Whatever be the critic's judgment on the Conference as an executive he will be unjust if he estimates the merit of its more permanent contributions without taking into account the strain upon its attention of this current business, which constantly distracted it from constructive work.

Besides the questions coming before the Council demanding administrative action, it had, if it were to reach a settlement, to determine problems of two kinds, namely, problems of fact and problems of policy. The principles of settlement had been enunciated by the President, and, with certain modifications, had been accepted both by the Allied Powers and by the Central Powers. Most of these principles, however, were expressed in general terms. Agreement upon them enabled the Powers to stop fighting, but did not enable them to draw up definite terms of peace. What did the President mean, for example, when he said that "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable

lines of nationality? What *were* these lines, which for an indefinite future were to fix the boundaries of Italy and of neighboring states? The President himself would certainly have refused to define them, if he had been asked to draw them on a map. He would have done as he did later when the question of the Armenian frontiers was referred to him for settlement. He would have assembled experts, whose competence and impartiality he trusted, would have told them to study the region and to draw the best line they could, and when he had satisfied himself by discussion and reflection that this line was the best, he would have proposed it for acceptance.

Even this process would have involved not only a determination of the facts in the region in question, but also a decision on questions of policy. Rarely does a single line present all the advantages of a perfect frontier. Even if nationality be made the only criterion, rarely are the lines of nationality so "clearly recognizable" that they may be said to draw themselves, and still more rarely will such lines, if drawn, satisfy the other desiderata expressed or implied in the President's addresses of a just and lasting peace. A decision on the merits of alternative frontiers involves not merely a knowledge of details, but also a judgment on the relative importance of different human interests, and a prophetic insight into the future of man's development.

If it be difficult for a single individual, supplied with all available knowledge and power, to reach a decision in a matter of this kind, imagine how much the difficulty is intensified when several individuals must agree upon the decision, when each has his individual standard of judgment, when some have views which to the others seem clouded or distorted by individual interests. If

agreement is to be reached in these circumstances, it will almost certainly be by a process of compromise, in which A yields his position at one part of the frontier, to get the adherence of B to his line at another part, or A yields his line entire in one part of the world, to get B to accept his line in a distant region. This process of barter is, of course, offensive to the idealist. When the result is analyzed in detail many perversions of justice will appear. The result must be judged as a whole, if it is to be judged fairly. And the critic must also consider not whether the actual decision is as good as one which he might propose, but whether it is better than no decision at all.

For the determination of matters of fact the Council of Ten was manifestly ill adapted. It lacked the technical preparation and intimate acquaintance with detail which were needed for the effective investigation of facts in the many parts of its great field. The Council of Ten proved also unfitted to settle the serious questions of policy, which involved both its administrative and its legislative functions. It could not follow a definite plan in dealing with Russian problems, and it could not clear the way for a settlement of the fundamental territorial and economic problems, until the great Powers had arrived at a common understanding on the issues in which there was a grave divergence of view. M. Pichon's study offered a noble setting for a spectacle, but considered as an office for the conduct of practical business it was a failure.

There were too many people in the room. Secretaries and specialists served a useful purpose in the eyes of their principals, but to the eyes of the principals of other countries they appeared as a crowd of hangers-on, unknown

to them personally, possibly dishonest or indiscreet, before whom the principals were not inclined to discuss delicate questions with the entire candor that the situation demanded.

There were too many states represented in the Council. The Japanese delegates were diligent in attendance, and (unlike some others) kept their eyes open, however tedious were the proceedings. When a territorial question was under discussion they peered at their maps with inscrutable gravity. One never knew, however, whether their maps were right side up, and one felt pretty certain, anyway, that it made no difference whether they were or not. The Japanese were not interested in the European questions that composed most of the business. Nor were the Italians equally concerned in all parts of the field. Keenly, sometimes passionately, interested in questions that touched Italy directly, they were complaisant and sometimes almost indifferent when the topic was remote.

There were too many delegates apportioned to each state. The panel system allowed substitutions and a shifting membership, by which individuals were granted the compliment of a seat at the Council, but by which the compactness and the continuity of the Council itself were impaired. Normally the chief of each state was accompanied to the Council meetings by his foreign minister. The arrangement assumed an equality of the two officials which did not in fact exist. The comparison involves no question of the actual merit and ability of the foreign ministers. Sonnino was probably a stronger man than his principal, Orlando, more determined than he to press Italian demands, and certainly better equipped for the business in that he could urge his claims in French or

English with equal facility. "Which language shall I speak?" he inquired on one occasion; "it is all the same to me." Balfour appeared, unfortunately, to think that he shared this advantage, but even when he talked French, he presented ideas that were always interesting, if they sometimes inclined to the abstract and doctrinaire. It was a pleasure to hear him analyze and criticise the notion of "autonomy," when that vague concept had crept into the discussion. No one could surpass Lansing in the logic and force with which he could present a legal argument. But ability, even first-rate ability, did not count when it was in the second place in the delegation. Lansing might convince every one else in the room, but if he did not convince Wilson, who had given him his place and who himself was (in the words to the treaty) "acting in his own name and by his own proper authority," his argument profited nothing; it hindered, rather than helped, the progress of deliberation. An observer got the impression that in fact the principal representatives of the American and British delegations were less open to suggestions from their foreign ministers than to those that came from any other source; they appeared openly to resist any appearance of dependence on their colleagues. As to Clemenceau, he did not allow the existence of Pichon to inconvenience him in the slightest degree; he used him and abused him without any recognition of the distinction.

The Council of Ten recognized early that it was not qualified to investigate the intricate facts which underlay most of its problems. Within a fortnight after its opening session it began therefore to establish special commissions, to which it referred questions as they arose, for preliminary study and report. For example, after

hearing the claims advanced by the Rumanian representative the Council voted: "The questions raised by the declarations of M. Bratianu on the territorial interests of the Rumanians in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination, in the first instance, to a committee of specialists composed of two delegates for each of the following Powers: the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Italy. The duty of this committee will be to study the questions to be settled, to condense them in as narrow limits as possible and to propose a solution for an equitable settlement. This committee may hear representatives of the peoples concerned."

The advantage of this process, by which the supreme organ of the Conference was relieved of the preliminary processes of investigation and discussion, and could devote itself to the decision of the larger questions, was obvious. Commissions grew rapidly in number. According to the calculation of André Tardieu, fifty-two of them were at work before the treaty with Germany was signed, and these fifty-two commissions held, altogether, one thousand six hundred and forty-six sessions. Dispersed and secluded, these commissions attracted in general little attention. They had no proper authority except that of recommendation. They had, in fact, immense influence on the outcome of the Conference. Without them the terms of peace would certainly have been very different, if indeed they could have been written at all.

Some of these commissions were intrusted with questions so important that their contributions to the settlement appear positively greater than those of the Council of Ten itself. At the head of the list comes, of course,

the commission on the League of Nations. The body which formulated the Covenant of the League had a membership which (unlike that of the Council) was not fixed by any official convention, but was determined by a more personal standard. Under the presidency of Wilson it reached out to include great men of the small Powers, such as Venizelos of Greece and Dmowski of Poland, and men who are recognized as intellectual and moral leaders in the greatest empires, like Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, and Leon Bourgeois. If the opinions of those who believe in the future of the League of Nations are to be trusted, the work done by this commission in its sessions at the Hotel Crillon, is destined to be more fruitful, if at the time it seems less decisive, than that accomplished by any other organ of the Conference. Another commission, whose work was essentially constructive, was that on International Legislation on Labor, including such representative spokesmen on the broad and difficult problems that it covered as Gompers of the United States, Barnes of England, and Vandervelde of Belgium. Other commissions studied the reform of international commercial relations, in the case of customs tariffs, shipping regulations, waterways, and railroads. Every student of the history of commerce knows how seriously the world has suffered from the perversions of policy in these matters, and will recognize in the lists of members of the commissions some of the names of those most competent to initiate reform.

Two commissions, those on reparations and on financial questions, occupy a place apart by reason of the peculiar gravity of the questions intrusted to them. Some of the ablest men in banking and in business, some leaders from the academic and some from the official

world, were associated in these commissions in the endeavor to determine the damages inflicted on the people of the Allied countries in the war, to decide upon the measure and means of reparation, and to manage the financial questions that were incidental to the restoration of peace. Finally, a whole group of commissions was established to study the territorial questions involved in the peace settlement, with a central committee above them to correlate their work. To these territorial commissions the European states contributed mainly men trained in their foreign offices and in their diplomatic corps; the British Government complimented some of its colonial premiers with seats, and the United States was ordinarily represented by college professors, and the like, who, as members of the The Inquiry, had been studying the special questions with a view to the eventual discussion of terms of peace.

The commissions varied greatly in size. The four great Western Powers had always one or two representatives apiece; Japan had a seat on those commissions in the work of which it felt a particular interest, and other Powers had seats on the larger commissions. Procedure resembled that of the Council. Members sat about a table in designated places, and spoke on any topic in an order fixed by the alphabetical arrangement of countries; all the important commissions had the usual apparatus of secretaries, interpreter, and stenographer, and printed in their minutes the substance of the discussion. Some of the sessions were formal; one of the Powers would introduce an expert to present a studied argument, or representatives of outside interests would be heard. Most of the sessions were distinctly practical and businesslike. The field of interest was specific and limited,

and each state had picked for its members those who were thought to be most competent to represent it in that field. Views of the facts and of the proper settlement usually varied greatly when they were first presented. Discussion and criticism often cleared away mistakes and misunderstandings, and led to an agreement based on genuine conviction. Sometimes they did no more than to define more sharply the differences, but also served to suggest some compromise on which both parties could agree if neither could have his own way. Sometimes, particularly when facts were obscure and interests sharply divergent, agreement proved to be impossible, and the commission would have to submit a divided report.

The commissions had necessarily not merely to determine facts, but also to decide questions of policy in working out their problems. Representatives of some of the European Powers, notably Italy, were bound by strict instructions, which required them to work for a particular solution; their policy was determined by powers above. Delegates of the United States were notably free from such influence; they could share with their plenipotentiaries the responsibility for choosing a certain course, but were encouraged in general to make their own decisions, with a view to the facts in their own field, and with little regard to outside influences. As time passed and the need of reaching some definite conclusion grew more urgent, the process of compromise became prominent as a means of adjusting differences of opinion which would not yield to argument.

The final stage in the work of a commission was occupied with the preparation of its report. This gave in condensed form the salient facts, the principles followed, and the conclusions reached. Its most important con-

tent was a series of draft articles, embodying the results of the deliberations, and proposed for inclusion in the treaty of peace. The commission drew up these articles with the greatest care, and with the assistance of specialists skilled in drafting. The leader of these specialists, M. Fromageot, declared modestly that he was a mere "machine à écrire," to be employed by the commission in recording its results, but he early gave evidence of a feature not common in typewriters; the machine locked if one attempted to write with it anything that was not perfectly clear and specific. These draft articles supplied the materials with which the treaties were built up. Only in rare cases were amendments or additions made by some superior organ of the Conference.

The establishment of the commissions relieved the Council of Ten of a considerable part of the business which it would otherwise have had to conduct, but did not improve its capacity to deal with the problems that remained within its province. The weakness of the Council became actually more apparent as it ceased to be occupied with minor matters and ceremonial audiences, and faced at closer range the great questions that were beginning to take shape. Only one of the questions, that relating to the eastern frontier of Germany and the Polish outlet by way of Danzig, actually came before the Council for settlement. In the background, however, were other questions even more serious: the amount and form of the reparation payments, the position of France on the Rhine frontier, the claims of Italy in the Adriatic region and of Japan in the Far East. Some of the questions were being debated in commissions, some were discussed only in private conferences. They affected such grave interests, and they were so entangled with each other and with the position to be accorded the League of

Nations, that they must be settled before the Conference could proceed to frame terms of peace; but they were questions too difficult and too delicate to be intrusted to the Council of Ten. The Council, established as the supreme power of the Conference, appeared now as an obstacle blocking the way. It was set aside in the summary and informal manner which characterized all the vital acts of the Conference. Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando ceased to attend the sessions of the Council of Ten and met as a group by themselves. The Council of Four took control of the Conference.

Events had in fact long been tending toward this consummation. During the second month of the Conference, the heads of the three most important Powers had been absent from the Council. Lloyd George was occupied in England by questions of domestic politics; Wilson was absent from February 14 on his trip to America; and Clemenceau was shot on February 19. The Council of Ten had an opportunity to realize how helpless it was to reach decisions without the individuals in whom authority and power centred. The Council continued its sessions with representatives replacing the absent members, but did little more than mark time. The serious business of this period was conducted either in the commissions or over the telegraph wires and in private conversations at Paris. When the representation of the heads of states was completed again by the return of Wilson on March 14, the practice of private conference persisted. The three weeks following were a critical period, culminating in the announcement from Wilson on April 7 that preparations had been made for him to leave France. Following on the arrangement of the differences between Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George, which permitted the settlement of terms of the German treaty, came the Adri-

atic crisis and the departure of the Italians for Rome on April 24. To submit to the old Council of Ten the points which divided the great Powers in this period would have been an idle form. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando were bound by considerations of home politics to fight for certain terms of settlement which they had given their peoples reason to expect. Wilson was bound to fight for terms conforming to the principles which he had published. Agreement was possible only by way of compromise. Compromise was possible only as each individual became convinced that he was getting the most he could, and that what he got was better than the nothing which would ensue if he declined altogether to agree. He might hope for guidance in this matter by solitary reflection or by intimate discussion with personal advisers, but he could hope for no help from the formal arguments, the platitudes, the sedulous shrinking from the facts, which would have characterized a discussion of the subject in the old Council of Ten. No one in that body at this stage of action would have dared to tell the truth. His fragment of truth would have been quoted, and would have appeared to half the world as a monstrous perversion. An attempt to realize at this time the ideal of "open covenants openly arrived at" might readily have started another war, and would certainly have delayed interminably the agreement on terms of peace.

Lacking the chiefs of state, the old Council lost its former prestige and authority. It continued to sit now as a Council of Five and did useful work as a sort of superior commission, considering the reports of the commissions which it had created and transmitting them with its findings to the Four. It bore itself with dignity in a situation which was not agreeable. If the Five did nothing definitive, at least they did it very well. Of the

sessions, however, which I was privileged to attend, there was but one in which I noted on the part of the Five a real relish for the work in hand. The Four, busied with matters of greater moment, had directed the Five to send a telegram ordering two of the Allies to remove their troops from a district in central Europe where they were in conflict. The action proposed appeared ill-advised. Further, was it a duty of the Five to send telegrams for their superiors? "We are not messenger-boys," remarked one of the plenipotentiaries. At last a subject had arisen on which the Council of Five could express itself with some decision; and it considered the manner in which the Four had best be corrected with a zest that at other times was lacking.

An indication of the relative activity of the different councils is afforded by the statistics compiled by Tardieu. The Council of Ten held seventy-two sessions, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ("the Five") held thirty-nine sessions, the Council of Four held one hundred and forty-five sessions. In comparison with this last and smallest council the others fade into insignificance. The Ten fell into the background, the Five never emerged from obscurity, the Four ruled the Conference in the culminating period when its decisions took shape.

The Council of Four had begun in purely personal and informal conversations, and preserved its privacy in many of its later sessions. It needed at most the service of an interpreter, and of a secretary who could be called to make in due form a minute of some decision. To assume on this account, however, as some have done, that the treaties were drawn by the four heads of states and that the terms were fixed by these four individuals, is an extraordinary perversion of the facts.

Most of the articles in the treaties were taken bodily

without change from the reports of commissions. Some serious problems, it is true, notably those relating to the Italian frontier, had not been referred to any commission; decision on these problems was reached in the private sessions of the Four. Further, there were questions of policy in the field of the commissions which were too grave to be definitely settled by them, and which were still in flux when the Four were ready to hear and act upon their reports. Doubtless the Four discussed these matters in their secret sessions, and they sometimes decided them there. On the other hand, they followed often the practice of bidding their special advisers to attend the session, as the Council of Ten had done, inviting suggestions from their advisers as the question was discussed, and frankly relying upon their guidance in the effort to arrange the best settlement. At these later meetings in the beautiful salon of the President's residence, the attending delegates from the commissions were indeed given a position of far greater prominence than was ever conceded them at the sessions of the Council of Ten. They were called from the back row of chairs to seats immediately by their principals, and conferred openly with them.

It is impossible to apportion exactly the influence on the final settlement of the many individuals and groups who contributed to it. The critic of the proceedings was inclined at the time, and is still inclined, to take for granted the terms which were fixed by the commissions, and to direct his attention to those questions which had not been studied, or at least had not been settled, in the commissions, or the settlement of which was revised in the Council of Four. Judging the matter from this standpoint, he exalts the power of the Four, and ascribes to

them all the credit or blame for the treaties. In truth the Four did take to themselves the responsibility of decision. They had the courage to determine one question in comparison with which any other question seems a matter of detail: they decided that there should be a treaty ready for the signature of the Germans at a date pretty definitely fixed. Their power to determine just what the terms of that treaty should be is commonly much exaggerated.

Even those parts of the final settlement which had not been fixed in finished form by the commissions had been studied and discussed for months by experts officially designated to investigate them. No question was absolutely decided by this process. No question could be subjected to this process, however, without a narrowing of the field of choice in which the final decision was likely to lie. The representative of a great Power had every reason to follow the guidance of his expert advisers, and would depart from it only in the rare cases in which considerations of higher policy, concealed from his subordinates, made a sacrifice in one part of the field appear to him the inevitable means of gaining a greater benefit in another part. Cases of this kind were, at least as regards the American representative, extraordinarily few.

It is interesting to speculate on the concealed activities of the Council of Four, and particularly on the interplay of the personalities of its members. If one can judge from the impressions obtained in council meetings which were open to observation, Orlando must have played a relatively subordinate part in the general settlement. It seems equally clear that no one of the remaining three dominated the group. If one could have dominated by a dauntless will, it would certainly have been Clemenceau.

If shrewd management and ingenuity in devising practicable plans had been enough to assure control, the leadership would have gone to Lloyd George. If ability to define and defend the aim to be kept in view had been the essential quality, no one in that respect matched the American President. No one of the three had, in fact, his own way. Each has been criticised because he got less than was expected of him. Wilson is of the three the one most blamed, yet time may prove, as I believe it will, that his generous devotion to ideals of the future contributed the most positive and most permanent features of the settlement. Sufficient time has already passed to show that some features which he opposed are bad, and further to make clear that these features are the expression of deep-rooted national prejudices, against which even now reason cannot combat.

Years more will pass before real peace actually prevails. The war released blind forces in all fields of human interest, and the Powers of the world were as helpless in 1919 to compose these forces as they had been in 1914 and are now in 1921. No human peace conference could have relieved us of all these present evils. The Conference at Paris was eminently human, and the critic can readily point out features of its organization and of its operation which in a different and a better world would have been better managed. This much, at least, he must recognize. When compared with similar bodies in the past, such as the Congress of Vienna or the Congress of Berlin, the Paris Conference faced vastly greater problems, studied its problems in a more scientific way, and sought more earnestly to harmonize its settlement with the principles of justice.

III

THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY

BY CHARLES HOMER HASKINS

The new frontiers of Germany constituted one of the fundamental and one of the most troublesome problems of the peace conference of Paris. About them waged the conflict of ideas between a peace of justice and a peace of violence, and in them are illustrated the chief difficulties which arose in giving effect to the peace of justice which the conference sought to establish. They meant the release of submerged nationalities like the Danes of Schleswig, and the undoing of ancient wrongs like the partition of Poland, or recent acts of force like the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. They involved the question of the best kind of national boundaries and the meaning and limits of self-determination. Territorial in their nature, they were also tied up with matters of reparation, customs zones, national defense, and guarantees for the future. Though the provisions fixing new frontiers occupy less than one-fourth of the Treaty of Versailles, such matters underlie the whole settlement, and their history would cover a large part of the history of the conference.

Fortunately for our present purpose, all this can be shortened and simplified. Let us take a brief view of the general problem and then go on to a survey of Germany's new boundaries in the west. The eastern or Polish frontier is a topic by itself, and will be discussed in another chapter.[1]

[1] See Chapter IV.

The German Empire dates only from 1871, but its constituent parts have a long history. Its chief member was the kingdom of Prussia, which contained at the outbreak of the war three-fifths of the empire's area and population. Prussia had spread in all directions, and, save in Alsace-Lorraine, which belonged to the whole empire, the frontier problems both in the east and in the west were all concerned with Prussia. It was Prussia that had partitioned Poland, that had swallowed up the Left Bank of the Rhine in 1815, that had seized Schleswig-Holstein in 1864. Nearly half the area of Prussia had been acquired since Frederick the Great. It was Prussia that dominated the empire, and it was the Prussian king who, as German emperor, had declared the war. It was not surprising that there were those who urged that Prussia should lose the fruits of a long career of military aggrandizement and be reduced to the limits she had occupied in the eighteenth century or even earlier.

Now, if the conference of Paris had been the congress of Vienna of a hundred years before, it would have proceeded to carve large slices out of Prussia for the benefit of the victorious Allies, just as Prussia had done for her own benefit at the earlier congress. But the world had moved since 1815, most rapidly of all since 1914, and a peace of the older sort no longer accorded with the common moral sense of mankind. Moreover, the Allies had accepted as the basis of the peace the Fourteen Points and other utterances of President Wilson, and these, while providing specifically for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, had condemned the bartering of peoples from sovereignty to sovereignty without their consent, while at the same time they upheld the principle

of self-determination, which Germany had so conspicuously violated in the past. The carving up of Prussia was impossible, not because the Prussian Government did not deserve it, but because her peoples would oppose it, and in our time it is peoples that count. The righting of historic wrongs may easily cause greater wrongs when men have become reconciled to the conditions once wrongly established, and the conference was cautious about reaching back far into the past to correct old acts of injustice. It reached farthest, as regards Germany, in the case of Poland, and here the reason was not so much that a wrong had been done in the eighteenth century as that the Poles continued to cry out against this wrong and resist it. In the west none of the changes made by the treaty reached back farther than 1814.

The conference even declined to compel the division of Prussia into several states within the German Empire. For such a division there was a good deal to be said. The German Empire pretended to be a confederation, yet this one state could outvote and outmanœuvre all the others; there was inequality everywhere. If Hanover and Westphalia and the Rhineland had been set off as separate federal states, the empire would have been more truly federal, and the diverse interests of the western regions would have had some chance to express themselves. For some weeks just after the armistice a little encouragement from the Allies might have accomplished this result at the hands of the Germans themselves; but the encouragement was not forthcoming, at least from England and the United States, and the slight local movements in this direction proved abortive. Anything of this sort was thought to involve meddling in Germany's internal affairs, and the worst feature of Prussia's

anomalous position had been removed with the flight and abdication of the Hohenzollerns. With no king and no emperor, Prussia seemed less dangerous, and there was a disposition, especially in England and the United States, to deal gently with a Germany which professed democracy and repentance.

In western Germany the conference used the knife very sparingly and only after careful local diagnosis. Alsace-Lorraine was the only major operation, and that was really performed by the armistice. But the patient will often suffer much pain from a surface wound, and make more complaint over it than over a deep incision. Although the Germans had contemptuously refused the self-determination which they had promised the Danes in 1866, although they had ignored the unanimous protest of the deputies of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, in 1919 they became suddenly enamored of self-determination as they now interpreted it. As they explained this principle, none of the alien peoples could get out of the empire without a popular vote, whereas the application of such a vote to its German-speaking inhabitants, outside of Alsace-Lorraine, was not self-determination but conquest. They even retorted that the Allies ought to apply self-determination to their own ancient conquests, not only in Ireland and Egypt, but in Canada and Cuba and the Philippines. I have a German map, issued during the conference, which even represented Florida and Texas as wild buffaloes straining to get loose from the brutal lasso of the United States!

Whatever happened at Paris the Germans were sure not to be pleased with it. A good deal of false sympathy has been wasted on the penitent German of 1919 who had failed to wreak his will in annexations and indemnities

on a defeated Europe, and who, if measured by his own standards, certainly got off very easily at Paris. What a victorious Germany would do in the east was seen, less than a year before the armistice, in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. What she would have done in the west is, fortunately, exemplified in no such document, but her ambitions were stated in Pan-German and semi-official form throughout the war, and an official formulation of 1917 has recently been revealed in the "War Memories" of Ludendorff,[1] including a huge war indemnity from France, a protectorate over Belgium, "strategic and economic rectification" of the French frontier, which was another name for the seizure of the iron-mines of Briey and Longwy and unconquered border fortresses like Verdun. This was the least for which Germany hoped, and victory on the Marne or the Somme or at Verdun might have meant far more. In the face of the German war aims the Allies might well be astonished at their own moderation. Accepting at the armistice the principles proposed by the American president, they exacted no indemnity, enforced only moderate restorations, nearly all of them definitely agreed to by Germany in advance, and preserved the unity of an empire founded by force and conquest. The world had certainly moved since Vienna—it had even moved far since Brest-Litovsk and the German terms of 1917. And the most decisive element in that advance had been furnished by the United States, both through its military aid in the war and through its insistence on a peace of justice as the best preventive of future wars of revenge.

The western frontiers of Germany include the problems of Schleswig, the Belgian border, Luxemburg, Alsace-

[1] I, p. 320 (London, 1920).

Lorraine, the Left Bank of the Rhine, and the Saar valley. Let us review them briefly in this order.[1]

Schleswig

The new boundary between Germany and Denmark was one of the simplest problems presented to the conference and one which most readily reached a just solution. Like every region on the circumference of the German Empire this had been an area of dispute for many centuries, the dispute being settled in Germany's favor by the war with Denmark in 1864 and the subsequent annexation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia. A clause was inserted in the treaty of 1866 that the "inhabitants of North Schleswig shall be again united with Denmark if they should express such a desire by a vote freely given." This promise Prussia never made any pretense of carrying out, and while Denmark had not joined in the Great War, the conference lent a sympathetic ear to her claims for justice. The treaty provided for a popular vote by zones under an international commission, and the result of these votes, held in the spring of 1920, was to give the northern zone to Denmark and the southern to Germany. It was originally proposed to have a third zone which included territory farther to the south, but the Danish Government was timid on this point, fearing lest the thrifty farmers might try to vote themselves out of the German Empire to escape the fiscal burdens left by the war, only to form a recalcitrant German-speaking minority as soon as they got into Denmark. Such fears proved groundless, for the voting followed linguistic rather than economic lines,

[1] For a fuller discussion of these matters, see Haskins and Lord, "Some Problems of the Peace Conference" (Cambridge, 1920), Chaps. II–IV.

and Danish influence in the middle zone was probably weakened by the elimination of the southern zone from the plebiscite.

The Schleswig clauses of the treaty were elaborated by a commission of ten, which, starting from the principle of determination by popular vote, had merely to work out the method and extent of its application. Delegations were heard from Denmark and from the disputed territory. The general policy of the commission, which was unanimous on all its recommendations, was to make the popular consultation as broad and fair as possible, even to the extent of allowing a vote in the third zone, which was finally stricken from the treaty. The basis of the settlement has generally been regarded as just, and the final elimination of this question from the field of controversy may well be viewed as one of the distinct triumphs of the conference.

Belgium

The Belgian frontier, which raised less important issues than the Danish, was handled by the same commission. Here Prussia's annexations had been made in 1815, and she had recently used them to prepare her attack on Belgium's neutrality by building strategic railways through a sparsely inhabited region and by constructing a great military camp at Elsenborn, near the Belgian border. Some thousands of the inhabitants continued to speak French, and the whole region was closely connected with Belgium. By the treaty the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, with a population of 61,000, as well as the minute border territory of Moresnet, which had been ruled jointly by Belgium and Prussia, were handed over to Belgium, partly on the score of

reparation and of security against future attack. The interests of the people were covered very vaguely by a clause which required the Belgian Government to open registers in which written protests might be made by such inhabitants as opposed the cession. This was the provision of the first draft, but, on the initiative of its two American members, the commission of June 7 unanimously recommended a modification, so that the duty of securing a free and secret expression of the desires of the population should fall to delegates of the League of Nations rather than to the government immediately interested. Unfortunately, this change failed of embodiment in the final draft of the treaty. The result was a dispute in which Germany has accused the Belgians of keeping the registers in such a way as to avoid protests and intimidate protestants, and Belgium has accused the German Government of exerting local pressure; but the Council of the League of Nations, to which the Germans appealed, rightly decided that it had no jurisdiction to interfere. I have no first-hand knowledge of the merits of this dispute, but under the procedure recommended by the Paris commission the Germans would have had no excuse for their protest, and the Belgian title would have escaped any possible question in the future.

In general, this change of frontier was of minor importance for Belgium, whose interests at the conference were concerned rather with reparation and with her relations to Holland.

Luxemburg

In the case of the grand duchy of Luxemburg the only problem concerned the customs frontier, not the political boundary. It is a quaint bit of Old World life, this di-

minutive state of a thousand square miles and 260,000 inhabitants, with its ancient castles and its modern blast-furnaces, with its independent grand duchess and its people whose national song expresses their desire to "remain what they are." Situated between Germany and France, in a position of great strategic importance, so small a state must inevitably gravitate in one direction or the other, and until the armistice it gravitated toward Germany. Its dynasty was German, its railroads were German, it was a member of the German customs union. At the outbreak of the war Germany violated its neutrality, which she had promised by treaty to respect, and seized its railways for use against France and Belgium, though she was bound by treaty not to use them for military purposes. Indeed, Luxemburg was the vital connection between the two wings of the German army in their invasion of France. German princes and generals were well received by the reigning duchess, and throughout the war Luxemburg was swallowed up in Germany and cut off from the outside world, while popular leaders, like Prüm, languished in German prisons. No wonder the Germans were not allowed to keep the railroads which they had turned from their proper purposes, no wonder the Luxemburgers denounced the customs union with their defeated neighbors. This the peace treaty confirmed, and this was all that it required. Some months thereafter, after a sharp campaign between Belgian and French interests, the people, by this time under a new grand duchess, voted for a customs union with France.

Alsace-Lorraine

Alsace-Lorraine took little of the time of the peace conference. This would have seemed strange at any time

during the war or the generation which preceded it, for Alsace-Lorraine was an open wound which, in President Wilson's phrase, "had unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years." It was not a direct cause of the war, but it became a burning issue as soon as the war broke forth, and it remained one of the chief obstacles to any peace of compromise. But the problem of Alsace-Lorraine was settled by the Allied victory and evacuation required by the armistice, and these military acts were sealed by the enthusiastic reception of the French troops immediately thereafter. There was no way of reopening the question at the conference, for the Germans had accepted President Wilson's eighth point requiring that the wrong done to France should be righted, and by their enforced evacuation they were no longer in a position to delay or to interfere.

Nevertheless at Versailles Germany put up a last fight for the retention of these territories, tied up as they were with Germany's imperial tradition, with her strategic position, and with her supply of iron ore. She demanded that there should be a popular vote. For this there was no legal ground, the language of President Wilson speaking only of the wrong done to France, and the armistice having assimilated Alsace-Lorraine to other occupied territories. Nor could Germany point to her past record as justification, for she had gone directly in the face of popular opinion in 1871, expressed most formally in the protests of the representatives of these three departments in the French Chamber at Bordeaux, and had from that time on refused any popular consultation on the question. But consistency was not an obstacle in the Germany of 1919, and a referendum was her last hope.

To this the French objected on principle, declining to

recognize the rightness of the act of 1871 by any form of voting to undo it. There were also grave practical objections of justice because of the emigration of perhaps a half million Alsatians and the incoming of nearly as many Germans from beyond the Rhine, quite apart from the effects of war in a region whose man-power had been ruthlessly sacrificed for German imperialism. No immediate plebiscite could be just, and any postponement in this particular region might work even greater wrong. Perhaps the French would have been wise to call a large representative assembly by which some formal expression of opinion might have been made and later objections thus forestalled.

Since the signing of the treaty the secret propaganda of the German Heimatdienst has been active in Alsace-Lorraine, keeping alive German feeling where it still exists and in particular fomenting a so-called Neutralist movement for the separation of this region as a neutralized state under the protection of the League of Nations. Propaganda of this sort has begun to appear in American newspapers, and should be received with the caution with which we learned to treat German propaganda during the war. It is amusing to hear from such sources of a "national" movement in Alsace-Lorraine; for this region, chiefly German in speech, has no traditions of separate life or national independence, and was not even allowed by the Germans to become a federal state of their empire. Whatever the strength of any movement for autonomy, it is in no proper sense "national."

With the major question of the return of the lost provinces to France settled in advance, the Paris conference had only to deal with matters of detail, such as naturally arise in a retrocession from one country to another. A

draft of such clauses was submitted by the French and referred by the council of four to the special committee of three, Messrs. Tardieu, Headlam-Morley, and Haskins, which had already been at work on the Saar valley. The clauses were examined point by point by economic and legal experts, and various modifications were introduced in detail with reference to other portions of the treaty. The clauses respecting citizenship are particularly complicated, and much depends upon the spirit of liberality with which these and the economic clauses are interpreted by the French administration. One of the matters which occasioned most debate was the relation between the port of Strasburg and that of Kehl, across the Rhine in Baden, for the Germans were understood to have retarded the natural development of Strasburg to the advantage of Kehl, and several years would be required to bring the facilities on the Alsatian side forward to a corresponding point. It was finally decided to place the two ports together for seven years, to be extended, if necessary, for three years longer, with a free zone in each port, under the international authority of the Central Rhine Commission, whose control over the Rhine was given a more international character by the treaty. In the discussion over the port of Kehl one of the American advisers remarked to a French minister: "The simplest solution would be for you to dig a new channel for the Rhine east of Kehl, which would then be permanently united with the Left Bank!" The minister took the suggestion seriously and needed to be privately informed of the danger of misunderstanding the American form of humor.

The Left Bank

So far the boundary changes considered have been relatively simple, the moving of a line backward or forward on the map, followed by all the machinery of governmental administration. When we come to the questions of the Left Bank and the Saar we meet with various proposals for separating the economic and military from the political frontier and for introducing elements of international control over regions in some measure internationalized.

By the Left Bank of the Rhine is commonly meant the territory of the German Empire lying west of the river between Alsace-Lorraine and the Dutch frontier, in all about ten thousand square miles with five and a half million inhabitants—about the same number as the State of Illinois. The greater part of this territory belongs to Prussia, which acquired it from the French in 1814, while the French themselves had first taken it, with some minor exceptions, from its many previous lords only twenty years earlier. It is a great industrial region, not unlike Pennsylvania. It was also a military region, rich in munition factories and fortresses and strategic railroads planned to support German military enterprises to the westward. And it is a thoroughly German region in speech and government and economic life, closely bound to the lands beyond the Rhine.

France had shown interest in the Left Bank in the early days of the war, and it formed the subject of a secret agreement with the Czar's government in February, 1917. Downright and immediate annexation was not commonly proposed, but many desired ultimate annexation, prepared by military and economic control. Thus

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the agreement with Russia required the complete separation of the Left Bank from Germany as an autonomous and neutral state, to be occupied by French troops until all the terms of the final treaty of peace had been fulfilled. It was expected that this occupation would be long, and the buffer state might remain in the French customs union still longer, with perhaps a favorable plebiscite for permanent union with France. In other words, the political frontier of France remaining for the present very much as before, its economic and military frontiers were to be advanced to the Rhine. Part of this policy was traditional interest in the region of the Rhine, part of it was plain imperialism, economic or political, but much was legitimate self-defense on the part of France against German invasion. Such a programme had much support in France during the conference, and it gained prestige from its strong advocacy by Marshal Foch, commander-in-chief of the victorious Allies. His plan, as sketched just after the armistice, comprised the moving of the German frontier back to the Rhine, an independent régime for the Left Bank, and the occupation of the Rhine bridges until the full execution of the terms of peace. Such a plan was approved, before the opening of the peace conference, by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the French Chamber.

The idea of a separate buffer state had never been accepted by England; indeed, English approval had been publicly withheld by Mr. Balfour in 1917, and Mr. Lloyd-George had frequently repeated: "We must not make another Alsace-Lorraine." The creation of such a state was consistently opposed by the United States as contrary to the best interests of the population and the conditions of the armistice and as a source of future

wars. To the French, on the other hand, some special military guarantee on the Left Bank seemed an essential part of the peace which had been won at such terrible cost. Twice within half a century Germany had invaded France, and it was a universal French demand that this should be prevented for the future. Granting that Germany was the larger and more populous country, the only defense seemed to push back her favorite field of concentration and to meet her by an advanced line before she could reach the French and Belgian border. More than once it was pointed out that England was protected by the sea, all the more since the surrender of the German fleet, and America by the Atlantic Ocean, but that France was exposed to the full first shock of German attack. The defense of the Rhine, it was argued, concerned not merely France but western civilization. If the League of Nations was mentioned, the futility of the Hague tribunal was called to mind, as well as the vain attempts at mediation in 1914. At best, its action would be slow, and France might be overwhelmed in the interval. Inter-Allied control of the Rhine bridges might be a sufficient precaution, as was urged in a brilliant French memoir of February 25, 1919, but that inevitably carried with it a certain degree of separation of the Left Bank from Germany.

This debate, one of the most fundamental of the peace conference, lasted off and on for six months. The negotiations have been traced from a French point of view by M. Tardieu,[1] one of the participants who was responsible for several able memoirs in which the French argument was set forth. Nothing has been printed by the British or American negotiators, and as the matter was

[1] *L'Illustration*, February 14, 1920.

handled by a small group of plenipotentiaries, their part of the story must be awaited. Both sides were firm, and the result was a compromise. France gave up the separate state of the Left Bank but secured occupation by an inter-Allied force for fifteen years as a guarantee of execution of the treaty. In return Great Britain and the United States offered to come to the aid of France in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany, an agreement, however, which was valid only if ratified by both countries, and the United States Senate has not yet ratified it. On one set of provisions there was no essential difference of opinion, the demilitarization of the Left Bank. Germany agrees to maintain no fortifications west of the Rhine or in a zone of fifty kilometres to the east thereof, and to assemble no armed forces in this whole region; any violation of these provisions shall be regarded as a hostile act against the signatory powers and "as calculated to disturb the peace of the world." Accordingly Germany's military frontier now lies fifty kilometres east of the Rhine; her political and economic frontiers remain unchanged, save for the control of Rhine navigation by an international commission, and subject temporarily to the occupation of the Left Bank and the Rhine bridge-heads as a guarantee of executing the treaty she has signed. Another temporary change in the Saar valley will be considered later.

The result failed to satisfy extremists of either sort. Marshal Foch stood out for the separation of the Left Bank and opposed the final settlement as inadequate in a plenary session of the conference, May 6, which was not reported in the press. This view of the necessity of geographical and military, as opposed to political and preventive, guarantees has naturally had many advocates

in France with the failure of the United States to accept the special treaty. Opponents of M. Clemenceau have insisted that this tenacious negotiator yielded too much to England and the United States. On the other hand, radical critics of the peace held up their hands at what they called a military alliance of these countries with France, overlooking the very significant point that assistance was to be given only in case of an *unprovoked* attack. If France provokes the attack she goes alone. If Germany without provocation attacks France, she repeats the aggression of 1914 and brings on a general war. The mere existence of such an obligation would have prevented war in 1914; if ratified, its existence ought to prevent such a war again. By this time the world ought to have learned that the Franco-German frontier is not merely a local question but an international matter, for peace between France and Germany is a condition of world peace. It is well known that there is an important group in Germany whose declared object is a new war of revenge against France. It is in the world's interest that this movement should fail, and the best method to defeat it is, first, the avoidance of provocation on the part of France, and, second, a united front against unprovoked aggression. The fifteen years of inter-Allied watch on the Rhine may be gradually reduced if Germany executes the treaty faithfully. The Anglo-American guarantee will prove superfluous if Germany refrains from unprovoked aggression. And the permanent demilitarization of the Left Bank remains as a warning to militarists of all countries that frontiers bristling with forts and armies are not the safest guarantees of international peace.

The Saar Valley

One corner of the territory of the Left Bank formed a problem by itself, namely, the Saar valley in the south-western part of Rhenish Prussia and the Palatinate along the northern edge of Lorraine. A pleasant region of farm and forest under the old régime, its importance then was chiefly military, through the use of its bridge-heads for the defense of Lorraine and for an advance eastward. In more recent times it has become highly industrialized, thanks to its important deposits of coal. Its furnaces and iron works support a dense population in its towns; its coal-mines produced before the war 17,000,000 tons a year, 8 per cent of the enormous coal output of the German Empire. Its western portion, about Saarlouis, became French with the foundation of this fortress by Louis XIV; its eastern part, about Saarbrücken, where the coal chiefly lay, had been in French hands only from 1793 to 1815. It had all been considered sufficiently French to be left to France in the preliminary peace of 1814, but had been taken away in the following year and handed over to Prussia, which coveted its bridge-heads and its coal-mines. The frontier of 1814 continued to have its advocates in France until the Franco-Prussian War set back the French frontier still farther; and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine in the Great War once more revived French claims on the Saar.

These claims differed in territorial extent according to the point of view. The historic frontier of 1814 would have returned to France 250 square miles, with 355,000 inhabitants, including the area producing about two-thirds of the coal mined north of the new boundary of Lorraine. An economic frontier which included all of

the coal deposits of the Saar and the district directly dependent upon them would have included an area more than twice as large, and the frontier of 1814 would have disrupted this economic unit. A strategic frontier, drawn so as to protect the mining territory and the approaches to Lorraine, would have extended still farther to the north and east. The strength of these several claims was also different. The frontier of 1814 had been violated by Prussian annexation in the following year, but it was not an ancient boundary, had never, in fact, been laid out on the spot, and had been in abeyance for more than a hundred years. The inhabitants nearly all spoke German, and while it was alleged that many thousands of them had French sympathies, this statement was, in the nature of the case, incapable of verification at the time. The military frontier had much to commend it on purely strategic grounds, but no merit on the ground of history or the desires of the local populations whom it would annex, while its importance was diminished by the demilitarization of the Left Bank. The economic frontier, on the other hand, involved a new element, that of reparation, for the coal-mines of northern France had been wantonly and systematically destroyed by the German authorities as a means of wrecking French industry and delaying its revival; and German coal-mines were the most appropriate equivalent, especially those of the Saar, which lay within a dozen miles of the new French frontier and were almost wholly the property of the Prussian and Bavarian states. The economic claims were the only ones for which a basis could be found in the agreed basis of the peace as stated in President Wilson's Fourteen Points and other utterances. Here the justification was clear and unmistakable, both in the eighth point, which

provided for restoration of the devastated territory of France, and in the pre-armistice agreement for full compensation of damage done to the civilian population and their property. In order, however, to square with the basis of the peace, such material compensation must not involve the political annexation of unwilling populations. The problem of separating the mines from the people who lived over them was thus created, and it was not a simple one.

Annexation in the Saar valley had not appeared in any of the published statements of the French war aims, but both the mining area and the military frontier had been included in the secret agreement with Russia in 1917, and the French desires, as formulated in a note of M. Briand, January 12, had been made known to the British Government in the course of the same year. The frontier of 1814 was urged by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber shortly after the armistice, and it was understood that Marshal Foch desired a military line well beyond it. The French plenipotentiaries took their time about formulating their demands in this district, and it was not till March 27, 1919, that their plan was laid before the council of four. This included political annexation up to the frontier of 1814, with full ownership of the mines, but only the mines, in the adjoining districts beyond. President Wilson accepted the validity of French claims to coal from the Saar, and was early convinced that the ownership of the mines was the surest method of securing just compensation, but he did not admit the justice of political annexation. The British, while favoring the transfer of the mines, did not favor the frontier of 1814, which might have created a new Alsace-Lorraine, with protesting dep-

uties in the French Chamber; instead of direct annexation they preferred a larger autonomous state under French protection. The difference of opinion was acute and constituted one of the major points of disagreement in the difficult days of early April.

Like the Left Bank the Saar was one of those questions affecting closely the principal Allied powers which were not referred to commissions but were reserved for the special consideration of the council of four. Nevertheless, the members of this council were, on this matter, in close touch with their advisers, and established a special committee on April 2 which worked throughout the month. Italy not being particularly interested, the committee consisted of representatives of three countries only, Messrs. Tardieu, Headlam-Morley, and Haskins, M. Tardieu presiding with the resourcefulness and skill which he brought to all matters of the conference; and the final draft of the treaty articles was the unanimous work of the committee. It was aided by specialists, such as geographers, mining experts, and legal advisers. On the American side the work of Mr. David Hunter Miller was all-important at critical points in the negotiations, as regards not only the drafting of specific clauses but also in all larger questions connected with the new form of government. The determination of certain questions of boundary was facilitated by a special visit to the district.

The starting-point of the committee's work was a statement formulated on March 29 by Messrs. Headlam-Morley and Haskins, with the assistance of Major Douglas W. Johnson, and accepted by the council of four. By this it was agreed in principle that full ownership of the coal-mines of the Saar basin should pass to

France to be credited on her claims against Germany for reparation, and that the fullest economic facilities should be accorded for their exploitation, while the political and administrative arrangements necessary to secure these results should be the subject of further inquiry. In the negotiations which followed, the French naturally sought to secure as much as possible with the mines, while the Americans sought to safeguard the rights and interests of the local population. The British in general favored intermediate solutions and worked steadily for a final compromise. President Wilson remained firm against any form of annexation or protectorate, yet it soon appeared that under Prussian political control the ownership of the mines might easily be rendered valueless for France. A French mandate which was suggested under the League of Nations looked uncomfortably like annexation, besides stretching the mandatory principle beyond its proper purpose. A commission of arbitration to settle differences was shown to be inadequate to prevent trouble so long as the region was governed from Berlin, but it led to the final solution, elaborated from the American side, namely, a governing commission under the League of Nations acting as trustee for fifteen years. In the working out of this idea both President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd-George had specific suggestions to make, and took much interest in the clauses of the new form of government when they were examined in detail, with explanations from members of the committee at meetings in the president's study. It is said that at the close of one of these meetings when the general arrangements for the new government had been approved, the prime minister turned to the president and said: "Mr. President, I think we have got a very good plan here." "Well," the

answer is said to have been, "why don't you apply it to Ireland?"

The final result was a compromise which sought to reconcile the French right to the mines and the inhabitants' right to local self-government. France failed to secure the frontier of 1814 or any lesser form of annexation or protectorate; in gaining the holding of a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years to test the strength of French sympathies in the basin, she gave up the subsequent ownership of the mines in any part of the territory which should then become permanently German. During these fifteen years the Saar is included within her economic frontier, where it naturally falls because of its close relations to the iron-fields of Lorraine. The United States stood throughout for a principle which also had much support in France, namely, the mines without the people. While accepting the largest possible facilities for repairing the wrongs which France had suffered from Germany, America successfully maintained the rights of the local population, finally placed under the protection of the League of Nations, which thus became a guarantor of peace and justice on this portion of the Franco-German frontier. As the latest and most authoritative history of the conference, the British account, edited by Mr. Temperley, remarks: "It is very difficult to see how the conflicting interests involved could have been reconciled without some serious violation of justice, if the machinery of the League had not been available for a solution."[1]

The provisions respecting the Saar were bitterly assailed in the German memoranda on the first draft of the treaty, but, as in other instances, the Germans were stronger in general denunciation than in effective criti-

[1] "A History of the Peace Conference of Paris" (London, 1920), vol. II, p. 183.

cism. Government of the Saar population by the League of Nations was pronounced "odious," but the convenience and immediate certainty of this form of reparation could not be denied, and no secure or acceptable guarantee was offered in its stead. The Allies replied that they had chosen a form of reparation "which, by its exceptional nature will be, for a limited period, a definite and visible symbol," while at the same time "they intended, by assuring themselves of the immediate possession of a security for reparation, to escape the risks to which the German memoir itself has drawn attention," in emphasizing Germany's inability to pay. At one point the Germans made a helpful suggestion, namely, with regard to the arrangements for repurchase of the mines in territory which might vote in the plebiscite for reunion with Germany, and this clause, originally designed to enforce prompt action on Germany's part, was modified so as to bring it into harmony with the general reparation clauses. The Germans made no constructive criticism of the new form of government, and it was inferred from this that the clauses had been drawn with sufficient care to safeguard the essential interests of the population.

Like all settlements of a complex situation, the Saar settlement has been criticised as too complicated; and, like all compromises, it has been attacked from both sides. Those who wanted the frontier of 1814 consider it inadequate; those who are soft-hearted toward Germany pronounce it too severe. And because it is complicated and requires for its understanding that unusual accomplishment, the reading of a considerable section of the treaty, many have condemned it without taking the trouble to examine it. To my thinking, the Saar settlement is fundamentally fair in principle, and its practical justice

becomes clearer as we see the workings of reparation elsewhere. Germany, with her large pre-war surplus of coal, pays for the mines she has destroyed by handing over other mines, which were, with small exception, the government property of Prussia and Bavaria; and any excess value is credited to her reparation account toward a total sum which she declares herself unable to pay in full. Those who wanted France to accept an engagement to deliver a fixed amount of coal have been refuted by the events since the conference, namely, the diminished coal production in Germany and the small quantities actually furnished to France under other clauses to which Germany affixed her signature. As other prospects of reparation melt away, France holds one solid asset and receives therefrom something of the coal so sadly needed for the revival of her shattered industries. As I have said elsewhere, a mine in hand is worth many contracts to deliver. Those who pity Germany on account of the Fourteen Points would do well to remember that the Fourteen Points promised restoration to France, and that this is a fundamental condition of any right and just settlement. The Fourteen Points cut in both directions, and should be applied when they run against Germany as well as when they are in her favor. If in practice it may be necessary to forego full restoration because of Germany's inability to pay what she owes under the treaty, it is worth remembering that the Saar mines are something which she was able to pay, out of the public property of Prussia and Bavaria, and in the concrete form where payment was definitely due and imperatively needed. And the final decision respecting the government of each part of the territory is based upon the vote of its inhabitants as they may express their preference

for France, Germany, or permanent internationalization, a clear application of the principle of self-determination.

In the meantime the internationalized territory of the Saar basin comprises about 700 square miles, with 650,000 inhabitants. The people retain "their religious liberties, their schools, and their language." During the fifteen years while German sovereignty is suspended they send no representatives to the Reichstag and the Landtag, but they have local assemblies of their own. They participate in the government to a much greater degree than do citizens of our District of Columbia. The administration is not unlike the commissions which have been established in many American cities, only this commission is appointed by the League of Nations and is ultimately responsible to it. At present its five members include a Frenchman as chairman, a native of the Saar basin itself, a Dane, a Belgian, and a Canadian, the last named, Mr. Waugh, having been mayor of Winnipeg and representing in a peculiar degree the general and transatlantic interest in the maintenance of peace between France and Germany. It is a long way from Winnipeg to Saarbrücken, but not too long for one who cares for peace and justice.

What will happen in the popular referendum of 1935 will depend on the conditions of the moment as well as upon the experience of the intervening years. The inhabitants of the Saar basin are exempt from compulsory military service and enjoy valuable economic privileges which are sometimes envied by their French and German neighbors. Last spring voters of certain neighboring communes and cantons in Prussia petitioned the League of Nations for incorporation in the new district, and there is evidence that opinion in the district is favorable to its

new government. In any event the vote fourteen years hence is restricted to those resident in the territory at the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, so that all temptation to colonization is removed. It was conjectured by many at Paris that the results of commission government might prove so satisfactory that, under the alternatives offered in the plebiscite, the majority would vote to remain under the League rather than for union with either France or Germany. Whatever justification of the Saar settlement this might bring, the American participants will be content if its ends are accomplished during the fifteen years of League rule provided in the treaty. For that much depends on the actual workings of the League of Nations.

The settlement of Germany's boundaries was by no means a simple matter, and at times it strained the conference almost to the breaking-point, but the task was accomplished and embodied in a unanimous agreement. Two considerations had to be kept constantly in mind: justice to the local populations, in spite of the crimes of the imperial government; and satisfaction to the well-founded demands of Germany's injured neighbors. These two were not always easy to reconcile, and the different points of view often represented very different personal and national backgrounds. The discussion was frank, but it was friendly, and we are informed by participants that even at its most tense moments in the council of four it never lacked the tone of mutual respect and good-will.[1]

[1] This point deserves emphasis because the nature of the council's sessions has been grossly misrepresented by a popular writer, Mr. J. M. Keynes, in an effort to discredit the conference and its work ("The Economic Consequences of the Peace," pp. 30–32). It is stated by the official interpreter, Captain Mantoux, that Mr. Keynes never attended a regular session of the council of four; the con-

A treaty was possible only through the fundamental agreement of Great Britain, France, and the United States, and it can be maintained only by the continued co-operation among these powers, which is an essential basis for the world's peace.

fused and furious gathering which Keynes describes in the large drawing-room of the president's house would appear to have been so rendered by the presence of a large number of economic advisers like himself, specially called in for the occasion. The real work of the council was done quietly and efficiently in President Wilson's down-stairs study, and it is no service to the cause of truth or of peace to assert the contrary.

IV

POLAND

BY ROBERT HOWARD LORD

Among the political problems that came before the Peace Conference, the problem of the reconstruction of Poland was one of the first to be taken up and one of the last to be finished. Indeed, it is not altogether finished even yet. It was also one of the gravest and thorniest questions with which the Conference had to deal.

It was difficult because the eastern frontiers of Poland could not be settled without reference to the Russian Soviet Government, whose existence the Peace Conference could not pretend to ignore but never felt able to recognize; and because the western frontiers of Poland could not be fixed without taking a good deal of territory from Germany; and taking territory from Germany is very serious business. How serious it is may be judged from the fact that German statesmen, from Bismarck to Bülow, have been unanimous in declaring that Prussia's very existence depended upon maintaining her established frontier in the east. Prince Lichnowsky wrote, not long before the armistice, that: "The Polish question constitutes for Germany the gravest question of the war and of the peace—far graver than the fate of Belgium. . . . With it stands or falls the position of Prussia as a great power, and therefore that of the Empire." And it may as well be remarked at once that no other part of the territorial arrangements made at Versailles has

caused so much anger in Germany as the Polish settlement, and scarcely any other part has been more frequently denounced by the critics of the peace treaties outside Germany.

In the case of Poland, as of most other territorial problems, the Peace Conference proceeded from the principle that in the Europe of to-day the frontiers that are most likely to prove just, satisfactory, and durable are those that conform to ethnographic divisions; state boundaries ought, as far as possible, to follow the lines of cleavage between nationalities. Whether this is a sound principle I cannot undertake to discuss here. It may be that the doctrine of the rights of nationality has been enormously exaggerated; self-determination may be a false and monstrous idea; it may be that economic needs or historic rights or long-established political connections ought to be the chief considerations in determining boundaries. But it must be recalled that nationalistic ideas have been the most important factor in reshaping the map of Europe in the last hundred years; that most of the wars of the past century have been due to the desire of so many peoples to gain national independence or national unity; and that during the World War nearly every one seemed to applaud such utterances of President Wilson's as the speech before Congress in which he said: "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. . . . Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states." At all events, it seems to me the most distinctive mark of the Peace Conference at Paris that, more

systematically, more completely, and upon a far larger scale than at any previous peace congress, it attempted to remake the map of Europe upon the basis of the rights of nationality. Its territorial work must be judged with reference both to the validity of that principle in itself and to the degree of honesty and intelligence with which it applied that principle.

Already before the Conference assembled, the Allied and Associated Powers had in general terms defined their attitude toward the Polish question. In the thirteenth point of the famous fourteen, Mr. Wilson had declared that "an independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . ." The prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, in their declaration of June 3, 1918, had also affirmed that "the creation of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe."

These declarations, however, admitted of a considerable latitude of interpretation. There was much room to discuss what constituted an "indisputably Polish population"; which territories really contained such a population; and what was meant precisely by "free and secure access to the sea." When called upon to apply their formula in concrete cases, the principal Allied and Associated Powers had ample opportunity to, and in fact frequently did, manifest rather divergent tendencies with regard to the solution of Polish problems.

One may define the tendency of French policy as being on the whole extremely favorable to Poland. It was not invariably so, for in the dispute over Teschen France was

consistently and vigorously on the side of the Czechs against Poland; and with regard to the eastern frontier there was a very evident desire on the part of the French representatives to keep the aspirations of the new ally, Poland, within limits that would not irrevocably antagonize the old ally that might some day be won back —Russia. But, with these restrictions, France was for a Poland "grande et forte, très forte," as M. Pichon declared. And for obvious reasons. France and Poland, the two states that have gained most territory at Germany's expense, are, quite apart from their old and well-established mutual sympathies, in the very nature of things bound together almost indissolubly by their common interest in upholding the new settlement. A Poland "grande et forte" may become "a new France on the east of Germany," doubling the strength of the France on the west.

Rather different was the tendency of England. While committed to, and doubtless sincerely anxious for, the restoration of an independent Poland, she did not appear to be particularly concerned that it should be a large or a strong one. Indeed, I think I may say, for it is an open secret, that in the case of almost every question that came up England's attitude was less favorable toward Polish claims than that of any other Power, and the Poles are accustomed to ascribe most of their diplomatic disasters at Paris to Mr. Lloyd George. Why this was so I cannot adequately explain. I am inclined to think it was primarily because England regarded Poland as a liability rather than an asset. Poland was a weak country, set down between a hostile Germany and a no less unfriendly Russia. The defense of such a state was likely to be something of a burden for the signatories of the peace

treaty; the more contested territories you assigned to it the greater were the chances of getting into trouble on its account; and England seems to have had little desire to increase her responsibilities unnecessarily in behalf of a state that was a natural client of France but of no special interest to herself.

The Italians were in general disposed to favor Polish claims, but not to advance themselves very far or to fight very hard in support of them. The Japanese scarcely intervened at all in these questions. As for the Americans, I think I may say that the president and his advisers, while very friendly and sympathetic toward Poland, viewed her problems primarily from the standpoint of the general principles involved. The chief Polish historian of the Peace Conference has done us the honor of saying that America obviously desired that Poland should get neither too much nor too little, but just what belonged to her.

Such seems to me to have been the general attitude of the several Powers toward the Polish question. But I should like to emphasize that whatever divergences appeared related to secondary matters; all the great Powers were agreed on the fundamental propositions that there should be an independent Polish state, including Russian, Austrian, and Prussian Poland alike and possessing assured access to the sea, and that its boundaries should be settled chiefly upon the ethnographic basis.

For the elaboration of detailed proposals as to the frontiers of the new state, the Supreme Council, about the end of February, appointed a commission on Polish affairs, headed by M. Jules Cambon, who had been French ambassador at Berlin down to the outbreak of the war. This was one of the first, if not *the* first, of the territorial

commissions to be appointed; and perhaps some account of its methods of work may not be out of place here.

The commission received no detailed or precise instructions from the Supreme Council. Individual members frequently sought and obtained directions from their superiors on particular points, but, in the main, the commission was left to work out its problems as it thought just and right, always bearing in mind the general principles adopted by the Peace Conference and whatever each of us might know as to the views of our respective governments. And since there seems to be a widespread opinion that at Paris the Fourteen Points were from the start buried in oblivion, I should like to attest that in the discussions about Poland, both in the commission and before the Supreme Council, the particular "point" among the fourteen that referred to Poland was both the principle from which the discussion started and to which appeal was made again and again. The Polish commission made something of a record at least for industry. It sat from February to December; at some periods it met nearly every day in the week and sometimes twice a day; it held more meetings, I think, than almost any other commission of the Peace Conference. Its task, of course, was simply to work out detailed propositions to submit to the Supreme Council; it was the Ten or the Five or the Four who made the decisions. Usually they accepted the proposals laid before them without serious alterations; but there were several occasions, as will be explained later, when the Supreme Council very substantially modified or quite set aside the recommendations of the commission.

The first and most important Polish question to be taken up was that of the boundary on the side of Ger-

many. How difficult that problem was can hardly be appreciated without having made a close study of the extraordinary intermixture and interpenetration of Poles and Germans in the former eastern provinces of Prussia. In these regions, almost all of which were originally purely Polish in population, there was for centuries a steady inflow of German immigrants even during the period of Polish rule, and much more so after the annexation of Prussia. In the last half-century the Prussian government has worked systematically to colonize these provinces with Germans, spending over $100,000,000 for that purpose and endeavoring especially to build up belts of German population that would separate the Poles of Russian Poland from those of Posen or from Danzig and the sea. Hence the ethnographic map of these regions has become a very intricate mosaic. The two peoples are everywhere intermingled; there are many islands of German predominance surrounded by seas of Slavs; and to draw a frontier that would separate the two peoples in clean-cut fashion without leaving a large residue of the one nation in the territories of the other is a thing that simply cannot be done.

Another kind of difficulty arose from the nature of the statistics with which one had to work. The only available statistics as to the numbers and distribution of the two peoples in these territories were those issued by the Prussian government; and it has been repeatedly demonstrated by the most careful and painstaking investigations that these statistics are often tendentious and "doctored up," and in some cases absolutely false and misleading. They are too often designed to show that the success of Prussia's Germanizing policy has been greater than is actually the case.

On the other hand, it was to be considered that the strength of Polish national feeling varied a good deal in the different provinces of Prussia, and with it, presumably, the desire of these different populations for separation from Germany and union with Poland. The provinces of Posen and West Prussia, for instance, had belonged to Poland right down to the partitions at the end of the eighteenth century (save for one interval of a century and a half in the case of West Prussia). It was there that the racial struggle had been hottest in the past half-century. In this case there could be little doubt as to the sentiments of the Polish population. On the other hand, Upper Silesia had been separated from Poland for six hundred years; and although there had been a considerable revival of Polish national feeling in recent decades and much animosity between Poles and Germans, still the case here was not so clear as in the other two provinces just mentioned. Finally, in East Prussia there was a large Polish-speaking population which had never been directly under Polish rule at all; a population that was Protestant, unlike the overwhelming majority of the Poles outside, and which had never shown any very marked signs of Polish national consciousness. Such facts raised doubts whether *all* the Poles in Prussia could fairly be treated in the same way just because they were Poles. It was clear that many Poles detested and abhorred Prussian rule, had been badly oppressed under it, and would never be reconciled to it; but it was equally apparent that other Poles had no such feelings, and it was not easy to draw the line between such groups.

The commission on Polish affairs submitted its first report to the Supreme Council about the end of March.

This report recommended that the larger part of Posen and of Upper Silesia should be transferred to Poland, while leaving to Germany the western, predominantly German-speaking districts of both territories. In both the areas to be ceded to Poland the Poles formed about two-thirds of the population (65 per cent), according to the German census of 1910. In addition, the commission proposed to give to Poland the central and eastern zones of the province of West Prussia, including both banks of the lower Vistula and Danzig, the capital of the province. This was the origin of the famous Polish "corridor to the Baltic." This "corridor" has been so much discussed that it may not be out of place to enter a little fully into the reasons that led the commission to propose it.

West Prussia, the province around the mouth of the Vistula, occupies an area of such strategic importance that for many centuries it has been a battle-ground between Germans and Slavs. It has been the meeting-place, the point of intersection of two opposing streams of colonization, the Polish current from south to north, down the Vistula, and the German current from west to east, along the coast of the Baltic. In this conflict the south-to-north movement has been the stronger; the Poles have succeeded in maintaining a continuous belt of Polish-speaking territory extending through to the Baltic, while the Germans have failed to bridge the gap between Germany proper and the German colony in East Prussia. The ethnographic map of West Prussia showed the province roughly divided into three zones: a German zone on the west, and another on the east, along the right bank of the Vistula, while the central and southeastern zone was predominantly Polish. This was the primary reason for the construction of the corridor;

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the cession of this central zone to Poland was the only arrangement that could fit the ethnographic situation, the only arrangement that corresponded to the rather unfortunate way in which the German and Polish populations had become fixed in this region, as the result of centuries of conflict.

But there was another important reason for the building of the corridor. Poland had been promised "a free and secure access to the sea." There seemed to be strong grounds for holding that this "free and secure access" could be obtained only across and through territory actually owned and controlled by Poland, and that it could not be regarded as assured if the lower course of Poland's greatest river and the port at its mouth were left in the hands of Germany. For Germany has always been Poland's chief enemy, and unless all prevision fails is likely to remain so for a long time to come.

It was true that the proposed arrangement would have the grave disadvantage of separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany. But it was a case of choosing between two evils. Either East Prussia would have to communicate with Germany by land across Polish territory (there would always be easy communication by sea) or else Poland's communications with the sea would have to be across German territory. And were the two respective interests comparable or at all commensurable? Was it to be argued that the interest of the 2,000,000 Germans in East Prussia in having a land connection with Germany ought to outweigh the interest of 25,000,000 Poles in having assured access to the sea?

Such considerations led the commission to propose the corridor, and, it must be added, to propose to build it somewhat broader than strictly ethnographic reasons

would have warranted. For it was recommended that the corridor should include the city and district of Danzig, although their population of about 300,000 is overwhelmingly German, and also a narrow belt of German-speaking territory around Marienwerder, on the east bank of the Vistula. These were the only cases in which the commission proposed a serious deviation from an ethnographic frontier. In the case of Danzig it was from the conviction that that city was the natural port of Poland, and the only port in any sense available; and that the only clean-cut solution of the problem was to annex the city outright to Poland. As for the Marienwerder district it was argued that the possession of that small area (the population is about 138,000) was necessary in order to assure to Poland control of the lower Vistula and of the one direct railroad between Danzig and Warsaw.

Finally, it remained to deal with that southern zone of East Prussia which is generally called the District of Allenstein. Although the majority of the population here was Polish in nationality, for reasons suggested above it was to be doubted whether these Protestant Poles really desired to be annexed to Poland as a strict interpretation of the Fourteen Points would seem to have required. Hence the commission recommended that the fate of this territory should be referred to a plebiscite.

The set of proposals just outlined was agreed upon by the experts of all the Powers represented in the commission after very long discussions and a good deal of give-and-take on all sides. When these unanimous recommendations were then submitted to the Supreme Council it seemed for a time as if they would be accepted *in toto*. It soon became evident, however, that Mr. Lloyd George

was dissatisfied; he held that with the frontiers proposed the number of Germans to be incorporated in Poland was dangerously large, and ought, if ever possible, to be reduced. As a result of a first intervention on his part the Supreme Council decided that the Marienwerder district should not be transferred to Poland outright, but should also be subjected to a plebiscite.

Soon after the British prime minister proposed a second change, of much greater consequence to the Poles, in the matter of Danzig. President Wilson was persuaded to agree to his suggestions; and Mr. Clemenceau, quite certainly against his own inclinations, was induced to acquiesce. The upshot was an entirely new plan, which was intended to insure Poland's economic interests in the port of Danzig and at the same time to avoid the inconvenience of annexing that German-speaking city to Poland. According to this plan, Danzig and the small adjacent district were to form a free city under the protection of the League of Nations. While with regard to most internal affairs Danzig was to be quite autonomous, it was stipulated that the free city was to be included within the Polish customs frontiers, and that its foreign relations and the protection of its citizens abroad were to be intrusted to Poland. Poland also received the right of freely using and of developing and improving all waterways, docks, and wharfs within the territory of the free city; and the control and administration of the Vistula River, and—subject to some restrictions—of the railway, postal, and telegraph systems of Danzig. The details of the arrangement were to be regulated by a treaty between Poland and the free city, the terms of which were to be fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

With these modifications the proposals submitted by

the commission on Polish affairs were incorporated in the terms of peace communicated by the Paris Conference to Germany on May 7, 1919. As is well known, the Germans returned a reply of vehement protest, objecting particularly to the cessions demanded in favor of Poland and especially to the threatened loss of Upper Silesia. This led to something of a crisis in Paris. The British Labor party and every other element in England and America that regarded the proposed terms of peace as too draconic, made their voices heard; and Mr. Lloyd George, after a visit to London, returned convinced of the necessity of making concessions, whether in order to induce the Germans to sign or in order to placate British labor. His colleagues again to some extent gave way to him. Among the concessions to the Germans that were then decided upon, the most important, perhaps, related to Upper Silesia.

It had originally been resolved to demand most of that territory for Poland, because of the large Polish-speaking majority (65 per cent for the whole area, and in not a few districts 80 or even 90 per cent); and also because the Silesian Poles seemed to have given sufficient proof of their Polish sentiments and their desire for union with the mother country. But it was not to be denied that the loss of Upper Silesia would mean a very severe blow to Germany. For this territory was one of the chief mining centres and one of the most highly industrialized regions of the former German Empire. Before the war it produced about 44,000,000 tons of coal a year, *i. e.*, 23 per cent of Germany's annual output, three times as much as the Saar basin; and it also furnished 81 per cent of her zinc, 34 per cent of her lead, and a very large part of her steel and iron products. It could well be argued that

so great a sacrifice could not fairly be proposed unless it was certain that the majority of the population desired union with Poland. And it was impossible to be quite certain of that without putting the matter to a popular vote. Hence the decision that in Upper Silesia, too, there should be a plebiscite, and that in case the vote fell out in favor of Poland, Germany should enjoy a treaty-right to a certain amount of Silesian coal.

With this third important modification of the original proposals, the Polish-German settlement assumed final form and was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. The results may be summarized by saying that Germany has been forced to cede to Poland about 16,750 square miles of territory and about 2,900,000 people, *i. e.*, about three times the area and one and one-half times the population of Alsace-Lorraine. Among the ceded populations there are, according to the last German census, about 1,800,000 Poles and about 1,000,000 Germans, *i. e.*, a ratio of nine to five.

Plebiscites have already taken place in the Allenstein and Marienwerder districts. In both cases the results were overwhelmingly in favor of Germany, as was, indeed, to be expected; for in the Marienwerder district there is a large majority of Germans and in Allenstein the Polish-speaking majority is a backward, rural population, very much under the control of German landlords, pastors, and officials, and a population among which the Polish national movement was only in its first faint beginnings.

In Upper Silesia the plebiscite is to be held within the next few months. Its outcome must be awaited with some trepidation, for plebiscites have the drawback of raising national animosities to fever pitch; there have already

been two bloody outbreaks in Upper Silesia, and both the contending peoples are desperately anxious not to lose what is undoubtedly the richest territorial prize that remains to be awarded.

Finally, it may be remarked that the treaty between Poland and Danzig, which has been drawn up by the Council of Ambassadors at Paris, has just been signed. In the meantime there has been an unhappy amount of friction between the Poles, the Germans of Danzig, and the British high commissioner representing the League of Nations. The Poles in Danzig are frequently mobbed; in the face of the crisis threatening her very existence last summer Poland found her one port virtually closed to her through the animosity of the Danzigers and what seems to me the very ill-advised action of the high commissioner—in short, it must be admitted that the complicated arrangement about the free city of Danzig has so far worked out rather badly.

The Peace Conference made no definitive arrangements about Austrian and Russian Poland. In the case of the former region there were two principal territorial disputes. The duchy of Teschen in Austrian Silesia, which in spite of its small size is extremely valuable because of its excellent coking coal and its thriving industries, was the object of a long controversy between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. After going through a great many vicissitudes, this dispute was finally settled by a decision of the Council of Ambassadors last summer, which, with slight regard for the rights and the vehemently expressed wishes of the Polish-speaking majority of the population, awarded to the Czechs the whole mining region and the chief railroad line running through the territory. As a result the city of Teschen is cut in two; the larger, eastern

portion of the town goes to Poland, but the western part, with the railway station, goes to the Czechs; the electric-light plant goes to the one state, but the gas-works to the other, and I do not recall what has become of the municipal water-works. This judgment of Solomon is a curious monument of the wisdom of diplomats.

Eastern Galicia, which was in dispute between the Poles and the Ukrainians, also furnished the Peace Conference with a complicated set of problems, into the details of which it is scarcely possible to enter here. The Conference finally decided to leave Eastern Galicia under Polish sovereignty, but as an autonomous province, with ample guarantees for the national rights of the three and one-half millions of Ukrainians, who form the majority of the population, and with provisions for a plebiscite twenty-five years hence. The Poles, however, have been unwilling to accept these conditions, which, they affirm, would only keep up unrest and agitation and would make it almost impossible to govern the country. For the past year the negotiation seems to have been at a standstill. While the Poles are actually in possession of the province, the ultimate fate of Eastern Galicia has not been settled.

The Peace Conference also found itself unable to fix the eastern boundaries of Poland on the side of Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers were not at war with Russia; they had no desire to dispose of Russian territory without Russia's consent; and there was no recognized Russian Government with which they could deal. It was, indeed, possible to assume that Warsaw and the adjacent region had been renounced by Russia, because immediately after the revolution of March, 1917, the government of Prince Lvov had spontaneously recognized

the principle of "an independent Polish state including all regions with an indisputable Polish ethnic majority." Unhappily, however, there lies between Poland and Russia a large debatable zone where, because of the unreliability of our statistics and other data, it is difficult to say what the ethnic majority is or what are the wishes of a very illiterate and inarticulate population. At present, it is almost impossible to say with certainty just where ethnographic Poland leaves off and ethnographic Russia begins.

The Peace Conference did, at all events, issue one provisional declaration regarding this question—a declaration that has been much referred to in recent months and the nature of which has, I think, been much misunderstood.

Wishing to reduce the area of controversy and to make it possible for the Warsaw Government to organize a permanent administration in that part of Russian Poland that was certain to remain to it, the Conference on December 8, 1919, defined a provisional boundary for Poland on the east, including all the territory that could be regarded as having "an indisputably Polish ethnic majority." This was, in short, a kind of minimum line. Whatever lay to the west of it was to be considered as belonging henceforth unconditionally to Poland. The Conference expressly reserved, however, the claims Poland might have to territories east of this line; claims on which the Conference did not feel able to pronounce and which must therefore be left to future negotiations between Poland and Russia.

This provisional minimum boundary of December, 1919, has since become famous as the "Curzon line." In the crisis of the Polish-Bolshevist conflict last summer,

Lord Curzon, acting for the British Government, attempted to mediate peace on the basis of the acceptance of this line as a definitive, permanent boundary. As this would have involved the renunciation by Poland of broad areas in which, it is claimed by the Poles, there are majorities of Polish population, the Warsaw Government staved off such a settlement, and finally, by the preliminary peace signed at Riga on October 12, it has secured a boundary much farther east than the Curzon line and much more advantageous.

The Treaty of Riga, while disposing of Bolshevist claims to whatever lies west of the new frontier, has not altogether settled the fate of Vilna, the largest city in the ceded territory. Vilna and the region about it form the subject of a long-pending dispute between Poland and Lithuania. While fully reliable data are lacking here, it would seem that the Polish claim is much the stronger, if the question is to be settled chiefly with reference to the language and the presumable desires of the population. The case for Lithuania rests mainly on the fact that Vilna was the historic capital of the old Lithuanian state, and that the bulk of the population of this region, though now decidedly Polonized, is probably originally of Lithuanian stock.[1] Through the intervention of the Allied Powers an attempt is now being made to induce the two contending governments to decide the question by a plebiscite.

Apart from this problem and that of Upper Silesia, and barring the possibility of a new conflict with the Bolshevists, the frontiers of Poland are thus at last fixed.

[1] According to the census taken by the Germans in 1916–17 the population of Vilna (139,000) was made up of: Poles, 53.6 per cent; Jews, 41.4 per cent; and Lithuanians, 2.1 per cent.

As now constituted, the new state has an area of about 148,000 square miles, *i. e.*, it is much larger than the United Kingdom or Italy, and about three-fourths as large as France. Its population, which cannot be fixed with any certainty because of the chaos caused by the war, is variously estimated at between twenty-seven and thirty-two millions. At all events, Poland now ranks as the sixth state of Europe, both in size and in population; and it may be considered by far the most important of the new states which the war has produced in eastern Europe.

V

THE END OF AN EMPIRE: REMNANTS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

BY CHARLES SEYMOUR

"If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to create her." This diplomatic aphorism, coined by a member of one of the very nationalities oppressed by the Hapsburgs, had rung in the ears of European statesmen for many decades. It had become almost axiomatic that the union of Danubian territories was essential to the economic welfare and political tranquillity of southeastern Europe. There were few who did not recognize the service performed for Europe by the Hapsburgs in holding together regions naturally interdependent, and in obstructing the advance up the Danube of that internecine strife which has characterized the political habits of the Balkans. The disruption of the Hapsburg empire would threaten economic dislocation at the same time that it would inflame the nationalistic jealousy and ambition of the peoples that had been crushed under the Hapsburg yoke. The prospect was regarded with a doubt that bordered upon dismay even by the nations that were fighting Austria in the Great War.

But the statesmen of the Peace Conference were confronted by a condition and not a theory. However clearly they recognized the dangers coincident with the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, it was not for them to decide. The question had already been settled by the

nationalities of the dying empire, which in the last weeks of the war had set up their own governments, contemptuously brushing away the traditions of centuries. Austria-Hungary as a political entity had crumbled like the one-hoss shay, and the most solemn peace conference imaginable could not put her together again.

Such a disintegration had long been foreshadowed and discussed. The empire had never been a nation, and factors of union and disunion had always engaged in fierce struggles. Ties of language and blood kinship, which form the strongest elements of political integration, were lacking, and neither the political skill nor the good fortune of the Hapsburgs succeeded in welding into a single whole the myriad of peoples who had come to sojourn in the regions that make up the modern Austria-Hungary. The development of revolutionary organization during the war was slow. It came first and most effectively among the Czechs, who organized wholesale desertion of Czech battalions from the Hapsburg armies and the betrayal to the Allies of Austrian military secrets. The Jugo-Slavs were more cautious. Especially after the entrance of Italy into the war they showed themselves suspicious of Allied propaganda, for they feared lest emancipation from the Hapsburg yoke might become simply the first step toward enslavement by Italy. Nor were the Allies anxious, at first, to foster revolution, since the disruption of Austria did not enter completely into their diplomatic plans. But the growing conviction that Austria had become the catspaw of Germany, combined with the disgust of the subject nationalities, resulted in the encouragement and the success of the revolution. In 1918 Czecho-Slovakia was recognized as an independent Allied state. The newly formulated aims of the Jugo-

Slavs for independence and union with Serbia were generally approved, and a cordial, though informal and temporary, understanding with Italy was established.

With the surrender of Bulgaria, the rolling back of the German tide in France, and the defeat of Austrian armies on the Piave the revolution was inaugurated. Irresistibly and with extraordinary quiet it gathered headway. Hapsburg officials and organs of government were not assailed, but simply passed over, and in their place arose the provisional councils representing the nationalities. Within the space of a month the artificial cement that held the empire together had crumbled, loyalty to the emperor had evaporated, and the overlordship of Germans and Magyars had been cast aside. The Tyrol and Trieste were occupied by Italians; at Prague the new Czecho-Slovak Government was solidified; in Croatia the Jugo-Slavs seized the reins of power and prepared for union with Serbia, while on the coast they took over the Austrian fleet; in Galicia the Poles negotiated with the new national government of Warsaw; in Transylvania the Rumanians were greeted as liberators.

When the peace conference opened, therefore, the empire of Austria-Hungary was a thing of the past. One journalistic critic complains that the conference angrily broke up Austria into jigsaw bits; but the accusation betrays a wealth of ignorance and shows how much easier it is to be critical than correct. The United States and Great Britain would have been glad to create a federation of the Danubian nationalities which, without the vices that had led to the fall of the Hapsburgs, might have accomplished the economic integration and preserved the political order so essential to the tranquillity and prosperity of southeastern Europe. The suggestion

would have been no more effective than a tenor solo in a boiler-shop. The nationalities would have none of it. They had freed themselves, they were instinct with the sense of their own capacity, bursting with nationalistic ambitions, suspicious of any federation as likely to revive the tyranny under which they had so long suffered. The Conference lacked the right, as well as the power, to impose union upon them. By virtue of the principle of self-determination it was for the nationalities to determine their own destiny, and if they preferred disunion no one could deny them. The independent sovereignty of the Czechs had been recognized; the union of the Poles of Galicia with the mass of the nationality in Russia and Germany was generally admitted; the right of Rumania to Transylvania had been acknowledged; and there were few inclined to dispute the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of southern Hungary, Austria, and Bosnia, with their kinsmen in Serbia and Montenegro, although the prospect was not hailed with enthusiasm by Italy.

It was true that the Allies and President Wilson had declared that they had no intention of breaking up Austria-Hungary, and the Fourteen Points had stipulated merely the autonomy of the subject nationalities. But as Mr. Wilson pointed out in his reply to the first request of Austria for an armistice in September, 1918, the face of circumstances had changed so rapidly that mere autonomy had become insufficient; the sovereign rights of the Czechs and the aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs had been recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Government admitted its willingness to accept this change. It might fairly be argued that in the division of Hapsburg territory the new Austrian and Hungarian Governments had a right to expect that the Peace Conference would

allocate territory in the spirit of the Fourteen Points; there was at least a strong moral obligation laid upon the Allies to treat Austria and Hungary with the justice that had been so eloquently voiced by President Wilson, although in fact the armistice of November 3 had been concluded so hastily that the Fourteen Points had apparently been forgotten. But even so, the integrity of the ancient empire could not be preserved.

The Peace Conference was, accordingly, placed in the position of executor of the Hapsburg estate. The heirs were generally recognized—Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, the new lesser Austria, lesser Hungary, and Italy. The duty of the Conference was to determine the character of the division. Even this had already been fixed in its broad lines, so that much of the task of the peacemakers consisted simply in the determination of detailed frontiers. The task, however, was not one which could be easily and satisfactorily accomplished. There were, it is true, two treaties in existence which had mapped out the new frontiers of Italy and Rumania in Austria-Hungary. The first of these, the famous Treaty of London, had been signed in May, 1915, and it was upon the basis of the promises therein made that Italy had entered the war on the side of the Allies. The second treaty, signed in August, 1916, had assured Rumania generous frontiers in Hungary. But the United States had not been party to either of these secret treaties, drawn up before our entrance into the war, and had never been officially informed of their existence. President Wilson had gone on record as opposed to the approval of secret treaties of any kind. Furthermore, the promises made by France and England were by no means in accord with the new international ideals enunciated by

Wilson and crystallized in the Fourteen Points. If Italy and Rumania insisted upon holding the Allies to their promises and if the United States delegation refused to recognize the justice and the wisdom of carrying those promises into effect, the Peace Conference obviously would face a problem of the greatest difficulty.

It soon became clear that the heirs of the Hapsburg empire would furnish no assistance to the Conference in its task of territorial delimitation by entering into friendly agreements among themselves. Each nationality viewed affairs through the colored prism of its own ambitions. When the Conference assembled in January, 1919, it was confronted with the necessity not merely of drawing permanent boundary-lines but of composing the quarrels that had sprung up between the different nationalities, which threatened to break into open warfare. In Silesia, Poles and Czechs each violently claimed the district of Teschen with its invaluable coal-mines; in the Adriatic, Italians and Jugo-Slavs were face to face; in southern Hungary, in the Banat of Temesvar, the Rumanians and Serbs stood ready to come to blows. Jugo-Slavs and German-Austrians fought along the Drave; the Rumanian army that had invaded Transylvania constantly advanced and threatened to occupy and hold pure Hungarian territory.

Such were some of the problems faced by the supreme council of the Conference, in addition to the necessity of making arrangements for the renaissance of normal economic life, the transportation of food, the rehabilitation of the railways, the opening up of river traffic, and the resumption of coal-mining. At first the members of the council of ten may have hoped themselves to settle these boundary disputes. But it was not long before they

realized that if they gave to each the time and study essential to securing a just solution, their deliberations would last for long months. And after all, the Austrian problem was but one of many. Nothing was more striking than the sense of discouragement that manifested itself upon the faces of the statesmen of the great powers as they listened to the claims and charges, the counter-claims and counter-charges presented to them by the representatives of the nationalities, so recently allied in a common cause, now inflamed by the bitterest jealousy.

The hearings took place in Secretary Pichon's study in the Quai d'Orsay, with its old pearly gray carpet marked with red roses, its rich Gobelin tapestries, and high French windows opening on to the perfect lawns of the foreign office gardens. In the centre, behind the empire desk, sat Clemenceau, squat, stolid, gray of face, his hands clasped quietly, covered by the eternal gray gloves, on his countenance an expression of bored tolerance. In his cynical wisdom he had never believed that the end of the war would bring the millennium; these nationalistic quarrels seemed to him entirely natural, even though inconvenient. His arid humor, his biting sarcasm displayed in an infrequent question, contrasted with the patient earnestness of President Wilson, who sat upon his right, and to whom, it is not uninteresting to note, the claimants appealed by their manner, if not in form, as the man of justice upon whom their hopes rested. Next to the Americans sat Lloyd George and Balfour, perfect contrast. The British prime minister, consumed with an electric energy, always on the edge of his chair, questioning and interrupting; Balfour, with his long legs outstretched, his head on the back of his chair, eyes not infrequently

closed, philosophic in his attitude, completely proof against those sudden gusts of enthusiasm which sometimes assailed his chief. Next, on the right were the Japanese, with features immobile as the Sphinx, enigmatic as the Mona Lisa. Facing Clemenceau sat the Italians: Orlando, florid in manner, eloquent in speech; Sonnino, with eagle features, powerful nose, and jaw set like a vise. In the corners were the secretaries. Behind the principals sat the attachés and experts, with their maps and tables of statistics, whispering corrections of the *ex parte* statements which the delegates of the nationalities presented.

The latter stood or sat before Clemenceau's desk, presenting the particular claims of their newly founded or expanding states. There was the black-bearded Bratiano of Rumania, rather moody, fighting for the treaty of 1916, resentful of opposition. Or, contrasting type, the young and smiling foreign minister of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Edward Benes, magnetic in manner, frank in negotiation. He had done much to organize the revolution that swept aside the Hapsburgs and to build up the Czecho-Slovak army in Siberia; his diplomatic skill had combined with the solid honesty of President Masaryk to win the recognition of the Allies for the infant state. Then again the claimant would be the Pole, Dmowski, with furrowed visage, clear logic, and power of satire that wounded as effectively, though less ostentatiously, as the scalding invective of Bratiano. Paderewski came to Paris only late in the history of the Conference. There also were the Serbs, the patriarchal Pachitch, with white flowing beard, veteran of many a diplomatic battle in the Balkans, and the smooth-spoken Vesnitch, both representing the Serbia of old, together with Trumbitch

and Zholger, representatives of the newly freed Austrian Jugo-Slavs.

It is easy to imagine the perplexity of the leading statesmen of the Allies as they listened to the conflicting claims. Districts of which they had heard but vaguely, if ever, were discussed as though upon the fair apportionment of each depended the entire security of the future. The Banat, Teschen, Klagenfurt, many another name which was soon to become familiar—how were the merits of each contention justly to be adjudged? And where the time for the study of details? Inevitably the council adopted a suggestion, long mooted by Colonel House and approved by President Wilson, as the latter appreciated the time lost in fruitless debate, namely, that the claims of the Austrian nationalities be heard by commissions of Allied experts, who should formulate reports to be submitted to the Conference, and which when approved should form the basis of the treaties. On February 1, 1919, the council appointed the first of the territorial commissions, whose function it was to reduce the questions at issue in the matter of Rumanian boundaries to the narrowest possible limits and to suggest solutions. Shortly afterward other commissions were formed, with similar purpose, to study Czecho-Slovak, Polish, and Jugo-Slav frontiers, and in this way prepare the new map to replace the Austria-Hungary that had been torn to pieces.

The commissions that drafted the new boundaries were composed of representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States, two delegates for each power. The Europeans were generally professional diplomats, taken from the foreign offices, and included such well-known personalities as Jules Cambon, formerly

French ambassador at Berlin; André Tardieu, Clemenceau's chief lieutenant and commissioner of Franco-American affairs; Marquis Salvago Raggi, former Italian ambassador to Berlin; and Sir Eyre Crowe, of the British Foreign Office. They were supplemented by officials not so well known, but qualified by their special study of the problems to be settled.

The American representatives were for the most part chosen from Colonel House's "Inquiry," men who had spent the preceding fourteen months in gathering materials of all kinds, economic, political, geographic, and historical, which would help to form a basis for just and practicable boundaries. The Americans were naturally at a great disadvantage in their lack of diplomatic experience; they were incapable of utilizing the time-worn diplomatic tricks of negotiation, even had they been so inclined. But the American representatives found themselves as well equipped with exact facts as any of the foreigners. There is an incident that occurred in one of the commissions that is not without interest and significance. The commission had agreed to recommend a certain frontier, but on studying this frontier the Americans decided that a change should be made. At the next meeting the American delegate asked permission to introduce an amendment to the boundary-line, stating that he had with him the statistics which would, in his opinion, justify the change. A foreign delegate said at once: "I suggest that we accept the amendment without asking for the evidence. Hitherto the facts presented by the Americans have been irrefutable; it would be a waste of time to consider them."

In their labors the commissions followed the informal methods of discussion inaugurated by the council of ten.

They were presided over by the senior French delegate, full minutes of the debates were taken by a joint secretariat, and remarks were translated, since proceedings were in both English and French. Informality was assisted by the practice of smoking, without which their labors would have seemed interminable. For the commissions took their responsibility seriously and spared neither time nor effort in endeavoring to secure ideal frontiers. In general, it is fair to say that their decisions resulted from honest study and were only slightly affected by selfish political considerations. The American point of view was that we had chief interest in securing a lasting settlement which would guarantee tranquillity; absolute justice was desirable, not merely in the abstract but as promising better chance of permanence. The American propositions were accordingly characterized by greater generosity toward the defeated nationalities—the German-Austrians and the Magyars. So far as possible, the Americans believed, the frontiers ought to be determined by the distribution of the peoples, and the creation of discontented groups of irredentists should be avoided. Common sense and justice alike argued against the barterings of peoples for political purposes.

The Europeans readily accepted this point of view in theory, although at times they were affected by special considerations. Both the French and British desired to create a Czecho-Slovakia with easily defensible frontiers and solid economic strength, even though it meant the inclusion in the state of a large number of Germans and Magyars. Bohemia was looked upon as a bulwark against a resuscitated Germany which might some time in the future plan a new drive to the east. They also desired adequate railway connections between the Czechs

and the Rumanians, an ideal which compelled the extension of Rumanian boundaries beyond the limit that strict justice might have required. They found it hard to forget that the Austrians and Magyars were still the "enemy" and easy to accord portions of their territory to their friends, Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia.

The Italians, on the other hand, showed some tenderness toward the Austrians, except in the Tyrol, since they were anxious to resume friendly commercial relations and, especially, because of their desire to weaken the Jugo-Slavs. For a time they supported the claims of Rumania, based upon the secret treaty of 1916, presumably because they wished to emphasize the validity of secret treaties, for they themselves had been promised important acquisitions by the secret Treaty of London of 1915. But when the Americans declared that they had no official knowledge of the treaty and that their decisions could not be affected by promises made before America entered the war, and of which they had never been informed, the Italians accepted the situation and tended rather to oppose the extensive claims of Czechs and Rumanians. Evidently they feared the political predominance in southern Europe of what was soon to be called the Little Entente, made up of the Czechs, Rumanians, and Jugo-Slavs.

It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize such motives in the drawing up of the new frontiers. The commissions spent long hours in studying the conflicting claims of the nationalities and in comparing them with the host of statistics which were available. If nothing else interfered the obvious frontier was the line that separated the nationalities, Czechs from Germans, Rumanians from Jugo-Slavs, Jugo-Slavs from Magyars.

But many other factors had to be considered, physiographic features, the disturbance of normal economic life, the cutting of railways by boundaries. If a chain of mountains or a river offered a natural frontier, it might seem advisable to depart slightly from the linguistic line. If an agricultural district of Jugo-Slavs were economically dependent upon a German-Austrian city, it might be wise to leave the district in Austria. If the linguistic line were crossed and recrossed by a railway or canal, it would be questionable policy not to arrange the political frontier in such a way as to leave the railway or canal entirely within one state or the other, so as to avoid troublesome customs interference with trade. It might even be necessary to consider whether a district should not be assigned to one state because it needed its agricultural or mineral wealth in order to secure economic independence, whereas the rival state did not.

With such factors in mind, the commissions labored steadily through February and much of March, finally presenting their reports to the supreme council. The reports were composed of definite recommendations of the new boundaries, illustrated with maps, and supported by the reasons for the decisions taken; they also contained draft clauses to be inserted in the treaties with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and these clauses formed the basis of the territorial sections of the treaties. It is important to emphasize the fact, perhaps, that the technical aspects of the treaties were not drafted hastily by the statesmen of the great powers, who obviously must have been ignorant of many details, but resulted, rather, from the labors and application of a body of technical experts who had taken pains to go into all phases of the situation.

By the time the reports were completed the council of ten had been broken up, and the direction of the Conference assumed by the council of four—Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando. It was for them to approve the boundaries proposed and to settle any differences that might have arisen in the commissions. In general the reports were unanimous, for all the delegates felt the necessity of arriving at definite decisions as rapidly as possible, in view of the troubled condition of Austria-Hungary and the imperative need of a resumption of normal life; but in some cases a delegation had not been able to join with the others and presented reservations or minority reports. Such differences must be settled by the council of four. With few exceptions, the four approved the unanimous recommendations of the commissions without alteration. In the case of the northern frontier of the Czecho-Slovak Republic they failed to accept recommendations for a series of minor alterations in the old frontier between Bohemia and Germany, which had been inserted in order to secure a frontier more in accordance with physiographical features and economic convenience; their refusal was based upon unwillingness to disturb a boundary which has existed for centuries. Furthermore, in the frontier between Austria and the Jugo-Slavs, they listened to the protests of the Jugo-Slavs, who demanded that the Klagenfurt basin be divided for purposes of plebiscite, whereas the commission had voted to preserve the integrity of the basin. And, in fact, the commission was later to be justified by the recent vote of the peoples concerned, which kept the basin intact and awarded it to Austria, a solution for which the Americans had always contended. Such changes in the recommendations of the

commissions were rare, and they seemed more important at the moment and to the members of the commission than they will to the historian.

Over the points in dispute the council of four worked with earnest industry and surprising informality. They met in the front room of President Wilson's house, frequently with the members of the commissions, listening to different points of view. There one might have seen President Wilson himself on all fours, kneeling on a gigantic map spread upon the floor and tracing with his finger a proposed boundary, other plenipotentiaries grouped around him, also on all fours. In such matters the President took a keener interest than either Lloyd George or Clemenceau, and absorbed with extraordinary speed the salient points relating to an issue, which were frequently whispered to him by some American expert sitting on the sofa beside him. When finally approved, the draft clauses were inserted in the treaties and communicated to the nationalities of the disrupted empire. The latter, while they were apparently in the position of litigants in a suit, in reality had been kept informed of the different decisions taken and had been able at various points to influence decisions in their favor. The representatives of the new Austria and Hungary were, of course, not called to Paris until the treaties were completed, at least in their main aspects, and, like the Germans, could plead their cause only in written notes.

With certain exceptions, the boundaries finally approved conform roughly to the distribution of the several peoples, although in all matters of doubt the balance turns slightly against the former dominant nationalities —the Germans and Magyars. One of the exceptions to be noted is the case of the Austrian Tyrol, where the

demands of the Italians for annexation of the Tyrol as far north as the Brenner Pass were granted, as promised in the secret Treaty of London. It should not be forgotten that this problem was not considered by any territorial commission, since Italy refused to permit any discussion of her territorial claims except by the supreme council. France and Great Britain were bound by their promises, and President Wilson, early in the history of the Conference, agreed to Italian demands in this quarter.

To Italy the Brenner frontier appears the merest justice, for it is unquestionably the best geographical boundary and affords the surest strategical security; the importance of the latter factor was emphasized the more by Italians, inasmuch as Italy's northern frontier had in the past always been dominated by the Austrian military positions. Austria, on the other hand, while admitting the justice of the annexation by Italy of the southern Tyrol, with its 400,000 Italians, complained that the Brenner frontier would annex some 250,000 German-Austrians to Italy, and that these peoples are of all Hapsburg subjects the most loyal to Vienna; for this was the home of Andreas Hofer. Austria asked, accordingly, that the linguistic frontier, farther south, be followed in assigning political boundaries. A third solution was advanced by certain experts at Paris, and approved by many Americans, which would have placed the line about midway between the other two, thus leaving the majority of the Germans in Austria, but securing for Italy a better defensive frontier and one less injurious to the economic interests of the inhabitants than the linguistic line. The decision of President Wilson, who may have desired to convince Italy of his friendliness in

view of the Adriatic situation, settled the problem in favor of Italy.

A second exception to the general rule that the political boundary should conform roughly to the linguistic is to be found in the case of Czecho-Slovakia. The Czechs demanded not merely union with their Slovak cousins of northern Hungary, a development which in view of their services in the war was inevitable and probably wise, but also that their boundaries should be so arranged as to include a large number of Germans and Magyars. The northern rim of Bohemia is almost exclusively German and a strict application of the principle of nationality in this region, and in Moravia and Silesia, would have given something more than 3,000,000 Germans to Austria and Germany (for the creation of a separate German-Bohemian state was hardly within the realm of practical possibility). But the Czechs argued that to rob Bohemia of its geographic and historic boundary would be to lay it open to the attack of Germany from the north. Furthermore, it would deal a mortal blow at the economic life of the new state by taking away districts essential to Bohemia's industrial prosperity. The districts in question, even though inhabited by Germans, were closely bound in the economic sense to the Czech districts, and naturally separated from Germany; the inhabitants themselves would suffer from any arrangement which cut them off. Such arguments, particularly those which emphasized the economic factors, seemed valid to the commissions, which accordingly recommended the historic boundaries of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with slight rectifications. The third province, Silesia, was divided between the Czechs and the Poles.

MAP SHOWING THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE FORMER AUSTRIAN EMPIRE BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE

While the Czechs argued for historic frontiers in Austria, when it came to the Slovak districts of Hungary, they insisted that the historic boundaries of the kingdom be broken so as to permit incorporation of those districts in the new Czecho-Slovakia. They also asked that a notable Magyar minority be included on the south. Without the territory of these Magyars, Slovakia, which is a mountainous country with no transverse valleys of importance running east and west, would be deprived of practical means of communication between one part of the country and the other. Again, the commission agreed, not forgetting President Wilson's principle that every state has a right to conditions that will assure its economic life. Czecho-Slovakia is thus a polyglot, for of its 14,000,000 inhabitants there are more than a third belonging to other nationalities, chiefly Germans, Magyars, and Ruthenians.

The new Rumania, which acquired enormous territories in Transylvania, Hungary, and Bukowina, is likewise a polyglot state. This results partly from the fact that in Transylvania, which is chiefly Rumanian in character, large colonies of Magyars (Szeklers) and Germans are to be found. Furthermore, Rumania, like Czecho-Slovakia, was assigned generous frontiers on the Hungarian side in order to assure facilities of transportation. Without the railways running north and south, communication between northern and southern Transylvania would be costly or impossible. Hence the new Rumania includes a notable Magyal fringe.

The chief interest of Rumania, however, was to acquire that district in southern Hungary between the Danube, Theiss, and Maros Rivers, which is known as the Banat of Temesvar. This district, which is an economic en-

tity, was claimed by both Rumanians and Serbs, the former demanding all of it, the latter only the western portion, since the eastern third is admittedly Rumanian. The problem was intensified by the confused distribution of peoples, Serb, German, Magyar, and Rumanian villages being scattered in that Macedonian fashion which has given its name to a well-known salad. It was further intensified by the network of communications, railways, rivers, and canals, through which no frontier could be drawn without injury to the economic interests of the inhabitants. But to hand the entire region to Rumania meant the creation of an irredentist spirit among the Serbs, who claimed several districts as the homes of national heroes, who needed protection across the Danube for Belgrade, and who, in the western portions, undoubtedly outnumbered the Rumanians. With such considerations in mind, the commission decided to divide the Banat, giving the western third to the Serbs and the eastern two-thirds to the Rumanians. The decision was probably inevitable. No one will call it satisfactory. It has at least this merit: it so enraged both parties to the dispute that they forgot the enmity toward each other in their common disgust with the Peace Conference.

Whatever the disappointment occasioned to the contending nationalities of the former empire, the new boundaries of the states into which the fragments have been formed are a clear manifestation of the degree of importance assigned to the principle of nationality by the Conference. That principle was even applied to Austria and Hungary, the former being accorded districts inhabited by Germans along its eastern frontier, which by historic right belonged to Hungary. Respect for the principle of nationality forms the strong side of the

settlement. In place of the semi-feudal system of the Hapsburgs, imposing the edicts of hostile minorities upon subject majorities, outworn remnant of an age that is past, we have political power granted in accordance with popular desires. It is the principle for which American statesmen have contended since the birth of the nation.

No honest student of European conditions, however, can be blind to the new dangers which have been created. It is undeniable that a considerable stretch of territory has been Balkanized, that in place of a co-ordinating whole we find a group of small states, which by temper and experience are not as yet well qualified to meet the contingencies of the future with that moderation and spirit of compromise which is essential to tranquillity and progress. The very factors which enabled the nationalities to secure their freedom have intensified their self-confidence, their sense of nationalistic jealousy, their willingness to take up arms.

Occasion for friction between the different states will, unfortunately, not be lacking. Each state includes something of a nationalistic minority, which will look for support to its kinsmen, who form the majority in the neighboring state. Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, we have seen, include large minorities of aliens; Ruthenians are brought under the political control of Poland; Germans and Jugo-Slavs are annexed in large numbers by Italy. Jugo-Slavia includes comparatively few outsiders, but the differences between Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs do not promise a tranquil future. In the United States we think little of the dangers apt to proceed from a racial mélange, but in this part of Europe, if a man speaks a different language from that of his neighbor, he

becomes almost necessarily his enemy. With this in mind the Conference, much to the disgust of the states, drew up guarantees to be furnished to all minority groups, assuring them the protection and the justice which in this country are taken as a matter of course. How seriously these guarantees will be observed is a problem of the future.

We may also expect that difficulties will develop from economic quarrels. Three of the states formed from the Hapsburg empire are absolutely landlocked. Of these, lesser Austria is perhaps in the worst plight. Cut off from territorial access to the sea, with its capital city of 2,000,000 inhabitants placed on the eastern frontier, and poor in natural resources, the new Austria lacks many of the conditions conducive to economic prosperity. It would have been natural, in view of the purely German character of its population, to have permitted union with Germany. This was, on the whole, approved by the American delegates, as it was requested by the Austrians themselves. The French, however, set their face firmly against any acquisition of territory by the secular enemy across the Rhine. We may ask whether the six and a half million German-Austrians might not tend to counterbalance the Prussian domination in Germany, for they have much in common with the south German. Certainly union would tend toward the economic rehabilitation of these regions which is so essential to political tranquillity.

If the Conference made a mistake, the economic consequences of which may prove disastrous, in not permitting the union of lesser Austria with Germany, it committed another of equally serious character when it attempted to lay the sins of the Hapsburgs upon the new state.

The Austrian representatives at St. Germain argued with a logic which to many Americans seemed incontrovertible, that lesser Austria was in reality a new state, sprung from the revolution of November, 1918, and that it should not be punished by being forced to assume responsibility for a war debt and reparations account incurred by the Hapsburg government, with which it had no connection. In the case of Germany, the fall of the Hohenzollerns had not made a new Germany; but the Austrian revolution had resulted in the birth of a number of new states, and it was unfair to impose upon two of those states responsibility for the misdeeds of the old empire. Austria, they insisted, was as much a new state as Czecho-Slovakia. With greater force they pointed out that with a population less than a seventh that of the former Hapsburg empire, it would be physically impossible to make good the war damage for which the old empire was responsible. But the Conference persisted in treating lesser Austria with lesser Hungary as the successors of the Hapsburg empire and adopted the same method as that used in dealing with Germany; the Treaty of St. Germain compels Austria to recognize her liability to pay full reparations, although the reparations commission is given wide discretionary powers.

The same attitude was taken toward lesser Hungary. Like Austria, that state now becomes landlocked, and it has been deprived of its mountainous periphery, so rich in coal, precious metals, lumber, and water-power. But Hungary retains the fertile plain, productive of cereals, and can always feed itself. Czecho-Slovakia, the third landlocked state, has inherited the lion's share of the industrial districts of the former empire, the coal and lignite fields, the great manufactories, and also fertile

agricultural regions, so that it appears, broadly speaking, to be economically independent.

But in the case of all three of these states, which lack seaports, there is the danger that freedom of transit may be denied them by the neighboring states, through whose territory they must send their exports. Such a danger was constantly in the minds of the peacemakers at Paris, who not merely drew up general articles guaranteeing freedom of transit and international control of means of transportation, but gave to Czecho-Slovakia part of the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, and approved her claim to Pressburg on the Danube, although the population of the city included only a Czech minority. But the danger resulting from lack of seaports is none the less real, though clearly perceived at Paris and possibly mitigated to some extent by international control of communication.

That danger is intensified by the economic interdependence of the heirs of the Hapsburgs. Austria will have to import raw materials, coal and the like, from which to produce manufactured goods, and will have to export these goods to buy food. Hungary will have to exchange its grain for manufactured articles. There is always the opportunity for one state to exercise political pressure upon its neighbor through an economic boycott. It was this danger that as much as anything else convinced the commissions who worked on the new boundaries of southeastern Europe that some general supervisionary agency was necessary to replace the co-ordination that the Hapsburgs had exercised. Without such international supervision economic tranquillity and political peace would always be endangered. For this reason many of the delegates, certainly those from America,

believed that the proposed League of Nations was desirable, not merely because of its abstract idealism, but rather as a concrete necessity. And they readily appreciated the remark of Venizelos: "Without a League of Nations southeastern Europe would face the future with despair in its heart."

VI

FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM

BY DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON

The story of Fiume is closely linked with the whole problem of Italy's new frontiers. Both in the Trentino on the north and in the region of the Isonzo on the east Italy suffered before the war from frontiers which were geographically unsound, and which invited invasion by a dangerous neighbor. The boundary ran either close to the southern margin of the Alps, or actually down on the piedmont plain south of them, leaving almost the whole of the formidable mountain mass in Austria as a well-nigh impregnable defense against Italy, while Italy remained virtually defenseless against possible Austrian aggression.

It is difficult for Americans to conceive what this meant to the Italian people, for we live secure with defenseless frontiers separating us from weaker neighbors on the north and south. Yet if we are to appreciate the Italian point of view, we must try to put ourselves in the position of a people who find the gateways into their country held by an hereditary enemy, who have often suffered from invasions through those gateways in the past, and who know that they are held by the enemy for the deliberate purpose of making any possible future invasion easy. Add to this the further fact that Austria's strategic designs against Italy involved the enslavement of hundreds of thousands of Italians, both in the north

and in the east, and it is not difficult to understand that the battle-cry of "Trent and Trieste!" should awaken the fighting spirit of every patriotic Italian. Whatever the objectives of the then-existing government of Italy, it would seem clear that the great mass of the people, who knew nothing of the terms of the secret Treaty of London, entered the war not to subject large areas of Germanic and Slavonic territory to their rule, nor even to gain the port of Fiume, with its remote islet of Italian population; rather, they entered the war in a fervor of exalted patriotism, to complete the great work of unification of Italy by freeing truly Italian territory from a foreign yoke, and to drive the enemy from the very threshold of their homes back into his own domain.

Since certain aspects of the Trentino or Tyrol problem are inseparable from the story of Fiume, let us pass in brief review the salient features of that problem. The Italian Government demanded the whole Trentino to the line of the Brenner Pass, and in the secret Treaty of London the Allies promised it as part of the compensation to be given Italy for her aid against the Central Powers. At the Peace Conference Italy increased her demands, claiming in addition to what the treaty allowed her several important areas on the northern slopes of the watershed having considerable strategic importance.

As the Italian claims would certainly be supported by racial, historical, geographic, and strategic arguments, it was necessary for the American specialists to examine fully into every aspect of the problem. It is true that in the drainage basin of the Adige River, forming most of the Trentino, the majority of the population is Italian. But it is equally true that even the Italian authorities on the distribution of races in the Trentino admit that

the Italian majority is largely confined to the south, while the northern parts of the basin are overwhelmingly German and have been so for centuries. It was found possible to draw in the Trentino one of the cleanest-cut ethnographic frontiers in the world, leaving few Germans to the south and few Italians to the north of it.

A careful study of the theory that the watershed crossing the Brenner Pass was the only natural northern frontier for Italy, and that the drainage basin of the Adige River constituted an indivisible geographic unit, did not substantiate that view. In the Alps, as is so often the case in glaciated mountains, the drainage divide is in places determined by some insignificant topographic detail, such as a small moraine or a tiny alluvial fan in the bottom of a great valley. The Adige watershed, instead of following along Alpine ridges, actually descends into and cuts squarely across the floor of the Pusterthal, thus dividing in an accidental and abnormal manner one of the most striking geographic units in the Alps. The true boundary between geographic units, the real topographic barrier separating German and Italian lands in that part of the Alps east of the Brenner Pass, lies not on the watershed, but some distance south of it.

Italy's historical claim to a frontier on the Brenner Pass seemed equally weak. The former extent of the Roman Empire over the coveted area could not seriously be regarded as a basis of territorial awards in the twentieth century. The argument that Napoleon's annexation of the upper Adige to the kingdom of Italy showed the military and political necessity of granting Italy a frontier on the Brenner fell to the ground in view of the fact that the "Upper Adige" of Napoleon's time stopped far short of the Brenner and included little beyond the lands

which to-day are unquestionably Italian. If Napoleon's action proved anything, it proved that that military genius did not regard a frontier on the Brenner as vital to Italy.

Yet the strategic arguments in favor of Italy's claim to the whole of the Trentino were the strongest which could be advanced. The long, narrow form of the Italian peninsula, by rendering peculiarly difficult the mobilization of Italy's man-power, makes the need of a strong frontier on the north especially urgent. Fifty per cent of the defenders of the frontier must come from south of the constriction of the peninsula near the latitude of Bologna, and must journey to and through that constriction on four main railway lines, of which three traverse the Apennines mountain barrier and two can be destroyed from the sea. Hence, Italy might with some show of reason demand a strategic frontier so strong that in case of attack a fraction of her man-power could defend it successfully against superior enemy forces until the whole could be mobilized.

The geographic character of Italy's northern frontier compels her to maintain two campaigns against a Teutonic or a combined Teutonic-Slavonic aggression. Italy's northern plain is vulnerable from the north and from the east. The armies defending the eastern frontier depend upon supply lines which traverse the Venetian plain for 150 miles in sight of an enemy advancing over the northern mountains. Hence the eastern armies must always fight under the menace of a disaster which is inevitable if the enemy on the north succeeds in reaching the plain and cutting their communications. In the present war Cadorna's eastern operations came to an abrupt halt in May, 1916, when he was compelled to transfer large

forces westward to check the dangerous Austrian advance across the Asiago plateau almost to the edge of the plains. Irretrievable disaster to the eastern armies was narrowly averted. The magnitude of the Caporetto disaster, consequent upon the Teutonic armies' breaking through to the plains near the extreme eastern end of the northern frontier, enables one to picture the far more serious consequences which must ensue if ever the northern mountain barrier is breached farther west, and the communications of the eastern armies destroyed 150 miles in their rear.

Since Italy's military forces will not admit of two offensive campaigns against so powerful an enemy, at least one of these campaigns must be defensive. Topographic conditions dictate that the defensive campaign should be the northern one, for a successful offensive across the main Alpine barrier, supported by but one through railway line, has less chance of success than an offensive in the east, where the terrain is less difficult, railways are more numerous, and support by sea is possible. Hence we conclude that Italy's northern frontier should be strategically so strong as to render a defensive campaign in the north comparatively simple and assured of success, leaving the bulk of her forces free to defend the eastern gateways.

It so happens that the Central Alps provide a series of natural trenches and mountain barriers together constituting one of the strongest defensive terrains in the world. But the Austrian province of the Trentino drove a wedge clear through the system, rendering the defense of Italian territory extremely difficult, and assuring tremendous advantages to a possible Teutonic invasion. In the opinion of the American specialists, to

push the frontier northward only so far as the ethnographic frontier would still leave Austria, or Germany and Austria combined in case of their future union, in possession of very great strategic advantages over their Latin neighbor, advantages which might invite aggression. To push the boundary farther north, to the natural topographic barrier referred to above, would give reasonable protection to Italy by making invasion from the north so difficult as to be highly improbable, and would add the minimum German population to Italy compatible with securing a good geographic and defensive frontier for the southern Kingdom. To push the frontier clear to the Brenner and eastward into the Pustertal, as Italy asked, would be to carry it far into purely Germanic territory, to enlarge the German irredenta to dangerous proportions, and to split the geographic and economic unit of the Pusterthal. In favor of the latter proposal it could, however, be urged that the territory to the Brenner had secretly been promised to Italy by England and France in order to secure Italy's entry into the war on the Allied side, that a frontier well advanced into Germanic territory would still more effectively protect Italian territory, and that generous treatment of Italy's demands on the northern frontier, where the mountainous terrain was not in any sense vital to the development of neighboring lands, might make Italy more willing to reduce her demands on the east where she claimed areas the annexation of which would render impossible the free economic development of her neighbors.

The Conference decided in favor of the most generous fulfilment of Italian ambitions on the north, and gave her not only all the territory to the watershed frontier promised by the Treaty of London, but in addition the

Sexten valley district lying beyond the watershed and conferring important strategic advantages on its possessor. With Italy's frontier established in an impregnable position on the north, and all danger of invasion from that direction eliminated, we may now consider the eastern frontier in its proper relation to Italy's frontier problem as a whole.

On the east the Italian Government had demanded as one of the conditions of Italy's entrance into the war, and in the Treaty of London England and France had promised to give, not only the Italian-inhabited areas around Goritzia and Trieste, but vast areas of almost pure Slavonic country about the head of the Adriatic and on the eastern shores of that sea, as well as a large proportion of the Slav-populated islands fringing the eastern coast.

The American Government not only consistently refused to recognize the Treaty of London, a document held to be, both in the manner of its execution and in its precise terms, fundamentally in opposition to the very principles for which America was fighting, but early recognized the right of the Jugo-Slavs to rule themselves. President Wilson took certain other steps more or less incompatible with the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty, such as securing the consent of the Allied Powers to make peace on terms which provided for the determination of Italy's new frontiers "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." Throughout the negotiations the American Government held to the view that the Treaty of London was obsolete in view of the disappearance of Austria-Hungary as a great Power (at whose expense the treaty was to have been executed), the agreement of the Allies to erect a new Jugo-Slav

nation associated with them and Italy, the entry into the war of new nations not parties to the treaty, and the agreement of the Allies, Italy included, to make peace on a new basis of right and justice.

When, as a result of the Russian revolution, the contents of the secret Treaty of London were made public, the Jugo-Slav forces in the Austrian army, strongly disaffected toward their Teutonic master and held in control only with the greatest difficulty, were galvanized into new hostility against Italy. It was not difficult for the Austrian leaders to show that by the terms of the treaty itself Italy was not fighting to set the western Jugo-Slavs free, but rather to transfer nearly a million of them to Italian rule. The consequences were most harmful, not only to Italy, but to the whole Allied cause. Thoughtful Italians deplored the fact that much Italian blood was being shed by a people who were, like themselves, sufferers at the hands of a common enemy and oppressor.

After the Caporetto disaster Italian appreciation of this anomalous situation became more acute, and informal negotiations were begun between Italian and Jugo-Slav representatives looking toward an accord. These negotiations bore fruit in the "Pact of Rome," ratified by the Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities at Rome in April, 1918, according to which the representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav people specifically agreed "in the interests of good and sincere relations between the two peoples in the future, to solve amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the rights of peoples to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the

two nations, such as shall be defined at the moment of peace."

Later Italy, in common with the other Allies, accepted as the basis of the peace with Germany the Fourteen Points, the ninth of which read: "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."

The beneficial effects of the Rome agreement were soon apparent, for Jugo-Slavs united with Italians in pushing a vigorous propaganda to convince Jugo-Slav troops in the Austrian armies that Italy was henceforth the friend of their national aspirations, the Pact of Rome having recorded the agreement that "the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation." The propaganda was effective, and reports from independent sources gave it credit for being one of the several causes which brought about the remarkably complete disintegration of the Austrian armies revealed by their final débâcle, when in a few days, on one of the strongest defensive terrains in the world, they surrendered wholesale to the victorious Italians.

Such was the background of the thorny problem of Fiume and the Adriatic when it came before the Peace Conference. Instead of reducing their territorial demands to accord with the provisions of the Pact of Rome and the Fourteen Points, the Italian representatives believed themselves justified in increasing them even beyond the limits of the Treaty of London. While insisting upon the execution of the Treaty of London in respect to the territories which it assigned to Italy, the Italian representatives asked that it be revised where favorable to the Jugo-Slavs, in order that Fiume, definitely assigned

to Croatia by the treaty, should be given to Italy. Other territories of much strategic or economic value, lying beyond the Treaty of London line, were also included in the Italian demands. The American specialists were thus called upon to examine into the validity of Italian claims to important territories scattered all the way from the Carnic Alps past Fiume and down the Adriatic coast to and beyond Valona at the mouth of that sea.

On the basis of nationality the case was extremely clear. The Italian populations did not cease at the old Austro-Italian frontier, but were in a majority as far eastward as Goritzia and along the western margin of the Istrian peninsula from Trieste southward to Pola. Italy could thus claim on racial grounds a frontier coinciding approximately with the western base of the eastern mountain barrier. From that line eastward, however, both Italian and Jugo-Slav authorities were agreed that the Jugo-Slavs constituted an overwhelming majority of the population. A few Italians were scattered here and there along the eastern Adriatic coast, but they formed remote Latin islets in the midst of a great Slavonic sea, the two most notable of which were at Fiume and Zara. By no possible interpretation could the principle of nationality be stretched to sanction the annexation to Italy of the hundreds of thousands of Jugo-Slavs who must be subjected to Italian domination against their will if Italy's frontiers were to reach eastward over purely Slavonic territory far enough to incorporate the remote islets of Italian population. To reach the few tens of thousands of Italians in Fiume (approximately 24,000 according to the last official census, 33,000 according to Italian claims) about half a million Jugo-Slavs would have to be thus annexed.

On the basis of self-determination the case was equally clear. It was undoubtedly true that many of the Slavs used the Italian language as well as their own, and that many of them were strongly influenced by Italian culture. But against these facts and Italy's claim that in general these people were not unfavorable to her political programme concerning them, the American specialists had to weigh the overwhelming mass of testimony coming in from every possible source, which demonstrated beyond any possibility of doubt that the Jugo-Slav populations in question were deeply resentful of Italian occupation of their territories and violently opposed to any form of Italian sovereignty over them. Even the Italian representatives ceased to press this argument and rejected all proposals looking toward a solution of the vexed question on the basis of a vote by the people themselves.

The historical argument that in the days of Rome and Venice the east Adriatic coast came under the dominion of those states, and the fact that traces of Latin culture abound throughout the territories in discussion, were given full consideration. But it seemed to the specialists impossible to draw frontiers on the basis of conditions in an age that is past, when such frontiers would violate the fundamental racial and economic conditions upon which the present and future peace of Europe must rest. Whatever political systems endured for longer or shorter periods in the past, we faced the inescapable fact that the east Adriatic coast is, and long has been, overwhelmingly Slavonic, and that it intensely desired its own rule rather than that of an alien race dwelling beyond the Adriatic Sea.

On geographic and economic grounds Italy could prop-

erly claim much more than on the basis of nationality, self-determination, or history. Assuredly the old boundary across the plain west of the Isonzo River was a geographical absurdity, and a line close to the mountain base would be little better. Neither would it be wise to cut off the Slavonic populations of the mountain valleys from the Italian markets on the plain, for the two are economically mutually dependent. In the opinion of the specialists, this was one of the cases where a literal application of the Fourteen Points would work injury, and it was accordingly recommended that Italy's eastern frontier should not be determined solely along clearly recognizable lines of nationality, but that it should be pushed far eastward into Slavonic territory, so as to include not only the Italian cities at the mountain base, but in addition the Slavonic hinterland dependent upon them. The President promptly accepted this view, and agreed to the frontier recommended by the experts along the crest of the mountain barrier, the only logical frontier, geographically and economically, in the region. That it gave a solid block of more than 300,000 Jugo-Slavs to Italy was regrettable; but it seldom if ever happens that the racial frontier, the economic frontier, the natural geographic frontier, and the historical or political frontier coincide in any given district. It is necessary to weigh each case on its merits, and to seek that line which will, all things considered, work the maximum of good and the minimum of injury to the vital interests of those directly concerned. In the present case this line followed high mountain ridges and barren limestone plateaus, separating the natural hinterland of Trieste on the west from the natural hinterland of Fiume on the east.

As in the case of the northern frontier, so in that of

the eastern, strategic arguments loomed larger than all others. Here, as in the Trentino, Austria had enjoyed strategic advantages which made Italy's successful defense of her own territory against hostile aggression extremely difficult, if not impossible. With the disappearance of Austria as a world power, and with the substitution of a new, small, and comparatively weak nation on Italy's eastern border, the strategic argument would seem to have lost much of its weight. Nevertheless, it was given serious consideration, and the details of the so-called "American line," already located wholly in Slavonic territory in a dominating position on the mountain barrier, were so drawn as to insure to Italy strong tactical positions which would enable her to block the available passes with ease in case of enemy attack. The line was deemed strategically strong as well as economically and geographically good.

Strategic arguments alone could justify Italian claims to extensive territory in Dalmatia and on the east-coast islands, inhabited almost wholly by Jugo-Slavs. The mountainous, ragged eastern coast of the Adriatic, with its numerous harbors, is in strong contrast with the low, simple western coast, where harbors are few in number and inferior in quality. Any naval power on the eastern coast must find itself possessing immense advantages over Italy. A fleet taking refuge in one of the Italian harbors is visible from far out to sea because of the flatness of the coast, whereas vessels secreted along the eastern shore are invisible behind mountain barriers. From the low western coast observation of an approaching squadron is limited as compared with the better observation enjoyed by those on the dominating heights of the eastern shores. Coast defense artillery has little

choice of inferior positions on the Italian side and unlimited choice of excellent positions on the eastern coast. A fleet emerging from one of the western harbors to give battle may be taken unawares before it can develop its battle formation, while a fleet manœuvring behind the protective fringe of islands along the east coast may emerge from a number of passages simultaneously and assume a predetermined formation without delay. The Italian submarines scouting along the eastern shores find the bottom rough and deep, so that lying in wait for an enemy is a dangerous proceeding, while the enemy submarine finds shallow water and a smooth bottom upon which to lie concealed pending the passage of a prospective victim. The clear waters along the eastern coast reveal hidden mines or submarines to the scouting hydroplane, while the murkier waters bordering the Italian coast make it difficult for Italian observers to locate enemy submarines or mines sown by enemy craft. Even in the matter of illumination the Italians are at a great disadvantage. Raids are usually made by crossing the sea under the cover of darkness and appearing off the enemy coast in the early morning. When a raider thus appears off the Italian coast, his objective is well illuminated by the rising sun; whereas the Italian artillerymen must look into the sun when firing upon their attacker. And when an Italian squadron appears off the eastern coast, it finds its objective obscured by the shadow of high cliffs and must look toward the sun when developing its fire, the while its own vessels are so well illuminated as to form excellent targets for the east-coast batteries.

On such arguments as these Italy might claim the need of special consideration in the Adriatic. The three keys

to naval domination of this sea are the great naval base and harbor of Pola, controlling the northern Adriatic; the mountain-girt, impregnable harbor of Valona, guarding the southern Adriatic and the exit into the Mediterranean; and some central base, as in the Lissa group of islands midway between Pola and Valona. These key positions could not be assigned to Italy without marked departures from the principles of nationality; but here again it was deemed wise to accord a generous response to the Italian point of view, and to assure her absolute security for her eastern coast. The President early announced his willingness to see all three key positions—Pola, Valona, and Lissa—assigned to Italy. Thus was Italy assured absolute supremacy in the Adriatic, along with strategically strong frontiers on the east and north.

That no attempt was made to apply with strictness in Italy's case the principle of nationality, the right of self-determination, or the Fourteen Points, is evident from the fact that every mile of Italy's new frontiers, from Switzerland to Valona, as recommended by the American experts and accepted by the President, lay far within alien territory from which Italians were nearly or completely absent. Whether such wide departures from a strict application of the principles upon which it was proposed to execute the peace were justified by geographic, economic, and strategic considerations, and by the peculiar difficulties presented by the Italian settlement, is a question of opinion lying beyond the scope of this discussion. Here we are solely concerned with the fact that such departures appeared both necessary and advisable to the American delegation.

But the Italian representatives demanded far more than is included in the limits described above. At the

head of the Adriatic they asked that the Italian frontier should be carried well beyond the crest of the mountain barrier down into the Jugo-Slav lands to the east, expanding their claims beyond the Treaty of London line at a number of critically important points, and demanding, among other things, the city and district of Fiume, containing the only practicable port for the new Jugo-Slav nation, and specifically reserved to Croatia in the Treaty of London. On the Dalmatian coast a vast area of the mainland and a large proportion of the islands, the former expanded beyond the Treaty of London terms by the addition of a request for the port of Spalato, were included in the Italian programme. Control over all of Albania, instead of the portion tentatively assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London, was asked. The Italian representatives felt that Italy was entitled to increased compensation partly because the war had lasted longer than anticipated, and partly because the collapse of Russia had thrown a heavier burden upon Italy than was foreseen when the Treaty of London was negotiated.

The American experts studied the full Italian claims with the greatest care, and advised the President and other American commissioners of their findings. From the racial point of view it was clear that the Italians constituted a very small minority in each mainland area, and in the group of islands claimed by them. In this connection it must always be carefully borne in mind that while the Italian representatives supported their claims to Fiume and Zara with the contention that those localities contained Italian majorities, they demanded the *port of Fiume and much additional territory on the west*, together with the portion of the port in the suburb of Susak, on the southeast; also the *district of Zara and*

surrounding territory sufficiently large to give the tiny Italian town breathing space. As both Fiume and Zara, thus delimited, contained a majority of Jugo-Slavs, the argument that the principle of nationality favored the Italian claims was always invalid. The Italian representatives doubtless realized, as did the representatives of other countries, that a tiny morsel of Italian territory in the midst of a Slavonic sea was an anomaly which could not hope to endure; and at no time during the Peace Conference negotiations did they restrict their demands to areas having an Italian majority, or to which the argument of nationality could apply with results favorable to Italy. Much confusion has resulted from the failure to understand that the Fiume and Zara claimed by Italy were entirely different entities from the restricted Fiume and Zara represented as containing Italian majorities.

From the economic standpoint it was evident that the granting of Italy's claims must have disastrous consequences for the newly recognized Jugo-Slav nation. The area claimed in Dalmatia was found to be economically the most valuable portion of the province. It is a large tract of comparatively low-lying territory along the coast, and was so outlined as effectively to block one of the few practicable routes from the interior across the Balkan mountains to the sea. Fiume, the only practicable port for Jugo-Slavia, for reasons which will appear fully below, would be in a foreign country. Much of the rest of the coast would be blocked by a cordon of Italian islands and Italian territorial waters. Under these conditions it seemed fair to say that Italy would literally possess a strangle-hold upon the economic development of her neighbor. It was not necessary to accuse the Italian

people of any desire to exercise the tremendous power which they would thus acquire in order to appreciate the evident danger to future peace in the Balkans which must result from sanctioning an arrangement so manifestly inequitable and so pregnant with possibilities of trouble. It could not be forgotten that one of the potent causes of unrest in the Balkans had long been the mistaken policy of blocking Serbia's efforts to obtain "free and secure access to the sea."

The possible political consequence of sanctioning Italy's desire to obtain a solid foothold in the Balkans through control of Albania and the annexation of Slavonic territories, against the bitter protests of both peoples concerned, appeared most grave. The people who were rejoicing over the elimination of Austrian interference in Balkan affairs were evidently equally hostile to anything which might savor of Italian interference. Under these conditions it was believed that to grant Italy's claims to the eastern islands and mainland must be to sow the seeds of a new Balkan conflict.

When examined from the standpoint of strategic geography the three main areas along the eastern Adriatic coast claimed by Italy were seen to possess tremendous military value. It was the manifest duty of the American specialists, without in the least degree questioning the motives actuating the Italian claims, to study the inevitable consequences which must necessarily follow upon granting them. It seemed obvious that the Fiume region and adjacent territory at the head of the Adriatic, by dominating the great northwestern gateway into the Balkans; the Dalmatian region and coastal islands by controlling the central route across the mountains into the interior and closing the ship passages to and from

the mainland harbors; and Albania with Valona, by commanding the most important southern routes into the Balkans and blocking access to and egress from the Adriatic Sea, did in effect constitute three extremely strong and admirably located military bridge-heads, assuring to Italy the possibility of moving her armies across the Adriatic and advancing them into the Balkans, should occasion require. With the mouth of the Adriatic sealed by a barrage protected by naval units based on Valona, the lines of sea communication across the Adriatic from Italy to the bridge-heads would be secure from outside interference. Every direct access to the sea possessed by the Jugo-Slav lands would be blocked, and the power of resistance to an Italian advance enormously curtailed. Assuredly if the three areas in question had been specifically and solely claimed with the express purpose of gaining for Italy firm political and economic footholds on the eastern Adriatic as bases for future expansion into the Balkans, capable of serving as military bridge-heads for armed support of that expansion if need be, they could not have been better adapted to serve such purposes.

The territorial specialist must judge claims on their essential merits and not with respect to the motives which prompt them, since obviously governments and motives may change while the acts and their consequences endure. It is appropriate, nevertheless, in order to show that the significance of the three areas discussed above is not a figment of the imagination, to note the fact that well-informed and influential circles in Italy frankly declared that the object of the proposed annexations was to establish political, economic, and military bridge-heads on the eastern side of the Adriatic, in order

to assure Italy's future expansion in the Balkans. The following quotation from the *Giornale d'Italia* of July 4, 1919, is of more than ordinary interest because that paper was generally regarded as the mouthpiece of Baron Sonnino. It is part of a defense of the policy of the Orlando-Sonnino government published shortly after that government had fallen from power. After rebuking certain influential Italian elements for refusing to admit "the strategic, political, and economic reasons for which Italy must set foot in Dalmatia, thereby constituting with Istria and Albania the triple bridge-head for expansion in the Danubian and Balkan system, which expansion is feared by others and is the true motive of the resistance offered to our Adriatic claims," and stating that it is now necessary "to put our cards on the table," the defense enumerates the following objects, which Orlando and Sonnino had in view in consenting to discuss at Paris the so-called "Tardieu project" for a free state of Fiume:

First. Annexing to Italy the whole of Istria, even including that part of eastern Istria which Wilson denies us.

Second. Giving to the small free state of Fiume such a statute as would have effectively placed it for fifteen years under our government through the long arm of a local government faithful to us, pending its eventual annexation to Italy.

Third. Saving in Dalmatia the harmonious system of Zara-Sebenico and the islands, while leaving Jugo-Slavia a part of the interior; but thus establishing an adequate political, economic, and military bridge-head, together with a substantial guarantee of the Italianità of Dalmatia and full security against any future contingency.

Fourth. Having Albania under mandate and thus insuring through its integrity and national independence our influence, our expansion, and our strategic safety.

In view of all the considerations enumerated and of others which cannot be dealt with in this short review, the American specialists reported that the handing over to Italy of the areas in question would be wholly unjustifiable and extremely dangerous. In addition to the advice of the territorial specialists, the President had before him the reports of naval and military students of the question, of special investigators in the Adriatic region, and other expert opinions. There was remarkable unanimity in the conclusion that the coveted territories could on no basis of justice or right be assigned to Italy. The French and British specialists, consulted informally, were of the same opinion, and it is an open secret that the French and British Governments, while loyal to their engagements and maintaining their readiness to execute the terms of the Treaty of London if Italy required it, nevertheless felt strongly that under the entirely new conditions created by the disappearance of Austria-Hungary from the Adriatic and the agreement to recognize the right of the Jugo-Slavs to govern themselves in a new federated nation, Italy's annexation of the territories in question was neither just nor wise.

There followed a long series of negotiations, in the course of which Italy reduced her demands in Dalmatia and among the east-coast islands, but sought at the same time to maintain in its essential integrity the system of three bridge-heads on the Balkan shore, and to pave the way for the early annexation of Fiume. Little progress was made with Orlando and Sonnino, and after their retirement the *Giornale d'Italia* correctly

stated that this Italian delegation, in consenting to discuss the so-called "Tardieu project" (one of many compromise suggestions), "had not allowed itself to be caught in any actual and substantial concessions. And, in fact, if that scheme, together with the amendments which our delegates had ready, had been approved, we should have achieved all the claims of the London Pact, with the exception of a strip of the Dalmatian hinterland and of a few islands of no military importance; and in addition would have created at Fiume a situation genuinely Italian and susceptible of certain transformation in time into annexation to Italy."

It would not be profitable to trace the history of the negotiations, which dragged out over many long months, although in a more friendly spirit in view of the conciliatory spirit of the new Nitti government. Attention soon centred on the Fiume region, the most important and dangerous of the three bridge-heads, and the one over which the Italians were most insistent on gaining control.

A glance at a good physical map will show that the Dinaric Alps, a broad belt of wild and rugged mountainous country, intervenes between the interior of the Balkan peninsula and the Adriatic Sea. South of Fiume this range is crossed by but two or three narrow-gauge railroads, wholly inadequate to serve the commercial needs of the interior. The only standard-gauge road crosses the mountain barrier at its narrowest point, opposite Fiume. The geographic conditions are such as permanently to preclude any cheap and effective rail transport across the broad part of the barrier; hence Fiume, advantageously situated opposite the narrowest part, and at the head of a sea that makes water transportation both cheap and easy, is the inevitable economic outlet

for the northern part of Jugo-Slavia. Physical conditions render Buccari and other suggested substitutes unavailable.

Nearly all of the standard-gauge railroad system of Jugo-Slavia is in the latitude of Fiume, because the fertile river plains of the country are largely confined to that region; because nearly two-thirds of the people live in these plains and valleys; because railroad construction is easy and comparatively inexpensive there; and because there is sufficient local traffic to maintain the roads and keep rates down. Thus it will be seen that the life of the Jugo-Slav nation is to an unusual degree concentrated in the north of the country, and as the railroad system upon which this economic life depends has its only direct outlet to the sea at Fiume, it has well been said that the power that holds Fiume holds the life of an entire nation in its hands. Hence the peculiar value of Fiume as a base from which to exert economic, political, and military power in the Balkans.

In view of the facts that Italy had no need of Fiume, whereas for Jugo-Slavia and adjacent lands to the north it constituted an absolute necessity for their free economic development; that the future expansion of the port must be financed by those to whom it was an economic necessity; that it could not be annexed to Italy without placing under her domination an overwhelming majority of Jugo-Slavs; and that it was by treaty definitely promised to one branch of the Jugo-Slav people by the Allies (including Italy herself) it was held that, regardless of what a majority of the very mixed population of the city of Fiume might desire, the first principles of justice and the prosperity of the port required that Italy's demand for Fiume must be rejected.

The American specialists did, however, examine into the claims that Fiume was in majority Italian, and that the city had by "self-determination" proclaimed its unalterable will to be annexed to Italy. They found that only in the so-called *corpus separatum* of Fiume, which includes a part only of the port of Fiume, did the Italians outnumber the Jugo-Slavs; that even here, according to the last official census, there was only a relative, not an absolute, majority of Italians (not quite 50 per cent of the total population); that this number included many Italians who still retained their citizenship in Italy; and, finally, that even this relative majority was of comparatively recent date and probably resulted from artificial encouragement by the Hungarian Government, which had a comprehensible interest in developing an alien rather than a Slavonic majority in the city. But the *corpus separatum* of Fiume is not all of the real city and port. The Italian representatives asked for the whole port, including the part in the suburb of Susak. When Susak is included, even the relative Italian majority disappears, and the Jugo-Slavs constitute the absolute majority of the population.

The claim that Fiume had, by exercising the right of self-determination, proclaimed her will to be annexed to Italy could not be substantiated. This claim rested upon the speech of Ossoinack, deputy from Fiume, in the Hungarian Parliament, October 18, 1918, and upon certain proclamations and other manifestations of later date. The stenographic report of Ossoinack's address as submitted showed that he only demanded for the city the right of self-determination, and that Fiume should "be Italian in the future as it had always been Italian in the past." Even had he made any demand for political

union with Italy, which did not appear to be the case, the expression of a single deputy elected on a limited suffrage could not be called self-determination. Immediately after the Hungarian authorities evacuated the city, a group of Italians and Italian sympathizers constituted themselves into the Italian National Council of Fiume, and proclaimed the annexation of Fiume to Italy. The following day this proclamation was approved by some sort of a convocation of citizens. Later, renewed expressions of a desire for annexation were proclaimed. All of these manifestations appeared to have been most irregular, and took place under the direction of a self-constituted and unrepresentative body of citizens from which Jugo-Slav sympathizers were excluded, or under Italian military occupation which was accompanied by the imprisonment and deportation of Jugo-Slavs manifesting opposition to the Italian programme. There was no evidence that the people of Fiume had ever had an opportunity to express freely their will. Indeed, it seemed not improbable that the large Jugo-Slav vote, augmented by that of other nationalities and of Italians whose interests in the commercial activities of the port led them to fear the economic consequences of union with Italy, would give a majority against annexation, were that vote permitted to be cast without the coercive influence of Italian military occupation, which had from the first effectively stifled all free expression of public opinion in Fiume.

Such, then, was the complex of considerations surrounding the thorny Fiume question. After it had been carefully examined by the chiefs of the Italian, Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan divisions of the territorial staff, as well as by the chiefs of the divisions of Economics and Boundary Geography, who approached the problem from

their respective points of view, these united in submitting to the President their unanimous opinion that the Italian claims to Fiume could not be recognized, and that no arrangement should be sanctioned which threatened future external interference with the development and use of the port by those who alone had any valid claim upon it.

Throughout the negotiations the American delegation maintained this position; and if the deadlock continued, it was not due to differences over details, but to the fundamental fact that all arrangements proposed by Italy must inevitably have had the effect of preventing the normal development and use of Fiume by threatening the freedom of the port and insuring its early annexation to Italy. But while maintaining inviolate the principle that it would not unite in forcing upon a weak nation against its protest a solution of the Fiume problem which it regarded as flagrantly unjust and fraught with grave danger for the future peace of the world, and which both England and France sought on occasions to induce Italy to abandon, the American delegation made extensive concessions in the effort to reach an amicable solution. The Sexten valley and the Tarvis basin, both beyond the Treaty of London line, the Lussin and Pelagosa groups of islands, as well as the remaining islands of the Lissa group, the Albona coal region in Istria, and finally a mandate over a united Albania, were offered to Italy, in addition to the territorial concessions already described, which everywhere carried Italy's frontiers far into alien lands. On the other hand, the American representatives frequently expressed their willingness to see the whole Adriatic question solved by any fair and equitable procedure. Solutions by arbitration, by vari-

ous forms of plebiscites, and by placing the disputed territories under the League of Nations were proposed at various times; but the Italian representatives did not feel that any of these solutions would prove satisfactory to Italy.

The latter stages of the negotiations and the ultimate initiation of direct discussions between the Italian and Jugo-Slav governments are all set forth in published notes and despatches. It could not be expected that Italy and Jugo-Slavia would meet on an equal footing in the recent negotiations, when Italians held the disputed territory, and were backed by the pledge of the French and British to execute the Treaty of London in case the Jugo-Slavs failed to accept some other solution satisfactory to the Italians. The political situation in America had by this time eliminated this country as a factor in any European territorial settlement, and the Jugo-Slavs alone faced the Italian representatives backed by the French and British, the two latter committed by treaty obligations and anxious to get through with an awkward problem at almost any cost. The terms of the Rapallo Treaty reflect this situation.

In the north the Jugo-Slavs yield a large expanse of purely Slavonic lands east of the natural frontier, thus bringing Italian sovereignty to the very doors of a nominally independent Fiume. The islands dominating the entrance to the Gulf of Fiume go to Italy, as does also the Lagosta group of islands near the centre of the east coast. In Dalmatia Italy receives Zara with a surrounding district greatly reduced from that demanded during the Paris negotiations, while the island of Lissa, earlier offered to Italy, apparently goes to Jugo-Slavia. In effect Italy obtains strategic and other advantages which

strengthen her foothold on the Fiume bridge-head, endanger the free economic development and the independence of the port of Fiume, and create a Slav Irredenta of serious proportions on her eastern frontier. On the other hand, when the reported terms are compared with Italy's original demands, it will be clear that the firm refusal of the American representatives to sanction the Italian programme of sweeping annexations, coupled with the moderating influence of the Nitti and Giolitti governments, has achieved the emancipation of several hundred thousand Jugo-Slavs, and made the ultimate settlement far less harmful and unjust than it would otherwise have been. It is but fair to state that whatever amelioration of the harsh terms of the Adriatic settlement has been accomplished, despite the commitments of an unfortunate secret diplomacy, is due primarily to the firm stand of President Wilson in favor of equal justice for both great and small nations.

VII

CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS[1]

BY ISAIAH BOWMAN

It is not an exaggeration to say that men now look out upon world conditions and upon peoples almost unknown until yesterday much as men looked out upon the world at the threshold of the Age of Discovery. People everywhere have been shaken violently out of their former routine. The aspects of life familiar before the war have in most cases been strangely altered. The current of the individual's life as well as the current of national life has been diverted into new channels. Paderewski, when asked if he found it difficult to face the crowds of Warsaw on his first appearance there two years ago, said that though he expected to have stage fright, actually he felt quite at ease, and that he supposed it was due to experience in facing audiences during his musical career. "You know I used to play," he said. "Yes," replied his listener, "I used to hear you."

A few years ago the Balkan wars were a matter of paramount public interest. Vast uncontrollable forces were then unloosed. No man could have foreseen the way in which they were to lead through the World War to the present chaos. Now we look back upon them as incidents; the stage of the world has been reset. The word "Balkanized" has become the familiar epithet of

[1] Most of the data for this article and some entire paragraphs are taken from my book entitled "The New World: Problems in Political Geography," published by World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, 1921.

the journalist. What have the Allied leaders done to better the political conditions of this "dark and bloody ground" of Central Europe?

Whatever practical considerations were brought to the peace conference of Paris by the European powers—and there were indeed a multitude—it remains a fact that never before in the history of the world was there put beside these practical considerations a group of idealistic principles which, winning "here a little, there a little," were finally, by the processes of fate, to end in a vital struggle both in the field of our own domestic politics and in the material field of Allied interests.

We may take the partisan view that the idealism faded and died, or we may take the view that here and there something was accomplished that was far better than the world had known hitherto. Whatever view we hold, it must not be supposed that because of the great clamor of criticism against the peace treaties other leaders could have united more effectively upon a programme of settlement. From the first there was confusion concerning the objects of the war and of the peace treaties. With the whole fabric of society torn and disfigured it was natural that there should be many divergences of opinion as to the manner by which it could be restored. To some the war meant political freedom, to others the liberation of oppressed minorities. The freedom of the seas meant one thing to Germany and another to England. To one group in Russia self-determination meant independence, to another autonomy, to a third the rule of the proletariat. One soldier from America might hope for better working conditions at home, while another thought only of helping France or beating Germany, or possibly of a glorious adventure or a chance to follow

the invisible banners of the spirit. Men suffered and died for different objects.

When the peace treaties came to be framed every person hoped to have his special object achieved; otherwise he would be disappointed. So diverse were the hopes of different nations and peoples that no set of formulæ could have been found to fit Allied purposes. The Fourteen Points of President Wilson received almost universal approval, because they were put into general terms. The vast scale of the losses, the bitterness of the military contest, was such that the moment that specific settlements were proposed every interested party felt betrayed. Each delegation felt that only its brand of "doxy" was orthodoxy.

If there was confusion, it is also true that never before were the peoples of the world all talking at once, as befitted the end of a war that embraced the world. A delegation from Orawa in the foothill region of the Carpathians came to Paris in native peasant costume to argue union with Poland; Jugo-Slav representatives came to argue against Italian ownership of Fiume; Macedonians came looking for the millennium. Each one of the Central European nationalities had its own bagful of statistical and cartographical tricks. When statistics failed, use was made of maps in color. It would take a huge monograph to contain an analysis of all the types of map forgeries that the war and the peace conference called forth. A new instrument was discovered—the map language. A map was as good as a brilliant poster, and just being a map made it respectable, authentic. A perverted map was a life-belt to many a foundering argument. It was in the Balkans that the use of this process reached its most brilliant climax.

It is no error of political judgment to suppose that any international agreement of the immediate future or any international policy, whether it relates to frontiers, commercial opportunities, or the formation of a government, will have a far greater number of unfriendly critics than supporters. America has yet to frame its new programme. To have that programme accepted it will have to deal with much the same kind of humanity; it will have to deal with essentially the same human leaders that met in 1919, and back of the leaders stand the common people with their nationalistic and at times uncontrollable aspirations and their simple and easily betrayable sense of right and wrong.

Constantinople

Had the secret Treaty of London of April, 1915, been made public, the world would have discovered, in less than nine months from the opening of the World War, that the objects of the war had completely changed. The orbit of political thought could no longer be calculated from the events of July and August, 1914. As President Wilson said in 1918, with full world approval, "whatever the causes of the war, the objects have changed." The great principle of the Allied commanders in the field and in the foreign offices was to augment and solidify the power opposed to Germany and her allies, and this could be done in the case of the materially minded only by offering material advantages. Though granting full credit to the noble idealism that pervaded a part of their people, it is yet true that Italy, Greece, and Russia were to be paid for a part of their services, and Constantinople and Dalmatia were as so much cash in hand.

From that time until the break between the Bolshevists and the Allies, Constantinople was looked upon as an ultimate prize of war. Instead of Russian control of Constantinople, as promised in 1915, we have Allied control. Instead of a free commercial passage with international guarantees of equality and security, but with a Russian flag, we have a so-called Zone of the Straits, to be administered by a commission of the League of Nations. While this arrangement is to be carried out through the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (August, 1920), it is interesting to note that it was suggested in principle by the head of the American Government on January 8, 1918, and that this view corresponded with the recommendations of "The Inquiry" (organized under Colonel House) in a memorandum to the President dated January 2, 1918. In this memorandum it was urged, among other things, that there should be friendly intercourse through and across the Straits, and that international administration be invoked to the end that the Straits should remain a commercial passage or should form part of an international zone.

It is not my purpose to expound either the historical or the commercial importance of Constantinople. That theme has been presented so often that I could hardly expect to add anything new or particularly illuminating. The Ukrainian section of southern Russia has in the past generation undergone significant economic change. The iron and coal deposits have invited capital and labor. A period of increasing agricultural production has corresponded with a period of rapid industrial development in Germany, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, and the growing export of cereals has been one of the chief sources of wealth. Manganese and petroleum from

Transcaucasia and even the dairy products of western Siberia have in some measure at least been turned toward the commercial focus of Constantinople. Here gathered Austrian, Russian, British, Dutch, Italian, and Greek shipping. Looking ahead for a period of fifty years one can see that both from its geographical position and from its economic and political importance Constantinople was to take a place in the modern world that accorded not with the ambitions and perspective of the Turk but with the view of the Western powers. It was to resume once more somewhat the place that it had as one of that group of four cities on or near the eastern Mediterranean —Constantinople, Athens, Rome, Jerusalem—from which for centuries have emanated religious and political movements of the first order.

I shall merely touch upon the place of Constantinople in the German political scheme. The enterprise of her merchants and diplomats was substantially rewarded. In the period 1887–1910 Turkish imports of German goods rose from 6 to 21 per cent, and of Austrian goods from 13 to 21 per cent. In the same period the imports of English goods fell from 60 to 35 per cent; the imports of French goods from 18 to 11 per cent. Between 1908 and 1911 German contractors obtained harbor concessions at Alexandretta and concessions for a railway line from Basra to Bagdad in territory of great strategic importance to India and the Far East, and in relation to the politics and commerce of the Mohammedan world. In 1913 General Liman von Sanders headed a German military mission at Constantinople, which thereafter practically controlled the Ottoman army.

The city of Constantinople is an important source of the revenues of the Turkish state. It is the most impor-

tant focus of trade in Turkey. Its entries in the year 1910–1911 amounted to 31½ per cent of the total imports, with Smyrna and Saloniki 10 per cent each. In exports, however, Smyrna led with 20.6 per cent, and Constantinople ranked second with 9 per cent. It has also been the chief focus of Turkish political life for a period antedating the discovery of America by forty years. Representatives of the various sections of Turkey have come here. It is the seat of the council of administration of the Ottoman foreign debt. With the capital retained at Constantinople instead of in an interior location, there is a better hold upon the functionaries of the state, a readier access to them, a more convenient centre for the spread of Allied influence in connection with the maintenance of the principle of the Ottoman public debt as of 1914, which continues to be administered in favor of the bondholders in order that the debt may be ultimately extinguished.

If we throw the position of the Turk at Constantinople against the background of fact and judgment that I have briefly sketched, I think we shall have far more patience, and, if I may say so, resignation. Every one expected the Turk to be kicked out of Europe. Following the defeat of the Turk at the second siege of Vienna, in 1683, he has been pushed step by step toward the southeastern corner of the Balkan peninsula. Here was the long-hoped-for opportunity to overwhelm him, and here apparently there should have been no revival of that historic rivalry between England and Russia which prolonged the stay of the unspeakable Turk. To many it seemed a betrayal of one of the Allied purposes to leave him there.

But here, again, we are dealing with one of the actuali-

ties of life, not with its ideologies. Constantinople is still to a great many Mohammedans the focus of their religious world. From Constantinople proceeded for many years an authority that extended over 260,000,000 people. Though a rival appeared during the war in the sherif of Mecca (the king of the Hedjaz), who not only refused to acknowledge the authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople, but even fought against the Turks, his influence was in the main confined to the Arab world. North and east of the Arab world, particularly in Anatolia, Persia, and India, were Mohammedans who still looked to Constantinople for religious leading, and among these were one group of 66,000,000 Mohammedans in northwestern India who had it in their power to set in motion vast and evil forces. Were they to attempt to disrupt the Indian Empire or even to turn their large section of India into a state of anarchy, the British might be unable to restore peace.

Thus the Mohammedan question, focussed at Constantinople, leads into a maze of vital problems in the fields of religion and colonies and sea-borne trade and international politics. French and Italian as well as British and Greek interests are involved. Let us look at a particular aspect of the matter—the relation of Constantinople to the powerful secret societies or confraternities among the Mohammedan populations. "Confraternities" is a general or collective name for the various religious societies of the Mohammedan world, of which there are from fifty to one hundred scattered from Morocco to Bagdad. Almost every male Moslem is a member of one of these societies.

The confraternities came into existence in an interesting way. After Mohammed's death Mohammedanism

changed its aspect. It reached into the field of law and gave religious authority to the words and decrees of the lawyers. The rulers, on their side, also sought to control the church and make it an instrument of military and political conquest. In addition, the Turks and the Arabs developed strong racial and then political animosities. In reaction to all these changes pious men of strong character founded sects or fraternities, withdrew to a remote region, gathered disciples, and built monasteries.

Some of these societies were widely known and their influence reached from one end of the Moslem world to the other; others were quite obscure and local. Some have lived for a long time; others went out of existence almost with the death of the original founder. Some were military in spirit; others were pacifistic. Some of them have become great missionary agencies whose chief goal has been the great interior of Africa, where they would be far from the arm of European authority and where there are millions of ignorant, superstitious negroes to convert.

The most powerful of the African societies is the Senussi, which, with a quite special character, has been in existence for about eighty years. Though at first free from all political influence, the Senussi gradually were drawn into political relations which have affected their later development. They strongly resisted the coming of the Italians after the Italo-Turkish War, feeling that with Italian control over the northern seaports, the lucrative trade in slaves and control of the caravan routes would be affected. Between 1912 and 1914 they were supplied with arms, ammunition, and money by the Turks, and thus were able to resist successfully the

Italian advance into the interior of Cyrenaica. With the outbreak of war in August, 1914, Turkish agencies became active in Libya and Tripoli, and the Italian forces were driven back nearer the coast. As the war progressed, the leader of the Senussi became more and more ambitious and desired to make himself sovereign of the Moslem world. He attacked the Egyptian border from three points, the central one being the oasis of Siwa; but the British defeated this movement and finally, in February, 1917, drove him out of Siwa.

While the confraternities represent in some respects a disruptive force in Mohammedan life—they have often quarrelled with each other and with the central religious authority—yet their fanaticism is always aroused by any consolidation of threatening power on the part of the Christian "infidel." The recent report of Tilho's work (*Geographical Journal*, London, 1920), during the war period, in the desert region northeast of Lake Tchad, in the border of the Tibesti highlands, illuminates this point. The virtually annual military expeditions of the British in the neighboring districts of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan also clearly show the constant strain involved in maintaining order in a remote desert region sprinkled with strongholds maintained by fanatical tribesmen.

When we consider the geographical distribution of the military expeditions and the cost that they involve, and especially when we view the generally unsettled state of the world, shall we not agree that a policy of conciliation in dealing with the Turk is wholly justified? Is the social and political wreck of the whole border of the Mohammedan world not too great a price to pay for the driving of the Turk from Europe? For his presence at Constantinople is a mere shadow. The armed forces about the Sul-

tan are limited to 700 guards. The total armed forces of Turkey shall not exceed 50,000 men, and these are to be distributed regionally by a military inter-Allied commission of organization in collaboration with the Turkish Government. The fortifications of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and on adjacent islands of the northeastern Ægean, are to be demolished, together with purely military roads and other works. In practice Allied war-ships occupy strategic positions, and doubtless will always remain there if the Treaty of Sèvres is confirmed. At a moment's notice the feeble military forces of the Turk in Europe could be extinguished. That a patch of the map of Europe should be colored in a way to correspond with Anatolia may seem a pity to the unthinking, but it has no significance whatever in reality. A centuries-old hope of the Western powers has been realized. Effectively the Turk is no longer in Europe.

Constantinople, seen in this light, is one of a number of world objects which can be protected only by a continuance of Allied solidarity. If the Allies fall apart old jealousies will be revived and new groupings formed, and Constantinople will once more become a prize of old-style diplomacy. This will not only be of advantage to the Turk; it will revive the rivalry of the Balkan states, and it would almost certainly bring Russia back into a programme of expansion and result in the nationalistic control of what the world has long agreed should be an international waterway.

What may happen may be judged by the status of the place since 1918. With the occupation by the Allied fleet it was changed from a commercial thoroughfare to a military base. Franchet d'Esperey became the leader of the Allied land forces in the region, and detachments

of French troops were distributed through the eastern Balkans. Commissions of control were located at important points in Bulgaria and in eastern and western Thrace; and individual French officers were stationed at Budapest, Lemberg, and other critical localities. Constantinople also became the base for British and French activities, the one in the Caucasus and the other in the Ukraine.

Between the French and British some sort of agreement appears to have been reached that looked toward French control of the Ukraine as a French sphere of influence, and British control of the Baltic and of the Caucasus as British spheres of influence. Sydorenko and Panyeko brought to various members of the American delegation a document which has since been published in an American periodical, purporting to represent the claims of France upon the Ukraine, late in 1918, and these claims included French control of railways, finance, and the Ukrainian general staff. It is alleged that the withdrawal of the French from Odessa early in 1919 was due to the refusal of the Ukrainians to accept the terms which the French proposed. British occupation of the Transcaucasus region was terminated soon afterward, when it became evident that only a strong land force could maintain order.

Thus, in the interval since the armistice with Turkey in October, 1918, Constantinople has been governed by army authorities which have had in view two objects: first, the military control of the city and the Straits, and, second, the use of Constantinople as a base of both military and political operations in regions political and strategically tributary to the Straits. In Allied hands Constantinople has changed its rôle, and we have as a

result of the change a clearer understanding of the precise objects which the Allied governments have historically associated with this important focus.

In order to set the point which we have just considered into higher relief, let us look at two quite concrete aspects of the Constantinople question—the primacy of British shipping in the region of the Straits and the economic situation of Bulgaria with respect to its foreign trade, for the latter country has lost advantages which it formerly enjoyed, and it is under a handicap in the process of reconstruction. Who makes a corresponding gain?

In 1913–1914 the approximate totals of ship tonnage in the Black Sea, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf were, by nationalities, as follows:

British	14,000,000	tons
Austro-Hungarian	6,500,000	"
Russian	5,500,000	"
Turkish	5,000,000	"
Italian	4,000,000	"
French	4,000,000	"
German	2,750,000	"
Greek	2,250,000	"
Dutch, Belgian, and Rumanian, less than	1,000,000	" each

That is, the entire block of territory included within these seas is a region which is primarily served by British, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Turkish ships. Italy and France have 4,000,000 tons each; Russia and Turkey are for the moment entirely out of it; Austro-Hungarian shipping has disappeared by reason of its surrender to the Allies. British shipping has made the most conspicuous gains as a result of the division of the German fleet. Of ships, Great Britain has taken, roughly, 70 per cent. In the reconstruction of commerce in the Constantinople

region, and in the revival of shipping facilities, Great Britain stands ready to play not merely the principal, but a wholly dominating part. To her statesmen it would be unthinkable that, with these material advantages in her hands, her diplomacy should fail to give her such a measure of control in so vital an outlet as the Bosporus as not to enable her to develop there a great trading realm, possibly second only to that which she has developed in India. While she has maintained military forces in Transcaucasia, in Syria (until the French occupation in November, 1919), and is still maintaining them in Egypt and Mesopotamia, she has most distinctly attempted to follow the policy of walking quite softly. Though her political agents had penetrated as far as Kurdistan in 1919, they were quick to disappear (and the detachments that occupied advanced posts were withdrawn) as soon as Arab and Kurd pressure developed in any important degree. Though Great Britain is charged with almost every imperial crime under the sun, her policy in this section of the Arab world has been, I think it is fair to say, conciliatory in the extreme; for Great Britain recognizes the vital connection between her social, political, and commercial life, on the one hand, and her trade on the other; and in the long run the best trading relations are those based upon good-will.

Having said this much, one is bound, also, to say that most of the political settlements of the time, though apparently based upon principles of justice, are very strongly contributory toward British material advantage. If Great Britain were to share in the control of the Zone of the Straits of Constantinople, it might be a desirable thing in contrast to Turkish control, with all of its effects upon minority peoples and the welfare of the

Balkan states; but it would also place Great Britain in an extremely favorable position at the outlet of eastern Bulgaria's commerce by way of the Black Sea. Likewise, Rumania, encouraged in the Dobrudja, will see her commerce flow in increasing degree toward the Black Sea, and this trade also will have its outlet at the Bosporus. When Greece asked for eastern and western Thrace, she obtained the territory after long and skilful negotiations, and, possibly, she ought to have it; but it cuts Bulgaria off from the Ægean, puts her trade outlets on this sea in the hands of Greece, and obliges her to despatch a considerable part of her goods over the railroad to Constantinople.

Here we have one of the complexities of the time into which I shall not venture to go more than a step. In the modern, closely organized, strongly commercialized world it is virtually impossible to make a clean-cut distinction between what is right from the standpoint of ethnography, nationalistic sentiment, and abstract justice, and what is fair from the standpoint of economic advantage. Lloyd George said that the Germans would not sign the treaty if Danzig were given to the Poles, and this may have been true; but the alternative to Polish ownership was not German ownership, but a free state under a British high commissioner. And can we suppose that British statesmen did not also have in mind textile mills, railroads, oil-fields, ships, and coal? So that if we introduce a new set of conceptions into diplomacy, if we call it, let us say, "The New Diplomacy," we shall perhaps be able here and there to achieve justice in minor cases, but the great stakes of diplomacy remain the same. We simply discuss them in different terms.

If these things be true, the mandatory principle of the

League of Nations may have in it one of the most powerful elements of international justice; and if the League of Nations continues, and particularly if it develops, the attention of a disinterested government should be very strongly focussed upon the precise manner in which the mandates of the League are exercised. With the complex relations that we have sketched above between trade and diplomacy, it is inconceivable that the terms of a mandate should be drawn up by the interested power. No such thing as equality of trade privileges, one of the objects of the mandatory principle, will follow. And to the degree to which there is an investment of capital and development by the mandatory power to the exclusion of other powers or to their disadvantage, there will be laid the basis for undivided control and outright ownership. It remains, therefore, to be seen whether the mandatory principle is merely a transition stage between the extreme of military occupation as a result of war and the extreme of complete ownership, or whether it is the first step toward the real administration of mandated regions by the League of Nations.

The Balkan Countries

From being an undernourished and undeveloped part of the Turkish Empire, with life demoralized or even degraded, with persecution rife and with society of a low order of development, the Balkan lands changed their character in the nineteenth century and were brought within the limits of the western European industrial realm. They became the transit lands for a part of the Oriental trade under that autonomy or semi-dependence which they had gained by several centuries of effort. Under the protection of general European

treaties whose execution involved chiefly the welfare of western European powers, the Balkan states increased in population, developed cities of considerable size and commercial importance, and put their products into the current of world trade. Though principally of importance as transit lands, the Balkans became important, also, because of their own economic resources and the increased purchasing power of their people.

Two broad groups of Slavic peoples had developed, the Jugo-Slavs and the Bulgarians. The former is composed of such diverse elements as the Serbs and the Slovenes, and the latter, originally Finno-Ugrian, as the ethnologist would say, and not Slavic, has been so thoroughly penetrated by Slavic peoples in successive migrations that it is now properly classed as a Slav state. The South Slavs form one of two great fingers of Slavdom thrust westward into Central Europe, and it extends all along the Adriatic, enveloping the key cities of Fiume and Trieste.

The degree of unity of these two Slavic groups, Jugo-Slavs and Bulgarians, is quite different. The Bulgarians are chiefly a peasant people, with fairly uniform economic advantages and ethnic qualities. Four-fifths of Bulgarian exports consist of agricultural products, and three-fourths of the imports are manufactured wares. While the large estate has long been a feature of land tenure in Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Greece, Bulgaria is pre-eminently the land of small peasant proprietors. Three-fourths of her land is held in small farms not exceeding twenty hectares (fifty acres). Proprietors holding more than thirty hectares (seventy-five acres) hold only 14 per cent of the total area of cultivable land. In contrast to the Bulgarians the Jugo-Slavs are com-

posed of most diverse elements. The Slovenes, for example, fought in the Austrian army and faced Italian divisions up to the end of the war. By the Pact of Corfu, signed in 1917, and the organization of a recognized government at Agram after the November armistice, 1918, the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created, and the group of Slovenes incorporated with the Serbs and Croats to form a new Allied state. Thus, by a political phrase, Croats and Slovenes became *allies* of the Italians, whom they had just been fighting! This was one of the facts that was used against them again and again by the Italians to support their claim to a large part of the Jugo-Slav territory and its commercial outlets at the head of the Adriatic.

The degree of unity of the Jugo-Slav state is altogether problematical, and doubt as to its political stability was a source of grave weakness in its diplomacy. There has been a steady growth of the agrarian party which seeks such control and division of the land and such commercial arrangements as will be of greatest benefit to it. Opposed to each other are two other political groups, the one seeking a strongly centralized government, the other a confederation which would leave the various states with a high degree of political and commercial autonomy. Such a state finds it difficult to manage its domestic affairs, and is almost groping in the dark in attempting to negotiate with foreign powers.

Thus the war has completely changed the orientation of the Serbian state, a part of Jugo-Slavia. Its original thought at the opening of the first Balkan War was to unite only its immediate kinsmen with the main body, and to secure a window on the sea. Because Greek troops captured Saloniki from the Turks after a long

siege in 1912 Serbia was deprived of an outlet on the Ægean. Her eyes thereupon turned to the Adriatic, and here she has struggled with Italy for just two years with the object of controlling the eastern Adriatic littoral. Realizing that she could not win on the programme of 1919, Jugo-Slavia took renewed interest in her eastern frontier, where she was able to make gains at Bulgaria's expense. To understand the background of this action requires us to digress a moment for a view of the general situation and an earlier phase of the treaty-making process.

The boundary settlements of the Balkans were made on a principle quite different from that which governed the making of the German treaty. The signatures of Germany and Austria had been obtained—and the ratification also—to the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain-en-Laye. It was a foregone conclusion that Bulgaria would sign. Months before, in the case of Germany, there was no such assurance. It is perhaps worth while, therefore, to sketch an historic incident that bears, if only by contrast, on the Balkan question, and which involves one of the most dramatic moments of the peace conference.

The early days of the peace conference were filled with organization plans, with a multitude of questions of the first order respecting the management of a world still largely under military control, and with hearing the insistent claims of minor nationalities. It would have been a ruthless spirit that denied a hearing to Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Greeks, to mention only the leading delegations of minor rank. Their representatives were not trained in the principles of effective speaking. When Dmowski related the claims of Poland, he began at

eleven o'clock in the morning and in the fourteenth century, and could reach the year 1919 and the pressing problems of the moment only as late as four o'clock in the afternoon. Beneš followed immediately with the counter-claims of Czecho-Slovakia, and, if I remember correctly, he began a century earlier and finished an hour later! Venizelos, a more practised hand, confined himself to one century of Greek history rather than to five, and was adroit enough to tell his story in instalments. To listen to these recitals of national claims, to organize field commissions to Berlin, Vienna, southern Russia, etc., for gathering political and economic data on the spot, to draft the projects for reparation, the League of Nations, etc., filled the first two months of the conference.

At last it was apparent to every one that the conference had to be speeded up. It had accomplished a vast amount of labor in a brief time, but the taking of evidence in the supreme council had to stop. This work was thereafter largely assigned to commissions who then reported to the supreme council. To facilitate one branch of the work, the territorial settlements, and to determine the new boundaries, Premier Clemenceau, Mr. Balfour, and Colonel House planned to meet at the French Foreign Office on February 19. On his way to the conference Clemenceau was shot. Mr. Balfour and Colonel House went ahead with the arrangements. On the forenoon of February 21 a group of British and American experts met, at the suggestion of Colonel House, in my office, room 446 of the Crillon Hotel. The British delegation included Sir William Tyrell, Headlam-Morley, Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall, and others; among the Americans were Haskins, Seymour, and Johnson.

When the session ended at four o'clock in the afternoon of that day, the boundaries of Germany were tentatively sketched and the way prepared for a conclusion of the matter in the various territorial commissions that worked out the details.

The first boundary report to be presented and then argued before the supreme council was that of the Polish territorial commission, fixing Germany's eastern boundary. Jules Cambon read the report of the Polish commission. At last the time had come for settling the details of a particular boundary. Up to this time everything had been preliminary—the taking of evidence; now there was to be fixed a definite frontier. Moreover, it was recommended that Danzig be given to the Poles, and the report of the commission was unanimous on this point. Here was an old Hanseatic town, a modern commercial port, a focus of sea-borne trade of great future importance. Trade is the life of the British Empire. It was an Englishman who wrote that shipping was to England like the hair of Samson, the secret of strength. Would Lloyd George continue in the rôle of irresponsible and playful plenipotentiary, or would he recognize the stake at Danzig—Danzig, behind which were textile mills, coal, and the petroleum of the Carpathian forelands? Suddenly Lloyd George changed from a state of bored indifference to one of aggressive participation. From that moment forward Lloyd George never relaxed his interest or his control. Sitting forward in his chair, and speaking in an earnest voice, he proceeded to tear the report to pieces, and the argument he employed wiped the smiles from the faces and drove fear into the hearts of his listeners. "Gentlemen," he said, "if we give Danzig to the Poles the Germans will not sign the

treaty, and if they do not sign our work here is a failure. I assure you that Germany will not sign such a treaty." There ensued a silence that could be heard. Every one was shocked, alarmed, convinced. Lloyd George had introduced a bogey and it had worked. Thenceforth the motto of the British premier might have been: "I have a little shadow that goes in and out with me!"

When the report was resubmitted to the Polish commission the next morning, it was the British representative himself who brought a typed answer to the assertions of his chief, Lloyd George. When on the same day the supplementary report was read, President Wilson reviewed in a masterly fashion the two sides of the question, emphasizing what had been promised the Poles in Article XIII of his declaration of January 8, 1918, before a joint session of the Congress of the United States. Thereupon, with his eyes fixed upon the trade prize of Danzig and his mind fortified with the historic precedents so skilfully supplied by Headlam-Morley, Lloyd George moved that the report be tentatively accepted as read, but that final decision on Germany's boundaries be reserved until all the territorial reports had been considered. Directly thereafter the council of four was organized, where decisions could be reached without the bother of territorial experts, with whose facts, or any other kind of facts except purely political ones, Lloyd George had no patience whatever. The next we hear of the Danzig question Lloyd George and President Wilson have agreed to make it a free city.

With this solution I have no quarrel. It was even with a sense of relief that we heard that the matter had been thus settled. While I believe that Danzig should be a Polish port, I also realize that there are two very

big sides to the question. To find out what had been agreed upon and to give the agreement substance, Headlam-Morley and myself waited on the President, for, within the space of an hour, to two different members of his staff Lloyd George had given two quite different versions as to what had been agreed upon between himself and the President, and a midnight meeting between the British experts and myself failed to untangle the matter. The President reported that it had been agreed to follow the ethnic principle in delimiting Danzig's boundaries and to give the city a "free" status. Spreading out various maps upon the floor of the President's study, we examined the matter in some detail, and decided to avoid discussion as to the relative merits of the ethnic maps of the different delegations by submitting a small map prepared by Lloyd George's advisers. Thereupon Mr. Paton, of the British delegation, and I set to work upon a large-scale map prepared by the American Inquiry, which was used throughout the Polish negotiations as the authoritative map on ethnic matters. Between four and six o'clock we traced the boundaries of Danzig as they stand in the treaty to-day. Transferring these boundaries to the British small-scale map for the benefit of Mr. Lloyd George they were presented to the council of four, and there passed without delay.

Six months thereafter, and against the protest of the American representative on the supreme council, Sir Reginald Tower was appointed high commissioner at Danzig. His stormy course there could have been predicted with mathematical accuracy by any one interested enough to see why Lloyd George labored for a free city on the shores of the Baltic, where British shipping and capital were to be rapidly increased, and why

Sir Reginald was chosen on the basis of a record in South America quite unfavorably known to many American merchants. In this and in many other matters the British knew just what they wanted and how to get it. In training and experience they were second to no other delegation, and they worked with a sureness of touch that aroused the deepest admiration.

No such fear as that which beset the minds of the leading statesmen with respect to the German treaty assailed them when Bulgaria came to sign. The ceremony of the signing was altogether extraordinary. In the old town hall at Neuilly stood files of soldiers, guards with fixed bayonets were stationed at the angles of the stairway, the cars of the different delegations swanked up to the entrance, the Allied leaders took their seats, and very powerful and formidable they appeared. It was a splendid array. In the background was a compact mass of onlookers from the various delegations, including a sprinkling of women. It was a scene, and they were there to see it. Several bound copies of the treaty lay on the table. One looked to see the doors thrown open and a file of Bulgarian officials and a little ceremoniousness and, in short, something befitting the power and majesty of the sovereign Bulgarian people on a solemn and historic occasion. Instead, there was a military order in French in the hallway outside, the doors slowly opened, a half-dozen French foreign office secretaries rose and stood about the entrance, and after a pause a single gray-faced and very scared-looking, slightly stooped man walked slowly in and was ushered to a seat at one end of the room. Was all this ceremony and this imposing array for the purpose of dealing with this lone individual—the peasant, Stambouliski?

It looked as if the office boy had been called in for a conference with the board of directors. Of course he would sign, as presently he did, very courteously escorted and supported by the hovering foreign office secretaries; and then the great chiefs of the Allies signed, and presently the lone Bulgar, still scared and wall-eyed, was led to the door, and thus furtively he escaped. The break-up of the rest of the assemblage wore the cheerful aspect of an afternoon tea. The Allies were at peace with Bulgaria!

What did the treaty do? It took things from Bulgaria. Were any of these actively protested? On what principle? These are important matters over which we would do well to reflect for a moment, for both during the war and the peace conference the position of the American Government was little understood, abroad as at home. On the one hand, we were accused of softness respecting a treacherous enemy state, an ally of Germany; and, on the other, we were thought heartless and lacking moral courage for signing a treaty that stripped Bulgaria of territory and property when we had never declared war against her. Let us see where the line of justice lies and exactly what was the record of the American delegation.

The Allies naturally viewed the peace now from the standpoint of imposing terms upon an enemy, again from the standpoint of abstract justice as expressed in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. In the settlements now one view, now another was dominant. Thus the path of conciliation was everywhere made difficult. At every turn one must needs give documentary evidence of hating the enemy or one might be thought pro-German. This state of things suggests a bit of self-analysis on the

part of the man who didn't like olives: "I don't like olives, and I'm glad I don't like 'em, for if I liked 'em I'd eat 'em, and I hate 'em."

America's chief representative was always powerful and respected, and on every occasion demanding clearness and vision it was he who stood head and shoulders above his associates. When I suggested to some of my British colleagues after a debate between Lloyd George and the President that we should keep score on our chiefs to see which made the most points, the reply was made: "Up to now, at least, your chief has won them all!"

But with delay in the Senate the influence of the American representatives grew steadily less. On one occasion Mr. Polk commissioned me to secure the opinion of Premier Clemenceau on the Fiume question, which was then leading up to one of its most critical phases. It was late in 1919, we had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the conference was nearing its end, the American delegation was soon to leave. Tardieu reported his chief's answer to our suggestion: "The Americans are charming but they are far away; when you have gone the Italians remain—and as our neighbors." Just at the end the power represented by America had a sudden burst of recognition. You will not find it in the minutes of the proceedings. The incident is historic. The German representatives were reluctant to sign the protocol of the final proceedings respecting the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. The American delegation was to sail on December 5. At the close of the session on December 3 Clemenceau turned to Mr. Polk and begged him to postpone the departure of the American delegation. On his face were no longer the aggressive and determined lines of the victorious leader. There was

a day when he had called the President pro-German and left the council of four in anger. Now he sought companionship as he walked through the dark pathway of his fears. Unless ratifications were exchanged all might be lost. "Mr. Polk, I beg you to remain. If you don't the Germans will not sign. I beg you to stay. I beg you not to go." The American delegation delayed its departure.

From the attitude of the American delegation in the case of the Adriatic dispute, it will be obvious what their position was in the case of those three salients of Bulgarian territory toward the west which Serbia coveted and eventually obtained by the Treaty of Neuilly, between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers. These three salients are occupied by Bulgarian populations, and not only in the territorial commissions but also in the supreme council the American representatives opposed to the end, and had their opposition entered in the record, the giving of Bulgarian territory to a greatly enlarged Jugo-Slavia. That state already included Slovenes of doubtful allegiance, colonies of Germans and Hungarians north of the Save, Montenegrins and Macedonian Slavs who certainly wanted least of all to be added to Serbia. And now the Jugo-Slavs were bent, for strategic reasons—the protection of the railway line from Nish to Saloniki—on lopping off four pieces of Bulgarian territory and carrying the boundary in one place within artillery range of Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria.

Of the four pieces of territory which Bulgaria has lost on the west—Timok, Tsaribrod, Bosilegrad, and Strumitsa—the southernmost one, the Strumitsa salient, represents the most significant loss, and it is also the largest.

THE BALKAN COUNTRIES, SHOWING THE CHANGES DETERMINED BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE

For the lopping off of this projection of Bulgaria into Macedonia puts an end, at least for the present, to the long process begun in 1870, with the foundation of the Bulgarian exarchate, and enhanced in 1878 with the autonomy of Bulgaria, which had for its object the Bulgarization of Macedonia and its ultimate annexation to the Bulgarian realm. This act and the tacit confirmation by the powers of the Serbo-Greek boundary in Macedonia throws the Macedonian question into its latest, possibly its last, phase. The refined ethnographic and linguistic studies of the past few years have shown contradictory or indefinite results as to the individualistic character of the Macedonian region. On the physical side it is made up of bits of several adjacent natural regions. On the religious side it might, in the nascent state in which it was in 1870, have just as readily become an appanage of Serbia as of Bulgaria. By 1912, however, over 1,100 Bulgarian churches had been established in the region.

The population of Macedonia is estimated variously between 1,200,000 and 2,000,000, owing to the indifferent boundaries of the region. More than half the people are Christians, and the rest chiefly Mohammedans, with some Jews. Each of the three adjacent states, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, made an effort to impose its culture upon the people and to develop a nationalist sentiment among them. Though the Bulgarians at one time had possession of the region and though the racial character of the people is perhaps somewhat more closely similar to Bulgaria than to Serbia, the Serbs also held the country for a time and they left a deep impression there, as is shown by the architecture and the literature. Greek influence was strong in Macedonia, because her

agents operated chiefly in the towns, and these dominated large expanses of tributary country. Even Rumania joined in the effort to penetrate Macedonia; there are probably between 75,000 and 100,000 pastoral Vlachs of Rumanian affiliation in the whole Macedonian country.

But greater success was bound to attend the Bulgarian penetration, because from the first the Bulgarian religious organization had a nationalistic cast. It was intimately associated with the Bulgarian effort to achieve independence and to round out the Bulgarian realm so as to include all Bulgarian populations adjacent to the central group. Thus it sought to include lands in Turkish hands in eastern and western Thrace. It had as one of its objects the incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria and the recovery of territory inhabited by Bulgarians in the Dobrudja. When its religious teachers went into Macedonia they took with them not merely the faith of their church but the hope of freedom from the Turk, the pride of nationality which the Bulgarians had, and kinship with a closely related ethnic group. Naturally, under these conditions Bulgaria, at the close of the first Balkan War, looked upon Macedonia as her own, and the restriction of approach of Serbia to Saloniki on the south was acknowledged by the Serbians themselves. In the secret treaty with Bulgaria just before the first Balkan War, Serbia agreed to the definition of a neutral strip running east-northeast to Lake Okhrida, one hundred miles northwest of Saloniki, which was to be the subject of later negotiation between her and Bulgaria. The later negotiation never took place, for Bulgaria made unexpected gains in eastern Thrace, and the powers decided to form an independent Albania in the regions where Serbia had hoped to increase her territory. Serbia

and Greece denounced the territorial terms of the alliance, Bulgaria insisted on them in spite of changed conditions, and the second Balkan War resulted. With the complete success of Serbia and Greece, as opposed to Bulgaria, they divided Macedonia between them, leaving only the Strumitsa salient and the country immediately northeast and east of it to Bulgaria; and the Treaty of Neuilly, by taking away the Strumitsa salient has shut the door on Bulgaria's expansion in this direction.

The Macedonian question, once the chief political problem of the Near East, has passed into an entirely new phase. Neither Greece nor Serbia is expected to give up Macedonian territory for a possible future Macedonia. The Macedonians are without leaders of real ability, and the heterogeneous character of the population makes it impossible for them to have, or to express, a common public opinion. There are no significant resources. It is a poor country, unwooded, rather desolate, and will always be commercially tributary to communities or states that are richer and economically better balanced. It is therefore improbable that the Macedonian question will be revived except through the possible cruelties of Greeks and Serbs in their treatment of the Macedonians.

It was a part of the programme of the American delegation that, while the Strumitsa salient should properly be removed because of the menace which it carried to Greek and Serbian railway interests from Nish to Saloniki, Bulgaria should not suffer the loss of the two middle bits of territory—Tsaribrod and Bosilegrad. For Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, is brought within thirty miles of the new frontier, that is, within the range of modern gunfire; and there is no warrant at all in ethnic considerations for a change from the frontier as it stood before

the beginning of the war. But the government of the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes desired to rectify their frontier. Not at all sure of a satisfactory settlement of the Adriatic question, Jugo-Slavia sought to make the best of the new boundary arrangements elsewhere. With Greece, a friendly ally, on the south, she could hope for no expansion of her national domain toward Saloniki, and it was altogether doubtful if she could obtain compensation in northern Albania, as had been promised by the secret Treaty of London in 1915. But two other places remained where advantages could be secured: on the north, where the enemy states of Austria and Hungary were to have their frontiers defined; and on the east, where the Bulgarian frontier was yet to be established. It was not in the interests of justice, it was solely in the interest of the Jugo-Slav state, that Bulgaria suffered territorial losses on the west. The American delegation protested, both in the territorial commissions and finally before the supreme council, against these losses of territory, claiming them to be unjustifiable according to any principle that had governed the peace conference theretofore, and emphasizing the menace of war that they invited.

While the arguments of the American representatives were courteously received, our delay in ratifying the treaty had weakened American prestige. If the loss of territory pained an enemy, Bulgaria, it pleased an ally, Jugo-Slavia. Germany and Austria had signed; Bulgaria would also sign. The territory could be taken with impunity. Politics had become quite practical; the Fourteen Points and their exponent, as Clemenceau had said, were far away. However charming the Americans might be, the Jugo-Slavs were nearer, and there remained the Adriatic dis-

pute to settle. Perhaps a concession on the east would soften the blow that impended on the west. When Jugo-Slavia insisted on taking land from Bulgaria by the Treaty of Neuilly, she paved the way for Rapallo.

On the other hand, we must remember:

(1) That in September, 1915, Bulgaria agreed to join Austria-Hungary against Serbia and in return was to receive a certain share of Serbian land and people.

(2) That Bulgarian authorities at one time even declared that Serbia no longer existed and had become Bulgarian, closed schools and churches, and even burned them, compelled the people to speak Bulgarian, and, like the Germans in Belgium and northeastern France, levied fines and contributions, took away food, and ruined the country.

(3) That out of tens of thousands of Serbians interned in Bulgarian camps, at least half died.

(4) That Bulgarian outrages upon Greeks and Serbs—men, women, and children—were among the most hideous of the war.

The territorial losses of Bulgaria appear slight, but the political stability of the state has been seriously affected by them. By tacit confirmation of the northeastern boundary of Bulgaria in the Dobrudja, on the part of the powers, Rumanian merchants of Braila and Galatz are given a vital hold upon that one-fourth of Bulgaria's foreign trade that passes by way of the Danube. She is deprived of an outlet on the Ægean save by the untried experiment of international guarantee of transit trade across a neighboring state, and the possible internationalization of the Maritsa River, as provided in the still unratified Treaty of Sèvres. Under these circumstances her primitive economic organization lends itself the more

readily to exploitation by foreign capital. More than a fifth of so-called Bulgarians live outside her new national boundaries—200,000 in Thrace, 200,000 in the Dobrudja, 800,000 exarchists in Macedonia—or a total of 1,200,000. Favorable to national solidarity and political control is the compact layout of the land. Favorable also in this respect is the ethnic purity of the people. Of 4,000,000 population, 80 per cent are Bulgarian (as contrasted with 60 per cent of Czecho-Slovaks in Czecho-Slovakia). Turks are found chiefly in the east and Greeks in the towns.

Perhaps the principal focus of territorial difficulty in the Balkans is Thrace, whose eastern and western sections affect the commercial outlets of Bulgaria in a critical way. This whole territory was coveted by Greece and claimed on ground of strategy, ethnography, and commercial advantage. A secret treaty, signed in February, 1913, approved of the cession of Kavala to Bulgaria on the ground that it was the natural outlet for the western section of that country, and at that time there was no thought but that Dedeagatch would also remain in Bulgarian hands. The ethnography of the entire area would certainly indicate such a solution, and Greece had her eyes fixed rather on Saloniki, southern Albania, and the remoter borders of the eastern Ægean. But with Allied victory Greece's programme expanded so as to take in the chief elements of the Greek world, and she sought to consolidate the Greek peoples of eastern and western Thrace by including these territories within her national domain.

Ultimately she won the assent of all delegations except the American, and American opposition continued until the end, at least to the extent of not desiring to give Greece all of the territory which she eventually obtained.

American opinion favored a rectification of the Bulgarian frontier at Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse, so as to advantage Bulgaria to some degree, and thus recognize not only the ethnic principle but also the historic fact that in the first Balkan War it was the effort of the Bulgarian army which defeated the Turkish legions, and that the flower of Bulgarian manhood fell in the sieges and campaigns against Turkish strongholds in eastern Thrace.

Having reviewed a few of the outstanding problems of the eastern Balkans we may now turn to Albania, on the other side of the peninsula, where a sharp, three-cornered conflict has raged for two years and where there still exists a problem of the first magnitude. The Albanians number 1,000,000 people. Like the states about them, they have slowly gained political self-consciousness. Their homeland is a broken country, and a large part of the population leads a pastoral life. Its coastal towns and lowland cities are intimately tied up with the commercial systems of its neighbors, and its mountain population retains the primitive organization of the clan. Under these circumstances it is obvious that the Albanians should not have had a strong national programme or the means to advance it. It was the will of the great powers in 1913, after the first Balkan War, that was imposed upon Albania in establishing her boundaries, and it was the will of the Allies that so long kept Italy at Valona and for a time threatened to bring Jugo-Slavia into active conflict with the northern Albanians about Scutari. Toward such a people in such a land it is difficult to frame a policy. It is easy to award independence, but it is not equally easy to believe that right use will be made of it. Jugo-Slavia and Italy are equally hated, and Greece is no exception in disfavor.

Had the terms of the secret Treaty of London of 1915 been carried out, Albania would have been divided. The central portion would have been an autonomous Mohammedan state under Italian protection; the northern part would have been under the protection of Jugo-Slavia, and the southern part was to have been divided between Greece and Italy. Koritsa would have become a Greek city, Valona an Italian stronghold and point of penetration; Scutari and the Drin valley would have become an outlet for Jugo-Slavia's trade—and all of these points would have become places for military and political conflict, for the Albanians, though having no unity of sentiment regarding a national programme, are united in the belief that they can manage their affairs better than the people about them. The Italians have been driven from Valona by the efforts of the Albanians themselves, and Albanian independence has been recognized by the Council of the League of Nations. By a subsequent treaty (1921) Italy is to have possession of the island of Sassens and the two peninsulas that embrace the Bay of Valona in order to complete her defense of the Adriatic. She is also to have prior rights of a political and commercial nature, but the reality of these rights have yet to be proved.

VIII

THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND THE DISRUPTION OF TURKEY

BY WILLIAM LINN WESTERMANN

The treaty of the Allied Powers and Turkey, signed at Sèvres on August 10 of last year, marks the end of the Turkish Empire. The land which by the terms of this treaty is left under the control of the Sultan, contains in large percentage peoples who speak the Turkish tongue and are believers in Islam, however much they may differ in the component strains of their blood. They feel themselves to be Turks, or, to use the designation which they prefer, Osmanli.

The Arab peoples of Mesopotamia, Syria, and desert Arabia have nothing in common with these Turks or with their rulers, other than their Moslem religion. The Treaty of Sèvres has, indeed, freed the Arabs from the domination of the alien Ottoman dynasty; but it has not made them free. The Greek islands off the Asia Minor coast which Italy was holding in 1914 have been reunited with the kingdom of Greece by a separate treaty between Italy and Greece. Here they belong by all the tests of language, deep desire, and other affinities which are inherent in our complex idea of nationality. Palestine has been set aside as a homeland for the Jews of the world, under the mandate of Great Britain. If the terms of the treaty are carried out, thither the Jews may go, if they desire, and live in security as Jews, free to carry out

their interesting plans for the social and economic betterment of the Jews who may come. To the Jews of the diaspora, Palestine is to be the symbol of the political nationhood which they lost twenty centuries ago, and a pledge that the great tragedy of their humiliation may now be ended. The Arabs of the Hedjaz, lying along the eastern shore of the Red Sea, had been recognized, during the war, as forming an independent state, and the Cherif of Mecca, old Hussein Ibn Ali, had been called king of the Hedjaz, much to his amusement, by the great Western Powers, including the United States. The independence of this kingdom was confirmed in the Turkish treaty.

Except in the case of the Greek islands and the kingdom of Hedjaz, these solutions are not as yet complete or secure. Men will still have to face death, fighting for or against the stabilizing and continuity of the decisions made in respect to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Yet these four results of the Turkish treaty and other negotiations which accompanied and are practically a part of it, are, on the whole, to be rated as a gain to the Greeks, to the Arab peoples, to the Jews, to the Turks themselves, and to the world at large. This is, however, the sum of the satisfaction which the peoples of the Near East may derive out of the endless discussions of distinguished diplomats at Paris, at London, and at San Remo, covering in all a period of twenty months in 1919 and 1920. As compared with the hopes men set their hearts upon at Paris, this accomplishment is meagre. Far-seeing men believed that the hold of the Ottoman Sultan upon Constantinople would be ended. He still rules there—or, better, is ruled there. The world believed that the highlands of Armenia would be formed

into a free state, and the policy of the extermination of this people would be thereafter impossible forever. The Treaty of Sèvres does, indeed, constitute a free and independent state of Armenia; but that state exists only as a name. Its boundaries are in part undetermined, in part demarcated upon maps which it would be a bitter derision to publish. Actually there exists to-day a Soviet Republic of Armenia, a small territory in Transcaucasian Russia. It is entirely subservient to the wishes and designs of the Soviet Government. The Turkish provinces of old Armenia, Van, Bitlis, and Erzerum, are under the complete military control of the rebel Turkish leader, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. He and his followers lead the organization called the Tashkilat Milli or National Organization. Their purpose is to defeat the practical application of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, because they see as clearly as we that the carrying out of its terms means the end of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of a small but compact Turkish state. The liberation of Armenia was the one outstanding result expected from the Near Eastern negotiations at the Peace Conference. The failure to meet this general expectation was indirectly a result of the struggle among the Allied Powers for equality or priority of opportunity in the commercial exploitation of the old Turkish Empire in the case of a successful termination of the war. In the pursuit of these objects the independence and protection of Armenia became a thing men talked about, but did not work for.

Directly, the United States is responsible for the present plight of the Armenians, by default of service. An essential weakness of our position in all Near Eastern affairs was that we had not declared war upon Turkey.

Hence we could not, in the period of the armistice, send troops into Turkish Armenia when such action might have saved many thousands of people from starvation. Not having declared war upon Turkey, we were always, during the period of discussion, outsiders, impotent to affect the actual course of the negotiations or put our own stamp upon the decisions taken. Even so, we, the people of the United States, might have saved the Armenians, had we been willing to accept a mandate, preferably for all the northern part of the Turkish Empire, but at least for the Armenian portion. We may justify ourselves as we will. The mandate for Armenia was offered us and we refused to accept its obligations and the undoubted troubles which their acceptance would have entailed. We feared foreign entanglements. That fear was justified. But it *is* fear. The policy of no entangling alliances advocated by the founders of our government was based upon a caution which served well the period of our immaturity and undeveloped union and strength. A caution justified at the turning of the nineteenth century has become a counsel of cowardice in the twentieth century. We were asked to assist in the establishment of a new international policy in the control of undeveloped peoples under the mandate system, advocated by liberal sentiment the world over, by able leaders from South Africa, Canada, China, Great Britain, South America, and where not. It was entirely acceptable, if honestly enforced, to the people to whom it was to be applied. When boldness, confidence in the strength of our own political integrity, and active support of a new political ideal might have saved Armenia and with it the Near East, we held back. President Wilson is not responsible for this. We are, we the people of the United

States. The decision was ours and we took it. American safety first. Where we might have led at the zero hour of political opportunity, we faltered and refused to go over.

In 1908 a successful revolt, led by the Young Turk party, had brought to book the old tyrant, Abdul Hamid, the Red Sultan. The Turkish constitution of 1876 was revived, dusted off, and patched up. The old absolutism of the Sultan was severely limited. A new spirit ran through the Turkish Empire. Extravagant hopes of liberal treatment were aroused among the Arabs and the Armenians. They believed that at last a *modus vivendi* had been attained by which they might continue to exist as loyal subjects of a state in which they would no longer be regarded and treated as "riayah," the declassed, but as free Ottoman subjects. This enthusiasm was soon dissipated by the actions of the Committee of Union and Progress, the central controlling organization of the Young Turk party. Their policy of Turkizing all the peoples of the empire was a foolish attempt to tear out roots which ran deeply into the history of the Orient and drew from those depths the emotional nourishment of the centuries. The Turkizing policy ran afoul the Arab revival, a movement in the Arab world for the maintenance and further development of Arab culture. Up to 1912 the Arab organizations which had arisen in this revival had been literary and academic, harmless and unrevolutionary. These societies with their numerous branches in this country and in South America continued to exist. But beside them grew up two secret revolutionary bodies, the one called the Fettah, an organization in the civilian world, the other and more dangerous one the Ahad. To this society

were admitted only Arab military officers of the Turkish army. In 1914 the loyalty of the Turkish army was rotted away by this new loyalty among Arab officers, high and low, who had sworn an oath to give their fortunes and their lives to the cause of the political separation of all the Arab-speaking peoples from Turkish misrule. Many of these officers were intelligent and well-trained in modern military science by Germans supplied to the Turkish armies by General von der Goltz and his staff. The plans for Arab liberation had matured to the point where the year 1923 had been fixed upon as the time for striking the blow for freedom.

In March, 1915, began a series of negotiations between the Allied Powers in respect to the disposition of Turkish territory in case of Allied victory. From these issued four international compacts. By the Sazonof-Paleologue Agreement of March 4, 1915, Constantinople and the control of the Straits were to go to Russia. By the London Pact of April 26 of the same year, Italy was to receive, in the event of Allied victory, full sovereignty over the Dodecanese and recognition of her right, in case of a partition of Turkey in Asia, to a "just share" of the Mediterranean region about and back of Adalia. In vain British liberals at that time pointed out to their government that it was entering upon a dangerous course; that it was committing itself to a policy of giving away rights of sovereignty or of corresponding economic priority in territories to which it had no legitimate claim even in the then doubtful event of victory. Italy's participation upon the side of the Allies seemed necessary for Allied success. And Italy fixed in advance her price for the blood her soldiers were to shed and the war debt she was to contract.

In the spring of 1916 Russian troops had pushed forward into the four northeastern provinces of Turkish Armenia and were in military occupation of a large territorial area. Fear aroused among her allies by this Russian advance undoubtedly dictated the next step in the series of negotiations which, with our own failure to participate, made impossible the application of any modern or liberal policy in dealing with Turkey and rendered impotent at the peace conferences all those forces which worked for new and sounder methods of diplomatic treatment in settling the problems of the Near East. In May, 1916, it was secretly agreed that Russia was to acquire in sovereignty the four Armenian vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis. British and French negotiations, conducted at the same time, roughly defined the respective areal acquisitions or spheres of these two Powers by the ill-fated Sykes-Picot Treaty. Palestine, as then stipulated, was to be constituted as a separate state under a special international régime. This was undoubtedly a British demand, conditioned by the necessity of protecting the Suez Canal and the narrow seaway it offered to India. Zionist agitation later altered this decision. Established as a homeland for the Jews, Palestine serves equally well the vital need of British imperial policy for a protected seaway to her great Eastern possession. Zionism gives to the Palestinian decision an idealistic motivation which saves it from the anachronistic baldness of nineteenth-century political conception which characterizes the Near Eastern decisions as a whole.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement defined the advantages which were to accrue to the British Empire and France out of the hoped-for dissolution of the Turkish Empire.

The zone of French complete control gave to the leaders of the Near Eastern policy of France what they primarily desired, control over the potential cotton production of Cilicia, over the middle section of the Bagdad railway, and the reputed copper wealth of the Arghana Maden mines of lower Armenia. In the Tripartite Agreement between France, Great Britain, and Italy, which was signed upon the same day as the Turkish treaty and is essentially a part of it, this zone is actually delivered over to France as a sphere of special interest. British policy in the formulation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty was dictated apparently by three considerations: by the necessity of controlling the outlet of Mesopotamia into the Persian Gulf as a danger-point in the defensive frontier of India; by the need of raw cotton for the looms of Manchester; and by the requirement of a sufficient supply of petroleum for the uses of the British navy. The British sphere of control in Mesopotamia, as delimited in the Sykes-Picot Treaty, may be defended as having some sort of geographic and ethnic justification. The French area defies every known law of geographic, ethnographic, and linguistic unity which one might cite who would attempt to justify it.

One feature of the Sykes-Picot Agreement commends itself as dictated by a more liberal spirit than the clauses so far cited. The French and British, Russia later concurring, made provision for the establishment of an Arab confederation in the Syrian desert, four sultanates which were to be independent, though somewhat smothered, perhaps, under the blanket of the French and British spheres of influence which lay upon them. This, the sole concession to the Arab movement for independence, was brought about as follows: when Turkey entered the

war the most vulnerable spots in the British Empire were the Suez Canal and Egypt. German leadership understood this fact. A plan was projected for a Turkish advance into Egypt. Djemal Pasha concentrated the fourth Turkish army corps in Syria in the spring of 1915 for this attack. The British, seeking for every aid in the war, seized upon the movement for Arab independence. Through the agency of a Syrian named Faroki, with the assistance of Feisal, son of the Cherif of Mecca, and an able young British archæologist named T. E. Lawrence, they approached old Hussein Ibn Ali, the Cherif of Mecca. For over a year the negotiations pended. The old Cherif stood out for the complete and unified independence of the Arab-speaking world in Turkey as then constituted. It must be said in justice to British diplomacy that its agents used in these negotiations claim that their correspondence shows no definite promise to this end. But Cherif Hussein insisted that he would expect consideration of this claim in the adjustment to be made after a successful issue of the war. It is credibly reported that in the consideration of this problem by the Arabs before Hussein at Mecca, one of the sheiks asked him whether he were not becoming involved in very large affairs. The response was quite Oriental, worthy of a hero of Scheherazade and the "Tales of the Thousand and One Nights": "I am the fish that swims in the sea. The greater the sea the fatter the fish."

The entrance of the Hedjaz into the war, in revolt against Turkey, was precipitated by the senseless cruelty of Djemal Pasha in Syria. He hung the most honored leaders in Syria, on proof of academic rather than dangerous plotting. He starved the Lebanese, 200,000 of them, it is said, in their beautiful mountains, by drawing

a cordon about the base of the mountains and allowing no food to go up. The secret and really dangerous revolutionary societies represented in the heart of his own armies remained unsuspected by him. The pressure brought upon the Cherif of Mecca in his position as the most distinguished leader of the Arab world became too great to resist. In 1916 he declared the revolt of the Hedjaz from Turkey. The Arab camel corps led by his son, Emir Feisal, with Colonel T. E. Lawrence as liaison officer between the Arab forces and those of General Allenby, rendered distinguished service in the campaigns in Palestine in 1917 and 1918.

Late in the year 1916, at a meeting held at Saint Jean de Maurienne in the southeastern corner of France, Italy obtained a definition of her prospective territorial acquisition and her sphere of influence in Asia Minor, which had been left undefined in the London Pact of 1915. The territory to be acquired outright included the entire southwestern corner of Asia Minor, as far north as Smyrna. To the north of this a large zone of Italian special influence was delimited, the "equivalent" of the similar zones of Great Britain and France in the Syrian desert. A final clause of this Agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne provided that the consent of Russia must be obtained. Before this could be done, the old government of Russia was overthrown and Russia's signature was never given.

This is the complicated tale of the secret agreements. A change was made in regard to Palestine, when the British Government published the Balfour declaration of November, 1917, granting to the insistent Zionists the privilege that Palestine should be set aside as the homeland of the Jews. This was an open covenant, published

to the world and fought for in the open. It received official and public recognition from the French and Italian Governments. President Wilson declared his adherence to it, and many of our State legislatures passed resolutions urging the national government to support it.

One more secret understanding and I am through with all the list of these follies of secrecy and blind self-interest. When Venizelos brought Greece into the war on the Allied side he was able to obtain a promise, never written or published, so far as I know, that western or Bulgarian Thrace would be granted to Greece by the peace decision.

Two events of 1918 introduced new complications into the Near Eastern situation, already so distorted between two incompatibilities, the desire of certain of the non-Turkish elements of the empire for freedom, and the secret covenants. These new complications were: the defection of Russia and its consequent elimination as a participant in the political thanksgiving which the secret agreements contemplated; and the clear formulation of the American attitude toward the principles of the peace as first expressed in the Fourteen Points of President Wilson on January 8, 1918. The doctrine of "open covenants openly arrived at" was, unfortunately, not so stated as to be retroactive and thereby eliminate the existing secret agreements of our Allies. The whole spirit of President Wilson's speech was, however, in direct contrast to the traditionalized diplomacy which gave rise to the Near Eastern agreements. It emphasized the right of all peoples, strong or weak, to live on equal terms of liberty. Only the practised sophistry of old-line diplomacy could maintain unimpaired either the spirit or the substance of these secret agreements after

the Fourteen Points had been accepted in the armistice terms as the basis of the formulation of the peace terms.

In respect to Turkey, Article 12 of the Fourteen Points specifically provided that "the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty," that the non-Turkish portions should have the right of autonomous development, and that the narrows leading into the Black Sea should be permanently open under some international arrangement. Liberal British statesmen saw clearly the impassable gulf between this declaration and the secret agreements. They urged their government to take up with the United States the whole question of the basis of the peace terms, and arrive at some agreement as to general method and purpose, as well as to specific and detailed terms. The failure to do this vitiated the whole course of the negotiations at Paris regarding Turkey, blocked every effort at a common understanding, and made the Turkish treaty as it stands to-day an anachronism and a by-word to all the peoples most vitally concerned, except the Venezelist Greeks.

When the Peace Conference assembled, the Sazonof-Paleologue Agreement lay buried in the ruins of Russia. Constantinople and the four Armenian vilayets had lost their secret tags. The President of the United States sat in the chair which Sazonof or Isvolsky had expected to occupy. It was a natural thing for men to assume that the United States would replace Russia in the political settlement of the Turkish problems as she had in the war, by accepting, under provisions entirely adjustable to our own ideals of international fair play, the territorial assignments which the Russian collapse had left vacant. The Armenians desired this with all their hearts. Liberal British and French opinion urged upon our delegation the

necessity of American acceptance of a mandate over Armenia. I was one who shared their opinion, and I still share it. However strongly President Wilson favored this plan I never heard any man say that either he, or any one of his colleagues on the American Peace Commission, made any promise which would tend to preempt the constitutional right of the American people to answer this question through their representatives in Congress.

At the Peace Conference the principal delegations from the Near East present throughout the protracted period of the peace negotiations were: the Greek, headed by Venizelos, shrewd, tireless, and innocent-looking; the Arab delegation, headed by Emir Feisal, a sincere young man, and a stately and attractive figure in his Arab headdress and flowing robes; the Zionist delegation, led by Doctor Chaim Weizmann, with assistance from a number of able American and British representatives; two delegations of Armenians, that of Turkish Armenia, directed by the strange figure of Nubar Pasha, a wealthy Egyptian landowner, and that of the former subjects of Russian Armenia, under the leadership of a distinguished poet and novelist, Avetis Aharonian. There came, also, other committees whose stay was temporary. These had been sent to represent certain more localized phases of the separatistic tendencies aroused amid the ruins of the Ottoman Empire by the new political evangel of self-determination. Among them were the delegates of the Smyrna Greeks, demanding reunion with the mother country; of the Pontic Greeks headed by the archbishop of Trebizond, with the same Irredentist dream, or failing that, with a demand for localized independence as a Pontic Republic. The Kurds were there, claiming rights of independent state-

hood over an area which covered a large portion of the territory claimed by the Armenians of Turkey. The disintegrated expanse of old Russia has since the armistice been welded together again into a fairly cohesive mass in the fires of the new Bolshevist fanaticism. But during the first year of the Peace Conference it lay in broken pieces. In the Transcaucasian region of Russia, also, the doctrine of self-determination wrought its own complicated local problems. The Georgians and Azerbaijan Tartars presented claims to independent statehood which overlapped, each upon the other, territorially; and both delegations claimed, as their own, areas within the northern and eastern limits of the state outlined on the maps of the Armenians as the minimum of the Armenian territorial area. As a side-line the Georgians had interesting business proposals in manganese. The Azerbaijan Tartars talked big money in oil, especially in the Groszny oil regions.

The conflict of local native desires in the Arab regions was no less sharp. The French interest in Syria, already formulated in the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, runs back for centuries. As distinguished from their desire to control Cilicia and central Anatolia, the French attitude toward Syria cannot be regarded as bald commercial imperialism. For sixty years the French Government has regarded itself, and with some justification in actual accomplishment, as the privileged protector of the Maronite Christians. Syrians resident in France who were French citizens by adoption, presented to the Peace Conference the demand for a French mandate as that of a majority of the native Syrians. A Syrian by birth, named Chukri Ganem, who writes poetry in the French language and is a French citizen, spoke long and in eloquent periods

before the Council of Ten for French control. He told how "we have shed our blood" in Syria for this ideal of a unified Syria, including Palestine, under the French ægis. When one knew that he had not seen Syria for well over twenty years, that he was a propagandist upon the French pay-roll, and saw that despite the terrible bloodletting of which he spoke, he seemed, for a poet, to be in quite normal health, his eloquence failed markedly of its effect. From Beirut the French imported (expenses paid) a committee of five Lebanese who also spoke for French guidance. The wishes of these Syrian groups conflicted with the claims of Emir Feisal, representing the hope of complete independence of the entire Arab-speaking section of Turkey as a unit (expenses in Paris paid by the British Government). The Zionist movement, for separation of Palestine and a special régime to insure the establishment of the Jewish homeland, was bitterly opposed by the Syrian protégés of France, less markedly and with vacillating policy by the Arab group of Feisal.

Behind all these conflicting local hatreds and ambitions, more confused and complicated, in fact, than they can possibly be presented here, lay always the secret agreements. These treaties were the handiwork of the old-style diplomatic craftsmanship of European officialdom. Sanctified by the signatures of the Governments concerned, they remained in the background, adaptable as to form, immutable in their spirit, working inevitably, like Até in a Greek tragedy, to the destined end of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement of August 10, 1920. From behind it all came the sound of children's and women's voices crying for bread. American relief workers began to drift in and tell about the conditions in

Armenia. The younger men always spoke passionately: "Why do the American people permit this? Why do you, who are sitting at Paris, not do something?" The middle-aged men spoke more quietly, as if their hearts were old and their sympathies shrivelled. They were much the more terrible to listen to.

The first of the Near Eastern claimants to appear at a hearing before the Council of Ten was the persistent and astute Greek premier, Eleutherios Venizelos. On February 3 and 4 of 1919 he presented the claims of Greece. He was the favored of France and Great Britain. In fluent French, and with an engaging appearance of frankness, he laid claim to southern Albania, Bulgarian and eastern Thrace, and the western coast of Asia Minor. One must recall that his claims could not be answered by two of the parties most interested and most directly affected by his patriotic dreams of a Greater Greece. Bulgaria and Turkey, as enemy Powers, were not represented at the Peace Conference. But in the Italian delegation his aspirations found bitter and persistent opposition. In the Pact of London western Asia Minor south of Smyrna had been ear-marked for Italy. By the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement a large section of the coast of Asia Minor lying north of Smyrna had been set off as a sphere of Italian influence. Despite skilful and tactful compliments which Venizelos paid to Italy in the course of his appearance before the Council of Ten, despite the ponderous return compliments of the Italian premier, Orlando, the conflict of interest between Greece and Italy was one not readily to be adjusted.

The Greek claims were then referred to a special commission of representatives of the four Powers for consideration and report to the Council of Four. The gen-

eral disposition of this Greek territorial commission was to grant to Venizelos, who was consistently supported by French and British professional diplomacy, as great a measure of his Pan-Hellenic claims as could be done. Italy was consistently opposed to all his claims, because of her own political and commercial aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean. The American official attitude at that time was dictated by a desire to call the secret treaties into the open and register its unalterable opposition to any recognition of these as determining factors in the decisions to be made. It was indisposed to grant the Venizelist-Greek claim to any territorial control in Asia Minor. The reason for this attitude lay in the conviction that complete control of Smyrna was an absolute essential to the possibility of development of the six or seven million people of Asia Minor whom we call Turks. Smyrna, or some harbor in its immediate vicinity, has been the one great outlet for the goods of this entire region in all the period since history has knowledge of its life. Through Smyrna, not through Constantinople, Anatolia pours out its goods which the western world desires. In return for these goods Anatolia may take in through Smyrna harbor western products and ideas which it sorely needs, modern farm implements, modern ideas of scientific agriculture and industry. Only through this means can the peasant of Asia Minor, whom we so harshly condemn as "the Terrible Turk," become an acceptable citizen of the modern world. To this end Smyrna and its harbor are the eyes, the mouth, and the nostrils of the people of Anatolia. It is the consensus of opinion of American missionaries, who know him through and through, of American, British, and French archæologists who have worked for years

beside and with him, of British merchants who have traded with him, of British soldiers who fought against him, that the Anatolian Turk is as honest as any other people of the Near East, that he is a hard-working farmer, a brave and generous fighter, endowed fundamentally with chivalrous instincts. That these characteristics and instincts have been distorted by the brutalizing effects of Ottoman rule is self-evident, just as Ottoman rule once brutalized the Balkan peoples, and continues to brutalize the Armenians. Of all these peoples the Anatolian peasants have suffered the most. They have been conscripted for fifty years to fight the battles of a government whose corruption has been a stench in the nostrils of the world. They have been scraped to the bone for taxes to pay for the Sultan's wars. The Young Turk leaders, who were, be it remembered, largely from European Turkey, Moslemized and Turkized Jews and Thracians, robbed them blind, themselves becoming rich and mighty. They delivered the Turkish peasants to the tender mercies of Prussian drill-masters, who beat them into shape as soldiers. These soldiers starved or died of disease, chiefly cholera, typhus, and dysentery, literally by the thousand, while the wheat their people raised was shipped to Germany.

It was the American belief that the crux in the question of the future welfare of the Near East lay in giving, for once in history, a chance to this peasantry of Asia Minor. The great majority of all westerners interested in and acquainted with the Near East—missionaries, the British Freshfield and Wital merchant organizations, the American tobacco interests—were opposed to granting Smyrna to Greece. Yet it was eventually done, though in compromised form.

In the Greek territorial commission it was impossible to bring the question of the secret agreements into open discussion. Only once, when the Italian delegates spoke of the promises made to them in the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement, it became apparent that Great Britain certainly, France by its silence, refused to countenance that understanding as a binding contract, on the specious plea that one of the parties which should have been signatory to the agreement, Russia, had not signed. The Italian delegates thereupon withdrew from participation in the discussions of the Greek territorial commission and the subsequent recommendations, though they remained as silent observers throughout the following meetings. The futile result of the report was, on the whole, a victory for Venizelos. He had gained a favorable recommendation of three elements of the commission regarding southern Albania and the Thracian coast of the Ægean Sea. The French and British delegates recommended the Greek claim to Smyrna and an area about it much reduced from Venizelos's demand. The American delegates opposed the Greek desire for sovereignty in any part of Asia Minor.

When Premier Orlando broke with President Wilson upon the Fiume issue and left Paris, the astute Venizelos immediately pushed forward his Smyrna claim. He was able to gain the support of the American leaders at the Peace Conference, in the face of the contrary American stand as represented upon the Greek territorial commission. Under a secrecy which kept knowledge of this decision absolutely from the office of the American advisers upon Turkish affairs, he gained permission to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops. This was done on the morning of May 15, 1919, in open daylight, though

the Turkish local authorities were assured repeatedly that it would be an occupation by Allied troops, including Greeks. Upon May 15 and 16 Greek troops and civilians massacred between 400 and 800 Turks in the city and its environs. In the next two weeks the killing of Turks, with all the horrible accompaniments of Near Eastern massacres, spread through the countryside roundabout as the Greek troops advanced. It is a moderate estimate to say that over 2,000 Turks—men, women, and children—were done to death unnecessarily by this decision of the War Council and the Council of Four.

It is a tribute to the skill of Venizelos that he could still ride high upon the wave of his astounding reputation, despite this terrible indictment of the discipline and self-control of the Greek army. Venizelos was perhaps only remotely responsible. The Greek officers appointed under his dictation surely were directly so. In early July Venizelos was warned by the Supreme Council that his troops were advancing beyond the limits set by them. He explained and made promises, and sent within forty-eight hours a telegram to the Greek command for a still farther advance.

Knowledge of the Smyrna incident is necessary to an understanding of the elements which have made the Turkish negotiations at Paris and London and their results, embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres, entirely ineffective, especially in respect to their provisions for Armenian independence. For Armenia has been betrayed by the civilized world and thrown upon the tender mercies of Bolshevist Russia and the Turkish Nationalist forces.

News of the Smyrna massacres spread rapidly throughout the Near East. It caused terror and suspicion of the Allied intention, even in Syria. Great mass meetings

of protest were held in Constantinople. Young Turk leaders had already fled into Asia Minor and were then attempting to organize, under the new name of the Tashkilat Milli, Turkish resistance to the disruption of the empire. The empire had meant to many of them official position, whether in the army or in civil service, which was their means of subsistence, with limitless opportunities of graft. The massacres gave life and purpose to their appeal to the Turkish peasantry, to defend themselves against other massacres which would surely befall them when the Allied control should be established. It helped, no doubt, in destroying the confidence of the Allies in Venizelos, and in the possibility of a just rule by the Greeks over the Turkish population of Asia Minor. Venizelos continued to work tirelessly through the fall of 1919 and the spring of 1920, but his diplomatic skill could no longer meet the odds against him. In a last desperate cast against fortune he made promises in May of 1920 to defeat the forces of Mustapha Kemal Pasha in Asia Minor. He threw in additional Greek troops who advanced toward Constantinople and Ismid. The Turks retreated before them, fighting guerilla warfare. In October of 1919 a Smyrna Greek confessed: "Smyrna will be the tombstone over the reputation of Venizelos." And it has been so. In the Turkish treaty the Supreme Allied Council altered its Smyrna policy. The United States had no hand in this. Instead of the complete Greek sovereignty over Smyrna which Venizelos had hoped for—and almost had—the Treaty of Sèvres has made a five-year provisional arrangement. The sovereignty is Turkish. The administration is in Greek hands. After five years of this situation the population in the Smyrna district is to hold a plebiscite to

determine whether it desires to be Turkish or to become a part of Greece.

The costly and fruitless maintenance of Greek troops in Asia Minor gradually wore out the support of Venizelos at home. In the parliamentary elections held in Greece on November 14, 1920, he was overwhelmingly defeated. Venizelos had ridden the crest of the wave of world-wide popularity and confidence for seven years. That wave has now thrown him, in self-imposed exile, high and dry upon the beach at Nice. His dream of the Ægean Sea as a Greek *mare clausum* is past.

At the Paris Conference Syrian affairs were also kept from any early decision by the incompatible character of the secret treaties and the Arab aspirations, war-time diplomacy and the new doctrine of self-determination, and the local native hatreds based on religious groupings. On November 9 of 1918 General Allenby had allowed an official statement to be published in Palestine, committing both the French and British Governments to the policy of assisting and encouraging the establishment of native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia. These native governments were to derive their authority from the free will and initiative of the peoples concerned. This solemn promise has not been kept. Emir Feisal came to Paris demanding independence, under mandatory guidance, if necessary, for all the Arab portion of Turkey, and that the Allied Supreme Council send out an Interallied commission to find out what sort of government the Arabs really wanted. He spoke before the Council of Ten in the Arab tongue, recounting the aid rendered to the Allied cause by the Arab camel corps.

There came also to Paris from Syria a great American, Doctor Howard Bliss, demanding independently of Feisal

that a commission of inquiry be sent into Syria. Oblivious of its results, he felt that the good faith of the Western Powers was involved in the keeping of the promise inherent in the Allenby declaration that the Arabs should have a chance of making their wishes known. The word of great Western Powers, he said, had been passed, and their honor was involved. The conspicuous honesty of Doctor Bliss, his tremendous influence for good in the Near East, are deserving of a much greater recognition by Americans than they have received.

Out of these and many more conversations, out of much diplomatic hauling and pulling, came the decision of the Supreme Council to send a commission into Syria. The French were opposed to this expedition. Never did they intend that it should go, to judge by their obstructionist policy. Their official policy was to stand absolutely upon the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. After two months of futile conferences of all kinds President Wilson, in exasperation, determined to send out an American commission to ascertain what the Syrians really wanted. In early June the Crane-King commission departed for Syria, returning to Paris in September. The results of its inquiries have never been made public, and the reasons for suppression can only be surmised. Rumor has it that the overwhelming sentiment of the Syrian population desired an American mandate over all of Syria. That being impossible, they preferred a British to a French mandate.

In December of 1919 the United States Government withdrew from active participation in the work of the Peace Conference. This removed the chief deterrent to the settlement of the Turkish problems, in the sense that no force opposed to the secret treaties was any longer



MAP SHOWING THE DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE FORMER TURKISH EMPIRE

represented in the meetings of the Supreme Council. From this time on the application of the secret terms was assured. Seeing this, the followers of Emir Feisal proclaimed Syria an independent state and Feisal its king, at a meeting held at Damascus on March 11, 1920. In anticipation of the assignment of Syria to France, French colonial troops were already in occupation of the Syrian coastal towns. "King" Feisal issued an ultimatum in March to the French commander that he must withdraw his troops by a given date. Upon April 26, 1920, at the San Remo conference, the mandates were assigned, Mesopotamia to the British Empire, Syria to France, Palestine to the British Empire, under provision of the application of the Balfour Zionist declaration. If we combine the mandatory assignments for Syria and Mesopotamia with the Turkish treaty and the Tripartite Agreement, it is patent that the secret treaties have been clamped upon the Arab world, as also upon the territory remaining to Turkey. The method of control imposed upon the Arabs is called the mandate. The character of this mandatory control has not yet been made public. Nor do we know as yet of any provision whereby a time limit has been set upon the duration of the mandates.

The Arabs of Syria fought the French colonial troops in desultory skirmishes for four months in 1920. The end of all the threats of the Arabs that they would "throw the French into the sea," of all the dreams of immediate Arab independence, was shockingly simple. I quote from General Gourand's proclamation of July 25, 1920: "Emir Feisal has ceased to rule. Emir Feisal has been requested to leave the country with his family." Feisal is now in Switzerland. He made the impression of a

lovable and high-minded personality, too little ruthless to carry through to success against western diplomacy, western desires for commercial privilege, and western arms the wishes of the Arab people for real independence.

By the Paleologue-Sazonof Treaty Constantinople was to go to Russia. This would have meant the elimination of the Sultan from the city on the Golden Horn. This result would have been a blessing for Turkey. It would have deloused that state of thousands of useless and venal officials and have put the ruler and his bureaucrats within reach of the Anatolian Turks, whom they have so long robbed and bled. In the first months of the Paris Conference it was expected that the maintenance of the Sultan in Constantinople, which gives a Byzantine character to the Turkish state, would surely be done away with. Then opposition developed on the British side. Turbaned Moslems from India appeared before the members of the Supreme Council, shepherded by Mr. Montagu. They asserted that the 60,000,000 Moslems of India protested against the ejection of the Sultan as a degradation of the caliphate. Two considerations made this alleged Moslem danger, in case of a changed status of the old Turkish capital, less impressive than it might otherwise have been. The first was that the British Government had not, in the secret treaty which gave the city of Constantinople to Russia, regarded the Indian Moslem danger as paramount. The second lay in the obvious argument that this danger was strictly an internal problem of the British Empire, and that the question of the control of Constantinople must be settled with a view to world welfare rather than from the standpoint of the British India office and its difficulties.

Whatever may be the actual as opposed to the osten-

sible reasons for the maintenance of the Turkish capital at Constantinople, it is so provided in the Treaty of Sèvres. To insure freedom of navigation through the Straits a commission of the Straits has been established, which will be the real controlling power in the zone of the Straits. Provision is made for representation of the United States, whenever it desires to participate, for Russia, when it becomes a member of the League of Nations. As to Constantinople the Treaty of Sèvres has made no real decision. Matters are where they were a half-century ago. International control means control by that Power which is strongest upon the commission. The policy of Russia will continue, as in the past, to look toward complete control of the Straits, as even Soviet Russia has already begun to do.

The efforts of the two Armenian delegations at Paris were directed toward the ultimate end of establishing an independent state, including the Armenians of Russian Transcaucasus and the four northeastern vilayets of Turkey, stretching southwestward so as to embrace a part of Cilicia, and debouching upon the Mediterranean Sea at the Bay of Alexandretta. Their immediate desire was to obtain recognition of the Armenian Republic of the Transcaucasus as a *de facto* government, so that they might be in a position to obtain credits, money for food for the 400,000 refugees assembled in Russian Armenia, and for arms and ammunition with which they might defend themselves against Moslem Tartar and Turkish attacks and move the refugees back to their homes in Turkish Armenia. But the Armenian mountains have little to offer in exchange for help, except a brave, industrious, and broken people.

The Armenian desire for Cilicia conflicted with the ter-

ritorial assignment to France by the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Cilicia and central Anatolia, therefore, remain to Turkey in the Treaty of Sèvres, and are designated as a sphere of French interest in the Tripartite Agreement. Again, the secret treaties had won in the diplomatic field. But the attempt of the French to occupy Cilicia has been frustrated by the Turkish Nationalist opposition. Bitterly disillusioned, the French press is demanding that the entire Cilician adventure be abandoned.

By the Treaty of Sèvres President Wilson was asked to fix by arbitration the boundaries between Armenia and the Turkish state. His competence was limited to drawing these boundaries within the four vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Bitlis, and Van. In other words, the territory which he could possibly assign to Armenia approximates that formerly given to Russia by the Paleologue-Sazonof Treaty. Here, too, the territorial dispositions of the Treaty of Sèvres are the offspring of the secret treaties. Though the Turkish treaty declares them to be free, in actuality the Armenians have been betrayed by the western world. Lenine and Mustapha Kemal have cracked the whip and they have sovietized. Who of us dares look an Armenian in the face and upbraid him for this?

IX

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND NATIVES IN TRANSFERRED TERRITORIES

BY MANLEY O. HUDSON

The gulf between German practices before the war and the announced aims of the Allies during the war is nowhere more notable than in dealing with subject peoples. It was Prince Bülow's defense of German policy in Poland that "in the struggle between nationalities, one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is the victor and the other the vanquished." "It is a law of life and development in history," he said, "that when two national civilizations meet, they fight for ascendancy." It would probably be untrue to say that such a conception of domination was ever prevalent throughout Germany. But the notorious efforts at Prussianization of the Poles before 1914, and the measures taken by the Germans during the war to spread the German language in occupied territories, undoubtedly did much to bring German *Kultur* into such universal disrepute. The failure of the Germans to enlist the sympathies and the ambitions of the mingled nationalities in eastern Europe must be counted as one of the things that destroyed them.

When President Wilson proclaimed as running through the whole programme of the Fourteen Points, "the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak," the war

became for millions of men in Allied countries as for many thousands in enemy territory, a crusade for the liberation of oppressed peoples. With the acceptance of the President's explanation as one of the conditions of the German armistice, the Allied states were committed to a programme of territorial readjustment which excited the most extravagant hopes in many peoples of Europe. The fulfilment of such a programme gave the Peace Conference two of its important functions: first, to decide on the actual territorial changes which should be made; and second, to take measures, after those territorial changes were arranged, to protect the peoples and nationalities concerned—to make sure, in other words, that the peace did not mean for numerous discontented groups the exchange of one bad master for another. I shall attempt to explain the work of the Paris Conference in this second field, and to describe the measures which it formulated for protecting the racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in Europe and the native peoples in former German territories outside of Europe.

Obviously, self-determination as a practical measure has very definite limits. In any territory where races are mixed, where numerous languages are spoken, and where different religions are practised, the fixing of a national boundary is beset with many difficulties. Any boundary will almost surely mean that people of different languages, different races, and different religions must find it possible to live under the same political organization. In the case of Greece and Bulgaria, for instance, almost any line which might have been drawn would mean that many Greek sympathizers would be left in Bulgaria, and that many Bulgarian sympathizers would find themselves still in Greece.

But the problem is more difficult still. It is not merely a matter of national sympathies which must be ferreted out. There is also the complication of determining what qualities identify particular families, or even individuals in the same family, with one or the other of the contending groups. Families Greek by inheritance, religion, and political sympathy may, nevertheless, speak only the Bulgarian language; or in some cases individuals speaking Greek, and of many Greek attachments, may be identified with the Bulgarian church. Even the children of the same parents may be divided in their political allegiance. Obviously then, the fixing of a boundary between two such states will leave many people dissatisfied, and if one envisages any degree of permanence in the frontiers established it is necessary to encourage toleration which will reduce dissatisfaction to a minimum. The history of Switzerland shows that this ideal is not an impossible one.

After the armistices in October and November, 1918, the wildest expectations began to be entertained by scattered groups of dissatisfied peoples throughout the Central Empires. During 1918 the Allies had made it plain that Poland was to become independent. They had recognized the Czecho-Slovaks as entitled to a national existence. They had given assurances of sympathy with the territorial ambitions of Serbia, Roumania, and Greece. The result was that at the moment of Allied victory many thousands of people found themselves quite uncertain as to their political future. During the winter of 1918–1919, in some cases this uncertainty grew into concern, and from concern into alarm. The chaos of defeat and the scarcity of food had prepared the field in which such alarm spread rapidly. Among the Germans in several

parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for instance, there was a feeling that they were about to be handed over to an inferior civilization, which would rob them of their language, which would deny them political equality, which, in a word, would submerge their culture. And the Protestant Magyars in Transylvania began to fear for their religion. Some of the peoples liberated had been very badly treated, and their oppressors naturally expected liberation to mean a reversal of the process, with the oppressor becoming the oppressed. The success of the Allied armies had given a tremendous impetus to nationalism—the kind of nationalism which is satisfied only with superlatives.

Some of the attempts to extend the use of languages went very far. One of the complaints received at the Peace Conference was that Czech troops, on entering a part of German Bohemia, would immediately order all advertising signs on the stores to be written in the Czech instead of in the German language. The whole situation could only result in intensifying existing divisions and in increasing the barriers to co-operation and toleration. With reference to the Germans, this situation was, perhaps, more serious than with reference to other peoples. More than a million Germans lived in the territory about to be transferred to Poland, and fully three millions in territory about to become part of Czecho-Slovakia. German is one of the great international languages of Europe. The Polish language is seldom spoken out of Poland. The Czech language is known to but few people in other countries. The Serbian, the Magyar, the Roumanian, and the Greek languages are all restricted to particular regions. But in a certain sense German is in eastern Europe what French is in western Europe, and what the

English language is so fast becoming in many parts of the world. To a German, therefore, there is more than sentimental value in making sure that his children will speak his own language. There is an economic interest in their using a language which will serve them in other countries. There is a cultural interest in continuing the use of a language which, in science and learning, is third only to English and French in importance. Yet the Germans had set an example in their efforts to force unwilling peoples to use the German language, and it was but natural if the peoples whose languages had been suppressed made similar attempts in reviving them.

The responsibilities of the Peace Conference in this troubled situation were quite clear. Its first goal had to be the establishment of a stable peace. It was, therefore, part of its duty to anticipate new Irredentisms, which might call for future vindication. In the second place, the Peace Conference had assumed a great responsibility in dealing with the political fortunes of large numbers of Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Roumanians, Greeks, Germans, Austrians, Magyars, and Bulgarians living in transferred territories. President Wilson's insistence on "impartial justice in every form of the settlement," and on the "justice that knows no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned," constituted a part of the contract under which the peoples in the Central Empires had laid down their arms. The President had made it very clear that peoples and provinces were not to be "bartered about from sovereign to sovereign, as though they were mere chattels and pawns in a game," and this seemed to demand that the fullest possible provision should be made for the minorities in

race, language, or religion, living in territories about to be transferred.

Precedents were not lacking for the decision of the Conference to impose special obligations on the new states, and on states to which large accessions of territory were to be made. When Greece was first admitted to the family of nations in 1832 the Conference of London had prescribed the form of her government, and when her acquisition of the Ionian Islands was recognized in 1864, it was made subject to guarantees for freedom of worship and religious toleration. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin had elaborated provisions on religious freedom and political equality to be embodied in the public law of the Principality of Bulgaria; it imposed similar guarantees as a condition of its recognition of the independence of Montenegro and Serbia and Roumania; and specific provisions were included in the Treaty of Berlin for protecting religious liberties in the territory which remained with the Ottoman Empire. After the Congress of Berlin, provisions for protecting religious minorities had frequently been included in treaties concerning the transfer of territories—they had proved particularly important to the Mussulmans, and the treaty of peace between Turkey and Greece in November, 1913, went into such detail as to provide that "the name of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as Caliph, shall continue to be pronounced in the public prayers of the Mussulmans." It should be noted also that the abortive peace of Bucharest between the Central Powers and Roumania, in May, 1918, had attempted to establish equal freedom in Roumania for the Roman Catholic, the United Greek, the Bulgarian Orthodox, the Protestant, the Mussulman, and the Jewish faiths, and the Central Powers had recognized the neces-

sity for a provision extending Roumanian citizenship to Jews.

For almost a century, therefore, it had been an established practice, if not a principle of the public law of Europe, that guarantees to religious minorities should be included among provisions dealing with the transfer of territory inhabited by heterogeneous peoples. It is true that the practice had yielded but questionable results in some cases, notably in that of Roumania. But this would not have warranted a departure at Paris, even if the commitments of the Allies had not in clearest terms bound them to protect the "equal rights of the peoples concerned."

The first proposal for protecting minorities in the new states was made by President Wilson. It provided for religious freedom in terms not unlike those to be found in the Treaty of Berlin. His proposal went further, however, in providing for political equality among the various races and nationalities in the states which might be asked to give guarantees. Meanwhile, at the instance of an American Jewish committee, led by Judge Julian W. Mack and Mr. Louis Marshall, the question of protecting the Jews had interested Colonel House, and the American delegation had prepared clauses dealing with minorities in Poland for insertion in the treaty with Germany. It was so obviously a question on which differences of opinion would arise, requiring perhaps prolonged negotiations, that the Supreme Council decided to refer it to a special commission. It is unfortunate that this decision was not taken until May 1, for with the presentation of the conditions of peace to the Germans set for May 7, the earlier work of the commission was necessarily hurried.

This Committee on New States and the Protection of Minorities, as it was called, was composed of M. Berthelot and M. Kammerrer of France, Mr. Headlam-Morley and Mr. Carr of Great Britain, Mr. de Martino and Colonel Castoldi of Italy, Mr. Adatci of Japan, and Mr. David Hunter Miller and Mr. Hudson of the United States. In the later stages of the work the American representative was Mr. Allen W. Dulles, and valuable counsel was given throughout by Professor A. C. Coolidge, who had just returned from his mission to central Europe. Between May and November the committee on new states held sixty-four meetings. As with many of the other commissions, the committee was given only the most general directions by the Supreme Council, and where unanimity was reached in the committee its work was usually approved without close re-examination.

It was at once decided that the two new states whose independence was to be recognized by the treaty with Germany, and which were to receive cessions of German territory, should agree in the peace treaty itself to accept such guarantees as the Principal Powers should deem necessary "to protect the interests of inhabitants . . . who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion." This applied to the new state of Czecho-Slovakia, with not less than 3,000,000 Germans, and to the new state of Poland, which was to include at least 1,000,000 Germans and 4,000,000 Jews in its population. The incorporation of this undertaking in the treaty with Germany had the effect of obligating these states to each of the other signatories to the treaty, and it gives even Germany a *locus standi* for seeing that the guarantees accepted are performed.

The same course was later adopted with reference to

the other new states. Thus the peace treaty with Austria obliges Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania to accept similar obligations; the peace treaty with Hungary binds Jugo-Slavia and Roumania in the same way; the peace treaty with Bulgaria binds Greece; and that with Turkey binds Greece and Armenia. The Hedjaz is the only new state set up by the Peace Conference with reference to which this course was not followed, the population being so homogeneous as to make it unnecessary.

But one may ask, what was done for the minorities in other European territories severed from Germany and the former Austro-Hungarian Empire? What of the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, in the Trentino, in Schleswig, and in Eupen and Malmedy? In none of these territories were the problems of race and language and religion so complicated as in eastern Europe. Moreover, these accessions were not incident to settling up new states or reorganizing old ones. In none of these cases was the territory acquired by a state already subject to general international obligations in its treatment of minorities. But it need not be concealed that some of the leaders of the smaller Powers, notably Mr. Bratiano of Roumania, found it very difficult to believe that Italy and Roumania were not in this respect in identical circumstances. Even if Italy's position as a Principal Power had not seemed to her representatives to preclude it, perhaps her record of religious toleration and political equality would have seemed a sufficient reason for not binding her with a separate minorities treaty. And Alsace-Lorraine was quite generally regarded as merely a case of *dis*annexation.

But some of the representatives of the new states

found the distinction most invidious, and the incorporation of these obligations in the treaties of peace was stoutly resisted for many months. As the question first arose with reference to Poland, her case began the contest. The statesmen who had been so engrossed in the herculean tasks of setting up new commonwealths had very naturally not found time to work out their own international position. People engaged in a struggle to be free do not easily conceive of themselves as possible oppressors. Where excesses and pogroms had occurred, they had been, perhaps in all instances, the result of irresponsible zeal rather than of deliberate government policy. It was, therefore, something of a shock to the Polish leaders to be called upon to sign a separate treaty with the Principal Powers concerning what they deemed to be a domestic matter. It was argued that their sovereignty was being invaded, that their good intentions were being doubted, and that their national unity was being jeopardized. Roumania and Serbia thought it also a reflection on their past records and on their performance of the obligations undertaken in 1878.

The opposition culminated in a protest made in the plenary conference on May 31, which was styled by the press a revolution of the small Powers. It was one of the few occasions when a real issue was discussed before the plenary conference. Mr. Bratiano and Mr. Paderewski were very emphatic in rejecting any obligations which did not inure to all members of the League of Nations. Mr. Kramar, of Czecho-Slovakia, and Mr. Trumbitch, of Jugo-Slavia, were insistent on amending the objectionable clauses. Mr. Venizelos, of Greece, contented himself with pouring oil on the troubled waters. The occasion called forth the speech of President Wilson, which was

so much debated in our 1920 presidential campaign, in which he insisted that the United States could share the responsibility of the territorial readjustments only if assurances were given that conditions would not be maintained which would inevitably lead to new oppression and renewed conflict. The President is reported to have said:

> It is not, therefore, the intervention of those who would interfere, but the action of those who would help. I beg that our friends will take that view of it, because I see no escape from that view of it. How can a Power like the United States, for example—for I can speak for no other—after signing this Treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation on the part, for example, of Roumania and of Czecho-Slovakia and of Serbia, that if any covenants of this settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed.
>
> In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct? Mr. Bratiano—and I speak of his suggestions with the utmost respect—suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of Roumania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Roumania by the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say: "If we agree to these additions of territory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace."

This was in no sense a commitment by the President. It was, instead, an appeal. It did not wholly soothe the excited feelings of the Poles, and the uncertainty as to their course continued down to the time when the first minority treaty was signed. The continued disaffection of the Roumanians and the Jugo-Slavs led them

to take a very determined stand with reference to the contents of the treaties themselves, and for this reason their signatures were withheld until some time after the Principal Powers had signed. That this attitude of the new states did not frustrate altogether the attempt to give special protection to minorities is due in no small measure to President Wilson, whose interest in the policy was perhaps keener than that of his colleagues on the Supreme Council, and to the wise and patient judgment of Mr. Frank Polk.

The most unfortunate consequence of such opposition was that it inevitably affected the procedure adopted in framing the treaties themselves. The committee on new states was compelled to proceed without the assistance and co-operation which it would have desired from the representatives of the various peoples concerned. But the wisdom of Doctor Beneš, of Czecho-Slovakia, and Mr. Venizelos, of Greece, had led them to recognize the desirability of the minority treaties from the start, and the Czecho-Slovak and Greek delegations were very helpful in framing their respective treaties.

In dealing with the content of the treaties, certain provisions must be noticed which are common to all the special minority treaties and to the minority provisions of the treaties of peace with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey. First, they are designed to secure to all inhabitants full and complete protection of life and liberty without distinction as to birth, nationality, language, race, or religion, as well as the privilege of practising in public and in private any religion which is not inconsistent with public order and public morals. In the second place, they aim to assure to all the inhabitants in the transferred territory a choice between acquiring the

nationality of the country to which the transfer is made, and retaining their old nationality by removing themselves from the territory. As to inhabitants born in the future, a stipulation not unlike that in our own fourteenth amendment provides that all persons born in a state become *ipso facto* nationals of that state. This provision seemed essential to prevent such abuses as have been suffered by the Jews in Roumania, where the law continued to classify as aliens people whose families had lived in Roumania for generations.

Provision is also made for securing equality in the enjoyment of political, religious, and cultural liberty to all citizens without distinction as to race or language or religion. To make this more than an expression of pious hope, it was necessary to be very specific about the use of languages and the control of schools. To a person who feels the necessity of perpetuating his stock and his kind, nothing is dearer than his mother tongue. Its extinction almost inevitably spells defeat. The stories of Polish children striking because they were forced to say their prayers at school in the German language, are indications of the ruthlessness of the nationalizing process, and it is not strange that language requirements have brought such sharp contests in eastern Europe. But even the instruction received at a mother's knee would soon be forgotten if children had all their school training in another language. To the Roumanian living in Eastern Serbia, for instance, it is not enough to have his child taught at school to read the Roumanian language—the instruction must be in the medium of the Roumanian language if the child's loyalty to his parents' beliefs is not to be weaned away. So the minority treaties provide that in districts where a considerable part of the popula-

tion belongs to a linguistic minority, instruction must be provided in that people's own tongue. Such provisions are enforceable in the face of a deliberate attempt to stamp out a language, or a religion, only if the minority is given some share in managing the schools. The minority treaties, therefore, provide for an equitable division of public funds used in maintaining educational, religious, and charitable institutions among the various groups concerned.

To some of us in America, such provisions are likely to seem very strange. They have been attacked on the ground that they encourage disunity within the state—that they make for perpetuating hyphens instead of abolishing them. Current opinion in America would not have much hospitality for a suggestion that instruction in a public school in one of our large American cities should be in some other language than in English. But the Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and the Magyars in Roumania are in a very different position from that of the Germans in St. Louis and the Magyars in Cleveland. They have lived for generations or centuries on the land where they are to-day—their life and their history are identified with the place in which they live. Their position can better be compared to that of the Spaniards in California or Arizona, and to that of the natives in Porto Rico. European immigrants in Chicago have come to a new world where an American tradition has preceded them, and a claim by them to replace existing traditions with their own would be more comparable to the Prussianizing of a Polish city in the days before the war. The situation in the United States must be distinguished on the one hand from that of homogeneous communities like France or England, and on the other hand from that

of such composite states as Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. In a unified state like England, the protection of racial and linguistic and religious minorities is not an issue. Our American problems are those of fusion—the eastern European problems are those of union.

The general clauses described are designed to protect the Germans and white Russians and Jews and Lithuanians in Poland, the Germans and Jews and Ruthenians in Czecho-Slovakia, the Magyars and Germans and Roumanians and Albanians and Mussulmans in Jugo-Slavia, the Magyars and Serbs and Jews in Roumania, and the Mussulmans and Jews and Albanians and Vlachs in Greece. They were also included in the treaty of peace with Austria to protect the Czechs and Slavs and Jews left within the new state; in the treaty with Bulgaria to protect the Germans and Roumanians and Jews; in the treaty with Hungary to protect the Germans and Slavs and Jews; and in the treaty with Turkey to protect the Christians and Jews.

But special protection was thought to be needed by the Jews in Poland and Roumania and Greece. The Jews are both a race and a sect. Scattered throughout eastern Europe, engaged often in trade which carries them into several countries, and a deeply religious people, their problems are quite distinct from those of other minorities. Moreover, unlike the Germans or Magyars or Roumanians, they have had no Jewish country to which they might emigrate until the treaty of peace with Turkey opened Palestine to them. The Yiddish language was looked upon as a corruption of German, and many Jews in eastern Europe bore the stigma of pro-Germanism and Bolshevism in 1919, with the result that anti-Semitic agitation was revived in some places in very revolting pogroms.

The Polish treaty contains a provision for the expenditure by local Jewish committees of the public money devoted to maintaining Jewish schools—a provision not uncommon in Europe where religious schools are given state support. The Roumanian treaty guards specially against the Jews' being treated as aliens, and requires citizenship to be extended to them. The Turkish treaty provides that Jews resident in Palestine shall become *ipso facto* citizens of Palestine. In Poland, Roumania, and Greece the Jews are not to be forced to violate their Sabbath. But pious Jews may still be placed at an economic disadvantage if after resting on Saturday they are not permitted to work on Sunday. The treaties do not attempt to deal with that possibility.

Several other minorities seemed to need special protection. The Mussulmans in Jugo-Slavia and Greece, the Saxons and Czechlers in Roumania, the Vlachs of Pindus and the monks of Mt. Athos in Greece are given a measure of local autonomy in scholastic and religious activities. The persecution of Christians in Turkey in the past made it imperative that they receive special protection also. In Czecho-Slovakia the Ruthenians living south of the Carpathians were given political autonomy and special participation in the government at Prague. The Italian delegation proposed that Jugo-Slavia should be asked to give similar autonomy in Macedonia, but this proposal was not supported by other delegations, and would doubtless have been stoutly resisted by the Jugo-Slavs.

The elaboration of such measures will doubtless prove a boon in times of stress to unpopular groups who may resort to them as a kind of bill of rights. But experience in Roumania has shown that a formal treaty provision

will not execute itself. The Congress of Berlin had been content to frame provisions for protecting minorities and embodying them in formal treaties, without giving them a definite sanction. Any of the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin might have protested against the violation of its provisions by Roumania in refusing to permit Jews to own rural land because they were aliens. Only a collective protest of the signatory Powers was likely to prove availing, and it was never made. But the enforced emigration of Roumanian Jews to America gave the United States an interest in Roumanian conditions. Though our government had not signed the Treaty of Berlin, in 1902, Secretary John Hay made a very strong protest to Roumania, in which he described conditions then existing in Roumania in the following terms:

Starting from the arbitrary and controvertible premises that the native Jews of Roumania domiciled there for centuries are "aliens not subject to foreign protection," the ability of the Jew to earn even the scanty means of existence that suffice for a frugal race has been constricted by degrees, until nearly every opportunity to win a livelihood is denied; and until the helpless poverty of the Jews has constrained an exodus of such proportions as to cause general concern.

The political disabilities of the Jews in Roumania, their exclusion from the public service and the learned professions, the limitations of their civil rights, and the imposition upon them of exceptional taxes, involving as they do wrongs repugnant to the moral sense of liberal modern peoples are not so directly in point for my present purpose as the public acts which attack the inherent rights of trade. The Jews are prohibited from owning land, or even from cultivating it as common labourers. They are debarred from residing in the rural districts. Many branches of petty trade and manual production are closed to them in the overcrowded cities where they are forced to dwell and engage against fearful odds in the desperate struggle for existence. Even as ordinary artisans or hired labourers they may only find employment in the proportion of one "unprotected alien" to two "Roumanians" under any one employer. In

short, by the cumulative effect of successive restrictions, the Jews of Roumania have become reduced to a state of wretched misery.

If these conditions existed in spite of the solemn undertaking of Roumania in 1878, it would seem that some redress should have been possible. The British Government seems to have been willing to act on Secretary Hay's protest, for in September, 1902, it sent the following reply to his circular:

> His Majesty's Government joins with the United States Government in deploring the depressed conditions of the Roumanian Jews and in regarding with apprehension the results of their enforced emigration.
>
> His Majesty's Government will place themselves in communication with the other Powers to a joint representation to the Roumanian Government on the subject.

But no such joint representation was ever made, and Secretary Hay's efforts to secure the intervention of the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Berlin were fruitless.

With such an example before it, the Paris Conference might have despaired, if no means of enforcing the protection of minorities could have been found. Such means were found in the League of Nations. All the minority clauses were expressly framed as "obligations of international concern," and were "placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations." No modifications can be made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League. Moreover, the Council is empowered to enforce the provisions, and in case of "any infraction or any danger of infraction," to take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective. The Permanent Court of International Justice is given jurisdiction over certain disputes which may arise

in connection with the interpretation and execution of the treaties. Last February the Council of the League consented to this guarantee of the minority provisions in the Polish treaty, and in October it assumed the guarantee of the minority parts of the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties.

The method of enforcement adopted is carefully restricted so that the governments of the new states will not be constantly harassed. An aggrieved minority must interest in its behalf some government which is represented on the Council of the League before the Council can act. A direct appeal by an individual Jew, or even by a committee of Jews, is not enough to force a government to defend itself at the bar of the League. The American and Italian delegations wanted to leave the international court itself to frame the procedure, and they would have allowed any member of the League, and not simply the members represented on the Council, to set the League's machinery into action. But the other delegations insisted that this would weaken the local governments. In the plan agreed upon, it is important to note that a method of judicial enforcement is provided, and that this assures the new states against the dangers of improper political interference.

Such a programme for protecting minorities does not take care of all the difficulties, however. It is almost inevitable in drawing a boundary in a closely contested area that some people will be left on both sides who would prefer to be on the other side. This is particularly true in the Balkan peninsula, and it led Mr. Venizelos to propose one of the most interesting innovations attempted at Paris, a scheme for facilitating the intermigration of dissatisfied peoples across the new national frontiers.

Mr. Venizelos suggested that a mixed commission be set up to facilitate, during a period of two years, the removal of Greeks from Bulgaria into Greece, and of Bulgarians from Greece into Bulgaria. In some instances whole villages wanted to remove in this way, but it was only possible if government aid could assure them against loss of their property in their old homes and against exploitation in the places to which they should go. The scheme of Mr. Venizelos was carefully studied by the committee on new states, which concluded that it might contribute to a solution of the Balkan tangle, if Greece, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, and Turkey would co-operate in some such plan. The suggestion was not favored by the Jugo-Slav delegation, however, but such a treaty was signed by Greece and Bulgaria, and provision for a similar arrangement between Greece and Turkey was embodied in the Turkish peace treaty. The Greek-Bulgarian treaty is now in force, and last September the Council of the League nominated two members of the mixed commission which is to supervise the intermigration. The success of this experiment in Balkan polity is to be awaited with greatest interest.

It remains to speak of the measures taken by the Peace Conference for the protection of the peoples inhabiting transferred territories outside of Europe. Colonial expansion had been one of the principal objects of most of the governments of Europe before the war, and the contest in Africa and the Near East and the Pacific had given rise to many delicate issues in international politics during the decade preceding 1914. One need not say that colonial expansion was an object for which the war was fought, on either side. But it was bound to have an important place in the work of a peace conference at

any time, and few people dreamed that the *status quo ante bellum* was to be left intact. New rivalries had been engendered by the very progress of the war. Japan had seized the German Islands north of the equator, and Great Britain and France had agreed to support her claim to keep them. Australia had seized the more important of the German possessions in the Southern Pacific, and her representatives came to Paris determined that they would not be given up. In German Southwest and German East Africa the South African Union was bitterly opposed to any restoration of German control, and the frightful treatment of the Herreros, who had been all but exterminated by the Germans in Southwest Africa, lent support to the general attitude toward the German colonizers' treatment of native races. In this situation most of the Allied world in 1919 was in no temper to see the German hold continued, and possession as a *fait accompli* often means as many points in politics as in law.

But the principle for action was not simple, once action had been decided upon. The Fourteen Points had called for an "impartial adjustment," on the vague principle that interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the governments contending for title. Mr. Lloyd George had been more specific in declaring that the general principle of self-determination was as applicable in these territories as in the occupied territories of Europe. In terms of the next half-century in international relations, it might have contributed to a more stable world to have left some of her African possessions to Germany. Yet it was probably true that few of the indigenous peoples desired such a fate, though in East Africa enough of loyalty to Ger-

man rule survived to enable the German army there to fight through the war, and to keep together until after the armistice. In all of the German colonies there were fewer than 25,000 Germans before the war. It seemed most in line with the interests of the 15,000,000 of natives to regard their government an international trust, which would not only prevent their exploitation, but which would also assure to all nations equal opportunity in trading with them and in developing their territories.

Various suggestions for international control had been made during the war. The experiments in Egypt, Morocco, Samoa, and the new Hebrides had not warranted great confidence in the possibilities of direct international administration, however, and the suggestion that the League of Nations should assume administrative responsibility found little support. But in his well-known memorandum on the League of Nations General Smuts had formulated a proposal widely discussed in England that a system of mandates should be devised under which the state administering a territory should be responsible to the League of Nations and should conduct a stewardship along general lines recognized by the League to be just and proper. The American delegation backed the English support of this proposal. The chief opposition came from the British Dominions, after the French had been won over to it. But early in the Conference, on January 30, an agreement was reached which was later incorporated in the Covenant of the League as Article 22.

The mandate system provides for three types of mandates. The class A mandates are to apply to the territories formerly Turkish, which are to be set up as provisionally independent nations, subject to administrative

advice and assistance from a mandatory Power until such time as they can stand alone. Such mandates are to apply to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. The class B mandates are to apply to Central African territories, administered under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion to the native inhabitants, will prohibit such abuses as the slave-trades, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, will prevent the arming of natives for other purposes than police, and will maintain an open door and equal opportunity for the commerce of all members of the League. A third type of mandate, class C, deals with such sparsely settled territories as Southwest Africa and certain of the Pacific Islands, which are to be administered, subject to the same safeguards for the natives, under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory.

After this plan was agreed upon, the next step was the decision as to what states should be selected as mandatories, and in what territories. On May 7, on the same afternoon that the conditions of peace were handed to the Germans, the Supreme Council decided that France and Great Britain would make a joint recommendation to the League concerning the mandate for Togoland and the Cameroons; that the mandates for German East Africa and the island of Nauru should be held by Great Britain; that the mandate for German Southwest Africa should be held by the South African Union, that for the German Samoan Islands by New Zealand, that for other Pacific Islands south of the equator by Australia, and that for the islands north of the equator by Japan. Whether this allocation to Japan of the islands north of the equator included the island of Yap has recently been the subject of some controversy. It seems quite clear

that an American reservation was made as to this island, on account of its importance as a cable station, but this reserve may have been misunderstood and perhaps vaguely recorded. A later modification assigned part of East Africa to Belgium, and Kionga to Portugal, to strengthen the territorial position of those Powers in adjacent territory. The disposition of the territories severed from the Turkish Empire had to await the framing of the Turkish treaty, and it was not until the meeting at San Remo in 1920 that the Supreme Council assigned to France the mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and to Great Britain that for Palestine and Mesopotamia. No state was found willing to take a mandate for Armenia.

The formulation of the mandates themselves was undertaken by a committee which sat in London during the summer of 1919. This committee framed drafts of the B and C mandates, subject to a Japanese reservation based on their desire for free immigration to mandated territories, and an unfortunate French reservation concerning the arming of natives for defense of the territory under the mandate and the territory of the state exercising it. Apparently these drafts have now been finally approved by the Allied Powers, and the C mandates were recently approved by the Council of the League of Nations. The other mandates have not been made definitive, although the mandatories are controlling the territory. Drafts of the A mandates for Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, and the B mandates for Central Africa, are now being considered by the Council of the League. The Assembly of the League has recently created the permanent committee which will supervise their execution. In view of America's failure to play any part in the later developments of this situation, perhaps we should be

patient with the tardiness and delay. If conditions in the Near East should become more settled no reason will then exist for any further delay in putting the mandates into effect.

Evaluation of the mandate system must await experience under it. The Allies have been criticised for a failure to apply it more generally—yet perhaps few Americans would be willing to extend the principle of general accountability to our own receiverships in such independent countries as Haiti. It seemed as unnecessary to the Allied states to apply the mandate system to their existing African possessions. The arrangement at Paris did undoubtedly mean different things to different people. To some of them it was a disguise for annexation. To others it was an extension of the field of law and order essential to proper protection of native inhabitants. The execution of the plan will determine which of these views is to prevail. If one mandate had been given to Germany, the security of the idea in public law might have been better assured. But it does not seem too sanguine to hope that the mandate system will be so administered by the League that it will help to banish that vulture attitude toward backward territories which produced so much international friction during the first decade of the present century. If it has not now been made impossible to repeat such international scandals as those in the Congo, it has at least become possible to check them effectively once they are known to exist.

The attempt made at Paris to assure to native races and to racial and linguistic and religious minorities such protection that the world may not be thrown into another holocaust to deliver them from oppressors may prove only measurably successful. The limits on effective legal

action are nowhere more rigid than in dealing with the imponderable elements which determine men's willingness to admit to or exclude from their fellowship other men of different shaped heads, or different styled clothes, or different forms of worship, or different political views. Our own American courts do not attempt to force men to be good samaritans. With constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, we are still called upon to oppose efforts at ruthless suppression. Our thirteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution did not prevent numerous instances of peonage worse than slavery, and the purpose of our fifteenth amendment has been defeated by "grandfather clauses," judiciously phrased and discriminatingly enforced. It will not be surprising, therefore, if subterfuges are found, where Jew or German or Magyar is disliked, for evading such provisions as those in the minority treaties. But a lever has been provided by which a group in distress can advance its claim, and which the world outside can seize upon for action when a just claim would otherwise go unheeded.

The growth of international law is slow. Its content in any era depends on changing conceptions of social and national justice. The principle of religious toleration was made the basis of international action so repeatedly during the last century that Secretary John Hay could refer to it in 1902 as a "principle of international law and eternal justice." The Paris Conference has entrenched that principle. And it has extended the protection to racial and linguistic groups as well. It has created in this field a new body of public law, which constitutes a notable contribution to the effort to get international justice through law rather than without law. The Assembly of the League of Nations recognized the

value of this contribution recently when it recommended to Albania and the Baltic and Caucasian states the acceptance of the principles of the minority treaties in the event of their admission to membership in the League of Nations. Whatever view be taken of the satisfactoriness of the various territorial arrangements made at Paris, the efforts on behalf of the minorities affected by them were certainly conceived in the liberal spirit which gave the Fourteen Points their wide appeal.

X

THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER

BY JAMES BROWN SCOTT

"A treaty of peace is, therefore, an agreement to waive all discussion concerning the respective rights of the parties, and to bury in oblivion all the original causes of the war."—(Lord Stowell in *The Eliza Ann*, 1 "Dodson's Reports," 244, 249, decided in 1813.)

I do not hold a brief for the kaiser. I have never met him. Indeed, I have never seen him, except from a distance—a very respectful distance, be it said. I have been familiar with his name for many years, but I am reasonably sure that he has never heard mine. I do not hold a brief for any persons in the civil or military employ of the former German Empire who have been accused of committing, or of failing to prevent, crimes against our common humanity, or against the laws and customs of war, whom some of the Allied and Associated Powers made up their minds to hale before a court of justice. I believe that I have not met any of these civilians, although I may inadvertently have seen some of them from time to time, driving hither and thither in their own country, or at some receptions which I was privileged to attend. I do not know, personally, any of the military commanders, although it is possible that as a young man in Germany, and on later visits, my mother, my sisters, and I, may have been brushed aside by them—pushed off the sidewalk into the street, with the horses and dogs and other beasts of burden.

I do, however, hold a brief for justice, even to our enemies.

First, let us "hang the kaiser," to use the phrase of the hour, although only trial is meant—for we can do it in this place as well as anywhere else.

The heavy and unwieldy document which is commonly called the Treaty of Versailles, and which few read, although many criticise it, has this to say in its 227th Article, of the trial of the kaiser:

> The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.
>
> A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
>
> In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed.
>
> The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.

The meaning of this is tolerably clear. The framers of the treaty had no doubt as to the guilt of Germany or of its then emperor in causing the war, or in its prosecution. Yet it is necessary to dwell upon these things, inasmuch as the trial of the kaiser presupposes the guilt of Germany and of William II of Hohenzollern.

The commission on responsibilities created by the peace conference of Paris, on January 25, 1919, was directed, among other points, to inquire into and report upon the responsibilities of the authors of the war. The

commission was composed of fifteen members: two appointed by each of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and five elected "from among the Powers with special interests," to quote the language of the conference. These special Powers turned out to be Belgium, Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Serbia.

On the cause of the war the commission was unanimous, finding it to have been due to Austria-Hungary, aided and abetted by Germany, or, to quote the exact language of the report:

1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.
2. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war.

During the meeting of the commission certain documents became public and were included in the dissenting opinion of the American members. The first, printed for the first time in that document, is from Herr von Wiesner, who had been sent to Serajevo to investigate the circumstances of the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne and his morganatic wife, on June 28, 1914—five years to the day prior to the signature of the Treaty of Peace and the condemnation of the Central Empires. This special agent thus telegraphed the results of his investigation to the ministry of foreign affairs at Vienna from Serajevo on July 13, 1914:

Cognizance on the part of the Serbian Government, participation in the murderous assault, or in its preparation, and supplying the

weapons, proved by nothing, nor even to be suspected. On the contrary there are indications which cause this to be rejected.[1]

The second telegram is from Count Szoegeny, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Berlin, to the minister of foreign affairs at Vienna. It is dated July 25, 1914, the very day on which the forty-eight hours would expire which the Austro-Hungarian Government had granted to Serbia to answer its ultimatum. This telegram reads as follows:

Here it is generally taken for granted that in case of a possible refusal on the part of Serbia, our immediate declaration of war will be coincident with military operations.

Delay in beginning military operations is here considered as a great danger because of the intervention of other Powers.

We are urgently advised to proceed at once and to confront the world with a *fait accompli*.[2]

The third telegram likewise is from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, at Berlin, to the minister of foreign affairs at Vienna. It is dated the 27th of July, two days after Serbia's favorable reply, and the day before the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on that devoted little country. It reads:

The Secretary of State informed me very definitely and in the strictest confidence that in the near future possible proposals for mediation on the part of England would be brought to Your Excellency's knowledge by the German Government.

[1] "Report of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris, on the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War," published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1919, p. 61.

Karl Kautsky, "Wie der Weltkrieg entstand. Dargestellt nach dem Aktenmaterial des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amts," Berlin, 1919, p. 40. English translation entitled, "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," 1919, p. 58.

[2] "Report of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris, on the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War," pp. 61–62.

"Wie der Weltkrieg entstand," p. 85. "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," p. 127.

The German Government gives its most binding assurance that *it does not in any way associate itself with the proposals;* on the contrary, it is absolutely opposed to their consideration, and only transmits them in compliance with the English request.[1]

These documents tell the whole story. They need neither explanation nor comment other than to say that their authenticity is not denied, and that the most competent of authorities, Karl Kautsky himself, says, referring to the two documents last quoted:

Both telegrams came into the hands of the "Commission of the Allied and Associated Governments (formed in January, 1919), for fixing the responsibility of the originators of the war and the penalties to be imposed," and were published in its Report, which gives a sketch of the origin of the war as brief as it is, in the main, correct.[2]

The commission on responsibilities found the German Government, of which the kaiser was the head, if he was not the government itself, aided and abetted Austria-Hungary to declare war against Serbia. Russia refused to stand by and see the little Slav brother crushed. It began to mobilize. Therefore the kaiser's government declared war against Russia on August 1, 1914, thus enlarging the scope of the war and making it certain that at least all of the great Powers of Europe would be involved. On the 3d of August Germany likewise declared war against France, because that country refused to desert Russia and to promise to stay neutral. To strike at France Germany rushed its armies through Luxemburg and through Belgium, although the German

[1] "Report of the Commission of Responsibilities of the Conference of Paris, on the Violation of the Laws and Customs of War," p. 62.
"Wie der Weltkrieg entstand," p. 87. "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," p. 129.

[2] "Wie der Weltkrieg," p. 86. "The Guilt of William Hohenzollern," pp. 128–129.

Government knew and stated at that time, through its chancellor, that it was violating international law; that it was overriding the just protests of Luxemburg and of Belgium, and that it would endeavor to make good the wrong that Germany was committing "as soon as our military goal has been reached," to quote instead of paraphrasing the chancellor's language on the 4th day of August, 1914.

Prussia and the German states were parties to the Treaty of 1839, neutralizing Belgium, and to the Treaty of 1867, guaranteeing the neutralization of Luxemburg.

The preamble of the Treaty of Versailles tells the story, not merely the beginning but the end of the war, in a few short, crisp sentences. It states that the principal Allied and Associated Powers granted an armistice to Germany on November 11, 1918, on the request of the imperial German Government in order that a treaty of peace might be concluded. So much for the end of the war. As to the beginning, the preamble says that the war in which the Allied and Associated Powers "were successively involved directly or indirectly, . . . originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia, the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on August 1, 1914, and against France on August 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium."

The refusal of Germany to observe the neutrality of Belgium brought Great Britain into the war on August 4, 1914.

Various forms of a preamble were submitted by the drafting committee to the supreme council. This one was chosen by that august body. The absence of honeyed and generous phrases, ordinarily to be found in

preambles, was noted. This was admitted by the member of the drafting committee responsible for this form, who replied, apparently to the satisfaction of the supreme council, that the commissioners who put their hands and seals to the treaty would, for the first time in history, sign a true preamble, and that any one consulting the treaty would, in its opening lines, have before his eyes the cause of the war and the defeat of Germany, admitted by the German commissioners, whose signatures were appended to the treaty.

Was it a crime to declare war at the time the German Government declared it, and was it a crime, for which the law of nations imposed a penalty, to break the treaties of 1839 and 1867? It was not in point of law, although in the forum of morals it assuredly was.

In view of this state of affairs, could the kaiser be tried for the commission of a crime, or could he be tried at all? The first paragraph of Article 227 arraigned the kaiser "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." The original draft prepared as a compromise by President Wilson himself—for he was adverse to any proceeding against the kaiser—contained an express denial that the offense was criminal, but at the suggestion, it is believed, of Mr. Lloyd George, this was omitted. Arraigning the kaiser solely for an offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties, and declaring that the judgment of the tribunal would be guided by the highest motives of international policy, were in effect an admission that law, in the legal sense of the word, did not exist for either offense, or that its violation was not a crime in the sense of criminal law.

It will be observed that in Article 227 of the treaty

there is no talk of trying the kaiser for a violation of the "laws and customs of war," for, contrary to the recommendations of the commission on responsibilities, although in thorough accord with the views of the American members of that commission, a sovereign or chief executive of a state was not to be sued for violation of the laws and customs of war. At present such a person is exempt under international law—the law made, or consented to by all nations. He is immune from suit in any court, national or international.

This does not mean that he is above the law. The people of the country whereof he is monarch or chief executive deal with him in their own way. In our country, for example, the president, like other civil officers of the United States, can be impeached and removed from office on conviction of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The House of Representatives decides whether he shall be impeached; the Senate, under the presidency of the chief justice, tries him. If impeachment proceedings be not brought against him, he or his party may be beaten at the polls, which is generally considered a punishment of no mean order.

In the future the sovereign or chief executive may, by agreement of the nations, be triable for a crime or offense by an international tribunal. It cannot be done now. The action contemplated by the treaty was therefore political, not criminal. In the trial of the kaiser "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties," the tribunal was to be so constituted that he should have "the guarantees essential to the right of defence," and in its decision the tribunal was to be "guided by the highest motives of international

policy," in order to vindicate "the solemn obligation of international undertakings and the validity of international morality," with the power "to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed."

If we wished to be critical it would not be difficult. Terms are used in Article 227 without attempting to define them. What is morality? What is international morality? What is an offense against international morality? And what is a *supreme* offense against this thing, whatever it may be? It is safe to assume that opinions would differ as to the meaning and application of these terms. The maxim puts it, "Many men, many minds." Admitting, however, that these matters would be as clear to the judges as they were to the members of the supreme council, no form of punishment was prescribed, but the victim—for he was condemned in advance—was to suffer the punishment, whatever it might be, which the members of the tribunal might hit upon, without any tangible limitation or restriction.

But, waiving such matters, let us suppose that we have the special tribunal duly appointed and ready to inflict punishment. How is it to get the culprit? One of the rules of the culinary art is that you first catch the rabbit before you make rabbit soup.

Napoleon Bonaparte abdicated and then delivered himself up to the enemy. Not so William of Hohenzollern. He dropped his crown and ran. He fled to Holland, to which country he is apparently more attached than in his earlier years. We can ransack the history of the world, without finding a tragedy in which the hero does not kill himself, is not killed, or does not give himself up in the fifth act, before the curtain falls. Otherwise, the spectators would hiss him from the stage. Were it

not for the death of millions of men and the sorrow which hangs over the world and will darken it like a cloud during the lives of those now living, this episode of William of Hohenzollern could more aptly be termed a comedy than a tragedy.

According to continental practice, a person may be tried in his absence, even in criminal matters. The Allied and Associated Powers did not contemplate this form of procedure. The Government of the Netherlands was to be asked by them to surrender the ex-emperor, in order that he might "be put on trial." Here the hitch occurred. Holland did not want the fugitive, but the rules of hospitality required that he should not be handed over. That little country had too much honor to think of it—more honor than the Allied and Associated Powers which dared to suggest it.

However, the Allied Powers were without shame, and asked the Government of Holland to surrender the former kaiser, believing, perhaps, that force would prevail where right was lacking. At one time the representatives of a principal Power affected to believe that Holland would yield, inasmuch as Mr. Lloyd George had not hitherto failed in anything which he had undertaken, and Mr. Lloyd George appeared to be bent on trying the kaiser. It may be that even one or more of the principal Powers hoped that Holland would refuse to comply with the request, inasmuch as the former kaiser would only be dangerous in their hands. How much better it would have been for the world if royal fugitives had always escaped, and had not been so stupid as to fall into the hands of their enemies!

However that may be, the extradition of a person charged with crime results only from a treaty between

the nations involved, with the further condition that the offense for which extradition is asked is a crime by the laws of both countries. But treaties of extradition exclude political offenses, and by the express language of the Treaty of Versailles, the ex-kaiser's offense was political, and the decision of the tribunal in which he was to be tried was to "be guided by the highest motives of international policy." Not one of the principal Allied and Associated Powers had a treaty with Holland for the extradition of a person charged with a political offense. It therefore followed that neither one nor all together could claim the kaiser as a right. Holland may have suspected that Mr. Lloyd George was satisfied with the provisions in the treaty putting the kaiser on trial, and that a refusal would answer his purpose. He had done the best he could, and he was not to blame if Holland would not give up the kaiser. Holland certainly knew that at least two of the principal Powers—the United States and Japan—were opposed to the whole miserable business. However, the little country stood firm. It was not to be "bullied" into compliance. It refused to surrender the kaiser, and he is likely to stay there, where he is well off, especially as no country—not even his own—seems to want him.

Here the story might end, but it is, perhaps, fairer to the Allied Powers to let them state in part the reasons why they made the demand upon Holland, and it is fairer to Holland to let the government of that country state in its own way the reasons which caused it to reject the Allied demand, notwithstanding the apparent earnestness and consciousness of superior justice with which it was pressed.

On January 15, 1920, the supreme council, represent-

ing itself and claiming to represent the Allies in the war with Germany, addressed an official demand to the Government of the Netherlands, "to deliver into their hands William of Hohenzollern, former Emperor of Germany, in order that he may be judged."

After referring to Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, whereby the kaiser was to be arraigned for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties, the note proceeds to lecture Holland as to its duty in the premises. "The Netherlands Government," it is stated, "is conversant with the incontrovertible reasons which imperiously exact that premeditated violations of international treaties, as well as systematic disregard of the most sacred rules and rights of nations, should receive as regards every one, including the highest-placed personalities, special punishment provided by the Peace Congress."

The note taxes the kaiser with at least moral responsibility, expresses the inability of the Powers to conceive that the Government of the Netherlands "can regard with less reprobation than themselves the immense responsibility of the former Emperor," and that "Holland would not fulfil," to quote the exact language of the note, "her international duty if she refused to associate herself with other nations as far as her means allow in undertaking, or at least not hindering, chastisement of the crimes committed."

In endeavoring to impose a duty upon Holland and to bring that country to a realization of this duty, as the supreme council saw it, the note dwelt upon the peculiar nature of the offense, and in so doing supplied Holland with an answer which would defeat the purpose, if indeed the Allied Governments wished at this

time the surrender of the former German kaiser. Thus the note continued: "In addressing this demand to the Dutch Government the powers believe it their duty to emphasize its special character. It is their duty to insure the execution of Article 227 without allowing themselves to be stopped by arguments, because it is not a question of a public accusation with juridical character as regards its basis, but an act of high international policy imposed by the universal conscience, in which legal forms have been provided solely to assure to the accused such guarantees as were never before recognized in public law."

The supreme council was truly in a moralizing vein. It was not merely the duty of Holland to surrender the ex-kaiser, but it was, so the note maintains, "to the highest interest of the Dutch people not to appear to protect the principal author of this catastrophe by allowing him shelter on her territory." It is also held to be in the highest interest of the Dutch people "to facilitate his trial, which is claimed by the voices of millions of victims."

It was not very difficult to reply to a note of this kind. The Dutch minister of foreign affairs, speaking on behalf of the Dutch Government, called attention to the fact that Holland was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles; that Article 228 of the treaty did not impose a duty upon Holland; that it looked at this question, therefore, from its own conception of its duty. It was not connected with the outbreak of the war; it was not a party to it; it was a neutral, and in no way bound "to associate itself with this act of high international policy of the powers."

Then follows a very important suggestion which Hol-

land took the opportunity of making, and which will be referred to later. "If in the future there should be instituted by the society of nations an international jurisdiction, competent to judge in case of war deeds qualified as crimes and submitted to its jurisdiction by statute antedating the acts committed, it would be fit for Holland to associate herself with the new régime." In the absence of an international duty which would be created in this manner, the case was to be decided by "the laws of the kingdom and national tradition."

The note ended with the statement that "neither the constituent laws of the kingdom, which are based upon the principles of law universally recognized, nor the age-long tradition which has made this country always a ground of refuge for the vanquished in international conflicts, permit the Government of Holland to defer to the desire of the powers by withdrawing from the former Emperor the benefit of its laws and this tradition."

The Dutch reply was not pleasing to the supreme council. Therefore, on the 14th of February, a second note was sent by the council of ambassadors, as successor to the supreme council, which had ceased to exist on January 20, 1920, in which that august body, speaking in the name of all the Allies, twenty-six in number, sought again, and with no better success, to teach Holland its duty; that duty being, according to the Allies, to make common cause with them in the punishment of the former kaiser.

Again, and in vain, the council speaks of the criminal acts whereof the kaiser was guilty, and the suffering of mankind because thereof. The Allied Governments represented by the council of ambassadors could not "conceal their surprise" at not finding in the Dutch reply a single word of disapproval of these crimes.

Apparently the council felt that Holland was not to be moved, and that it should make the best of a bad situation. As the ex-kaiser was not to be delivered, and as he was to remain in Holland, the council, claiming to represent the twenty-six Allied nations, which were probably not consulted, reminded the Government of Holland that the imperial fugitive was allowed to reside too near the German frontier, that adequate measures to prevent his escape had not been taken, and that if he should escape it would impose upon Holland a heavy responsibility.

But the Dutch Government was obdurate. On March 5 a reply was made to the second Allied note. It was shorter and, if possible, it was plainer, that Holland "would be committing an act contrary to laws and justice, and incompatible with the national honor if it consented, at the request of the powers, to violate these laws by abolishing the rights which they accord to a fugitive finding himself within the country's territory." The reply further stated that Holland appreciated its responsibility to take adequate measures to prevent the departure of the kaiser. "Mindful of its duties in this connection, the government has, and from the beginning, borne in mind the obligations imposed by its duties, and will continue to do so, being in a position in the free exercise of Dutch sovereignty to take on the spot all necessary effective measures of precaution, and to subject the freedom of the ex-kaiser to necessary limitations."

The kaiser is still in Holland.

I am bold enough to say that the American commission rendered a service to the world at large in standing as a rock against the trial of the kaiser for a legal offense,

and that Holland has made the world its debtor by refusing to surrender the kaiser for the commission of an offense admittedly political. As it is, the kaiser is being punished. He has lost his crown, to which he attached much importance; he has lost the respect of the world, including that of his own people; and it may be that his own self-respect is not what it once was. In any event, he does not show himself in public; he does not review his troops; he does not change his uniforms with the hours of the day; he is not photographed nor are his features painted. His words are not eaten up by an expectant world, and his views on art, literature, music, religion, assyriology, and the other fifty-seven varieties of "ologies," as the American advertiser would say—are of no interest.

One shudders to think what might have happened if the British and French commissioners had had their way, for they were the two who really seemed set upon getting the kaiser. Heroes are sometimes made out of very cheap stuff, and it apparently takes but little persecution to make a hero of a monarch. As James Russell Lowell puts it in "The Bigelow Papers," the best way to make a goose a swan is to cut its head off. It may be said that the best way to restore a dynasty seems to be to decapitate its headless ruler. Mary Queen of Scots, is a heroine, and her son became not merely king of Scotland but of England as well, succeeding that very Elizabeth who had her tried and caused her death. The male children of Charles I succeeded in turn to the British crown, and the two brothers of Louis XVI became kings of France. Even the exile of Napoleon Bonaparte seated his nephew upon the throne of France. Stranger things could happen than the restoration of

the house of Hohenzollern in the person of the kaiser's grandson.

That German Boswell, the faithful Busch, reports a conversation with the great Bismarck on the 14th of October, 1870, in which that man of blood and iron is made to say that he had "a lovely idea in connection with the conclusion of peace." This idea was to appoint an international court for the trial of those who had caused the war. Among those to be included was Napoleon III, of whom he said:

> He is not quite so innocent as he wants to make out. My idea was that each of the Great Powers should appoint an equal number of judges, America, England, Russia, and so forth, and that we should be the prosecutors. But the English and the Russians would of course not agree to it, so that the Court might after all be composed of the two nations who have suffered most from the war, that is to say, of Frenchmen and Germans.[1]

It is better for the world that the suggestion of Bismarck has not been followed.

So much for the kaiser. Now for his erstwhile civil and military subjects. The case here is different. A sovereign is immune either because it is deemed best that he be immune, or because sovereigns made the law, securing to themselves immunity. Subjects or citizens are held universally liable to municipal law, and they are, in appropriate cases, subject to foreign law. They always are, or should be, responsible to the law of nations. A breach of the laws and customs of war is a crime. The question is one of the court or tribunal before which the accused shall be passed. But it is complicated by the question to what extent a civil or military

[1] Moritz Busch, "Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History," 2 vols., New York, 1898, vol. I, p. 189.

official committing a crime is covered or protected by the command of his superior. The commission considered this phase of the subject. There is, however, no mention of it in the treaty. It need not detain us here, as it is a question for the court to determine.

The commission on the responsibility of the authors of the war and enforcement of penalties was directed, among other things, to inquire into and report upon "the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences."

Without meaning to give offense to the members of the commission, it may be said that from the American view-point they committed a number of errors. They were wrong in holding that a sovereign could be tried. But that is out of the way. They were wrong as to their jurisdiction. Being appointed to inquire into and report upon the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war, they insisted on dragging in "offences against the laws of humanity"—a very different thing. They were wrong as to a court, wishing to create out of whole cloth a new tribunal which never had any existence, and, therefore, could not have had authority to try the offenses when committed. They were wrong in vesting that court with the power to punish offenses against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity, when no penalty had been affixed to the breach thereof by the law of nations.

The American members of that commission repeatedly called the attention of their colleagues to these facts. They did not claim to be wiser than the other members. They were, however, more detached, inasmuch as their country had not suffered to the same degree as had other countries by the ruthless conduct of the Germans.

Perhaps the nature of our government—being a union of states, in which there was no federal law of crimes, except what was created by and for the Union, and after its establishment—may have led them to note more clearly and more quickly the difficulties of the situation. In their dissenting opinion, they cited the leading case of *United States* v. *Hudson*,[1] decided by the supreme court of the American states in 1812, in which it is held that "the legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence." They stated in their dissenting opinion that what was true of the American states must be true of this looser union called the Society of Nations, and they admitted that they knew of no international statute or convention making a violation of the laws and customs of war—not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity—an international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has jurisdiction over the offense. They were, however, in thorough sympathy with the punishment of offenders against the laws and customs of war. They wanted them to be punished, but insisted that it should be done according to law, not according to passion. Their purpose, which was misunderstood at the time, it is believed, by most of their colleagues, was to show how violators of the laws and customs of war could be punished according to law to which was affixed a penalty, and in a tribunal universally recognized. They had a concrete case in mind—that of Henry Wirz, commandant of the Confederate prison at Andersonville, Georgia, during the Civil War, who, after that war, was tried by a military commission sitting in the city of

[1] 7 Cranch, 32.

Washington, for crimes contrary to the laws and customs of war. He was convicted, sentenced to be executed, and actually was executed, curiously enough, on the 11th of November, 1865.

It would have been, of course, a simple matter if the treaty had provided that Germany should try, in its own courts, the persons accused of breaches of the laws and customs of war, whose names the Allied and Associated Governments should submit. They would not hear of this then, although they have heard of it later.

Without dwelling upon this matter further, it will be sufficient to say that the American members filed a memorandum which, grudgingly and partially accepted by the commission, was approved, as we shall see, by the conference, and forms the basis of Articles 228–229 of the Treaty of Versailles dealing with this subject. This memorandum is thus worded:

1. That the military authorities, being charged with the interpretation of the laws and customs of war, possess jurisdiction to determine and punish violations thereof;
2. That the military jurisdiction for the trial of persons accused of violations of the laws and customs of war and for the punishment of persons found guilty of such offences is exercised by military tribunals;
3. That the jurisdiction of a military tribunal over a person accused of the violation of a law or custom of war is acquired when the offence was committed on the territory of the nation creating the military tribunal or when the person or property injured by the offence is of the same nationality as the military tribunal;
4. That the law and procedure to be applied and followed in determining and punishing violations of the laws and customs of war are the law and the procedure for determining and punishing such violations established by the military law of the country against which the offence is committed; and
5. That in case of acts violating the laws and customs of war involving more than one country, the military tribunals

of the countries affected may be united, thus forming an international tribunal for the trial and punishment of persons charged with the commission of such offences.

Let us now turn to the Treaty of Versailles. Article 228 has this to say on jurisdiction:

The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law.

Article 229 deals with offenses which affect more than one nation, the first two paragraphs saying:

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.

Article 228 has an additional phrase which should be quoted, to the effect that "proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies" were not a bar to jurisdiction of the military tribunal, and the last paragraph of Article 229 provides that the accused should, in every case, be entitled to name his counsel.

As in the case of the kaiser, so in the case of his subjects—the rabbit must first be caught. If a person accused of violating the laws and customs of war—for the conference rejected the heresy of the majority of the commission as to the laws of humanity—were in the hands of the enemy, he could be passed before the appropriate military tribunal, but if not, he should not be

tried. Many of them would, of course, be in Germany, and Germany could be obliged to surrender its subjects. Thus the treaty, in the second paragraph of Article 228, requires that:

> The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German authorities.

But conviction must be based upon proof; hence, it is provided in Article 230 that:

> The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility.

Clauses of a like nature appear in the other treaties ending the war.

But how about the Germans who imitated the kaiser and took refuge in neutral countries. Can they be extradited? Not unless the treaty of extradition between the country making the request and the country in which the fugitive was found contains an obligation to surrender persons accused of what, for want of a better name, may be called "war crimes."

These articles of the treaty were naturally offensive to the Germans. They did not like to have their armed forces accused of the commission of crimes; they did not want to have them tried by military tribunals of the enemy. To these they would have preferred international tribunals composed of neutral members, or tribunals with a sprinkling of neutrals. They preferred, of course, their own courts, and after much haggling the

Allied and Associated Powers have made lists of persons whose names have been submitted to the German authorities. These persons are to be tried before the supreme court at Leipzig. Each country (with the exception of the United States and Japan, which refused to present lists) had a very imposing list, and thousands might have been put on trial. When, after the ratification of the treaty, the first list was presented to the German representative in Paris, he refused to receive it, and rather than transmit it he resigned his position. Inasmuch as Germany has been "scotched," not killed, it apparently seemed more prudent to allow the Germans to punish the accused in their own way, provided they punished them. If they were found guilty, it would reflect credit upon the German authorities. If they were acquitted they were innocent, or the Germans were to be blamed.

Here are some of the "chief offenders" in a list published in the London *Times* for February 2, 1920:

Ex-Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.
Duke of Würtemberg.
General von Kluck.
General von Bülow.
Field-Marshal von Mackensen.
Admiral von Capelle.
Field-Marshal von Sanders.

In the *Times* for February 28 of the same year the following names appeared:

General von Ludendorff.
Admiral von Tirpitz.
General von Falkenhayn.
von Bethmann-Hollweg.
Hindenburg.

According to the *Times* for February 9, 1920, Great Britain presented a fairly representative list of admirals and submarine commanders.

One does not need to be a prophet to divine what would happen if the Allied and Associated Powers had insisted on passing persons like these before their tribunals. We can imagine the feelings of the American people if the fortunes of war had permitted Germany to demand that General Pershing, commander-in-chief of the American armies should be handed over to the enemy. Let Shakespeare answer for us:

> O, it is excellent
> To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous
> To use it like a giant.

As in the case of the kaiser, we might stop here. It is, however, better to set forth the correspondence passing between the German Government and the Allied Powers, by which an agreement was reached to try the accused in Germany.

On February 3, 1920, the council of ambassadors drafted a note to Baron von Lersner, then the president of the German peace delegation at Paris, calling the attention of Germany to its obligation to surrender for trial Germans accused of violations of the laws and customs of war, who, by Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles were to be specified either by name or by the rank, office, or employment which they held under the German authorities." The list of persons, amounting in all to about 900, was presented on behalf of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, and the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In addition, proof which might be necessary and which was in the possession of Germany was demanded.

The list, large as it was, was not final, and the president of the conference, on behalf of the powers, reserved the right to demand the extradition of further persons. Baron von Lersner refused, as has been said, to transmit the list, and resigned his position. Therefore, it was sent by special messenger to the German chancellor at Berlin.

The commotion in Germany was great and immediate. A meeting of the council of ministers was held and the unanimous conclusion was reached and given to the press that it would not comply with the Allied demands. Before the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, and before as well as after the deposit of ratifications at Paris, on January 10, 1920, the German Government had stated that it was impossible to comply with these provisions.

In anticipation of the demand Germany had prepared a note, dated January 25, 1920, to the president of the peace conference, stating that for political as well as economic reasons it could not surrender the persons accused of war crimes, but that it was willing to try them before the supreme court at Leipzig. This note reads in part as follows:

> The German Government is willing to instruct the German legal authorities immediately to take proceedings based upon the material to be transmitted against all the Germans who are named by the Entente as guilty of offences against the laws and usages of war. It will suspend all the laws which might stand in the way of such proceedings, and will go so far as to suspend the existing amnesty law.
>
> The highest German Court, the Imperial Court in Leipzig, shall be authorized to conduct the trial. Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments which are concerned in each particular case will be given the right directly to participate in the proceedings. Judgments given by the Imperial Court will be published immediately together with the grounds on which they were given.

The situation was indeed serious. Germany either would not or could not surrender its subjects for trial. It offered, however, to try them, and to allow the Allied and Associated Governments to assist in their trial. Under these circumstances the Allied Powers accepted the proposal of the German Government contained in its note of January 25, 1920.

In a note of the council of ambassadors, dated February 13, 1920, it was stated that:

> The prosecution which the German Government itself purposes immediately to institute in this manner is compatible with Article 228 of the Peace Treaty, and is expressly provided for at the end of its first paragraph.

This was a lucky discovery, as it enabled the Allied Powers to withdraw from an embarrassing position, and put Germany, as it were, upon trial and upon its good behavior. This they did by refusing to participate in the proceedings of the supreme court at Leipzig, reserving the right to pass upon the findings of the court, and specifically reserving themselves their right under the treaty to constitute their own tribunals and to try any and all Germans accused of war crimes, if the Allied Governments should be convinced that justice had not been done by the German court.

The Allied Powers created a mixed inter-Allied commission to examine and to communicate to Germany the details of the charges brought against each of those whose guilt should be established by the investigations of this commission.

This commission got to work, and from the many cases before them, picked out forty-six which might be called test cases. Of these Belgium presented fifteen,

France twelve, Great Britain seven, Italy five, Rumania three, Poland three, Serbia one. It will be observed that there were none from the United States and Japan.

Should, however, the nations decide that violators of the laws and customs of war should be brought to trial and punishment, they can take action now, and in so doing anticipate the future.

A committee of the assembly of the League of Nations has just reported to the assembly that "there is not yet any international penal law recognised by all nations, and that, if it were possible to refer certain crimes to any jurisdiction, it would be more practical to establish a special chamber in the Court of International Justice." On the 18th of December, 1920, the assembly approved this report.

This means that there is no international penal law, but if there were, questions arising under it should be submitted to a court already in being, not one to be constituted specifically and after the commission of the acts.

It is well for our common humanity that every war of which we have the record teaches us that the reports of crime and of cruelty are grossly exaggerated, and we know from our own experience in ordinary life that people laboring under excitement and smarting under a sense of injustice are not in a position to see things as they do later, when they have recovered their balance and poise.

We should have sympathy with those who have suffered, and we should not criticise them for wishing to bring to punishment those who have been the architects of their misery. Our allies were disappointed at the time that the kaiser was not tried and that an inter-

national tribunal was not created for the trial and punishment of persons accused of breaches of "the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity." The time will come when they will be glad that they did not succeed. Perhaps it has come already. "La nuit porte conseil."

XI

REPARATIONS

BY THOMAS WILLIAM LAMONT

The subject of reparations caused more trouble, contention, hard feeling, and delay at the Peace Conference than any other point of the Treaty of Versailles. There was, of course, difficulty on the question of boundaries; there was grave controversy over the Polish frontiers and Danzig; the question whether German Austria should be allowed to join with Germany was of serious concern; the disposal of the Saar Basin coal-fields brought about a savage, personal attack by M. Clemenceau on President Wilson, and there were other topics, too, that were disposed of with the utmost difficulty. But, taking it all in all, the question of how much reparation Germany should be compelled to pay, how she should pay it, and what sanctions should be exacted to insure the payment, was the hardest of the lot.

The Conference set about the reparations question in the same manner that it did the various other topics that were up for adjustment, namely, by the appointment of a commission made up of leading members from the various delegations, including in the number, together with the alternates, for Great Britain, Lords Sumner and Cunliffe, J. M. Keynes, of the British treasury, and E. S. Montagu; for France, MM. Klotz and Loucheur, of the Clemenceau cabinet; for Italy, Signors Crespi and Chiesa; for Japan, MM. Tatsumi and Mori; and for the United

States, Messrs. Norman Davis, B. M. Baruch, Vance McCormick, and myself.

This plenary commission upon reparations held its first session on February 3, 1919, and resolved itself into three important subcommissions. Commission No. 1 treated the question of categories; that is to say, its purpose was to define the character and, in general, the scope of the reparations for which Germany and the enemy states were responsible. Commission No. 2 was to determine what was Germany's capacity to pay and how payment should be arranged. Commission No. 3 charged itself with the duty of suggesting sanctions or guarantees by which the payments by Germany, when determined upon, should be enforced. The work of commissions 1 and 2 was bound to prove, as it did, of the greatest importance. That of No. 3 became less important as time went on, and I am not aware that that subcommission ever made to the Peace Conference any final report.

The work of subcommission No. 1, to determine of the categories of damage, was, of course, dependent upon what principles should be adopted on the whole question of reparations, these principles being determined and defined by the main commission itself. Subcommission No. 2, on the other hand, was not so dependent for its work upon the general scheme that might be laid down by the plenary commission, by reason of the fact that the subcommission's investigation and determination of Germany's capacity to pay could be made quite independently of any other question involved.

The Controversy over War Costs

I shall go back directly to describe in some detail the workings of these important subcommissions, but, briefly,

I may explain that, before the plenary commission as a whole, the chief principle involved was as to whether or not the costs of war (aside from material damage done) incurred by the Allies should be included in the amount that Germany was to pay. The controversy on this point was a long and bitter one, and it was finally determined—in accordance with the American principle—that war costs should be excluded. When this principle had once been determined, the chief work of the plenary commission had been accomplished.

Thereafter the work of subcommission No. 1 on the question of categories became, of course, of decided and continuing importance, but not of such great moment as that of subcommission No. 2, around whose work the prolonged controversies of the Conference centred. For it soon became apparent that, regardless of the important principles laid down by the main commission, and regardless of the detailed categories of damage that might be filed and accepted, Germany must, perforce, pay reparations to the utmost extent of her capacity. Whatever that extent was, it was bound to fall far below the amount of damage that she had caused for which she could properly be adjudged responsible.

Therefore it became manifest that whatever was determined as Germany's total capacity to pay would naturally be fixed as the amount she *must* pay. So that the real question that was waged with such fierceness from early in February almost up to the signing of the treaty at the end of June was, "How much, at her utmost capacity, can Germany pay?" All factions were agreed that whatever sum that might prove to be, was the sum that Germany must pay.

After long weeks of argument, proof, and counter-proof

on this question of what Germany's capacity to pay was, and of trying to determine the definite capital sum that she should have to pay—the so-called "experts" still continuing to be wide apart in their estimates—the chiefs of state finally determined that, politically, it was unwise at the time of the peace settlement to fix any definite sum. M. Clemenceau was the first of the premiers—prompted in this instance by his minister of the treasury, M. Klotz—to make the declaration that whatever sum the "experts" might finally compromise and agree upon as the sum to demand from Germany, that would still fall far short of the expectations of the French populace; that no government accepting such a sum as final could endure.

Mr. Lloyd George, who never lent a deaf ear to political considerations, readily fell in with this point of view. There had, in his election campaign of 1918, been made such excessive estimates as to the amount that Germany would pay, that he felt that if the figures, as determined upon, fell—as they were bound to—far short of his campaign promises, then he too would, like Clemenceau, be tipped out of office. To Orlando, the premier of Italy, the question was comparatively unimportant. He could readily accept the solution of an immediate sum to be fixed or the indemnity programme that was finally adopted. Therefore, it became of prime importance to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George to convince President Wilson of the correctness of their position.

America Argues for a Fixed Sum

Now from the start the contention, not only of the American delegates upon commission No. 2, organized for the purpose of determining Germany's capacity to

pay, but of the whole American delegation, was that a fixed sum should speedily be determined upon and notified to Germany as the amount of Germany's indebtedness which she should be required to pay. The American delegation consistently urged this course of procedure, not as being particularly advantageous to America, because America's material interest in the actual amount of reparations was, in any event, slight; but because, chiefly, a definite settlement of the question would soonest bring about settled financial conditions in Europe and soonest yield improved credit and financial stability to France, Belgium, and such other Allied states as were, in part, dependent upon German reparations for the balancing of their budget.

Moreover, the American delegation asserted that until she knew the amount of her debt Germany would never properly and vigorously address herself to her own task of working out the reparation payments. This attitude, however, on the part of the American delegation, although it was cordially shared in by several leading members of the British, Italian, and Belgian delegations—and even, in their private utterances, by certain members of the French delegation—was, as a whole, obnoxious to the French. Oppressed, as indeed they were justified in being, by the terrible devastation that Germany had ruthlessly wrought throughout northern France, by the destruction of their coal-mines, by the deliberate looting of their factories, by the laying waste of their farms and orchards, the French, in general, felt that any suggestion which seemed for a moment to relieve Germany of the necessity of paying every penny of the damage caused, was, in effect, favoring Germany at the expense of France.

Of course, no such thought had for even a moment been in the minds of the Americans. We simply wanted to be practical, not visionary; we simply realized, as many of the French did not seem to do, that it was impossible to pick up Germany's static wealth, like her railways, and transfer them bodily to France; that, therefore, France would benefit most by taking everything that she possibly could, by taking it quickly and writing off the balance.

The points of view, though they were so divergent, seemed gradually, after many weeks of argument, to be drawing toward a solution, when M. Clemenceau became, as I have said, concerned over the political situation, and he and Mr. Lloyd George made the proposition of postponing the determination of the question. They then undertook to convert President Wilson to their point of view. He, naturally, was skeptical, but his difficulty was that it was quite impossible for him to determine the attitude of M. Clemenceau's and Mr. Lloyd George's constituencies. He could not have the temerity to declare to these statesmen that they were all wrong; that if they adopted a common-sense course of determining upon a fixed sum, disappointing as it might be to their constituents, still they could make a sound and proper defense of it, and, therefore, would not lose their seats.

Clemenceau and Lloyd George, with the utmost gravity, declared the contrary. They asserted that they were almost certain to be called to an immediate accounting, and to be turned out of office. They pointed out the serious consequences of any such step. It would mean the reconstitution of the British and French delegations; it would mean that the Peace Conference would have to

start all over again. Such a course was unthinkable. Therefore, no matter how much he might disagree with them in their judgment, President Wilson was bound to bow to this political crisis, as it was insisted upon by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George; and inasmuch as America's direct interests were not greatly involved, to agree with them in the postponement of fixing the sum of German reparations.

The Power of Clemenceau and Lloyd George

It sounds absolutely unwarranted for me to place my opinion against those of two chiefs of state like Clemenceau and Lloyd George; yet I am convinced, as I was at the time, that they were wrong, that they entirely misread their own constituencies when they believed that if they adopted the business course of fixing the German indemnity and proceeding to collect it they would, because of the disappointment of their voters, be turned out of office. Let me point out that at that time they were both at the height of their success. In France Clemenceau had, in the eyes of the multitude, won the war. He had come into office late in 1917, at a time when France was at a low ebb of her fortunes; when there was disaffection in the army, intrigue at home, dismay even in the breasts of the faithful. France's heroism and gallantry had had a rude shock, her resources were rapidly diminishing; she was being bled white. At that crisis Clemenceau came into power, and at once he stemmed the tide of disaffection and pessimism. He was like a great, rugged boulder in the midst of swiftly running water. The tide was bearing down upon him, threatening to overwhelm him, but there he stood, a

rock with all the forces of dismay and despair breaking impotently against his rugged shoulders and flanks! By the sheer force of personal will and dogged determination, he stopped that running tide. Gradually he swung it around until the stream again was flowing back, full of courage and of renewed hope. He lifted France from the slough and held her firm. To change the figure, Clemenceau became a mighty fortress, in and around which the hosts of France rallied and became valiant in boldness and in force, until, with their Allies, they had smashed the foe and won the victory.

Clemenceau began the Peace Conference with all this prestige undimmed—with this halo about his head. You cannot tell me that any reasonable decision that he had arrived at would not have been accepted by the French people at that time. There might have been argument, there might have been bitter debate, but Clemenceau would have carried his people with him.

In like manner, though possibly not so romantically, Lloyd George had the backing of the people of England. He had proved to be the "man of the hour." When the war began in 1914 Lloyd George still had, as he has today, many bitter opponents in England. At that time he was chancellor of the exchequer, and the business community questioned his financial judgment; but immediately upon the outbreak of the war he showed great shrewdness and foresight in mobilizing the financial forces of the community under the leadership of the Bank of England and, through a series of extraordinarily wise measures, preserved the empire from financial panic. This gave Lloyd George a great fillip among the powerful conservative and investment circles in England. Then when the munitions situation proved beyond the

capacity of Lord Kitchener to handle in connection with the onerous duties of his war ministry as well, Lloyd George became minister of munitions. At once there was an immediate change in England's outlook and handling of the war. I can say this of my own personal knowledge, because the firm of which I am a member was then acting on a large scale as purchasing agents for Great Britain in America. At once, when Lloyd George became munitions minister, there was a speeding up, a new vigor, a fresh drive. All England awoke to realize this fact. Then later, when, after the question of munitions had been remedied, the British handling of the war in general was not going well, Mr. Lloyd George came in as premier. The manner of his entry may be criticised—I do not know as to that—but certainly he was the right man in the right place. Even his worst enemies admitted it, and almost from that time forward things began to go better. With all the prestige that he had thus gained, with his tremendous driving power and his marvellous celerity in adjusting matters to changed circumstances, Lloyd George could surely have fixed any reasonable sum for German reparation and still, as the phrase is, "gotten away with it."

At the time when this question of naming the sum was a burning one, Mr. Lloyd George summoned one or more of the financial delegates many times into conference with him and his own experts, and at one time I thought he had become convinced of the utility of the American programme. Then he began to turn the other way to M. Clemenceau's solution. We begged him not to do so. We even went so far as to declare that if he would go back to England and address the House of Commons as he alone could, pointing out boldly that his pre-election

estimates as to Germany's capacity to pay were wrong, he would gain overwhelming support and a tremendous added political prestige. But he declined to do this—and who am I to say that Mr. Lloyd George, probably the most skilful politician of modern times, was in this particular situation impolitic? All I feel is, if at this critical juncture both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had had a little more confidence in their own strength they would have joined with President Wilson and settled this question of German indemnity once for all, thus avoiding, to a considerable measure, the terrible consequences of continued unsettlement that have plagued Europe and the whole world since the Peace Conference adjourned and left the German indemnity question open.

The Argument for War Costs

To return now to the manner in which the reparation question was developed and handled in the treaty. You will recall that, first of all, the plenary commission on reparations undertook to settle the great question of principle as to what should be included in the phrase which President Wilson and the Allies had set down, and which, prior to the armistice, the enemy had accepted: "That compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air. At once the British delegation, under the leadership of Premier Hughes, of Australia, and of Lord Sumner, undertook to argue that damage to the civilian population meant the actual costs of war. They declared, in general, that inasmuch as the costs of

war fell upon the civil population of each country, becoming an enormous financial burden and limiting the gainful occupations of the civilian population, therefore war costs were a proper charge. In the British contention that the costs of war should be included in reparation, France, Serbia, and other nations joined. This attitude on the part of France was difficult to understand. Germany's capacity to pay being limited, France would naturally receive a higher proportion of the total amount Germany did pay if the costs of war, which on the part of Great Britain were heavier than those of France, were to be excluded.

The British contention went very far. Premier Hughes, for instance, declared that if the little shepherd in Australia had been obliged to mortgage his house because of distressful conditions of trade brought on by the war, then finally, through foreclosure, lost his little roof, then that loss to which he had been subjected was fairly a cost of war and should be reimbursed to him by Germany. On this and similar points the Australian premier made many arguments, and at times bitterly assailed the American delegation for their contention that costs of war could not properly be included in reparation. Mr. Hughes declaring that this contention was based, not upon principle, but upon a desire to favor Germany. In one of his arguments, I remember, turning around and shaking his finger at the American delegation, he shouted: "Some people in this war have not been so near the fire as we British have, and, therefore, being unburned, they have a cold, detached view of the situation." At another time he spoke slightingly of the Wilson notes which had preceded the armistice, declaring that Solf, the German foreign minister, had outmanœuvred Mr. Wilson, and,

in shaking tones, asserting that Solf had been crawling through the Wilson notes "like a serpent through dead leaves."

To the American delegation the whole point was perfectly clear. Actual costs of war, military effort, and the like, could not by any possibility be considered strictly as damage to the civilian population of the Allied states, and, therefore, could not properly be included in the sum to be paid by Germany in reparation. For the American delegation, Mr. John Foster Dulles, the inheritor of a name illustrious in American diplomacy and the possessor of a mind of great force and quality, made the chief argument against the inclusion of war costs. His summing up was an admirable one, and all those who are particularly interested in the detail of this question I refer to Mr. Bernard M. Baruch's excellent volume, "The Making of the Reparation and Economic Clauses of the Treaty," in which Mr. Dulles's arguments are given in full.

It became evident, after a fortnight of argument on the question of principle, that the delegations by themselves could not possibly agree as to the principle. At this time President Wilson was on the ocean returning to America, and, accordingly, in behalf of the American reparation delegates, Colonel House addressed a wireless to Mr. Wilson, stating the position of the delegation and asking for his judgment. The President approved the stand of the American delegation, declaring that the contention on the part of the other delegations that war costs should be included "is clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect and cannot now honorably alter simply because we have the power."

The Inclusion of Pensions

When the American delegation acquainted the other chiefs of state with this vigorous declaration on the part of President Wilson, they finally withdrew their contention, and the great principle was, therefore, settled that reparation should be limited to what might actually be called material damage. It was, however, later determined to include as a part of the reparation the costs for separation allowances and pensions incurred by the Allied states. The American delegation as a whole, while deeply sympathetic, sentimentally, with the idea that pensions should be included as damage to the civilian population, found it difficult to reconcile this contention with actual principle, feeling that pensions fell more properly into the category of military costs of war. Mr. Lloyd George however, advocated with great vigor and ingenuity the inclusion of pensions under the head of damage to the civilian population. Said he: "You mean to say that France is to be compensated for the loss of a chimney pot in the devastated district, but not for the loss of a life? Do you set more value upon a chimney than you do upon a soldier's life?" This argument was appealing, but not necessarily sound.

However, it was General Jan Smuts who finally prepared the argument which convinced President Wilson that pensions and separation allowances should be included in the reparation bill. General Smuts's summing up was: "What was spent by the Allied Governments on the soldier himself, or rather mechanical appliances of war, might perhaps not be recoverable from the German Government under the reservation, as not being in a plain and direct sense damage to the civilian population,

but what was, or is, spent on the citizen before he became a soldier, or after he has ceased to be a soldier, or at any time on his family, represents compensation for damage done to civilians and must be made good by the German Government under any fair interpretation of the above reservation." I well remember the day upon which President Wilson determined to support the inclusion of pensions in the reparation bill. Some of us were gathered in his library in the Place des États Unis, having been summoned by him to discuss this particular question of pensions. We explained to him that we couldn't find a single lawyer in the American delegation that would give an opinion in favor of including pensions. All the logic was against it. "Logic! Logic!" exclaimed the President, "I don't give a damn for logic. I am going to include pensions!" Now Mr. Wilson was, least of all men, lacking in logic. For logicians who may stand aghast at his offhand utterance, I hasten to explain that it was not a contempt of logic, but simply an impatience of technicality; a determination to brush aside verbiage and get at the root of things. There was not one of us in the room whose heart did not beat with a like feeling.

Thus it was determined that pensions should be assessed on the French system of calculations, being about an average as between the British pensions, which were higher, and the Italian pensions, which were lower. It was roughly figured at the Conference that this pensions item would amount to about fifteen billion dollars, capital sum.

President Wilson's Generous Attitude

I am going to take this opportunity to say a word in general as to President Wilson's attitude at the Peace

Conference. He is accused of having been unwilling to consult his colleagues. I never saw a man more ready and anxious to consult than he. He has been accused of having been desirous to gain credit for himself and to ignore others. I never saw a man more considerate of those of his coadjutors who were working immediately with him, nor a man more ready to give them credit with the other chiefs of state. Again and again would he say to Mr. Lloyd George or M. Clemenceau: "My expert here, Mr. So-and-So, tells me such-and-such, and I believe he is right. You will have to argue with him if you want to get me to change my opinion." President Wilson undoubtedly had his disabilities. Perhaps in a trade, some of the other chiefs of state could have "outjockeyed" him; but it seldom reached such a situation, because President Wilson, by his manifest sincerity and open candor, always saying precisely what he thought, would early disarm his opponents in argument. President Wilson did not have a well-organized secretarial staff. He did far too much of the work himself, studying until late at night papers and documents that he should have largely delegated to some discreet aides. He was, by all odds, the hardest worked man at the Conference; but the failure to delegate more of his work was not due to any inherent distrust that he had of men —and certainly not to any desire to "run the whole show" himself—but simply to his lack of facility in knowing how to delegate work on a large scale. In execution we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye. President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; an inability, mind you, not a refusal. On the contrary, when any of us volunteered or insisted upon taking responsibility off his shoulders he was delighted.

Throughout the Peace Conference Mr. Wilson never played politics. I never witnessed an occasion when I saw him act from unworthy conception or motive. His ideals were of the highest, and he clung to them tenaciously and courageously. Many of the so-called "liberals" in England have assailed Mr. Wilson bitterly because, as they declare, he yielded too much to their own premier, Mr. Lloyd George, and to M. Clemenceau. But could he have failed to defer to them on questions in which no vital principle was involved? I well remember his declaration on the question whether the Allies should refuse, for a period of five years during the time of France's recuperation, to promise Germany reciprocal tariff provisions. What Mr. Wilson said to Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau was this: "Gentlemen, my experts and I both regard the principle involved as an unwise one. We believe it will come back to plague you. But when I see how France has suffered, how she has been devastated, her industries destroyed—who am I to refuse to assent to this provision, designed, unwisely or wisely, to assist in lifting France again to her feet?"

I am not attempting to give a technical description of the reparation clauses. You can get those from the treaty of peace itself and from books that have already been printed upon it. What I am rather trying to do is to give a sweeping picture of how the reparation question was handled and of the way in which some of the chief figures connected with it treated it. I have hitherto pointed out that the first great principle settled by the plenary commission on reparations was, after long debate, to exclude from the bill the costs of war. I have next shown how it was determined by the chiefs of state to

include the costs for pensions and separation allowances—this item amounting to a probable total of fifteen billion dollars. Next came the question of categories, that is to say, other specifications which should be included in the bill of costs. To this phase of the question Mr. Vance McCormick gave the most painstaking and intelligent attention.

The American engineering experts were the only ones at the time of the Peace Conference that had made any attempt to survey the actual material damage that had been caused by Germany's aggression. Their calculation was in the neighborhood of $15,000,000,000. French estimates, which, however, were acknowledgedly rough and approximate, exceeded that figure. But here we have, at any rate, in the two items of damage and pensions, a total figure of not less than $30,000,000,000, present capital sum, which could be figured as the sum Germany must pay.

As to Germany's Capacity to Pay

From this point then we took up the question of Germany's capacity to pay, the question that was referred to subcommission No. 2. Lord Cunliffe of the British delegation, was chairman of this commission, and, after a few sittings, he called upon the various delegations to submit their several estimates as to what Germany could, with her present economic and financial resources, pay. We naturally asked Lord Cunliffe first to submit the British estimate. This he seemed disinclined to do, stating that he would rest upon the figure given out in Mr. Lloyd George's pre-election campaign. This figure was 24,000,000,000 pounds sterling—call it

$120,000,000,000—a perfectly absurd figure so far as collectibility was concerned.

The French, too, for political reasons, seemed disinclined to submit their figure. Consequently, when the chairman called us together the American delegation, just as in other instances, was the only one prepared to make any concrete suggestion. It, therefore, submitted a preliminary report, indicating its belief that if proper steps to conserve Germany's assets were taken, a sum approximating $5,000,000,000 might be collected prior to May 1, 1921, and, thereafter, a capital sum might not unreasonably be levied as high as $25,000,000,000, always provided, first, that the other clauses in the treaty did not too greatly drain Germany's resources; second, did not, by tariff discrimination and otherwise, impair her industrial effectiveness; and third, permitted her to pay a reasonable part, say one-half of the total sum in German marks, which might, conceivably, mean the reinvestment in German domestic enterprises by British and French recipients of their payments.

Subcommission No. 2 then asked Lord Cunliffe, Minister Loucheur, of the French delegation, and myself to draft a report for the subcommission's consideration, indicating our views as to how Germany might pay such sum as might be assessed against her, and, in effect, asked the three British, French, and American delegates to concur in their own views as to a definite sum before submitting the report back to the subcommission. In making the first draft of this report, from which the final treaty clauses were in part drawn, I inserted the same figure of $30,000,000,000 with the same qualifications as heretofore expressed, and then showed the report to the French. They expressed satisfaction with its form and stated

that if we could revise our estimates up to a figure of $40,000,000,000 they could recommend to their chief of state such a figure.

The British delegation said that they could not accept a figure below $47,500,000,000, but even this was considerable of a come-down from the figure of $120,000,000,000 which they had before stuck at. At this stage of the proceedings it looked as if the delegations could probably agree upon some definite figure. While we were quite a distance apart, the difference did not seem to be irreconcilable.

Soon after this, however, political considerations began to arise, and the question became one practically for the chiefs of state themselves to finally determine. In an endeavor to reach a solution of the question, the chiefs of state practically withdrew the determination from the commission on reparations itself, and delegated it to an informal commission, upon which a few of us sat from day to day. We worked upon various schemes, one of them being that of trying to establish a maximum and a minimum figure; that is to say, the minimum that Germany must in any event pay and the maximum up to which she might be compelled to pay if circumstances permitted.

A Permanent Reparations Commission

It was in this connection that the proposal of setting up a permanent reparations commission for handling the whole matter was first made. This was the idea of Mr. John Foster Dulles and was in discussion rapidly developed. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lloyd George especially, and even M. Clemenceau, seized upon the idea of a permanent commission as an efficacious method to enable

them to postpone, until the political horizon had cleared, the decision of a definite sum for Germany to pay.

I shall not attempt to describe the almost interminable discussions that continued on this whole subject: First, the endeavor to effect a compromise upon a fixed sum; next, upon maximum and minimum fixed sums, and then, finally, the postponement of the whole question to the permanent reparations commission. When such principle had been determined upon, the constitution of the commission, its powers, and its operations constituted another topic requiring days of discussion. Whenever the informal committee in charge of the matter reached an impasse, they referred the matter to the chiefs of state, who, perhaps, after an afternoon of discussion, would settle it for them, and we would proceed with our plans.

The final result of all this was embodied in the clauses of the peace treaty itself, dealing with reparation and finance, and here I shall give you a brief summary of those clauses, taken directly from Volume II of "The History of the Peace Conference," edited by H. W. V. Temperley, to the publication of which I was able to lend my aid.

The summary is as follows:

First. Germany accepts the moral responsibility for having caused all damage suffered as a consequence of the war.

Second. The treaty specifies what portion of this damage is to become a financial liability of Germany.

Third. It does this by determining precisely what Germany shall pay *for;* it does not determine in general how much Germany shall pay nor in what form her obligations are to be discharged.

Fourth. *How much* Germany is to pay in all, both by way of reparation and on account of other treaty claims, is left to the decision of the reparation commission.

Fifth. The amount is to be determined by the commission by valuation and addition of claims conforming to the different categories of damage for which compensation is due under the treaty.

Sixth. In arriving at its decision the commission will have no regard to the ultimate total nor to the capacity of Germany to pay this total.

Seventh. The decision is to be notified to Germany by the first of May, 1921, after the German Government has been heard as to the admissibility and the valuation of particular claims.

Eighth. The reparation commission will also decide *when* payment is to be made, except that the equivalent of £1,000,000,000 must be paid as a first instalment within the period assigned to the commission for arriving at its decision as to the total reparation debt.

Ninth. *How* payment of the first £1,000,000,000 is to be made is also a question left to the discretion of the commission.

Tenth. *How* payment is to be made after the first of May, 1921, is left to the discretion of the German Government, except as regards certain specified amounts to be paid in kind.

Eleventh. The commission has no discretion to abate its aggregate award for reparation, when once it has been arrived at, except with the specific authority of the several governments represented upon the commission.

Twelfth. But though it may not vary the reparation *debt*, the commission has a wide discretion over *payments*. It may extend their date and modify the form even of such payments as are required by the treaty to be made in a specified way.

Thirteenth. The sanctions by which the commission is enabled to enforce its decisions are the ordinary international sanctions of force supported by public opinion. It has no special sanction to support its authority against Germany.

The Priority for Belgium

Before touching upon the formation of the permanent reparations commission and upon its workings, I must mention the priority of $500,000,000 that was arranged for Belgium. A priority, without specifying the amount of it, had, in effect, been pledged to Belgium long before the end of the war, but nobody seemed to

be very keen to establish the priority. Colonel E. M. House, however, with the foresight, kindliness, and wisdom which he displayed throughout the entire Peace Conference, late in February suggested a plan to Mr. Balfour of the British delegation, and M. Klotz, of the French delegation, granting Belgium a priority of $500,000,000 on the German reparation, this sum being sufficient to set Belgium well on her way to recovery. There was, however, great delay in getting final assent to this priority. Mr. Norman Davis, the able and leading United States Treasury representative, and all the American delegation worked hard to bring it about and to push the plan on every occasion, but it still hung fire. The Belgian delegation, finally becoming alarmed, insisted on formally taking up the question with the Council of Four. The Belgian delegation, under the leadership of Mr. Hymans, minister of foreign affairs, made two chief demands, one for the priority and one for reimbursement for what the war had cost her. To this latter item there was vigorous objection on the ground that it was inadmissible to provide for Belgium's "costs of war" and not for those of England, France, Italy, and the other Allies.

As a compromise to meet the situation a formula was finally proposed in a phrase to the effect that Germany was to be obligated especially "to reimburse Belgium for all the sums borrowed by Belgium from the Allies as a necessary consequence of the violation of the treaty of 1839." Inasmuch as all such sums borrowed by Belgium were used for the prosecution of the war, this phrase was simply a euphemism for granting Belgium the war costs that she had demanded. But it was finally agreed to on all hands, and the crisis was averted. It should be

noted that from the beginning the American delegation had claimed for Belgium full reimbursement of war costs on the ground that, irrespective of the armistice agreement, Germany had made herself liable for these through having violated the neutrality of Belgium. Germany in fact herself repeatedly recognized her obligation to indemnify Belgium completely.

German Prior Lien Bonds for Belgium

In connection with this priority, as arranged for Belgium, three of the chiefs of state, namely, President Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George and Clemenceau, agreed to submit for the consideration of their respective legislative bodies the proposal to accept German Government bonds in lieu of the various sums owed to them by the Government of Belgium. If—in the case of the United States Congress—this proposition were approved, it would mean that the United States Treasury would turn over the Belgian obligations it holds, to the amount of approximately one hundred and seventy million dollars, and receive in place thereof an equivalent amount of German Government bonds. When this proposition was discussed at Paris, and later publicity given to it, both there and in the statement which Mr. Lloyd George made in regard to it in the House of Commons, it was pointed out that the German bonds, to be received in place of the Belgian bonds, were probably of equal, if not greater, validity, owing to the priority granted to them under Article 232 of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

> In accordance with Germany's pledges, already given, as to complete restoration for Belgium, Germany undertakes, in addition to

the compensation for damage elsewhere in this Part provided for, as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839, to make reimbursement of all sums which Belgium has borrowed from the Allied and Associated Governments up to November 11, 1918, together with interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum on such sums. This amount shall be determined by the Reparation Commission, and the German Government undertakes thereupon forthwith to make *a special issue of bearer bonds to an equivalent amount payable in marks gold, on May* 1, 1926, or, at the option of the German Government, on the first of May in any year up to 1926. Subject to the foregoing, the form of such bonds shall be determined by the Reparation Commission. Such bonds shall be handed over to the Reparation Commission, which has authority to take and acknowledge receipt thereof on behalf of Belgium.

The reparation clauses further went on to specify concrete methods by which Germany should immediately begin to make restitution in kind. That is to say in view of the terrific inroads which German submarine warfare had caused in Great Britain's and France's mercantile fleets, it was provided that practically all of Germany's merchant marine should be surrendered so as to make good, at least to a certain extent, the Allies' terrible losses. Upon the whole question of shipping Mr. Lloyd George was, not unnaturally, particularly insistent, by reason of the fact that for generations Great Britain's mercantile marine had been the arteries of the empire's commercial life, and without it England was comparatively helpless.

In similar ways concrete provisions were adopted providing for the delivery of large quantities of coal by Germany to France and Italy. Germany had created such havoc in the Lens coal-fields of France, which furnished fuel for all French industries in the north, that, as experts calculated that these coal-mines could not be put back into working condition within five years, very properly

therefore, in addition to the coal supplies made available to France by means of the settlement of the Saar Basin, further definite supplies were to be allocated and delivered to France, month by month and year by year, for a period of time. As a matter of fact, the capacity of the Germans to deliver the specified amount of coal was overestimated, and modification of the tonnage has been arranged.

The delivery of several other items was also specified —particularly that of cattle, horses, sheep, goats, etc. Great outcry has been raised by Germany on the score that in compelling her to deliver over milch cows to France and to Belgium, the Allies were working a cruel hardship upon German children. Germany seems completely to have overlooked the fact that in the most cruel fashion she drove over into Germany enormous herds of cattle from both France and Belgium, and deliberately took away draft horses and all sorts of other useful animals, depriving both the French and Belgian peasant farmers of their stock in trade. In fact, Germany did this so openly that before the war was over she boasted of her possession of an entire herd of famous French stallions and brood mares, advertising that, having taken this herd, she (Germany) was now in sole position to furnish this valuable stock for the future.

As an earnest of good faith in carrying out the reparation provisions of the treaty, it was provided that Germany should deliver over to the reparation commission forthwith 20,000,000,000 marks gold bonds, not bearing interest, but payable within the two-year period provided for the original payment of this amount. Of course, any sums paid in commodities, or otherwise, were to apply against the principal of these bonds. Further provision was made for delivery by Germany of 40,000,000,000

marks gold bonds, bearing interest upon an ascending scale; and, within the discretion of the reparations commission, of a still third instalment of 40,000,000,000 marks of gold bonds, bearing interest at 5 per cent. Thus, it was provided that as a total Germany should, if so instructed by the reparations commission, issue a total of 100,000,000,000 marks gold bonds, amounting at the old rate of exchange to, roughly, $25,000,000,000.

Much confusion has existed as to the issuance of these bonds among persons having the impression that they were over and above the actual reparation which Germany should have to pay. This is incorrect. These bonds were given as a pledge of Germany's good faith and, under certain circumstances, could be utilized by the various countries just as any financial obligation may be utilized. If the total amount of reparation that Germany finally paid was, say, $30,000,000,000, then any outstanding bonds that she might have given, say, to the extent of $25,000,000,000, would be included in the first-named sum.

Advantage of American Participation

The permanent reparations commission, which was charged with the duty of determining the amount of material damage for which Germany's aggression was responsible, and was also instructed to use its discretion along various lines, was, roughly, to be composed of five members, representing respectively the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, with, however, a qualification that when matters relating to shipping were under discussion, Japan's delegate was to take the place of Belgium's; when matters relating to Austria-

Hungary were under discussion, then the Serbian delegate was to take the place of Belgium's.

The powers of this permanent reparations commission, as set up in the treaty, were so great, and the effect of its decisions upon the financial and commercial workings of all the Allied and Associated countries, including America, was likely to be so far-reaching, that obviously it was necessary that the delegates should be men of the highest capacity, courage, and wisdom. Of course, at the time the constitution of this commission was drawn up and its powers granted, there was no thought on the part of any one that the United States would fail to have a representative upon the commission. We all know that her failure in this respect has been due to the fact that the United States has not ratified the treaty; nor was the Senate willing to accede to President Wilson's suggestion that, temporarily at any rate, because of America's interests in the situation, he should be allowed to name an American representative.

This omission has, in my judgment, been, in considerable measure, responsible for the lamentable delay that has occurred in fixing the amount of the German indemnity. The Americans were always a moderating influence throughout the Peace Conference. There was no reason why they should not continue as such in the post-treaty deliberations. They would have occupied a position of peculiar impartiality by reason of the fact that, under the action of the reparations commission itself, the United States expected to receive little or no compensation. Our failure to name a delegate for this commission has been not merely a great disappointment to our former associates in the war, but has, I believe, been largely responsible for the continued economic unsettle-

ment in Europe, with its unfortunate reflex upon our own industrial and commercial business.

The situation in which we find ourselves to-day is this: The determination of reparations, after dragging along for eighteen months, has finally come to a head in the settlement agreed upon at Paris in February, 1921, between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Briand, under which notification has been made to Germany that, over a series of forty-two years, she will have to pay a total sum of approximately $56,000,000,000 (at the old par of exchange). If, however, this sum were to be amortized at 6 per cent and brought back to present value, it would amount to a trifle under $18,000,000,000. Amortized at 8½ per cent (which is not an unfair rate to take, inasmuch as Belgium and France are paying at least that sum for their borrowings in America to-day), the capital sum would be reduced to a figure of about $13,000,000,000 plus whatever amount Germany has already paid "on account."

Now, even the most moderate of the experts figuring at Paris thought that Germany could pay a capital sum of $10,000,000,000 to $15,000,000,000, so that, not counting in the so-called "export tax," which is a part of the recent Paris settlement, the schedule arrived at does not seem to be unreasonable. Certain it is that the Allied and Associated Powers would be delighted to receive as reparation a capital sum to-day of $13,000,000,000 rather than what that sum would amount to with interest spread out over a series of thirty or forty years.

Criticism has been heard on the point that the reparation payments may have to be strung out over a long period of years—thirty or perhaps forty. Of course, the

Allies would welcome the payment in a much shorter time—at once, in fact. But their feeling is that, inasmuch as Germany cannot pay all at once, she should continue to pay until such time as her debt is discharged. As a matter of fact, I believe that no one expects Germany to be making reparation payments thirty years, hardly even ten years, from now. We expect that before many years are past Germany's real capacity for continued performance will have been made so manifest that some discounting or short-cut method of final settlement and payment, in long-term bonds or otherwise, will be arrived at and the whole disturbing question settled once and for all.

Germany Able to Pay Large Amounts

The "export tax," so-called, to be levied on Germany may be difficult to defend, yet it is manifestly an attempt on the part of the Allies to gauge their reparations somewhat upon Germany's own prosperity. It is the same principle that we worked on so long at Paris to establish, a maximum and a minimum figure. Whether or not this extra levy will work out remains to be seen, but don't let us allow ourselves to be deceived by the protest and outcry that come from Germany.

We have, in my judgment, rather fallen into the error of estimating Germany's capacity to pay purely on a basis of her pre-war exports and imports. We have not taken into account sufficiently the fact that, while France's industrial machinery was ruthlessly destroyed by Germany, Germany's factories are still absolutely intact. Germany's aggression in starting the war resulted, not only in the frightful civil damage which, as I

have stated, would amount, including pensions, to a figure of at least $30,000,000,000 capital sum to-day, but has brought, in dollars and cents—forgetting, for the moment, the blood and suffering—a staggering load upon the world's shoulders.

Accountants now are figuring that the total cost of the war to the world has been not less than $348,000,000,000. While the causes of the war may be still in dispute, we cannot reconcile ourselves to any theory but that Germany's aggression was responsible. Therefore, when the Allies now propose that Germany shall pay a sum which, capitalized to-day at present going rates of interest, amounts to only about $13,000,000,000, it does not seem unreasonable.

And do not let us forget that it was the German people —not their rulers alone—who were responsible for the war. Don't let us overlook the fact that at the time when German fortunes were on the top of the wave, her people were acclaiming with glee the thought that they would be able to impose an indemnity upon the Allies of not less than $500,000,000,000.

Don't let us forget, too, when it comes to actual comparisons and estimates of Germany's capacity, that fifty years ago, when the world's industry and commerce were on a scale only a fraction of what they are to-day, Germany compelled France, within a period of two years, to pay over a sum of $1,000,000,000. If France was able to do that, ought not Germany, with a population almost twice as large—skilful, able, industrious, with her industrial machinery unimpaired—to be able (unless the Allies proceed to handicap her economic development) to meet pretty nearly the present schedule?

No American Pledge as to War Debts

This whole question, however, in my judgment, will never be properly and finally settled—nor will the adjustments be carried out in a manner to bring about world restoration—unless, and until, America has an official share in these discussions. America is already in the situation. She cannot disentangle herself. Europe is her greatest customer, her greatest purchaser of grains, cotton, copper, and all other raw materials. If our own industry and commerce are to be restored, if we are to get back to former prosperity, then, indeed, must we lend our own efforts to European restoration.

In this connection I note constant reference to some alleged secret understanding arrived at in Paris between President Wilson and his advisers on one hand, and the French and British representatives upon the other, to the effect that Allied indebtedness to the United States should, in whole or in part, be cancelled, or forgiven. There is no such thing. From start to finish of the Peace Conference President Wilson and his advisers, without exception, opposed vigorously and finally any such suggestion or proposition of cancellation. The question in one form or another constantly arose. It was always "stepped on" by the American delegates. There was no commitment, expressed or inferred, near or remote, moral or otherwise, as to the handling of the Allied indebtedness to the United States Government.

That whole question of international debts is a most important one. It is bound to be the subject of discussion. The American people must, in the last analysis, determine it upon the principle of what course is best calculated to benefit the world as a whole, including

America. And so far as the Peace Conference or any implied understanding there is concerned, the American people, in arriving at their decision, are as free and untrammelled as air.

We must, of course, give to our brethren abroad—with whom shoulder to shoulder we fought for Germany's defeat—we must give to them our counsel, our wisdom, our help. In no way can we do it otherwise than by sitting in with them, day by day; by discussing with them these problems; by showing them a moderate, dispassionate point of view; by trying to realize their own terrible difficulties, the disasters through which they are passing, and thus arrive with them upon a common basis of sympathy, of permanent understanding, of goodwill, and of abiding friendship.

XII

THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT

BY ALLYN ABBOTT YOUNG

Half of the Treaty of Versailles is made up of economic provisions. These provisions comprise literally hundreds of separate and distinct stipulations. Read them with any care and imagination and you will construct for yourselves, I venture to say, a better picture of how the treaty was made—of how it must inevitably have been made—than you will get from most of the published accounts of the Peace Conference.

No four men, you will decide, wrote those clauses. Undoubtedly the members of the Council of Four considered them, passed upon them, altered them at certain points, and of necessity assumed a final responsibility for them. Undoubtedly, too, a number of particularly knotty points, on which agreement was difficult, must have been referred to them for solution. And back of these hundreds of clauses, it will occur to you, there must have been a thousand complex facts—facts of history, of geography, of international law, of precedents, of past or existing treaties, of faith to be kept, of economic needs, of national interests and policies, and of domestic politics. Many men, you will conclude, must have had a hand in the making of the treaty, and for that task they must have needed all the knowledge and all the preparation they could command.

This much, I think, is no more than a fair inference

from a careful study of the economic sections of the treaty. So far as it goes it is wholly right. But while, on the one hand, it corrects a too prevalent notion that the details of the treaty were evolved through a process of debate by the Council of Four, it fails, on the other hand, to suggest the full importance of the share that President Wilson and his immediate associates had in its making. It is clear, of course, that most of the larger matters of the treaty had to be handled by the President. This is especially true of what may be called the major strategic points, upon which opposing interests and policies focussed. And then, as I have suggested, there were many difficult problems upon which the groups of delegates who framed the different economic sections of the treaty found it impossible to agree. These sections came before the Council of Four for review with American, or British, or French, or other "reservations" attached to particular clauses. In the Council of Four agreement had to be reached in some way. Some one had to yield. The president had to decide in each case whether the matter was one on which the American position must be maintained at whatever cost, or whether it was one on which a concession might be made to an opposing view. It is hardly necessary to add that the President, like the other American plenipotentiaries, was frequently consulted by the American economic representatives, as when the American policy on any matter of large importance was being formulated, or when unforeseen obstacles were encountered. It should be remembered, too, that each of the American plenipotentiaries (including the President) was a member of at least one of the different commissions which drafted the different sections of the treaty.

I do not want you to infer from what I have just said that, in respect of the economic clauses, there was ever any serious difference of opinion as to what American policy ought to be. The President had made what we were proud to call American principles luminously clear. In the actual work of framing the economic clauses there was rarely any doubt as to what, in the light of these principles, the American attitude should be. This, I think you will grant, is a remarkable and significant fact. The practical difficulty always was to determine just how far, as a last resort, it was justifiable and wise to accede to a departure from those principles in order to secure agreement. In the work of the subordinate commissions this problem always took a particular form. With reference to some matter it would become clear that the commission simply could not or would not agree to a solution that the American delegates could wholeheartedly accept. Should the American delegates do the best they could to secure a compromise that departed as little as might be from what they believed to be fundamentally right? Or should they stand by their guns, refuse any concession, and increase the President's burden by sending the disagreement up to the Council of Four? Always, I repeat, the problem before the American representatives on the various commissions which dealt with economic matters was a problem of just what was the best practicable solution of an actual, concrete, and pressing situation. Never was there much doubt as to the solution they preferred. They knew what sort of a treaty the President and his colleagues wanted. They believed, as I must still believe, that such was also the sort of treaty the American people wanted.

There are two definite impressions I have tried to convey in what I have just said. To make the first of these points clear, let us admit that there may have been certain defects in the formal organization of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Very likely there were. I do not believe they affected the character of the outcome. They were negligible as compared with the unity of spirit and of purpose that characterized the work of the whole organization. It is easy to see differences. They stand out and obtrude themselves. The full significance of agreement, of unity, of co-operation, is not so easily seen. Even those who were at Paris hardly realized the significance of this unity. They merely accepted it. They had a common cause and a common loyalty to high leadership.

I have also emphasized—and this is my second point—the element of compromise, concession, mutual give-and-take, in the economic clauses. Just here is where the critics of these clauses find their opportunity. The critic is prone to think in terms of clear-cut general principles, of absolute right and wrong. Compromise is a departure from principle. It is easy, then, to find serious flaws in these economic clauses, reached as they were through compromise and agreement. You may believe that Germany should have been more severely dealt with, or you may believe, as I do, that the economic clauses, as a whole, are unwisely harsh and exacting. In either case the clauses depart from your standards of what they ought to be.

But not one of the critics, so far as I know, has ever dealt with the matter with complete candor. Not one of them has squarely faced the alternatives. What would they have had the President do, when he saw that although

the great and essential interests of the peace could be safeguarded, there were a good many important points in the economic settlement upon which agreement could be had only through concession? Would they have had the American representatives abandon the Conference and return to the United States? Or would they have had the President and his associates dictate the economic terms and force them down the throats of our Allies? The two alternatives are equally unthinkable. Left to themselves, with the firm, persistent, steadying pressure from America withdrawn, the various conflicting forces at Paris, if perchance they could have been brought into any sort of agreement, could have produced only a treaty that would have delivered the world over to militarism, imperialism, and economic suicide. On the other hand, peace terms dictated to our Allies might have been signed but would not have been accepted. Either course would have meant prolonged bitterness and misunderstanding, new dissensions in Europe, the overturning of governments, and a clear field for militarism—or worse.

Look the facts squarely in the face, and there is no other conclusion than that the only way out and the only way forward was and is through international agreement and understanding. And as things were—and remain—agreement and understanding among the Allies were—and are—the indispensable prerequisites to any larger and more inclusive agreements. There is no other road to the maintaining of peace or to the mending of the wrecked economic structure of Europe. A refusal to see in the situation any questions save those of absolute economic right and wrong is not far removed from sheer intolerance.

These things are not said by way of apology or extenua-

tion. I am merely trying to restore a right perspective to matters that have become obscured and distorted by controversy.

I shall return to that subject again. But I must record here my emphatic dissent from the notion that the economic clauses were made harsh and intolerable through unnecessary concessions yielded by President Wilson because he was misled and outmanœuvred by his colleagues in the Council of Four. In the first place, those who were associated with the President at Paris will tell you how supremely quick and alert he was in discussion or conference, and how easily and accurately he penetrated to the heart of the most complicated proposal. In the second place, the notion which I am trying to dispel conveys a false impression of the way the treaty was made.

The Council of Four was not a debating club. Its functions were to make decisions, to reach agreements, and to give a sanction to agreements that had already been reached in one way or another. Naturally, its method was that of discussion. Proposals were made and interpreted. Attitudes and points of view were explained and defended. But it was not a game of fence.

The Peace Conference has been overdramatized. Interpretation of it in terms of tactics and strategy and dramatic incidents is superficial. Mere cleverness had very little to do with it, one way or the other. Judgment, courage, and understanding were the qualities that counted for most.

Then there has been some curious gossip to the effect that the economic clauses and other parts of the treaty failed fully to represent the American position because the President, in some way, had lost "his control of the

situation." This is wrong in two or three different ways. In particular it gives a false suggestion of what the situation was. Taking only the immediate personal situation into account, I suspect that the President, from the beginning to the end, had more power than he thought wise to use. But the whole situation, in its larger aspects, was an immovable and unchangeable fact, beyond the control of the President or of any other man.

That situation, of course, was highly complex, but in it there were two outstanding factors. One was a matter of contract: the pre-armistice agreement made with the defeated foe, embodying, with certain reservations, the Fourteen Points. This furnished the basis of the American programme at Paris. The other was psychological: the state of mind of the peoples of Europe.

The task was peace; the state of mind was one that war had evoked. It even seemed that the defeat of the enemy had released a fresh flood of war passions. The final victory of the war was to be the peace.

This state of mind was not confined to any one country. It was not even peculiar to Europe. It manifested itself in America. With us, if one may trust its visible signs, it was hardly more than an undercurrent of feeling among a rather small minority. But even here it was the kind of thing unscrupulous or reckless leaders might have seized upon, guided, developed, and used to advance some disastrous purpose. This state of mind, however, was more nearly dominant in some countries than in others, just as everywhere it was more prevalent among certain classes of the community than among others. But so far as its bearing upon the economic clauses of the treaty is concerned, the important thing about this state of mind is that it was expressed in the French attitude at

the Peace Conference. For reasons that must be clear to any sympathetic understanding that state of mind which saw in the peace a crowning act of retribution and judgment was particularly common in France. More than that, it was perhaps the most important single factor in the French domestic political situation. And it was built upon and used for political purposes.

What, then, was the French attitude at Paris? At its best it was the attitude of Clemenceau and of his ablest lieutenants. France could not be exposed to the danger of another unprovoked attack like that of 1914. In some way, in whatever way, France had to be secured against that danger. All other things were subsidiary to that end. But I do not think that Clemenceau had any illusions respecting the wisdom or the practicability of the more extreme economic proposals his ministers urged upon the Peace Conference.

At its worst the French attitude was that of a few men who seemed to be less interested in the ultimate effects of the economic provisions of the treaty than in its immediate use as an instrument of painful humiliation. They would have filled the treaty full of little poisoned darts that would have stung and rankled, but could not have advanced the interests of France, and would very certainly have tended to reduce the measure of her moral advantage over Germany. Very few of these unfortunate proposals got into the treaty. Getting rid of them took a good deal of time and effort on the part of both British and American delegates. But it is right to say that they had the generous and effective co-operation of Frenchmen with a broader and clearer view of the interests of their own country.

Occupying yet another position were those Frenchmen

who, like every one else, wanted France's safety to be assured, but could see safety in nothing short of her complete supremacy in Europe. On its political and military side this supremacy was to be secured through spheres of influence and military alliances, coupled with the partitioning of the enemy states. Economic supremacy was to be attained by repressing the trade and industry of the enemy states, by sapping the roots of their economic life. Never was there a purpose more tragically blind. No nation can gather strength from the weakness of other nations.

This is true in a special way of the states of Europe, with their dense population, their highly specialized industries, and their dependence on each other and on the outside world for markets and for food and raw materials. I do not see how there can be any sound plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe that does not take its economic solidarity into account.

The care of French interests in the economic sections of the treaty was assigned to different ministers at Paris. Their more important proposals, taken as a whole, seemed to embody the extreme and suicidal economic policy I have just described. Especially when they were coupled with other French proposals, it was easy to read into them a purpose to destroy the foundations of the economic life of the Central Powers, and of Germany in particular. Militarism and economic policy seemed to have joined hands.

I am convinced, however, that these proposals had no such calculated purpose. In the first place, the French ministers were men of political experience and sagacity, and they had able advisers—although the best economists in France were not among them. They must have known

the futility of some of the things they proposed. In the second place, some of their demands were inconsistent one with another. This is obviously so of the exaggerated bill for reparation payments as contrasted with the proposals to reduce Germany's export trade, upon which her ability to make reparation payments depends.

In the third place—and this is the consideration to which I attach most importance—in the discussion and modification of these proposals their true character was revealed. They were, I believe, essentially political. Their ultimate effect upon the economic situation of Germany counted for less than their immediate reception by the French press, the Chamber of Deputies, and the French voters.

I do not mean that these proposals were consciously insincere—that they were merely staged. Probably the motives and purposes back of them were mixed. I mean that when the issue was pressed the sound and fury of them seemed to be cherished even more than their effective content. The French Government at that time was riding on the surface of a perilous sea of popular feeling. The ship had to be steered according to the waves and the wind, regardless sometimes of the true direction of the port.

I do not pretend to a knowledge of the inwardness of French politics, but from this distance it appears that the cabinets that have been set up in France since the Peace Conference have been following the same compassless course. The situation as a whole remains built on the illusions, the expectations, and the state of mind created during the war. One cabinet, balked by the practical difficulties it encounters, gives way to a suc-

cessor willing to try to salvage a little more of the economic fruits of victory.

The new reparations proposals, discussed at the recent London conference, are a case in point. They are much more exacting than the reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. I cannot explain them except in times of political exigencies in France, with Lloyd George assenting for some inscrutable reasons of his own. Even with the best will in the world (and that is not reasonably to be expected) Germany could not meet the payments demanded of her. Competent French and British experts must know that such is the case. And the critics who have been clamoring for a revision of the reparation terms of the Versailles Treaty, and who have complained that these terms did not absolutely fix a maximum reparations sum, must now understand that, wholly desirable and right as it would have been, the fixing of a maximum sum that would have been anywhere within the bounds of reason was definitely impossible.

There has been measurable economic progress in France since the war, but any substantial recovery must probably wait until the French people have been told the whole truth about the position of the nation's finances —the drastic measures that will be necessary to balance the budget and restore the currency to a position where industry and foreign trade will be on a dependable basis —and about the relatively small sum that can be obtained from Germany by way of reparation.

I have experienced much the same difficulty in saying these things about the French attitude that the American delegates at Paris felt in opposing the French economic proposals. They knew that the grounds of their objections would be misunderstood. In fact, more than once

their motives were sharply challenged. But they tried to take full account of the difference between France's experience in the war and ours. There was sympathetic understanding, I know, of the inevitable effect which living for four years under the shadow of imminent national disaster must have upon the attitude of men. There was full consciousness of the world's immeasurable debt to France. But in loyalty to what they believed to be the interests of France and of the world, they had to refuse to accede to many of the French economic proposals. It is right to stop a man who is bent on committing suicide.

If the attitude of the French ministers at the Conference was based in any large measure on political consideration, that fact must be reflected in the character of the clauses that were the outcome of the negotiations. Read these clauses carefully with this suggestion in mind, weigh their real significance, and you can hardly fail to decide that such is in fact the case.

Take, for example, the reparations clauses. Germany signs a blank check to cover all the injuries she had done to civilians and to civilian property. Except for the inclusion of the questionable item of the cost of military pensions, this is clearly a reiteration of the pre-armistice agreement. Without the military pensions the blank check may be assumed to cover a sum as large as $15,000,000,000 or $20,000,000,000 in capital value; including military pensions probably doubles that figure. But this blank check is a political exhibit. The specific obligation imposed upon Germany was for the payment of a sum of not over $15,000,000,000, in terms of present worth, an amount which could not be increased except in the really impossible event that Germany should be found to be able to pay more, and then only by unanimous vote

of the reparations commission. The new reparations proposals, it is possible, may have been prompted by the fact that the "blank check" was beginning to lose its value as a political exhibit.

It is especially hard to see anything but a political motive—a regard for the expectations of the French people—in the French delegates' advocacy of the inclusion of war costs in the reparations bill, and their later acceptance of the item of military pensions. This decreased France's proportionate share in the claims against the reparation payments, and on any reasonable view of the total amount Germany can pay, it reduces the amount France is likely to receive.

Then take the commercial clauses. A number of them impose definite obligations upon Germany with respect to the treatment she is to accord to the citizens, the trade, and the shipping of the Allied and Associated Powers. In most cases there are no assurances of reciprocal treatment of German citizens, trade, and shipping, these matters being left for the different Powers to decide for themselves. But these one-sided obligations, for the most part reasonable in themselves, hold for only a few years —generally five. Then they stop, except that in some cases their prolongation is left to the discretion of the League of Nations.

Or consider the following clause:

> Each of the Allied or Associated Powers, being guided by the general principles or special provisions of the present Treaty, shall notify to Germany the bilateral treaties or conventions which such Allied or Associated Power wishes to revive with Germany. . . . The date of the revival shall be that of the notification.

This rather unusual but really necessary provision leaves the matter wholly in the hands of the Allied Powers. Germany has no voice in the revival or non-

revival of her commercial treaties with these Powers. But it is to be observed that by the terms of these treaties themselves Germany is able to abrogate them by giving due notice.

More examples could be given, but these will suffice. My purpose has been to show you that the treaty is not, in reality, the disguised instrument of economic oppression that it sometimes has been held to be. If any are deceived by its economic clauses, it is those who have been counting on its use as just such an instrument.

It is a hard and exacting document—it could and should have been nothing else—and makes some regrettable but necessary concessions to the prevailing state of mind in Europe, and especially to the political exigencies of the situation. There were times at Paris when that situation seemed like an impenetrable wall, blocking the way to any tolerable or even possible solution of the economic problems of the peace. But the very fact that the situation, while in part natural and inevitable, was also in part political and artificial, made it possible to find a way through.

Many of the economic clauses of the treaty are parts of a temporary scaffolding set up to hold things in place until a more enduring structure can be erected. The treaty does not purpose to settle the economic relations of the European states for all time. It is a forward-looking document. It leaves the way open for new and, it is to be hoped, better adjustments just as soon as the political situation in Europe makes those adjustments possible. In the long run the economic settlement will be just what the world makes of it.

There is one criticism which may rightly be made of the economic provisions as a whole. They are too minute

and detailed, and there are too many of them. Reading them you are likely to say that nothing that could have been thought of was left out. That is not quite true. More proposals were left out than were put in, but the provisions as they stand are a formidable array. Leave to one side the larger matters, such as the clauses relating to reparations, finance, and the disposition of German-owned foreign property, and the multitude of stipulations that remain give the impression not so much of severity as of unnecessary and meticulous concern for the interests of the Allied Powers.

This is again a more or less inevitable outcome of the concrete situation. A large number of Powers were jointly determining the terms on which peace should be made with a relatively small group of enemy Powers. Their outlooks and interests differed. To one delegation certain proposals seemed to provide for matters that were clearly essential. Other delegations attached more importance to other sets of proposals. Then there were the limited or special interests of the individual Powers. Some of these interests were wholly legitimate; that is, it was proper and necessary that they be safeguarded. But in practice it is hard to recognize any special interests without recognizing others. The representatives of the smaller states, in particular, sometimes explained that they would be accused at home of having been inattentive to their country's interests if they failed to secure special provisions corresponding to what had already been conceded, properly enough, on the insistence of some other state. Such things as these sometimes led to difficult and perplexing situations, calling for tact and patience on the part of those who had the broader and more general interests of the treaty at heart. Generally those difficulties were finally resolved in a reasonable

way and without undue concessions to special national interests.

It is easy, however, to exaggerate the real importance of this large group of detailed economic specifications. With very few exceptions each one taken by itself is defensible, and most of them are necessary. The American delegates believed, however, that much the same or better results might have been obtained through simpler and more general provisions.

Much has been written of the Council of Four, and much emphasis—perhaps too much emphasis—has been put on the clash of personalities and purposes in its council room. If space permitted, I should want to try to fill in some of the details that may be wanting in the picture of the Peace Conference at work by describing, as concretely as I could, the way in which the business of the various commissions and subcommissions that dealt with economic matters was handled. But I shall have to confine myself to saying a word about the men who composed them. Here I have especially in mind, merely because I know it best, the economic commission, which dealt with commercial relations and the status of economic treaties, of pre-war debts and contracts, of sequestered or liquidated enemy property, and of patents and other forms of industrial property.

One had to give ungrudging admiration to the efficiency of the British economic delegates and technical advisers, a number of whom were Board of Trade officials. Highly competent in all technical matters, always carefully prepared, they were never without an easy mastery of the subject in hand. Keenly alive to British interests, they always had also at heart the general inter-

ests of the treaty. Despite some sharp differences of opinion, the American delegation is indebted to them for a large amount of helpful and generous co-operation.

Among the French representatives there were more varied shades of personal attitude. Those who represented the Ministry of Commerce had a carefully prepared programme which they upheld with ability and tenacity. I should be doing this particular group of men an injustice if I did not record their patient courtesy under conditions that must sometimes have been trying, and their generous comprehension of other points of view.

There were distinctly able men among the Italian economic delegates, but they seemed to be rather closely bound by instructions from their government, and less free to make decisions, even on matters of distinctly minor importance. Among the economic delegates from other states, I venture to single out the representatives of Belgium and of Brazil as conspicuous in respect of ability, technical knowledge, and breadth of view. The Belgian delegates, I am sure, did not weaken Belgium's cause because they added to their solicitude for her welfare a manifest ambition that the treaty as a whole should establish a just peace.

The selection of the heads of our war boards and of representatives of the treasury to take charge of American interests in the economic sections of the treaty was an obvious one to make. Mr. Baruch, Mr. McCormick, Mr. Davis, and Mr. Lamont had all been concerned with the common economic problems and policies of the Allies during the period of our participation in the war. They had become familiar with many of the matters that were to come up for discussion at Paris; they understood the different points of view of the other Powers; they had

earned the confidence of the country. In addition to their responsibilities in connection with the treaty, they had to deal with important and pressing current matters of economic relations and economic policy. For this purpose a new body, the Supreme Economic Council, superseding various agencies of Interallied co-operation that had been developed during the war, was set up at Paris. Mr. Hoover, an important member of the Supreme Economic Council, was not officially associated with the drafting of the treaty. This does not mean, however, that his counsel was not frequently sought.

Adequate sources of information were available to the American delegates. Care had been taken to anticipate the economic problems that might be discussed and preparations had been made accordingly. It was inevitable that information should have been gathered on many matters that did not come up for discussion. It was impossible to foresee the precise course events would follow. The important thing was that whatever information was needed should not be wanting. Supplementing the large accumulations of information that were in the hands of the war boards, a fairly large amount of useful material had been brought together by The Inquiry. Much of it bore upon the territorial rather than the more general economic problems of the peace. Agriculture, mining, industry, commerce, transportation routes, and the like, had been studied with special reference to their bearing upon the shifting of boundaries, the creation of new states, and the reorganization of colonial systems. Through the co-operation of the United States Geological Survey there was available the most complete and accurate body of information respecting the location and magnitude of the mineral reserves of the world that had

ever been brought together. Various bureaus of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce also compiled economic statistics or prepared economic maps for the use of the American delegation. The United States Tariff Commission had supplied a very complete index and digest of the commercial treaties of the world. A small statistical organization was maintained at Paris, so that facts could quickly be put into usable form. A group of American army engineers, it should also be said, had made careful studies in the field which gave a reasonably accurate notion of the amount of damages for which Germany was liable under the terms of the pre-armistice agreement.

The matters I have just been discussing have taken us away from our main theme—the influences which determined the shaping of the economic clauses of the treaty. I have reserved two of the most important factors in the situation for the last.

In June, 1916, before the United States had entered the war, an economic conference of the Allies was held at Paris. A common economic policy after the war was agreed upon. During the period of reconstruction imports from enemy countries were to be restricted or even prohibited, and enemy subjects were to be excluded from industrial and professional activities within the Allied countries. Some measure of discrimination against the enemy countries, it was suggested, might be continued as a permanent policy.

In most quarters the resolutions of the Paris economic conference were not taken very seriously. They were interpreted as an aimless release of war passions, as a

gesture of intimidation, or at the most as an attempt to organize the economic advantages of the Allies so that they could be bargained with to best advantage when peace came to be made. A year ago two of the British delegates said these resolutions were a reply to an earlier declaration of economic war by the Central Powers.

Even before the armistice the Paris resolutions had become well-nigh forgotten—at any rate in the United States. I recall them here merely because they were revived, in effect, at the Peace Conference, in proposals made by the French Ministry of Commerce for a special economic régime for the period of reconstruction. They had lost, of course, most of their military significance. The emphasis was now put upon the special needs and deserts of the countries which had suffered most from the war, and especially upon the injustice of permitting German industry to gain an advantage at the start over the industries that had to be rebuilt because the German armies had wantonly destroyed them. Much was said, in other countries as well as in France, about the necessity of "priorities" in supplies of raw materials and in allocation of shipping.

There were some who went even further and urged that the whole world situation was such as to compel a complete supervision of the distribution of raw materials and the necessaries of life among the different nations. The ordinary forces of the market, it was held, were inadequate. Allocations should be based on fundamental needs rather than on present ability to buy. Those who wanted priorities with a view to special national interests and those who urged a world system of priorities in which immediate national interests should be disregarded wanted the same general sort of system, although un-

doubtedly it would have operated very differently in the one case and the other.

It cannot be denied that some of these proposals made a telling appeal to the sense of justice. Their wisdom and their practicability were other matters. It is far from clear that they would have afforded any real measure of relief or that they would have been as effective as unimpeded private enterprise. The arguments back of them rested in part upon exaggerated estimates of world shortages in raw materials and shipping. In most instances "priorities" would have been meaningless, for, given effective methods of distribution, there was more than enough to go around. In the arguments for special priorities for the industries of the devastated regions, there was a general tendency to underestimate the extent to which German industries, likewise, had been stripped for the benefit of the German armies, as well as to forget the direct connection between Germany's ability to export goods and her ability to make reparation payments.

But quite apart from the wisdom of the proposed transitional régime, it would have encountered insuperable practical difficulties. In the first place, it would not of itself have removed the chief obstacle to the speedy economic rehabilitation of the countries that might have been granted priorities. I mean the financial obstacle. Priorities are valueless unless they are accompanied by ability to buy. It should be said, however, that these proposals for priorities were often associated with financial propositions, such as pooling the war debts of the Allies, or pooling the proceeds of special war taxes to be imposed in all of the Allied states, or the joint underwriting of the reparations payments.

In the second place special restrictions upon Germany's

export trade, coupled with priorities for the needs of the industries of the devastated regions, would have made it necessary to continue not only the machinery of inter-allied economic co-operation, but also an effective national control of trade in each Allied country. And that was a practical political impossibility.

Finally, let us turn to another proposal—and one of a very different sort. The proposal to which I refer was made by President Wilson on January 8, 1918. The third of the Fourteen Points called for "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance."

The words "the removal of economic barriers" gave rise to some real or pretended misgivings in American political circles. Our protective tariff is an "economic barrier." Was it the President's purpose that it should be removed? Finally the President was forced to explain that of course he "meant to suggest no restriction upon the free determination of any nation of its own economic policy, but only that whatever tariff any nation might deem necessary for its own economic service, be that tariff high or low, it should apply equally to all foreign nations; in other words, there should be no discrimination against some nations that did not apply to others." The President's explanation further made it clear that what most of all he meant should be done away with was the exertion of economic discrimination for hostile purposes. This proposal, then, was closely linked to his other proposal that the economic weapon should be intrusted solely to the League of Nations. The passing

of the power to discriminate against the trade of some particular nation or nations was to be like the reduction of national armaments.

The full significance of this proposal is not easily seen by Americans, accustomed to tariff schedules definitely set by Act of Congress. Not that our tariff system is wholly without its discriminatory features, but these are not what give it its special character. In continental Europe, however, legislation fixes two (or in some cases more) sets of tariff schedules, or fixes the upper and lower limits of the duties that may be put into effect. Each country, then, in principle at least, is in a position to refuse to make tariff concessions to countries which do not, in turn, give favorable treatment to its own trade.

Under this system a discriminatory tariff is to one state a necessary means of defense against possible discrimination on the part of other states. But defensive weapons are prone to be used for offense. And this is true of differential tariffs. The most systematic and consistent development of such tariffs has been in France, but Germany was the first state to grasp their full possibilities as methods of controlling and dictating the commercial policy of other states. Even in supposedly sober and scientific discussions the German tariff was not infrequently referred to as an instrument of *Machtpolitik*, as a means of "imposing Germany's will" on other states.

The European commercial system before the war was held together by commercial treaties. Generally these specified the tariff schedules which should apply as between the two contracting states. They also contained most-favored-nation clauses, which assured to each state the advantages of any further concession either of them

should make to a third state. As a result, the revision of an important commercial treaty was likely to be followed by sweeping changes in European tariffs.

I imagine that the "equality of trade conditions," which President Wilson proposed would mean in practice something like a general or multilateral commercial treaty, in which the signatory Powers would guarantee to each other equal, *i. e.*, most-favored nation, treatment in respect of tariffs and other commercial matters.

Whether *colonial tariffs* of the sort which give free trade or reduced duties to the home states and discriminate against but not *among* other states, are to be deemed infringements of equality of trade conditions, is a more difficult question. It depends, I suppose, upon the degree to which a state and its colonies may be considered a unified political system, with one centre of sovereignty. It is probably wiser to consider this matter of the open door in colonies as a distinct and separate problem. The Covenant of the League of Nations, it will be remembered, provides for the open door in all regions that are to be administered by mandatories.

There are other important aspects to equality of trade conditions. What I have said merely suggests the general nature of the problem. The matter was not thrashed out at Paris. The immediate and all-absorbing task was to determine the terms of peace with the enemy Powers, rather than adjust the commercial relations of the members of the League of Nations. But the proposal was not forgotten or put aside. In the Covenant of the League of Nations is this clause:

> Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of

communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914–1918 shall be borne in mind.[1]

In the summer of 1920 some attempts were made to raise an alarm by urging that this clause looks toward free trade among the members of the League. It is not even necessary to show that the words of the clause cannot possibly be tortured into such a meaning. Any one who has any knowledge of the history or present status of the protective tariff policies of European states will realize how impossible it is that any clause to which such a meaning might be attributed could have passed the watchful scrutiny to which every word in the treaty was subjected.

In one way, it must frankly be admitted, the treaties framed at Paris create new "economic barriers." In eastern Europe the treaties shift and multiply political boundaries. Following, for the most part, lines of cleavage between nationalities, these boundaries cut across established channels of economic intercourse and sever territories that have been and remain economically dependent one on another. In part the old economic

[1] In the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German delegation on the conditions of peace, there is further reference to the matter:

"The principles which the Allied and Associated Powers desire to bring into application when the world returns to normal conditions are those which President Wilson has enunciated on various occasions in his speeches, and which are embodied . . . [as above] . . . in the Covenant of the League of Nations. . . . After the necessary period of transition is over, and when a reformed Germany is admitted to membership of the League of Nations, the Allied and Associated Powers will be able to co-operate with her in arriving at a more permanent arrangement for the establishment of an equitable treatment for the commerce of all nations."

systems in eastern Europe were artificial. Agriculture and industry had grown up inside of high-tariff walls and had, perforce, found their markets very largely within those same walls. But if artificial, the old system of market relations was none the less real. It cannot suddenly be upset without a shock greater than the new states, in their present weakened condition, can safely absorb.

If the treaties had been drafted by a group of despots, irresponsible but benevolently inclined, some measure of compulsory economic co-operation on the part of the states of eastern Europe might very easily have been insisted upon. But as things were, compulsory customs unions or similar arrangements were outside the field of possibilities. There was some fear, justified or not, that economic unions might pave the way to the re-establishment of the old political systems. But the real obstacle was the highly nationalistic attitude of the new states themselves, showing itself in an insistence on economic autonomy and independence. The best that could be done was to give the new states power to reduce or remove certain economic barriers in their own discretion. Thus at any time within three years Austria, Hungary, and the Czecho-Slovak state may enter into special customs arrangements. The Czecho-Slovak state may choose between such a customs union and one with Poland. Poland, in turn, is left free to enter into special customs arrangements with Russia or with states whose territories were formerly parts of Russia. But Poland cannot give exceptional tariff concessions to Austria or Hungary or Germany.

These provisions are not adequate. They recognize the problem and its importance, and probably go as far

toward a solution of it as was humanly possible under all the conditions that existed at Paris. They afford a temporary and tentative solution. More permanent arrangements will have to be reached under the guidance of the League of Nations when the political situation in eastern Europe makes such arrangements possible.

But it is absurd to believe that the treaties are in any way responsible for the economic plight of Europe or of any part of it. Nothing has happened that has lifted that responsibility from the place where from the beginning it has rested, and that is on the shoulders of the former governments of the territories that were once the Central Powers. It is hard to be patient with men who point to the economic dissolution war has wrought, and say: "There are the fruits of your peace."

I have tried to give a candid account of the economic clauses of the treaties. I have not tried to gloss over their imperfections, or to pretend that they afford a final settlement of all the matters with which they are concerned. But I trust I have made it clear that they are not the outcome of secret arrangements and understandings; that they were worked out slowly, clause by clause, in the face of formidable and sometimes discouraging difficulties.

I have emphasized the element of compromise and concession in these economic clauses. No one of these compromises represents a capitulation on the part of the American delegation. Every one of them, I believe, embodies a large concession to the principles for which the American delegation stood. From one point of view every compromise represents the partial defeat of a principle. From another point of view every compro-

mise in the treaties is a recognition of another principle, a step forward in that path of international agreement and understanding which is the only road left to the world.

XIII

THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY

BY SAMUEL GOMPERS

American labor did not leave the Peace Conference in Paris with all it felt it ought, in justice, to have secured, but it left with all it was possible to get. American labor felt then, as it feels now, that the proper course was to make the best fight possible, and to work during the ensuing years for the securing of amendments.

It was not to be expected that a treaty satisfactory to every nation, or all the people of any nation, could be secured in the Paris Conference. Those who had eyes to see knew, also, that it would not be possible to secure a treaty written in the spirit of America's participation in the war, because there were present in Paris those who were selfish and those who were in reality the emissaries of the old condemned order of things.

In my opinion there are serious defects in the labor provisions of the treaty. But I also know that those defects could not be removed in Paris, because every possible effort was made to secure their removal.

The direct opening for the insertion of a labor clause in the treaty was provided in the original draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 20 provided as follows:

> The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their indus-

trial and commercial relations extend; and to that end agree to establish as part of the organization of the League of Nations a permanent bureau of labor.

To give effect to Article 20 the supreme council representing the Allied and Associated Powers at Paris created the commission on international labor legislation. I had the honor to be appointed by the President a member of that commission, and later by the commission to be elected its president.

Due to a number of circumstances, one of which was that many nations did not see fit to name a true representative of labor to membership on this commission, much of the time I found myself in the position of being the sole representative of trade-union thought. It may be of interest to say that some countries appointed Socialists to membership, and that the struggle to secure consent of these Socialists to constructive proposals was as difficult and discouraging as it was to secure the consent to similar proposals from government representatives. It is a just indictment of these political party spokesmen that they obstructed constructive work and that they seemed unable to bring themselves to deal with definite relations of men and nations. They constantly were of assistance to those who were trying to weaken the labor provisions that were to be written into the treaty.

I have had much experience with politicians who claimed to speak in the name of labor and who claimed to be revolutionary and uncompromising for labor's cause. I have not had any more enlightening experience than that in Paris, nor any that was more convincing in regard to the lack of understanding possessed by such people. It is due to the fact that proposals favored by

the European Socialists were defeated, and proposals opposed by them were finally driven through, that American labor was able to indorse overwhelmingly the treaty and the labor provisions. During the darkest days in Paris this prospect seemed so unlikely that the American labor mission, of which I was chairman, thought seriously of departing for home in despair of being able to serve the cause of humanity by remaining.

But it was my duty to make the fight as long as there was opportunity and it was possible finally to secure a completed work that could be accepted, not grudgingly, but whole-heartedly and with enthusiasm.

The commission held thirty-five sessions. The American members made every effort to secure ample opportunity for the public to be informed as the work progressed, but we were compelled to submit to the prevailing system of communiqués which kept the public informed of essential developments, but conveyed nothing of the surrounding conditions.

The report of the commission, submitted to the peace commissioners, was in two parts. The first part was a draft convention creating a permanent organization for international labor legislation. The second part contained the labor clauses, known as "Labor's Bill of Rights," consisting of nine essential clauses expressing fundamentals for insertion in the treaty of peace.

The draft convention provided for the establishment of a permanent labor organization, adherence to this organization to be obligatory upon all of the high contracting parties. Acceptance of the principles enunciated in Labor's Bill of Rights was to be a part of the act of approval of the treaty as a whole.

The international labor organization itself is divided

into two parts. One of these parts is the international labor conference and the other is the international labor office, controlled by a governing body selected annually.

The composition of the international labor conference was one of the points upon which there was serious difference of opinion. The provision in this regard is that for each nation there shall be one delegate selected by the recognized labor organization, one by the most representative organization of employers and two by the government. This makes it possible for a combination of employer and government delegates to outvote the labor delegates on any question, a contingency which, in the American view, was improper, inadvisable, and indefensible. Obviously, under such circumstances it is only by courtesy that a conference can be called a labor conference. It may be that there will never be such a combination, but the fact remains even now that such a combination is possible. The American view on this question was supported by the French, Italian, and Cuban delegations. Some of the foremost Socialists of the world were members of the Conference and fought and voted to sustain the provision giving governments this disproportionate representation. Their view-point was egotistical and, therefore, perhaps characteristic. It was to the effect that Socialists shortly would be in control of most of the governments of the world, and therefore the workers would have the majority in all international labor conferences.

If the hope of the working people of the world had found in Paris no more substantial support than the support of the Socialists who were given membership on the commission empowered to draft the labor proposals

of the treaty, that hope would have been a most forlorn one.

I may say with candor, and with many a memory of those days still fresh in my mind, that the contest against reaction and misunderstanding and wilfulness and utopian foolishness was one of the most difficult of my life. Striving day after day against all of these conditions and these forces, in order to bring into existence a document having in it something of constructive thought, something of worthy and workable purpose, was an experience through which I have no desire to pass again, though that is not to say that I would not if human welfare demanded it.

The compensation came when we were able to report to the peace commissioners a document that did measurably meet the requirements of justice and freedom and that did measurably come up to the standards set by the American labor movement, standards which I unhesitatingly set down as the highest standards presented by labor anywhere during the Peace Conference. The American labor movement carried the foremost banner of freedom and human progress into that great discussion, and it succeeded in planting that banner at a position far more advanced than seemed possible at the outset.

The adoption of the bill of rights as adopted by the commission on international labor legislation was moved at the plenary session of the Peace Conference, April 28, 1919, whereupon the following redraft was moved as an amendment, adopted and inserted in the treaty of peace (Article 427):

> The high contracting parties, recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have framed a permanent ma-

chinery associated with that of the League of Nations to further this great end. They recognize that differences of climate, habits and customs of economic opportunity and industrial tradition make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment. But holding, as they do, that labor should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply so far as their special circumstances will permit.

Among these methods and principles the following seem to the high contracting parties to be of special and urgent importance:

First. The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

Second. The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.

Third. The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.

Fourth. The adoption of an eight hours' day or a forty-eight hours' week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been obtained.

Fifth. The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday whenever practicable.

Sixth. The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

Seventh. The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

Eighth. The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

Ninth. Each state should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the high contracting parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations and that if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the league and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earner of the world.

The labor section of the treaty of peace with Germany (Part XIII) upon the absolute and uncompromising insistence of the American delegation was made to include a provision completely safeguarding the advanced standards of living of countries like our own. The provision which gives us that safeguard is this (Article 405, last paragraph):

> In no case shall any of the members of the League of Nations be asked or required, as the result of the adoption of any recommendation or draft convention by the conference (the international labor conference), to lessen the protection afforded by its existing legislation to the workers concerned.

I think it important briefly to clear up some misconceptions and misapprehensions regarding the labor section of the treaty.

The international labor conference cannot impose its will upon any nation. It has none of the functions of a superparliament. It cannot compel any nation to lower its existing standards, or to improve them. It cannot punish member nations for non-adoption of recommendations or draft conventions agreed upon.

The whole organization for labor created by the treaty is nothing more than a moral force which has the power to bring truth into the light and give reason and justice an opportunity to be heard.

The procedure with regard to recommendations or draft conventions is this: The international labor conference may agree that certain standards should be set up. It may put these proposed standards in the form of (*a*) a recommendation to be submitted to the members for consideration with a view to effect being given them by national legislation or otherwise, or (*b*) of a draft international convention for ratification by the members.

The only binding agreement between the members is that each will, in no case later than eighteen months from the closing of the session of the conference, bring such recommendations or draft conventions as are adopted by the Conference before the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action.

If on a recommendation, no legislative or other action is taken, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the proper authorities, no further obligation shall rest upon the member.

Furthermore, our states' rights were fully protected by the insertion of a paragraph providing that in the case of a federal state, the power of which to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of the government to treat a draft convention as a recommendation only. Thus it will be seen that member nations may enact laws giving effect to recommendations or draft conventions. They also may refuse. If they refuse there is no power of punishment or coercion or blockade or influence of any kind beyond the moral effect of the world's opinion. Nations have only opinion to fear, and they may elect to meet that opinion with whatever course seems to them wisest, most just, or, if they so desire, most deceptive.

The bill of rights, as it appears in the treaty (Article 427) is not the bill of rights as reported to the Peace Conference by the commission on international labor legislation. It is not exactly what American labor wanted. Nor was the bill of rights, as reported by the commission itself just what American labor wanted. But let me say this: If American labor had been able to get in a conference where twenty-eight nations were rep-

resented all that it wanted it would have been an achievement beyond that of any other section of the Peace Conference. It was not possible.

There has been some criticism of the use of the word "merely" in the bill of rights, in that section which specified that labor must be regarded "not merely as an article of commerce," and it has been said that the word is used in a disparaging sense.

This is the criticism of prejudiced and unthinking minds. The bill of rights appears in the labor section of the treaty as a resolution which must be interpreted as a whole. The preamble cannot be left out of account. In this case the preamble makes a definite, high-minded, and progressive declaration for the increasing freedom of labor, and on that foundation the treaty declares that labor must no longer be regarded merely as a commodity. What is clearly the language and the spirit of the paragraph and of the whole section is that the hour has struck when labor is and must be regarded by the world as something far above commodity classification, when labor must be undisputed in its possession of the freedom and the rights that go with manhood and womanhood and citizenship.

It stands to the everlasting credit of America that the thought of American labor is the guiding thought expressed throughout the whole labor section of the treaty. American labor, the freest and most truly progressive in all the world, wrote into the labor section the heart and soul of that section. What others were able to do was to soil in some measure the garb, the expression. The heart and soul are to that extent deprived of their present opportunity to be expressive of the full meaning which was given to them by the workers of this country.

For the sake of full comparison, I quote here the bill of rights, with the preamble, as reported to the Peace Conference by the commission on international labor legislation:

The high contracting parties declare their acceptance of the following principles and engage to take all necessary steps to secure their realization in accordance with the recommendations to be made by the International Labor Conference as to their practical application:

First. In right and in fact the labor of a human being should not be treated as merchandise or an article of commerce.

Second. Employers and workers should be allowed the right of association for all lawful purposes.

Third. No child should be permitted to be employed in industry or commerce before the age of fourteen years, in order that every child may be insured reasonable opportunities for mental and physical education.

Between the years of fourteen and eighteen young persons of either sex may only be employed on work which is not harmful to their physical development, and on condition that the continuation of their technical or general education is insured.

Fourth. Every worker has a right to a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life, having regard to the civilization of his time and country.

Fifth. Equal pay should be given to women and to men for work of equal value in quantity and quality.

Sixth. A weekly rest, including Sunday or its equivalent, for all workers.

Seventh. Limitation of the hours of work in industry on the basis of eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week, subject to an exception for countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial development or industrial organization or other special circumstances render the industrial efficiency of the workers substantially different.

The International Labor Conference will recommend a basis approximately equivalent to the above for adoption in such countries.

Eighth. In all matters concerning their status as workers and social insurance foreign workmen lawfully admitted to any country and their families should be insured the same treatment as the nationals of that country.

Ninth. All states should institute a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the workers.

Because it is brief and because I believe you will want to know the views of the working people of our own country, I present to you the bill of rights presented by the American delegation. It is then possible to see the three stages of development. The American proposals follow:

The high contracting parties declare that in all states the following principles should be recognized, established and maintained:

First. That in law and in practice it should be held that the labor of the human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.

Second. That involuntary servitude should not exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Third. The right of free association, free assembly, free speech and free press should not be denied or abridged.

Fourth. That the seamen of the merchant marine shall be guaranteed the right of leaving their vessels when the same are in safe harbor.

Fifth. That no article or commodity should be shipped or delivered in international commerce in the production of which children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work.

Sixth. That no article or commodity should be shipped or delivered in international commerce in the production of which convict labor has been employed or permitted.

Seventh. It should be declared that the workday in industry and commerce should not exceed eight hours a day, except in case of extraordinary emergency, such as danger to life or to property.

Eighth. It should be declared that an adequate wage should be paid for labor performed—a wage based upon and commensurate with the standard of life conforming to the civilization of the time.

Ninth. That equal wages should be paid to women for equal work performed.

Tenth. That the sale or use for commercial purposes of articles made or manufactured in private homes should be prohibited.

The amendment of the bill of rights as reported to the Peace Conference by the commission on international labor legislation requires some explanation. The commission made its report to the Peace Conference, thus concluding its labors and completing the period of its existence. This having been the case, I returned with my colleagues to the United States. At the time the report of the commission came before the Peace Conference for adoption I was not only in the United States, but, as the result of an accident, I was in bed, unable to attend to any business or to have any business brought before me.

When I had partially recovered from the accident, and while the convention of the American Federation of Labor was in session in Atlantic City, I sent the following cablegram to President Wilson:

Atlantic City, N. J., June 16, 1919.

Hon. Frank L. Polk,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Because of its importance and urgency, will you please transmit the following message to the President:

"Upon my advice executive council of the American Federation of Labor has recommended to the convention of the American Federation of Labor, now in session, the indorsement of the League of Nations, including the labor provisions.

"Reports published here indicate that the labor provisions have been so changed and weakened as to practically nullify effectiveness.

"I cannot ask the convention or the rank and file of labor to indorse propositions which have been or may be made valueless.

"The convention must necessarily take up consideration of the matter on or before Friday, June 20, 1919, and I urgently request full and definite information upon the subject, together with copy of provisions affecting labor as now framed."

Samuel Gompers,
President American Federation of Labor.

To the above I received the following cabled reply from the President:

Washington, D. C., June 21, 1919.

SAMUEL GOMPERS, ESQ.,
Hotel Alamac,
Atlantic City, N. J.

Following message for you from the President:

"Comparison between your draft labor convention as reported to the plenary conference and the labor provisions as they now appear in the treaty of peace shows the following categories of changes: First, redraft of what is called in commission's report 'clauses for insertion in treaty of peace.' In actual treaty they appear under the title 'general principles' and read as follows: 'The high contracting parties recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have framed in order to further this great end the permanent machinery provided for in section 1 and associated with that of the League of Nations. They recognize that difference of climate, habits and customs of economic opportunity and industrial tradition make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment, but holding as they do that labor should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think there are methods and principles for regarding labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply so far as their special circumstances will permit. Among these methods and principles the following seem to the high contracting parties to be of a special and urgent importance:

"'First, the guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; second, the right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers; third, the payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country; fourth, the adoption of an eight-hour day or a forty-eight-hour week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been obtained; fifth, the adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable; sixth, the abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations of the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development; seventh, the principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value; eighth, the standard set by law in each country with respect to the

conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein; ninth, each state should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.

"'Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the high contracting parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations, and that if adopted by the industrial communities who are members of the league, and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world.'

"The second part of your cable seven has been transferred into body of the convention and now appears under Article 405 of the treaty of peace under clause 19 of your report. I am convinced that except for changes in wording, which do not affect the substance and spirit of these clauses, they remain the same; second, likewise your protocol to Article 1 has been transferred to body of treaty under Article 405. The 'resolutions' adopted by the commission do not appear in the treaty, inasmuch as they were merely proposals of separate delegations and no part of the report as unanimously adopted for incorporation in the treaty. Third, a number of changes of form have been made in draft convention to make it conform in phraseology with the covenant of the League of Nations as redrafted by the League of Nations commission. For example, the words 'the high contracting parties' now read 'members,' and other similar unimportant changes. Fourth, on April 11 at the plenary conference, which adopted the report of the labor commission, Sir Robert Borden made the following remarks: 'This convention is linked in many ways by its terms to the covenant of the League of Nations, and I think it desirable to make it perfectly plain that the character of its membership and the method of adherence should be the same in the one case as in the other.' He then offered the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted by the conference: 'The conference authorizes the drafting committee to make such amendments as may be necessary to have the convention conform to the covenant of the League of Nations in the character of its membership and in the method of adherence.'

"In pursuance of this resolution the following changes were made: Article 1, your commission reports, together with the first two clauses of your Article 35, together with Article 36, have been combined as Article 387 of the treaty to read, 'a permanent organization is hereby established for the promotion of the objects set forth in

the preamble; the original members of the League of Nations shall be the original members of this organization and hereafter membership of the League of Nations shall carry with it membership of the said organization.'

"As you doubtless have in mind, the changes have the effect of giving the British dominions and colonies separate representation on the general conference. When you give your final judgment upon the importance of these changes, I earnestly urge you to entertain the following considerations: one, that Borden could not go back to the Canadian people, who occupy a position of considerable importance in the industrial world, and tell them that they were not entitled to representation on the general labor conference at Versailles; two, that the changes did in fact bring the labor convention into harmony with the League of Nations' covenant; three, that the changes are not substantially important, inasmuch as every labor convention adopted by the conference must be submitted to our government for ratification; thus the choice of acceptance or rejection lies in our own hands, irrespective of the constitution of the general conference; four, that the problems of the chief British colonies and dominions are much more our own than like Great Britain's so that their representation will be a source of strength to our point rather than an embarrassment; five, that in my opinion the changes do not introduce any weakness or threaten particular weakness in the labor provisions. They stand still, thanks to your efforts and guidance, as one of the great progressive achievements of the Peace Conference, something from which peoples the world over may take courage and hope and confidence in a better future. I am sure that you will agree that nothing could be more fatal to first aspiration than any failure to indorse these provisions. I count upon your support and sponsorship."

FRANK L. POLK.

It will be seen that finally the very best that could be had was secured; and it must be borne in mind that amendment and improvement wait only upon the progressive thought and energy of the nations that are party to the treaty of peace and the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is a fact, patent to all, but seemingly denied by some, that it is not possible to make progress in agreement with the world any more rapidly than agreement can be had. In the labor section as it

stands we have got the utmost to which agreement was possible. I need not tell this audience, but it has been necessary to tell some, that unless all parties agree there is no agreement. The task of those who look forward now is to strive onward to secure agreement upon a still higher plane to still more perfect expression.

I want to say a word to those, not necessarily present in this assemblage, who have protested that progress and justice were jeopardized by the granting of a vote to each of the British dominions. The fact is, in my opinion, that progress is safeguarded by the British possessions having been given the vote. These commonwealths, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and so on, went into the Peace Conference as states. I am convinced that they were entitled to that status in the Conference, and that they are entitled to it in the various bodies set up by that Conference.

It was my experience, and I look upon it as something of a dependable guide, that the votes of the representatives of these dominions and commonwealths were more often with the United States than with England, and that they were more often with progress than against it. There is more than a little significance in this. With but a few exceptions, the view-point of the American labor movement, constructive, democratic, uncontaminated by any of the philosophies that are cousin to Bolshevism, is shared only by the labor movements of these self-governing dominions and commonwealths. I commend that fact to the consideration of thoughtful Americans.

With all the drawbacks that there were in Paris, with all the appetites that came there to be satisfied, with all the ambitions that grouped themselves about the Peace

Conference, here still was an idealism and a determination that would not be denied. Let not all of us forget that America gave to that idealism and determination its great leadership.

A fact of paramount importance in gauging the integrity of the Peace Conference was the fact that millions of people were liberated and set up under independent governments of their own choosing.

The Paris Conference sought, as no other peace conference ever has sought, to reach into the mind of the people and write into definite terms the deepest and best thought to be found there.

So it was that the interests of the world's toilers came to be considered. This was truly an epoch-making step. The Covenant of the League of Nations is the written verdict and agreement of the civilized world that until justice is done to those who work, justice has been done only in part.

Not even the most ardent advocate of the League of Nations Covenant or of the labor section of the treaty of peace will contend that perfection is to be found in it. The Paris Conference did not produce a perfect document and did not give a prefect expression to the high ideals that animate the civilized world to-day.

The Conference did produce a document that measurably expresses the best and most constructive thought of the world, and that opens the way absolutely to a complete expression of the highest ideals which mankind may have.

The treaty of peace establishes no barrier to progress anywhere.

It opens the way to progress everywhere.

XIV

THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION DURING THE ARMISTICE

BY HERBERT HOOVER

During the course of the war itself the economic difficulties in every direction were dominant factors in its conduct. With the moment of the armistice we were confronted with a host of new and unprecedented difficulties. These difficulties flowed not only from the overnight reversal in the whole alignment of economic machinery built up steadily during the war, but also from the added burden of our being confronted with economic and social currents from the enemy countries that threatened immediately to overwhelm Europe in chaos. The danger to civilization from militarism was at once replaced by the imminent danger from economic collapse. I propose to enumerate some of the major problems that lay before us.

A. Some 160,000,000 people in liberated and enemy nations were face to face with the most terrible famine since the Thirty Years' War, when a third of the people in those areas died. Their food-supplies had steadily degenerated through the war, by blockade and diversion of man-power, until the consequent breakdown of morale in the civil population had contributed more than any other one factor to their revolutions and subsequent surrender.

All the four old empires were in the midst of revolution, from which fourteen states emerged in a month.

Many of the new states started without even the most rudimentary machinery of government. All had established representative governments in replacement of the former monarchies, and in each case these were of necessity directed largely by men with little experience in government.

Except for parts of Russia, all of these fragmentary states were highly industrialized, intimately interdependent as regards raw materials and supplies, with railway systems and communications built up to serve economic frontiers now suddenly shifted. In the explosion leading to this separation of states and these new governments the racial hatreds of centuries reached white-heat, and in this atmosphere each state grabbed for every movable economic resource, and proceeded to erect physical and economic barriers against the other along ill-defined borders which not only dismembered transportation systems, but also paralyzed such production and interchange of commodities as could have been carried on.

With impending famine, food-hoarding became a mania with almost every farmer, every village, every city, and every state. The discipline and regulations of war suddenly relaxed and the control of distribution seemed lost. Agricultural populations in the main were able to support themselves, but cities and towns—the centre points of social danger—were in acute need. The production of coal and other essential industrial commodities, maintained during the war under a strong military arm, immediately collapsed. Strikes, seizure of private property by governments, the general let-down of discipline, and, above all, the socialistic background of much of the revolutionary movement, contributed to the

demoralization. The whole mass of urban humanity formerly under enemy domination seemed headed directly for Bolshevism, or anarchy—from which there could be no hope of peace.

B. New problems arose in the European Allied countries in addition to those which came from enemy sources. From the diversion of man-power to war purposes the Allies had throughout the war become increasingly dependent upon imports of food and textiles from overseas. Owing to the losses of shipping and to the vast tonnage required to transport the American army, it had become necessary to abandon the long voyages to the food-producing areas of the southern hemisphere, principally the Argentine and Australia. The burden of supplying the Allies, and to a large extent the neutrals, had thus fallen upon North America, the nearest market and the point connected by the safest routes.

To meet this demand, we in America—through the extra exertion of our farmers and the savings of our women—had at the armistice prepared a surplus of some 20,000,000 tons of food and textile supplies, the minimum amount necessary to have carried the European Allies in the war until the harvest of 1919.

In order to stimulate production in the United States and to meet the economic levels resulting from Allied buying before we came into the war, we had given moral pledges and in some cases legal pledges to our farmers that they should realize certain basic prices for their produce. The price levels at the armistice in the isolated markets of the southern hemisphere were scarcely one-half those in the United States, and the Allies naturally wished to abandon our market.

The motion of this swollen stream of supplies that

passed from the farmhouse, through the manufacturer, to the American seaboard could not be interrupted by a diversion such as the Allies contemplated without a price collapse, thus not only betraying the assurances given to American farmers but bringing a complete financial crash to the whole of our interior banks—for they, in loans to the farmer and manufacturer, had given confidence in the stability of prices.

While stocks of food-supplies and textiles had accumulated in the southern hemisphere (due to their isolation), the totality of supplies available to the increased numbers to be fed and clothed was barely enough to get all hands through until the harvest of 1919, even with the most careful and just distribution over the whole of Europe.

C. The tension upon world shipping was in no sense relaxed with the armistice, for while some relief was obtained by reason of the fact that it was no longer necessary to continue the shipment of troops and munitions abroad, the Allies and ourselves were immediately faced with the necessity of the repatriation of some 6,000,000 men from overseas, and we had further to find the tonnage with which to transport the vast amount of supplies required to stem the famine in liberated and enemy territory.

To add to our difficulties, shipping and port strikes became epidemic and greatly reduced the carrying capacity of the mercantile fleet.

D. None of the liberated countries—Poland, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Serbia, Roumania, Belgium, or Armenia—possessed a pound of commodities or a dollar of securities or gold with which to pay for supplies for their civil populations.

Therefore credits from our own and the Allied Governments had to be created to enable them to live. Beyond these financial necessities, continued credits were required by the Allies, particularly Italy, until they could in a measure restart productive life. The enemy states, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, possessed gold and securities, but Austria had nothing but hunger.

E. The coal situation was a series of calamities in itself. In Central Europe, the failure of production in the three states possessing coal-mines, endangered the municipalities and railways of a dozen other states. Therefore, production had to be reorganized and coal distributed from producing states to critical areas outside their borders, even though hardship resulted to the producing states by reducing their own consumption below real need. Added to this was the dependence of France and Italy upon British coal, of which the production steadily decreased in the general let-down and strikes following the armistice.

F. At the time of the armistice, the enemy areas were under vigorous blockade and the neutral countries were all under restrictions as to exports and imports, either for the purpose of pressing the enemy or to save shipping. The blockade was more than a naval blockade—it was an effective control penetrating back to every seaboard country in the world with a vast bureaucracy that did not easily yield to the sudden change in direction.

G. During the whole progress of the war, every government in the world had, to a greater or less degree, been compelled to assume the direction and control of economic life amongst its peoples. With the armistice, there was the insistent necessity for all countries to turn their production from munitions to civil supplies and

to restore business to normal. To do this it was first essential to free business and enterprise from stifling restraints and to secure an enormous shift of labor from armies and the production of war material. Freedom of business and industry demanded a rapid expansion of free shipping for commerce, and this in the face of increased demand for primary supplies.

H. The economic problems were inextricably entangled in the social problems. The misery of war famine, the weakening of institutions because of revolution, furnished the fertile grounds of social desperation for the resulting propaganda of a Bolshevist and Anarchistic order. Had this propaganda been successful, no peace would have been possible nor could intensive production have been stimulated to that degree necessary to lay the foundation of support to the excessive urban populations. Furthermore, it would have been impossible for us to expect even to maintain the Allied or our own institutions if Central Europe had succumbed to this sort of chaos.

With all these problems, the first issue was to secure co-operation in action by which each of the principal Allied and Associated Governments should bear its responsibility in the necessary readjustments. At the same time, essential liberty of action of each country could not be subordinated to the will of others, for the United States could not place her resources under the control of others. For this purpose, all of the various inter-Allied war committees, which co-ordinated finance, shipping, food, coal, and blockade during the war were grouped together under one common committee of somewhat shifting character, but ultimately known as the Supreme Economic Council.

The American point of view was that the solution of the major economic problems required some very direct and positive steps: First, that the blockade should be removed; second, each nation should contribute its share of shipping to be devoted to the movement of primary commodities such as food and coal, even against the clamor for higher earnings to be made in the world's trade; third, that some 2,000,000 tons of enemy shipping in enemy and neutral ports should at once be placed in service of supplies and repatriation of troops; fourth, that the stream of American food-supplies should be absorbed by the Allies, pending their diversion into the enemy area; fifth, that assistance should be given in the erection of the necessary economic functions of new governments, that they might restore transportation, suppress hoarding, secure the distribution of imported supplies within their own frontiers; sixth, that ports be opened, transportation across liberated and enemy states be recreated by both rail and canal, that the interchange of vital commodities such as coal, salt, oil, etc., should be resumed, that seeds and animals be distributed; seventh, that the production of coal should be revived and its distribution equitably arrived at, even though it brought hardship upon the nations possessing the coal-mines; eighth, that minimum credits should be extended to the liberated nations upon which they could cover their immediate necessities; ninth, that enemy people should pay for their supplies in cash; tenth, that provision for the unemployed, pending resumption of production, should be established, in order that suffering and social disorder might be mitigated; eleventh, that special charitable relief to the masses of orphan waif children, and measures in combat of contagious disease

sweeping Europe should be at once organized; twelfth, that every possible step should be taken to demobilize government control of industry, not alone to revive individual initiative, but to demobilize hatred through replacement of governmental economic contact by the softening processes of individual business.

While these steps were clear enough at the outset, and while they were all ultimately accomplished in the end, unity of view as to their necessity and their accomplishment was not secured in a single day.

In the first instance the Allies insisted that the changed situation at the armistice should be utilized to secure a general reduction in price levels of overseas supplies; they felt that their populations could not be rightly called upon to pay the higher price levels of the United States, when they could obtain cheaper supplies from the southern hemisphere, at greatly reduced prices.

We Americans, on the other hand, were compelled to insist that we could not have a break in the level which we had assured our farmers and our manufacturers in order to secure production on Allied behalf. We ultimately succeeded in preventing a break by using the resources made available under our own war powers in purchase of food-supplies, and we were able to tide over the readjustment period without a débâcle in the United States.

We also insisted that the blockade on neutrals and liberated peoples should be withdrawn, and the blockade of enemies should be steadily and rapidly reduced, so as to allow food-supplies to move inward, and industrial life to recuperate. This insistence was based, first, upon the inhumanity of continuing a food blockade after surrender—that we had no fight with women and children;

second, upon the necessity to fight famine as the mother of anarchy; and, last, to secure the return of enemy populations to productivity, in order to have world relief from starvation and the disorders that must daily flow from it.

Unfortunately, the militaristic view of dominated commerce and continued mobilization of economic power over the enemy died hard in Europe. The Allied military authorities contended that it was vital to maintain the blockade until peace was signed, lest the enemy might revive its military strength and might be less disposed to accept dictated terms of peace. The Americans' answer to this contention was that it was always within the power of the Allies to reimpose the blockade, that its terrors would be multiplied tenfold if the population had once appreciated the value of its relaxation, that the primary necessities of civilization required its abandonment.

After a compromise allowing the relaxation of the blockade on the import of food had been agreed to, new contentions arose out of the insistence of the Americans that enemy countries should pay for their supplies by shipment of commodities or by negotiable securities or gold. Some of the Allies felt that the removal of large quantities of gold and liquid securities reduced the ability of Germany to pay indemnity and became their particular loss. The view was advanced that America should furnish supplies to the enemy on credit, as being a function of the establishment of peace. Aside from the legal impossibility of such an undertaking the American economic representative did not believe such calls upon the American taxpayer could be justified, and that we were indeed carrying as heavy a burden as could be asked by

furnishing the Allies and liberated countries supplies on credit for a long period after the armistice.

Aside from securing unity of view amongst the Allied and Associated Governments as to these measures, it was necessary to secure co-operation of the Germans and Austrians in their execution. It was finally agreed with them that—as a condition of supplies—they should for reasonable hire hand over to the Associated Governments their entire merchant shipping. Incidentally, this resulted in a three months' earlier return of the American army than would have been otherwise possible. It was not until the end of March that a final agreement with regard to Germany was consummated in Brussels on the 24th of that month, and, indeed, furnished one of the dramatic episodes of the war. Here, to that city which had suffered so terribly of famine under the iron hand of the German staff, came the representatives of the revolutionary German government in plea to the Allies—including the Belgians—for food.

Germany was the last of the countries with whom arrangements were completed. Supplies had been long in motion to Finland, the Baltic States, to Poland, to Bulgaria, to Czechoslovakia, to Roumania, to Austria, to Jugo-Slavia, to Armenia, and elsewhere in Russia. The blockade had been relaxed with respect to the neutral countries, and the steady stream of supplies had been maintained to the Allies. Coal-mines in parts of Europe were placed in control where necessary; railways were placed under the command of American directors.

Measures had been established by which the philanthropy of America should advance its regiments of mercy across Europe, until provision had been made for the children and helpless of twenty nations. At its maxi-

mum load, America alone was providing in charity, food and shelter for over 7,500,000 children of Allied and liberated races. The Allied Governments established unemployment allowances to their stagnant labor and other governments were induced to do so. At one moment 15,000,000 families in Europe were receiving such allowances—75,000,000 people living on charity.

This is no occasion to recount the difficulties and details of negotiation, the great masses of statistics of distribution, the minutiæ of organization, the method in the control of shipping, the control and stimulation of production and distribution of coal, the operation of railroads, opening of canals and ports, establishment of the functions of many new governments, the vast financial operations that flowed from all these acts. They will furnish the historical student material for thought during the next hundred years.

In one item alone—the feeding of Germany—some $250,000,000 of gold had to be managed, and between all governments the movement of some 35,000,000 tons of commodities of one kind or another had to be arranged, consummated, and settled for.

It is sufficient for this occasion to say that America bore the major burden in negotiating these arrangements, and that her disinterestedness, her sense of service, carried Europe through this—the most terrible period of its history.

Despite all these efforts, at one time or another Bolshevism succeeded in planting itself in Western Europe in temporary control of a number of large cities; but the stability given to other parts made possible its isolation and eradication. At times the maintenance of social order during the overprolonged peace negotiations

seemed hopeless, for the very processes of peacemaking, its use as an excuse for military interference, contributed every stimulant to instability and interfered with economic rehabilitation. As great and important as were the steps toward reconstruction under united action these controls could not go on without developing from themselves great sources of friction, and the signature of peace came none too soon.

The final signing of peace marked a great turning of the political and economic forces from disintegration and destruction on the one hand, toward freedom of commerce, of production and of renewed hope on the other.

XV

THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE GREAT WAR

BY HENRY THOMAS MAYO

For nearly three years after the beginning of the war in Europe our country was neutral. The desire of the administration and of the country was to avoid being drawn into the war. And the idea prevailed largely that even should this country be brought into the war, our participation would largely consist of furnishing money and supplies. No one even dreamed of an American army of 2,000,000 men in Europe.

Of course these ideas changed rapidly. Congress, in August, 1916, had passed the three-year programme for increase of the navy, the largest and most costly programme ever considered, and also had authorized a material increase in number of personnel and provided for the development of a naval reserve force. Our entry into the war came too soon after the passage of this navy bill for the service afloat to have felt any of its effect.

The navy had not been asleep nor unmindful of what was going on in the world. On the contrary, the progress of the war abroad was closely followed, every item of information received was carefully considered, and all that the navy itself could do to keep up with new developments was done in the fleet. This was especially so after the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May, 1915, which indicated that sooner or later we would have to engage in the war. The result was a closer attention to everything pertaining to battle efficiency.

On February 3, 1917, when diplomatic relations with Germany were broken, the active Atlantic Fleet was at Guantanamo, Cuba. The fleet consisted of fourteen battleships, sixteen destroyers, three mine-layers, four tugs, used as mine-sweepers, an aeroplane ship, and the train consisting of supply and fuel ships. The destroyer force included a cruiser, used as a flag-ship, and mother ships fitted with repair-shop facilities. No submarines were with the fleet. As it seemed plain that war must follow, the fleet was at once placed on a war footing. The base was shifted to Guacanayabo Bay, where more room was available. Little apprehension of a German attack was felt, but it was essential that officers and men should become accustomed to war routine and war precautions. These were at once put into effect, while the usual drills and target practices were carried on. When the fleet went north late in March, 1917, there existed a general feeling of confidence. The work done by the destroyer and mine forces prior to the war showed in the results achieved as the war progressed.

In March the administration decided that the situation demanded that United States merchant vessels be armed. Accordingly, the fleet was called upon to supply the necessary officers and gun's crews. This was the start of a continuous demand on the fleet for trained gun's crews, and it became necessary to use special methods for their intensive training. The reports of encounters with German submarines during the war show how successful was this training and how excellently these men maintained the spirit and traditions of the service. The fleet reached Hampton Roads late in March and the fleet base was transferred to York River, Virginia.

In April, 1917, the Allied navies had command of the

sea, except as regards enemy submarine operations against merchant ships. German sea commerce had ceased, and German-armed ships had been driven from the sea, but the menace of the submarine remained serious. The German high-sea fleet kept in the security of its harbors, its morale dwindling by inaction, until, when it was desired to make a final forlorn-hope effort, the personnel revolted. Upon the unrestricted submarine campaign had been placed the main German reliance for destroying sea communications and isolating Great Britain; in the spring of 1917 these efforts appeared increasingly successful. The monthly destruction of tonnage mounted to alarming proportions. The anti-submarine measures taken were not sufficient and the cry was "ships—more ships," in the hope of keeping pace with the sinkings and maintaining the supply of food and materials for the Allies. Early in April the Navy Department directed the organization of a patrol force. The mission assigned to the force was "to give the maximum possible protection to the transatlantic commerce of the United States and of friendly powers in the area to seaward of and contiguous to the areas guarded by naval district forces." It became apparent that protection of commerce against submarine and raider operations could not be made effective by continuous sea patrol. Therefore, the patrol forces soon disintegrated until but one squadron remained. This did duty in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean throughout the war.

War was declared on April 6. On April 10 Rear-Admirals Browning, R. N., and Grasset, F. N., commanders-in-chief of their countries' naval forces on the North American station, arrived at Hampton Roads, where they were met by the chief of operations, United States

navy, the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet, and the commander of the newly organized patrol force. They stated the kind of assistance the United States navy might give and asked us what we were prepared to do. The conference reconvened the following day in Washington, with the secretary of the navy presiding and with the general board present. At this conference the representatives of the British and French navies were assured of full co-operation by our navy, and appeared entirely satisfied with the result. The United States navy assumed responsibility for patrol of nearly all of the western Atlantic, and agreed to furnish small vessels as rapidly as possible for work on the French coast, and to send a division of destroyers to operate off the English Channel. The request for these destroyers seemed to be based on the desire that our navy should appear in connection with the anti-submarine operations rather than on any idea that we could or should send destroyers in great number. Admiral Browning stated that the moral effect of even one United States destroyer operating with those of Great Britain would be excellent. Destroyer Division 8 accordingly sailed for Queenstown, Ireland, on April 18. This is the division whose commander—Taussig—reported on arrival "ready now," when asked how much time he wanted to prepare for active operations. These destroyers were followed at frequent intervals by others as rapidly as they could be made ready.

All naval vessels were being rushed into commission, together with hundreds of yachts, tugboats, small craft for district work, and vessels of every kind. These all demanded men and officers, and the demand for trained gun's crews for merchant ships was constant. Although the navy expanded in numbers very rapidly, growing to

a total in October, 1918, of nearly 33,000 officers and 497,000 men, yet these were almost entirely untrained, and the demand was for trained men. Officers and men for new vessels of the navy proper were also to be trained.

The fleet in commission contained practically all the trained men available. Upon it constant drafts were made, especially in the commissioning of the chief warrant and warrant officers and large numbers of the best petty officers. The Atlantic fleet thus became a great training force and source of supply for personnel; thousands of men were turned out sufficiently trained to be able to perform regular duty on the many vessels which the navy had to operate. This hard training work was continued through the war period.

Just prior to our entrance into the war Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims had been sent abroad to get into touch with Allied naval authorities, especially British, and obtain information which would be useful to us when war came. The first vessels—destroyers—sent over were ordered to report to him. This was also done as others were sent, and he was soon designated as "commander of United States naval forces in European waters," all these forces being nominally part of the United States Atlantic fleet, but operating as a detached force. However, it was required that the commander-in-chief be informed in regard to all these forces sufficiently for him to take immediate control in case the course of events should require that fleet operations be undertaken or that the United States and British fleets be combined.

The office of the "commander of United States naval forces in European waters" was in London and his duties there—which constantly increased during the progress of the war—were so multifarious and important, and re-

quired him to be in such close touch with the admiralties of the Allies, that it was a practical impossibility for him to exercise more than a general command over the whole. Therefore, in order to insure full co-operation, all our vessels were operated by the senior officer of each combined force. On the French coast, however, Admiral Wilson, United States navy, by arrangement with the French commander-in-chief, operated his own forces. The United States mine force was operated by Admiral Strauss, although he was obliged to arrange his mining "excursions" to meet the wishes of the commander-in-chief of the British grand fleet, being dependent upon him for details of ships for escort and protection during mine-laying operations.

During the month of May, 1917, the destroyer force of the Atlantic fleet disintegrated—as a force—all suitable destroyers being designated for duty abroad. The commander, Rear-Admiral Gleaves, was detached and ordered to New York to assume charge of convoy operations, being later designated as "Commander of Cruiser and Transport Force, Atlantic Fleet."

In June a squadron of patrol vessels—armed yachts—was despatched for duty on the French coast. They were followed by other vessels of various classes—yachts, mine-sweepers, tugs, repair ships, salvage ships. A patrol force of gunboats, coast-guard ships, and armed yachts was also sent to Gibraltar, together with destroyers from the Philippines; later a small force of destroyers and submarines was based on the Azores.

In May, 1917, the major part of the Pacific fleet under Admiral Caperton came through the Panama Canal and took charge of the patrol of the South Atlantic. Admiral Caperton also had duties of a somewhat diplomatic

nature on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America.

In August, 1917, the commander-in-chief, Atlantic fleet, was sent abroad to attend a conference in London with naval representatives of the nations associated in the war, and with the added purpose of getting into personal touch with the foreign officers with whom he would co-operate in case of joint fleet operations. At this time the commander-in-chief took up with the British admiralty the subject of a mine barrage in the North Sea. Returning to the United States, he advised that the North Sea mine-barrage project be pushed, that a division of battleships be sent to the British grand fleet, and that all forms of assistance to nations with whom we were associated in the war be extended and expedited, stressing the importance of the time element. But it was not until the chief of naval operations had himself visited London, a short time later, that it was decided to send the battleships to the grand fleet.

On our entering the war, it was wisely decided, in view of the special demand for anti-submarine craft, not to push the larger vessels authorized by the 1916 programme, but to concentrate shipbuilding facilities upon the construction of anti-submarine craft. The building of 222 destroyers, 20 submarines, 442 subchasers, 51 minesweepers, 6 coast submarines, 20 sea-going tugs, 30 harbor tugs, and 16 motor tugs was authorized and proceeded; 100 subchasers for France were included. Later the construction of 60 of the so-called Eagle boats by Henry Ford was agreed upon. The active war ended before any of the Eagle boats were finished and tested. The subchasers were rapidly turned out and did useful service. These little craft, only 110 feet long, crossed

the Atlantic and did good work as patrols in the Irish Sea, English Channel, on the French coast, and in the Mediterranean and in northern Russia in 1919.

Convoy

When the Germans began their unrestricted submarine warfare, on February 1, 1917, the question of convoys began to be seriously considered. Our first troop convoy sailed in June, and by July we were fully committed to the convoy system. It proved very successful, most of the objections disappearing upon actual trial. Many German merchant steamers had been in United States ports since 1914. These ships—103 of them—were taken over by our government and placed under the shipping board. Sixteen of the largest and best were turned over to the navy to be used as troop transports, followed by eighteen more for use as freight transports. It was found that in every ship the machinery had been disabled by the German crews, the injuries being principally the breaking of cast-iron parts, cylinders, pump casings, etc. Those executing the destructive work believed that repair was impossible and that new castings could not be made and installed within a year at least, especially as all plans of the ships and machinery were missing. The repair of this machinery by the navy, using the electric welding process, was one of the great successes of the war—and to this success was largely due the navy's ability to transport troops to France in the spring of 1918, in numbers greater than had been thought possible. It has been stated that this work saved a year's time and $20,000,000, and also that it was so well done that there was not a single instance of a defective weld developing. The success of the first trials caused the shipping board

to turn over to the navy twenty more ships for repair and return.

The convoy system, once started, rapidly developed. The convoys were made up according to speed of ships, and the escort work was participated in by English, French, and American cruisers. Certain large and fast ships, like the *Leviathan* and *Olympic*, were sent without ocean escort, but were met by destroyers and escorted through the submarine danger zone and into port. The convoy system was a material factor in combating the submarine efforts, although it was but one factor. Increased efficiency and experience of the destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, the depth charge and means for handling it, the use of submarines against submarines, mystery ships, aviation patrols, zigzagging tactics, arming of merchant ships, smoke-boxes, and the instruction and increased experience of shipmasters in proper handling of their ships in convoy and under attack, all were factors. One other factor should be mentioned, the method of keeping track of the movements of submarines practically from the time of leaving German ports until their return, which was brought to a high state of efficiency by the British, and enabled proper routing orders to be issued.

The convoy system continued with little change until the summer of 1918, when, fearing that the Germans might attempt operations against troop convoys with battle cruisers or swift raiders, the older battleships were assigned to escort duty with troop convoys. Under convoy approximately 2,000,000 Americans were transported to France, without a single man being lost while under escort of United States vessels. No navy troop transports were torpedoed on east-bound trips. Four were

torpedoed on west-bound (return) trips. Of these the *Antilles*, *President Lincoln*, and *Covington* were sunk, while the *Mount Vernon*, although badly damaged, was able to return under her own steam to Brest. One hundred and thirty-eight lives were lost in these ships.

Battleships

In November, 1917, the ninth division of the Atlantic fleet was formed, and sent to join the British grand fleet. It operated for the rest of the war, until after the surrender of the German fleet, under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the grand fleet, being designated as the sixth battle squadron of that fleet. In organization, up-keep, and gunnery, our ships were found satisfactory and, indeed, were able in some respects to give points to their British associates.

In midsummer, 1918, it was feared that the Germans might attempt successfully to get battle cruisers or fast raiders to sea to operate against our transports. The sixth division of our battleship force was, therefore, sent in August to Bantry Bay, Ireland, to be in position to combat the situation if it developed, the eighth division of superdreadnaughts being held in readiness to base on Halifax if required, and the older battleships were assigned to escort duty with troop convoys.

While the ninth division, operating with the grand fleet, engaged in no fleet action, it certainly had all sorts of war experience, including North Sea cruising, convoy escort work, and encounters with submarines, in which several times torpedoes were narrowly avoided.

Destroyers

Our destroyer list at the entrance into the war consisted of fifty-one destroyers, of which only sixteen were

in full commission with the fleet. Others were in commission with reduced complements and many had been on neutrality duty at our principal ports up to the outbreak of war. As destroyers were prepared they were sent overseas until we had destroyers operating from Queenstown, Brest, Gibraltar, and the Azores. Twenty-eight had sailed for Queenstown by May 28. The number at each base varied, but the maximum reached at each port was about forty-four at Queenstown, thirty-eight at Brest, six at Gibraltar, and four at the Azores. The work of these ships was arduous and constant. While at sea they were engaged in escort duty and in patrolling and hunting for submarines, and during their so-called "rest" days in port they were hard at work overhauling machinery, fuelling, and generally preparing for going to sea again. They kept the sea in all weathers, and winter cruising was by no means a picnic. But they were always effective and reliable, and the German submarines grew to fear them. The *Cassin* had her stern blown off by a torpedo from a German submarine, the *Jacob Jones* was sunk by a torpedo, the *Chauncey* was sunk by collision, and the *Shaw* was cut down by the *Aquitania*, which she was escorting, but she made port. Admiral Bayley, R. N., under whom the Queenstown destroyers served, praised their work in no uncertain terms. The destroyers accounted for several German submarines, the number being, as it always will be, somewhat uncertain; but their great work was in protecting other vessels, especially the convoys. The same kind of work was also performed on our own coast, although it was not as strenuous and constant as similar work abroad.

The Mine Force

In the spring of 1917 the mine force of our Atlantic fleet consisted of two old cruisers and one gunboat, which had been converted to mine-layers, and four fleet tugs fitted for mine-sweeping. While this force was entirely too small to mine extensively, it had sufficed for practice work and to develop a system and doctrine which later enabled a large and efficient mine force to be rapidly improvised.

The Naval Bureau of Ordnance had, even before we entered the war, considered the possibility of anti-submarine mine barrage in the North Sea or off the German coast. Our entrance into the war brought increased interest in this subject. In April, 1917, Mr. Ralph C. Browne, of Salem, Mass., brought to the bureau an invention which he called "The Brown Submersible Gun." This was not considered practicable in its proposed form, but the electric principle involved was at once applied to mines, and in it was seen the possibility of a suitable mine for a deep-sea mine barrage. By July, the tests were so successful that the bureau confidently urged the plan for a North Sea barrage. While attending the naval conference in London, the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet pushed the project and secured a tentative agreement with the British admiralty, who at once sent a naval mining expert to the United States to witness tests and obtain details of the mine and its operation. The mine barrage as agreed upon extended from about ten miles off the Orkney Islands—the ten-mile passage being heavily patrolled—to the Norwegian coast. The Norwegian coast waters, inside the three-mile limit, were mined by Norway.

The British admiralty was somewhat doubtful regarding the project. But since the United States offered the mines, estimated to cost $40,000,000, as well as the ships to lay them in by far the largest area, the proposition was agreed to. The manufacture of the mines and accessories was rushed. Eight merchant steamers were purchased and converted to mine-layers. The experience of the small mine force of the Atlantic fleet was utilized, with the result that our mine-laying vessels in the North Sea carried, on a much smaller displacement, many more mines than the British mine-layers and were able to lay their mines with greater rapidity. Parties were sent ahead and established mine depots and assembly plants in Scotland at Invergordon and Inverness, bases 17 and 18. The procedure was to ship mines to Corpach and Lyle on the west coast of Scotland, thence by the Caledonian Canal and by rail to bases 17 and 18. At these bases the assembly was completed, after which they were loaded on the mine-layers preparatory to planting. The *Baltimore,* in April, laid about 900 mines in assisting the British mine force off the north coast of Ireland, and part of the mine squadron made two mine-laying excursions. The entire force, however, was not ready until the end of June, 1918. Mine-laying then proceeded rapidly, and the barrage soon began to show effectiveness, although it was worked up to the time of the armistice. A total of 56,611 American and 13,600 British mines were laid in depths ranging from 40 to 160 fathoms.

The actual submarine losses due to the mine barrage will probably never be exactly known, but it is probable that at least ten submarines were destroyed and others damaged, and the effect was to close the North Sea to such an extent as to make exit or entrance difficult and

dangerous to enemy submarines. The laying of the North Sea barrage ranks among the big undertakings of the Great War. It was equalled by the task of destroying it after the armistice. In this work about ninety vessels were employed, two being lost and many badly damaged, and eleven lives lost. The whole operation was successful, and by September 30, 1919, Rear-Admiral Strauss was able to report the work completed.

Naval Overseas Transportation Service

To insure the expedition and regular supply of our naval forces abroad and to assist in the supply of the army, the naval overseas transportation service was established in January, 1918. The navy was called on to man ships acquired by the shipping board. This was a new task and made a new demand for trained officers and men. But it was cheerfully assumed and efficiently performed. In ten months this service grew to about 320 vessels, with a tonnage of 2,800,000, and requiring about 3,000 officers and 29,000 men.

Aviation

The development of the navy's aeronautical service during the World War was remarkable. In April, 1917, the navy's aviation group totalled 38 officers and 163 men, their equipment being only 45 machines of various types, mainly for training. During the war about 2,800 officers were assigned to aviation and about 46,000 men. Of these more than 1,200 officers and 19,000 men were sent abroad. At the date of the armistice we had some 2,100 planes and about 300 lighter-than-air craft. Five hundred and seventy aircraft had been sent abroad. A naval aviation group of 7 officers and 122 men was the

first organized force from the United States to land in France. The advent of our young, enthusiastic aviation personnel, the information as to our extensive plans, and observation as to the thorough way in which the execution of these plans was started, had a very beneficial effect at a time when there were many indications of a faltering morale among the Allies. As the work progressed information regarding its intended scope must have reached the Germans, where it also had its effect. Our navy established and placed in commission abroad twenty-eight operating aviation stations, two training aviation stations, and six bases. These were distributed in England, Ireland, France, and Italy, and included a marine aviation station in the Azores.

The entire aviation service had to be built up, materiel and personnel, on the assumption that the war might last several years. A story of this work would be a volume in itself. It is hard to say just what direct effect our aviation efforts had on the suppression of the submarine. The records show a probability of over forty attacks on submarines from our aircraft. A measure of the efficient work of our aircraft is, perhaps, to be found in the immunity from attack enjoyed by vessels passing close to the Allied coast under escort of aircraft. Our aviators patrolled the coasts, searched for submarines and mines, convoyed vessels, took part in bombing expeditions from stations in northern France against German centres, and from Italian stations against Austrian ports. Most of the aircraft used were bought abroad, but before the armistice the force was fairly well equipped with American materiel for serious and extensive work. It is claimed that fifteen enemy vessels were sunk or damaged through the efforts of United States aviators.

The Railway Battery

In November, 1917, the Bureau of Ordnance recommended that some of our naval 14-inch guns be utilized on shore on the western front. They were 50-caliber guns, that is, nearly 60 feet long, weighing 90 tons each, with projectiles of 1,400 pounds, containing 88 pounds of explosive, and having a range of over 25 miles. Use of these guns on railway mounts was approved, and designing of mounts and accessories was begun. By working night and day, complete plans and specifications were ready on January 25, 1918. The first mount was complete, ready for firing, April 25, 1918, and the last of the five on May 25, 1918. Each unit consisted of the gun car, a locomotive, and twelve other cars; besides the five battery units a staff train was provided. To design and build the above called for and received the complete cooperation of the Navy Department, American railroad men, and manufacturers. The work was rushed with patriotic speed. The first ship-load of materiel left on June 29. It was unloaded and assembled at St. Nazaire, France, and on August 11, the first unit was ready to leave for the front. On September 16, the entire group of naval railway batteries was ready for action on the western front. The force was manned and operated entirely by naval personnel. In general, batteries Nos. 1 and 2 operated with the French armies, and Nos. 3, 4, and 5 with the American army near Verdun.

For two months preceding the armistice the navy had in action the five largest mobile guns on the western front. No. 2 battery on September 6, 1918, fired the first American shell from an American gun manned by Americans on the western front. These batteries were

very effective against the German railroad communications and centres, and were therefore of importance in convincing the Germans that only surrender or an armistice could prevent complete disaster.

Communications

During the war the naval communication service was expanded until it included England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Belgium, Gibraltar, Italy, Corfu. To insure transatlantic communication for our army the navy began the building of the Lafayette radio station in France, which has been completed since the armistice and turned over to the French Government. The navy also took over the operation and censorship of all commercial radio stations in the United States, the inspection and sealing of radio apparatus of all merchant vessels which arrived in United States ports, the furnishing of operators to United States merchant vessels, the censorship of radio and cable communications. The above was in addition to the carrying out of the primary mission of naval communications—that of maintaining efficient communication for United States vessels at sea, including the transports. After the armistice the navy handled the communications for the President and our delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris.

German Submarines on Our Coast

In 1916 the German commercial submarine *Deutschland* twice visited United States ports, and October 7, 1916, the *U-53*, a strictly naval vessel, appeared at Newport, R. I. The voyages of the *Deutschland* were apparently for purely commercial purposes. That of the *U-53* was in the nature of a path-finding expedition, and may also

have had the purpose of warning the United States as to what we might expect if we engaged in the war. The day after leaving Newport the *U-53* sank three British and two neutral steamers off Nantucket Light vessel.

In 1918 German submarines appeared offensively on our Atlantic coast. Warning of their probable arrival had been received from London. Including all that came west of 40 degrees west longitude, six German submarines operated off our Atlantic coast between May and October, 1918, and destroyed seventy-nine United States vessels, most of which were of small size, by bomb or gunfire, and fourteen vessels by torpedoes. These included steamships, sailing vessels, motor-boats, barges, and one light vessel, ranging from a 19-ton motor-boat to a 10,000-ton tanker; they also included one west-bound transport, the *Ticonderoga*. The submarines also planted mines in seven different areas in the track of commerce on the coast. By these mines seven vessels were damaged or destroyed, among them the steamship *San Diego*, which was sunk, and the United States battleship *Minnesota*, which proceeded into port. The others were merchant steamships. Although the fact was never verified, the belief exsted that the *U-151* succeeded in cutting two cables, on May 28, 1918.

The United States was not stampeded by the submarine operations. Transports and cargo vessels for Europe sailed as usual, and coastwise traffic soon proceeded regularly, although naturally great care was exercised in routing vessels. When German submarine operations began, the offensive was at once taken by our patrol vessels, by submarines already distributed for the purpose, by flotillas of subchasers and by converted yachts armed with small guns but provided with depth charges. Despite

the number of vessels destroyed, the German submarine campaign on our coast was a failure. It neither interrupted the despatch of vessels to Europe nor succeeded in leading us to recall destroyers from Europe or even to retain vessels designated for duty in Europe.

Our Submarines

Prior to the war our submarines were not regarded as more than coast submarines, with limited radius of action. They were therefore utilized on our own coast only, until in October, 1917, a division of the L-boats left to take station at the Azores as an anti-raider and anti-submarine force. They remained there for the rest of the war. They had no contacts with the enemy, but their mere presence prevented enemy raiders and submarines from operating near the Azores. One division of four K-boats voyaged from Hawaii through the canal and to Key West, Fla., and took up patrol duty in the Straits of Florida and the Gulf of Mexico. In December, 1917, the fifth submarine division of seven L-boats proceeded via the Azores to Ireland. After a hard, stormy passage they arrived at Bantry Bay, and began training in British methods of anti-submarine work. Our submarines soon were able to take their part in the anti-submarine patrol off southwest Ireland and in St. George's and Bristol channels, which continued for the rest of the war. Numerous contacts were made, but no sinkings of enemy craft so far as known. The boats had exciting experiences in being depth-charged and fired upon by friendly destroyers and airplanes, which believed them to be enemy submarines.

The eighth submarine division of eight O-boats started for duty in European waters in the fall of 1918, but had only reached the Azores when the armistice was declared.

Subchasers

When we entered the war the great need was for vessels to undertake anti-submarine operations. Hence the despatch of our destroyers to assist in the English Channel. For such work on our own coast other vessels of the speed and handiness required were not existent, although large numbers of yachts were armed and flocks of small motor-boats provided for use off our principal ports. Then the 110-foot subchasers were devised and built. They were equipped with gasolene engines, had a speed of about fifteen knots, and were armed with almost anything that could be found in the way of small guns. Later they were given depth charges. They proved to be excellent sea-boats and valuable in the emergency, although such a type would have no permanent place in the navy. Many of them crossed the ocean—having some rather tough experiences en route—and did good service in operations from Queenstown and Plymouth, and from Corfu in the Mediterranean. The French were much pleased with the boats built for them.

The Marine Corps

A marine-corps unit reached France with the first expedition of American troops and a total of nearly 32,000 officers and men were sent overseas as part of the American expeditionary forces. This includes 1,540 officers and men who did duty in Europe with naval units ashore.

From June, 1917, to November 11, 1918, marines served 137 days at the actual front, of which 66 were in active sectors. They were represented in eleven different divisions. The fourth brigade of marines—a unit

of the second division—was in actual battle in eight distinct operations. We all remember Belleau Wood and the part taken by our marines in checking the German advance toward Paris. A total of 2,453 officers and men were killed in battle or died from wounds (or gas) received in action, while 8,529 were wounded, and the total casualties, from all causes, of marines in France reached 12,285. The fifth and sixth regiments of marines were cited three times in French army orders, the sixth machine-gun battalion twice, and the fourth brigade once. Marines received 763 American decorations, including 14 medals of honor and 1,721 foreign decorations. They served in both army and navy aviation operations, on board our battleships in the grand fleet and at Bantry Bay, and in the crews of cruisers and other vessels doing escort duty, as well as in the vessels of our main fleet.

Other Activities

A small force which gave excellent service consisted of four ships which constituted the American cross-channel transport force. It was found necessary to have this force when, in the spring of 1918, our army in France was being rapidly increased and men were sent by every possible vessel. Many were landed in English ports, more than the already overtaxed British cross-channel ships could handle. Ships were therefore purchased and rushed over to perform this duty, which continued to the close of hostilities.

A naval pipe-line unit was organized, sent over, and constructed a fuel-oil pipe-line across Scotland.

The bureau of medicine and surgery provided hospital facilities in connection with every naval activity abroad. These were so excellent as to excite the admiration of

the Allied services. Our hospital outfits and facilities on board ship have always been to foreign officers something of a source of wondering admiration.

In the fall of 1918 the U. S. S. *Olympia* was sent to northern Russia, arriving at Archangel October 28, and during the year following three other cruisers, two gunboats, three Eagle boats, and three subchasers were, at various times, in these waters looking out for American interests in various ways, operating on the coast and in the rivers.

Some of the greatest activities of the navy have not been commented on, nor is there space to do so. They were numerous and extensive. The expansion of training-stations and the opening of new ones; the taking over and fitting out of vessels of all sorts; the commandeering and operation of numerous commercial activities; the handling of supplies for ships at home and abroad and for shore establishments; the research laboratories; the great expansion of work in the Navy Department and its bureaus, all deserve to be, and will be, part of the history of the war. A knowledge of these activities will indicate how great is the general question of preparedness for war.

Prior to the war many had feared that patriotism was lessening, that the feeling of individual responsibility, of duty owed to country, was dying out, and that instead we thought usually of what the country owed to a class or to the individual. The war showed that patriotism was still alive, that individual responsibility did exist. The spirit, patriotism, adaptability, and general intelligence of the young men, and women, also, of our country was amply demonstrated.

XVI

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

BY TASKER HOWARD BLISS

The problem of the limitation of armaments differs, in one important aspect, from all the other important problems of the Paris peace conference. Those other problems, however much they affected for good or ill the relations of the world at large, primarily, and many of them mainly if not entirely, concerned the nations that were then making peace. They were created by the war itself, or were those for the solution of which the war was fought. And the general line of their solution was a foregone conclusion the moment it became evident with which side victory would rest. The factors were known; the case could be concretely expressed; waiving differences of opinion as to the relative value of these factors, some sort of a solution could be arrived at without great difficulty. And a discussion of them is, largely, a historical statement of these factors, the various opinions expressed as to their value, and the conclusions reached.

But the problem of the limitation of armaments differs from all these. It did not grow out of the World War, but long antedated it. That war accentuated it but did not create it. Its factors are vague and complex, growing from the very roots of national policies and intertwined in the growth of these policies. The failure to solve it made such a war as the recent one possible, and directly brought it on. This all-important one is still unsolved, and until it is solved other such wars are as certain to

come as the sun is to rise, with their grim threat of destruction of our civilization. It underlies the possibility of the existence of an association of nations for the maintenance of international peace, and the successful operation of an international court of justice and arbitral court.

The conference recognized the existence of this problem but made no direct attempt to solve it. I think that, whether consciously or not, the national representatives there assembled realized that it must be discussed by a conference differently constituted from that one; that while a world problem, its solution depended upon a workable agreement between only a small number of the nations; that an atmosphere in which the elements of war and violence were still muttering amid the clouds hovering over the ravages of the recent storm was not serene enough to permit the clear vision necessary to see and fix in substantial form this dim phantom of hope that has mocked men so long. The peace conference recognized a limitation of national armaments as the very cornerstone of the foundation that it was attempting to lay for a lasting peace, and in two very important chapters of its final treaty it pledged itself to do what could be done to bring it about. In the first of these it provides that the nations forming the League "recognize that the maintenance of peace requires a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." This, of itself, is vague; but that some sort of reduction was contemplated appears from the provision that plans shall be formulated "for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments." In the other chapter appears a more definite statement. It recognizes the belief universally expressed before the

war, and during it, that it was the German armaments which forced the world to adopt that country's system, and that with its drastic modification the rest of the world could then do the same. Thus the preamble to the military peace terms in the treaty provided that,

"*In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations,* Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

Now you will note that when Germany affixed her signature to one side of the last page of that document, twenty-seven other nations of the earth, including all the great Powers, signed it on the other side. Therefore, in all good faith and honor these nations have pledged themselves to initiate, as soon as practicable, a general limitation of armaments after Germany shall have complied with her first obligation. Germany is compelled to limit her armament in order that the other nations may be able to do likewise. It will be interesting to note, later, what we compelled Germany to do, as throwing light on what it was hoped that all the rest of the world might do as rapidly as is practicable.

And so the problem has been thrown by the peace conference in the face of the world as one yet unsolved. As such, it is open to discussion in a sense that does not apply to others.

In such a discussion the first question that will be asked is this: "Why has the problem suddenly become so urgent? The world may never see such another war as the one we have recently passed through; it may jog along, as before, for generations or centuries, with limited international struggles, upon which the larger part of the world looks with more or less indifference, and without

any special dislocation of its normal energies." The answer to this goes to the very root of the question of excessive armaments and will throw much light on a possible remedy, if a remedy can be found.

The problem is now urgent because, for the first time in modern history, we are confronted by war of a nature that threatens the continuity, if not the existence, of our civilization. This is due to one primary cause and certain inevitable resulting tendencies of it.

The primary cause is the radical change in the character of war, due entirely to the modern doctrine of the "nation in arms."

What is the nation in arms? It is a nation with all its dynamic forces—physical, material, moral—trained and controlled in time of peace, some of these forces entirely, all of them to a large extent, for eventual use in war; and directed in war so that all this concentrated force may be brought to bear in one blow for the destruction of its adversary. Nations which must depend for their security upon their individual preparedness for war cannot be content with measures taken merely for the training and equipment of armed forces. The recent war demonstrated the absolute necessity for each belligerent to mobilize all its civil activities for the purposes of war. But we learned the bitter lesson that one cannot mobilize for war unless prepared for it in peace. Mobilization means nothing else than the making promptly available on the outbreak of war all the agencies necessary for the prosecution of the war. We know now that, even if it be necessary only to give help to a friend, we cannot rely upon our preparedness unless we conduct these activities in time of peace with a view to their best employment in war. How will it be if we

should ever have to fight for our life? We find that military utility must be a large and often a controlling factor in determining the nature of our industries, the training of our workmen, and even the use of our land for agricultural purposes.

And so a nation in arms is a nation of combatants, men, women, and children—some drafted to the front, the labor of others commandeered and directed to maintain the former at the front. In this first and only war of the nations in arms that we have had, it was abundantly proved that the morale of the army was nothing unless supported by that of the people at home. Every military and political leader gave more thought to the latter than to the former. And, therefore, each belligerent employed every available agency of war to destroy the moral resistance of his adversary at home quite as much as to destroy his physical and material resistance at the front.

Now there are certain inevitable tendencies, I may say almost inevitable consequences, of the general application of this doctrine of the nation in arms. They have a direct bearing upon the statement that a war between two such nations will begin at once to drag the others into it until it becomes a world war.

The first of these consequences is the necessity of alliances. In times not long since, when one of the great powers expected to have to put into the field a maximum army of half a million men, or thereabouts, it had no apprehension as to lack of man-power. It could still call out another half a million, and then another. Meanwhile there was always the possibility of a conclusion long before the total man-power was seriously touched, and terms of peace for the loser which, however onerous, would not be destructive.

But see what happens when a nation, after straining every nerve during long years, and bearing many of the burdens of war, has trained the last of its available man-power, and sees that man-power not increasing, has accumulated all the costly material for equipment, scrapping much of it from time to time for the products of new invention—when, after all that, it finds itself confronted by potential or probable enemies with still more millions of trained man-power, growing year by year. The weaker nation can then have no hope except in an alliance that will at least restore the balance. And what is true of the single nations is true of the alliances themselves. When one is formed, and then another, every addition to the one side must be met by an added counterbalance on the other. That was the condition in Europe for some time before 1914. And it was the fact that every possible combination in the way of alliances and entente seemed to have been made that convinced many military students that the Great War was near at hand. If you will study the military journals of Europe for the three or four years preceding the war, you will find this as a growing conviction.

We know now that neither the individual preparedness of nations nor the alliances of nations so prepared prevented war. They delayed it, but the inevitable end was only the more terrible because the delay was only for the purpose of securing as nearly as possible every ounce of the world's energy for the struggle. Now that it is over, what are you going to do about it? Is it to be more preparedness and more alliances? If there is the one there must be the other. With them can you give any more assurance for the future than for the past? It is just this which makes such a tremendous problem for

us, the people of the United States, and which we *must*, for our own personal interest, do our share in solving. Some believe that the United States should make a solemn declaration that in the event of another war in Europe threatening civilization, we shall immediately take part to protect civilization. But, gentlemen, I maintain that in the conditions of this modern world a war cannot begin between two of the great powers of Europe without threatening civilization. And if it should come within this generation I doubt if civilization could stand the added strain.

Such a declaration as I spoke of would constitute a *moral* alliance of the United States with an unnamed and unknown nation, or group of nations. Because, whatever be its threat against civilization, no one now knows who will begin the next war, nor with whom it will begin.

It was my fortune while in France to hear many discussions of prominent men in private, where men speak their minds, at a time when France was basing large hopes upon an alliance with Great Britain and the United States. And I never heard other than one conclusion, which was this: France must have, in the event of such another war, from 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 men available for her assistance, part of them immediately, the rest as rapidly as transportation can get them there. And these men must be constantly reinforced. Nor did they think there would be any moral force in an agreement that was not supported by the physical force necessary to make it good. We often say that the moral force of a declaration by the United States that she would support France against Germany would have prevented the latter's invasion in 1914. From the military point of view I do not think that Germany would have begun

the war with France when she did had she not firmly believed that it would have been won within from six to eight weeks, during which time she would have no fear of what the United States might do.

Be this as it may, I agree with the French themselves that in the event of such another war France can have little hope without an alliance; and if war must come, then, whether as the result of a moral alliance or not, I earnestly hope that my country will go more promptly than before not only to her assistance, but to that of any nation whose downfall would be a menace to civilization. If the present military policy of the world is to continue, such a war will come and we must bend our backs to carry the load of preparation. Is it or is it not better to minimize the cost of insurance of our civilization by putting out a little of the fire that threatens it? Instead of contemplating the possibility of being forced into such another war, is it not better, in our own interests, that we should at least try to effect a modification of the systems and policies that alone make such wars probable or possible?

The second consequence of the doctrine of the nation in arms is the accumulation of the enormous amount of costly material for its man-power. Although every able-bodied man in a nation be trained to arms, his services are ineffective unless he and the military organization to which he is to belong have at once ready all the initial equipment which he and his organization require. There must, therefore, be immediately ready not only a vast accumulation of infantry arms and ammunition, but artillery of every kind, tanks, aeroplanes, motor-trucks. These require years to obtain; yet there is always the chance that some new invention may throw much of it

on the scrap pile. But that chance must be taken if there is to be preparedness when the emergency comes. A nation may train every man within its borders, but, without the necessary material at the outbreak of war, it may find that, in the temper of people of this modern world, in addition to a war abroad it will have a revolution at home.

Note another thing that tends to bring about the alliances that will make future wars more formidable. The antagonism growing out of opposing commercial interests or out of racial differences is no longer confined to any two nations. These interests bind them together in groups on each side. The result is great alliances bound to stand together until changed conditions result in new alliances, because the interest of one is the interest of all. By the very necessities of war, one side or each of them begins to put restrictions on neutrals with a tendency toward, sometimes with the object of, forcing them into it. When the relations of all kinds between the nations, especially the great ones, were not so close as now, when war meant generally a relatively small indemnity, with or without a relatively small loss of territory for the defeated side, other nations found it not difficult to keep out of it. But now the war of two nations in arms is so serious that the victor feels he must leave his enemy powerless for generations to come. It becomes a war almost, if not literally, for life and death. Some nations may think they have an interest in bringing this about for one or the other of the contestants. But there are others who are vitally interested in preventing it. So there is a tendency to bring one after another into the maelstrom, until, as I have said, the war of two nations in arms becomes one of the World in Arms.

A third consequence is the rigid blockade. The recent war showed that when the man-power of a nation is in the field, the surest way to defeat it is to break the morale of the people at home. It is not possible for any nation, even one with the most abundant and varied resources, to store up in peace the supplies necessary for the enormous, immediate, and continued demand in war. There is always something that must be obtained from abroad. And the withdrawal of men from productive labor makes it more and more difficult for a nation to utilize its own resources. Science may do much to provide substitutes for lacking material; but in war there are time limits, even if no other, to the operation of science. It was this which forced a more and more stringent blockade, regardless of previous rules or of national interpretations of them, much to the irritation of the United States, and which continued until the United States learned that the ruthless blockade was to her own interest as well as to that of European Allies.

And the character of this latest and, probably, of future wars justifies the extreme blockade. It will make, and it is to be hoped that it will make, future wars more difficult in their inception, because, unless the whole world accepts this new rule, it will require a nation or an alliance strong enough to defy the rest of the world, in order to block all avenues of commercial access to the nation with which it is at war. But it will do it if it can.

You will now see why it is that in a war of "nations in arms" it becomes increasingly difficult for any nation, with however little original interest in the matter, to maintain its neutrality. Modern agencies of warfare have already made it impossible to blockade directly and close at hand, with any certainty, enemy ports and coasts.

Therefore, when it has become necessary, in order to effect our purpose, to blockade whole seas and oceans; when, to stop all trade of every kind whatsoever with an enemy country, to prevent every possible pound of food or supplies of any kind from leaking through a neutral country to an enemy country, whether their borders are contiguous or not, it has become necessary to put those neutrals on short rations of food, of clothing, of fuel, of everything—then these neutrals can escape many of the hardships of war only by joining in it on one side or the other. And it may be that some will join a side because they think it will win rather than because they think it is right.

The basic reason for the ruthless blockade is not far to seek. With the modern nation in arms every woman, old and young, who can knit a woollen sock for the soldier at the front, every child able to knit a mitten, every old man who can cultivate a bushel of potatoes or wheat beyond his own needs—each of them is a soldier; their work is commandeered and directed by the government for the purposes of the war. The merchant deals in the goods that the government permits him; the farmer sows the crops that the government orders him. Every one is drafted for the war. The tendency has been to abolish the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, to treat all as soldiers—the mother rocking the cradle at home, as the husband or son in the trenches. And it is to be feared that it will be as bad, or worse, in the next war, unless the good God gives us sense at least to try some plan by which warfare may be made impossible.

Again, a characteristic of modern war is its startling suddenness. When nations, whether singly or in alliances, arm to the limit against each other, and each side

knows that the armament of the other has no use against any other than itself, we can all see that when one has reached its limit and knows that the other is capable of still further expansion, war, without warning, is inevitable.

Finally, the new warfare is marked by the ruthless use of every possible agency for destruction of life and material. When the Hague Convention pronounced against the use of toxic or asphyxiating gases and the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes, these agencies were regarded merely as irritants, making the struggle more bitter, and accomplishing nothing in the attainment of the ends of the war. But no agency, however terrible, has continued to be unlawful from the moment it is discovered to be practical and effective in determining the course of a battle or in bringing the war to an end. The use of gas has been legalized by war, as is shown by the preparations for its further use made by all the great armed nations. In every nation in Europe it is expected that the use of aeroplanes for the bombing of cities in the next great war will be on a scale without precedent in the last one. And all this is due to the fact that a war of nations in arms is in reality one of life and death, in which each will and must do what it can to save itself and destroy its adversary.

Now, I think we can accept the following statement of facts:

First, that it is a world war, as distinguished from the old-time warfare, that constitutes a menace to our existing civilization.

Second, such a war depends upon a few so-called great Powers.

Third, a war between any two of them, which formerly created, relatively, only a ripple on the surface of world

politics, now has an irresistible tendency to draw them all into the roaring maelstrom.

Fourth, to meet this, these few nations must stagger under an increasing burden during years of armed peace, solely to train what, if they can find some other method satisfactory for their purpose, is an unnecessary number of men in purely destructive arts, and to accumulate enormous quantities of costly material, which does not add a penny to their permanent wealth, and which when used for the only purpose for which it can be used, is finally represented by an atmosphere of stinking gas and by the destruction of every form of real and otherwise permanent wealth.

Fifth, such wars, resulting in the application of every ounce of accumulated energy on both sides, must result in the practical destruction of one by the other, even if both are not ruined.

Sixth, such wars, necessarily characterized by an intensity of national passions heretofore unknown, come to be regarded by each side as wars for life or death, in which each, to save his life and destroy his adversary, will use every agency of destruction available to him; that, therefore, such agencies as the absolute blockade to starve people who heretofore were regarded as non-combatants, noxious gases, night and day bombing of cities from aeroplanes, the submarine, have come to stay until replaced by more destructive agencies.

Seventh, various causes will operate to draw neutrals into the struggle.

Eighth, when such war comes it will be without warning and every one must be ready.

Ninth, all of this is due to the acceptance by a few governments of the military doctrine of the nation in

arms; to their belief that no way can be found to guarantee their rights except universal preparedness, no guarantee against a general war except a general preparation for it.

And, lastly, with all that staring us in the face, is the fact that after the last ounce of strength has been accumulated and the last combination of the Powers has been made, *one side or the other must strike or forfeit every dollar and every hope bound up in its preparation.*

That, I think, is a fair summary of the war through which we have recently passed. First was a period of individual preparation. Then, as nations began to foresee the limits of their possibility for preparation, and in the hope that by joining forces with others they need not go to their limit but could save some of their energy for other purposes, came the formation of alliances followed by ententes. In that status of things, the general war broke out, although for forty years the great nations had been bleeding themselves white in the belief that by getting ready for it they would prevent it. Six of the eight great Powers entered it at once, followed shortly after by the seventh, and finally by the eighth. And many minor neutrals, from one cause and another, were successively brought in. The blockade came, at first relatively mild, then more and more stringent; the gradually growing ruthless use of the submarine for the alleged purpose of establishing a counter-blockade; the use of toxic gases to break what seemed to be a strangle-hold which each adversary had of the other, all the other accompaniments and results of the war which you know only too well.

It is not necessary to speak in vague terms about

such a war being a menace to civilization, because it was a war of civilization against itself, or, rather, a civil war between two parts of it. It involved every one of the great civilized Powers. It has set one great nation on the road to an atheistic anarchy. It has weakened others in their powers of resistance to the seeping poison. It has destroyed, for a time at least, one great barrier between Oriental civilization and the narrow strip of Latin and Anglo-Saxon civilization clinging to the western coast of Europe. Uncivilized races took part in it only to learn our arts of war, perhaps in time to be used against us. And the pity of it is apparent from this: If we exclude Russia but include many peoples scarcely deserving it, our civilization in 2,000 years has now less than 500,000,000 adherents. It seems a far cry, and it probably is a far cry, to a struggle between our own and an alien civilization; but in considering our problem, I think it is our duty to view it in terms of generations or centuries, to regard ourselves not as conservers of the relatively petty interests of to-day and to-morrow, but as guardians of the ages to come.

The menace to civilization of the kind of war that I have been referring to consists in the magnitude of its shock. A structure that steadily withstands the impact of frequent blows of a lesser force may crumble under one blow of those forces combined. The modern system of preparedness has undoubtedly made wars rarer; but when they come it is with the accumulated shock of many lesser wars. A few figures will illustrate this: In all of the wars waged between the years 1790 and 1913, the total death loss was 4,449,300. An approximate estimate of their cost to the world I have not been able to obtain. In the recent World War, lasting from August of

1914 to November of 1918, the total death loss in battle was 9,998,771. The number of wounded was 20,297,551; prisoners and missing, 5,983,600. If we accept the usual estimate of the dead in the list of prisoners and missing, we have a total death list of 12,991,000. To this total there must be added the many more millions of people —old men, women, and children—who died from hardships and deprivation as a direct result of the war. To produce the energy necessary to kill and wound this number of men, to destroy property, and to occasion the other costs of the war, it cost the nations concerned a total of $337,946,179,657. "The figures presented in this summary are both incomprehensible and appalling, yet even these do not take into account the effect of the war on life, human vitality, economic well-being, ethics, morality, or other phases of human relationship and activities which have been disorganized and injured."[1] Who can deny that such a war was a greater shock to our civilization than the many lesser wars of many preceding generations could have been?

Now, assuming for the moment that this analysis of causes of the kind of war that the civilized world has most to dread is approximately correct, is there any remedy? If I were an unreasoning radical I would answer: "Yes; the universal abolition of the system which is the concentration of all the causes." But that is impossible. Is there any single step that can be taken, with the reasonable hope that it may in time be followed by others, that will greatly minimize the chances of a general war? Yes, there are more than one; and if the five great Powers really want peace, it ought to be only a question of a fair conference to decide which step, from

[1] "Preliminary Economic Status of the War," No. 24, Carnegie Endowment.

the point of view of all of them, it is most practicable to take first.

To get a clew to these steps, let us take an extreme case, and consider what was done to Germany by the peace treaty, and the reasons for it.

As you know, the armistice of November 11 was, in accordance with its own provisions, twice renewed for successive periods of thirty days. When the third time approached, there were many who perceived serious dangers in this course. The supreme war council therefore decided that it should be renewed for an indeterminable but short time, during which the peace conference should draw up the final military, naval, and air terms which it was intended to embody in a preliminary treaty of peace with Germany. Accordingly, in February of 1919, the conference appointed a committee charged with the work presided over by Marshal Foch. Its task was promptly completed, but, due to various causes, action on it by the conference was delayed; the final terms appeared in the complete treaty of June 28.

The first question before the committee concerned the number of effectives that should be left for a German army. That country was still in the throes of the revolution which had followed the armistice. A government was in nominal power that had in it the possibilities of democratic development. The world at large had every interest in the maintenance of this government unless and until a better one should present itself. It was being fought by monarchist reactionaries and Spartacist Communists. Disorder reigned in all the great centres of population and industry. Manifestly, it was better that a democratic government should be permitted to grow stronger by its own successful efforts to maintain and

develop itself than that it should go to pieces, a contingency which would necessitate occupation of the country by large alien armies for the indefinite future.

It was unanimously agreed that the force must be reasonably sufficient to maintain internal order, and yet too weak for external aggression. This number was not capable of mathematical demonstration. But it was unanimously agreed that the number should be 200,000 men, provided that they were to be raised by conscription with a very short term of service, and a much smaller number if they were to be long-service men under voluntary enlistment.

The issue thus raised by differences of opinion as to short-term conscription and long-term voluntary enlistment is the very heart of the great question of the limitation of armaments. It may seem a curious thing that the military men of those nations that had had most reason to fear Germany should favor conscription and short service. But it was natural enough. The total force proposed to be allowed for Germany was so small, in the scale of existing European armaments, that they had no fear of it so long as their own were maintained. Nor did any of them advocate reduction in their own for an indefinite future. But the fear, guardedly expressed, was this: The common people will say, "For forty years we have patiently and loyally endured a blighting military system because we believed it necessary in order to meet the menace of the German system. We have cheerfully withdrawn from productive labor, year in and year out, a great number of our best men and have borne the burden of constantly increasing taxation falling on the reduced productive labor. Now we have crushed the Germany that originated the evil system

and we have crushed her system. Why should we bear it any longer? Under the guise of a penalty you have bestowed upon Germany the blessing that we have longed for and we demand a share in it, too." So it is natural enough that men who believed it unwise for their governments to change their present military systems should hesitate to put such an argument in the mouths of their people, which perhaps those governments could not withstand.

This difference of opinion had, finally, to be decided by the council of the Powers, which wisely, in my opinion, ruled in favor of the army of 100,000 men, of voluntary enlistment, and the abolition of conscription.

The remaining matters involved no difficulty. In order to complete the destruction of the military system it was provided that universal military service and training shall be abolished.

It was provided that there should be only the amount of arms, ammunition, and equipment necessary for the small authorized army to perform its function of maintaining internal order.

The accumulation of stocks of arms and munitions of any kind was prohibited. This provision alone makes impossible international war on a large scale on the part of Germany. The immense stocks of costly munitions and other apparatus formerly accumulated by that nation, and which the other nations are still accumulating, presupposes a war of the "nations in arms" in which it must be possible for every able-bodied man to receive his initial equipment, together with the enormous reserves of material, the destruction of which will at once begin.

The material permitted to be on hand, which is to be sufficient only to replace the annual waste, must be stored

at points of which the Allied and Associated Powers approve. All other material must be delivered to commissions of those Powers for destruction.

The manufacture of war material of any kind whatsoever, except of the kind and in the amounts permitted by the treaty, is absolutely prohibited. Their permitted manufacture can be carried on only in establishments that are approved by the Powers. "All other establishments," says the treaty, "for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions, or any war material whatever, shall be closed down."

In subsequent clauses the German navy was reduced to a force sufficient only for a coast guard, and sufficient for that, it may be remarked, only in case other navies should be similarly reduced. No submarines are allowed. All war vessels not authorized must be delivered to the Powers or broken up. No new war vessel can be constructed or acquired except to replace those that are allowed. Further to guard this restriction, no vessel can be replaced unless it has been totally lost in the hazards of the sea or otherwise, or unless, for one class of vessels, it has been in service for twenty years, and for the other class, for fifteen years. All fortifications commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic shall be demolished, nor shall any such be hereafter erected.

Finally, says the treaty, "the armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces."

There were, of course, numerous clauses relating to details and methods of execution.

The committee wrote nothing but the straightforward, cold-blooded clauses. It was not their business to do more. But when the peace conference approved them

it added the very significant preamble which I have already quoted:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the Armaments of all Nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

Now, what did we require Germany to do that we would not gladly do ourselves, *provided* that every other nation loyally did the same, to our assured knowledge, and at the same time as ourselves? I can think of no other answer than—Nothing. But that is now impossible. It is the dream of the idealist.

It will be a long time before the nations will be relieved of a certain fear of each other; a fear which undoubtedly exists in varying degree is largely bred out of the existence of excessive and necessarily unequal armaments, and which results in continuing them. And it is this fear, whether unreasoning or not, that must be taken into account in any attempt to come to an agreement about these armaments. Fear results in armaments, and the armaments are simply a concrete expression of national policies. It is because they are so completely interwoven with the growth of these national policies that any question of their limitation is the most complicated one that confronts the world. It is not true that armaments on their present scale have been maintained solely for defense against wanton and unprovoked attack. It is because national leaders know that their policies may invite or even provoke attack, or because they know that these policies may force themselves to attack.

Now, if any business man has a competitor who, in some senseless form of competition, is not only cutting his own throat but is forcing you to do the same, you

are not going to any third party to discuss the matter; sooner or later you will have to go to him to see whether you can arrive at any better *modus vivendi*. If it is true that certain nations are needlessly burdening their peoples in a competitive race for this or that form of armament, they, and no one else, must get together in a fair discussion of the problem to see if they, too, can find a better *modus vivendi*. When the legislators of various nations have before them the question of taxing their people for the great sums necessary to maintain and expand their military and naval establishments, you may be sure that in their secret discussions they justify these expenses on the gound of a fear of some other nation's policy. And these policies are those of only some five or six Powers. It is they, therefore, that must come together. The nations will get nowhere in asking their military and naval experts: "Can we safely reduce our expenses for building programmes? Can we safely decide not to adopt the military doctrine of the nation in arms?" Their answer must be: "No, not until the other nations, our rivals in this business, do the same." Therefore, sooner or later, these questions must be asked of the nations the results of whose policy we fear.

And so the first step in the solution of our problem must be a conference of the Powers concerned. It need not include more than five. It must be free and unpledged. It must not be composed of military and naval men but of the most far-sighted statesmen. It were better held in our own country, where the other nations can more clearly realize what confronts them if they force us into military competition with them.

Assume such a conference to be assembled. Naturally, the representatives of the other Powers may say that as

we have called the conference it is incumbent on us to submit the first proposition for their consideration. What attitude might patriotic American representatives take? It seems to me that the following would be such an attitude for these representatives and result in a reasonable basis for discussion with some hope of good result.

They will declare that the United States will not lay up a single ship, nor cease building them, will not disarm a single soldier, will not cease or diminish—but rather increase—its efforts at preparedness, except as the result of an agreement between all the great Powers to do the same.

They will divide national armaments into their three component parts:

(*a*) Land fortifications;

(*b*) Navies;

(*c*) Universal training of a nation for war, together with the manufacture and accumulation of all the material necessary for international war.

It will be noted that these component parts of armament increase in cost from the first to the third, and that, in the same progression, they increase the menace to the common peace. The first menaces this peace not at all, and imposes the least financial burden; the third is a perpetual menace to international peace and imposes the greatest burden. The subsequent discussions of the conference must be solely devoted to determining whether there is any possible modification in any or all of these three parts of national armaments that will materially relieve the people of their burden and give more assured peace.

As a preliminary to these discussions the American

representatives could well accept the following basic assumptions:

First, it is as impossible to have equality in the limited armaments as it is to have equality in the present excessive armaments. And it would seem that nations which have had to endure the one inequality ought to endure very patiently the other.

Second, no government can be expected willingly to face the possibility of its own destruction. Therefore, it must have whatever force it finds necessary to maintain itself against the forces of disorder and disruption.

Third, before complete progress can be made there must be a radical change in the Russian situation.

Fourth, under the mandates over uncivilized peoples granted by a league of nations, the United States, whether it has anything to do with a league or not, should demand as its right, and the right of civilization, that under the guise of such mandates millions of men of savage races shall not be trained to take part in possible wars of civilized nations. If civilization wants to destroy itself it can do it without barbarian help.

Then, in this parley between the Powers, we must remember that the other nations are looking to us, not to take the first step, but to suggest one which none can refuse to take along with the others. They are saying to us: "We want your help in world affairs, because without you there can be no continued peace." We are saying to them: "The help you want of us will not make for our peace, but war." Why should we not take them at their word and test what it means? Why should we not say to them, and give them a chance to accept or refuse, something like this: "Will you, the nations that signed

the preamble to the military peace terms with Germany, sign this further document with us?

"'We will agree with you that each nation that so desires shall keep and build whatever frontier and coast fortifications it wishes. Fortifications cannot stride across the earth, devastating fields and destroying cities.

"'We will agree with you that each nation may maintain its navy. No navy without an army can conquer and hold foreign territory.

"'We will agree with you on a date when we shall simultaneously begin to abolish any military system which is solely necessary for international war, so long as no other nation retains it.

"'We will agree with you on a date, as remote as the existing conditions make absolutely necessary, when we shall begin the gradual reduction of our armed forces. In coming to an agreement about this we will accept any reasonable just principle of proportion, but admitting in advance that reduced armaments can no more be equalized than excessive ones. We will trust to the ultimate good sense of the common peoples of the nations, who suffer most from excessive armaments, to see to it that when the movement has once begun it is pushed as rapidly as may be to its proper limit.

"'We will agree with you on the proper amounts of material to be kept on hand for the reduced forces. And we will further agree with you to cease the manufacture of material until the amounts now on hand are reduced to what we agree upon as necessary for the reduced forces.'"

Are these propositions reasonable? And if agreed upon will they accomplish anything in the maintenance of international peace?

Manifestly, they do not guarantee against war, and I know of nothing that now will. But they will undoubtedly have a tendency to deter any nation from undertaking international war. And they will ultimately minimize the chances of the occurrence of another war such as the last one. Because, I repeat and insist, that such a war is only possible with the entire male population of the nations trained to war, and with the enormous accumulation of material for that population when called to arms.

But they will tide over the long period of mutual fear that will exist before the nations understand that they can be menaced by no sudden war in which defeat means death. Nations will retain as long as they choose their material defenses on land and sea. They will be left with gradually reducing military forces. And this reduction being made at simultaneous periods, they may gain a gradually increasing confidence in each other's good faith. They will not destroy their present vast stocks of material, but will agree to stop the manufacture of any new material. France and England and Italy, during this period of reduction and for long thereafter, need have no military fear of Germany, due to a reduction in their forces and stoppage of manufacture of material. Because, while there are now millions of young men in civil life on both sides trained in the recent war, on the one side there will be ample reserves of the present material for these millions, if called to arms, while on the other side there will be none at all. But, above all, we will have gradually accomplished a radical change in a *system* which alone is a standing threat to international peace.

I admit that perhaps the greatest difficulty will be in

coming to an agreement with European Powers as to the reasonable force that each nation requires to maintain internal order. But I do not believe that this difficulty is insurmountable. Underlying this question with them, is the latent fear of Germany. Under present conditions we can hardly understand this. None can, except those who have lived under this dread for a long generation. Nevertheless, I see no reason why an agreement cannot be reached. They all admit that a large part of their forces have been maintained solely because of the menace of the German system. With that menace removed —removed not only as coming from Germany but from anywhere else—the peoples themselves are not likely to allow any excessive number under the guise of preserving order.

No one can tell what would be the conclusion of such a conference. One thing is certain; we need not accept anything that we do not like. And another thing is certain; if the government of the United States were to-day to transmit an open telegraphic note to those of the four other great Powers, a note that to-morrow would be published in all the newspapers of the world, inviting them to a free, unpledged conference on the subject of armaments, there would be an immediate favorable response. Further, should such a conference meet, and should a fair abstract of its discussions be published to the world, its propositions and the objections to them and who make the objections, the common peoples of the five nations would not permit that conference to separate until it were prepared to show them at least the first step toward a practicable solution of the problem. For the first time in two generations the psychological moment is here and now, but it will rapidly pass. We

have a world, appalled by the magnitude of its losses, desirous of finding some way, any way, that will in some degree help its recovery from them and minimize the chances of their recurrence; a world that realizes, for the time at least, that the great insurance company in which it had invested has failed. We have the assurance for the present that the great exponent of the system which has brought the world to the verge of ruin is itself crushed and ruined; and we have the possibility of replacing it, in due time, by a law-abiding democratic member of the family of nations. Is it not the time for us to cease asking ourselves, helplessly and hopelessly, the question, "Can it be done?" and at least attempt to do something?

I have often heard it asked: "Has the United States failed to attain its ideal in the war?" Not if, as the result of it, the United States can show the world, and prevail on it to take, one assured step toward the prevention of its recurrence. Surely, among the small number of nations concerned there must be some men wise enough to work out a plan designed, not to give this or that its "place in the sun," but one that will set us all on the path to the sun. If not, then you and your sons and brothers did not fight to destroy an overgrown militarism, but only German militarism. You will have killed one giant only to set up five more in his place.

XVII

THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY DAVID HUNTER MILLER

My discussion of the making of the League of Nations is from the point of view of a party to the proceedings. The historian of the subject will hereafter be able to bring together the many threads of the fabric, to trace the motives of all the figures in the scene, to show not only what they did, but why. My present purpose is to tell a part of the story, rather than to recount the history, to testify rather than to pronounce judgment.

One of the first acts of the Conference of Paris was the adoption at its opening session on January 25, 1919, of a resolution declaring that a League of Nations should be created, that the League should be treated as an integral part of the treaty of peace, and that a commission of the Conference should work out the details of its constitution and functions.

But history does not begin with a resolution.

The whole world had agreed without any dissent, or at least without any expressed dissent, that some plan for the preservation of future peace should emerge from the chaos of the World War. Many statesmen in many countries had long preached such a result. President Wilson had declared that a league of nations was one of the essential terms of the settlement, although, curiously enough, the phrase which the President employed in his most important utterance, the phrase which is

found in the Fourteen Points, is not "league of nations," but "association of nations," a phrase which has since come into somewhat prominent use by others who are, perhaps, unaware of its origin.

Indeed, the declaration in the Fourteen Points for the establishment of an association of nations had, as shown by the note of our government of November 5, 1918, formally become one of the bases of the peace terms with Germany; so that the resolution of the Peace Conference, a resolution drafted by the British delegation, simply looked toward carrying out a part of the bargain with Germany which ended the fighting.

Furthermore, the provision of the resolution that the League should be "treated as an integral part of the General Treaty of Peace," was itself of the substance of the pre-armistice agreement. It was the right of Germany to insist upon the establishment of a league of nations for her own protection. The German delegates presented their plan for such an organization and the absence of any such plan from the treaty would justly have been regarded by Germany as a gross breach of faith; indeed, Germany always vigorously insisted that President Wilson's words, "a general association of nations," meant not only an association framed by the treaty, but an association of which Germany should be at once and forthwith a member.

The idea, once widely prevalent, that the writing of the Covenant into the treaty delayed the proceedings of the Conference, has, of course, long since been exploded. The Paris negotiations did not commence until January, 1919, after the results of the British elections were known. The conditions of peace were presented to the German delegation on May 7, some four months later. Even

if this could be considered a lengthy period for the discussions and work involved in the preparation of a legal document of some hundred thousand words or more, that work was delayed by well-known differences of view in regard to reparations and other questions quite remote from the Covenant.

But it was one thing to agree upon the general principle of a league of nations and quite another to formulate its details. For no agreement as to those latter had been reached except that the association should be constituted with "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike"; that detail, as a part of the Fourteen Points, had been agreed upon between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany. Strangely enough, those words, which constituted the only preliminary point of definite agreement about the League, became, when incorporated almost literally in Article 10 of the present Covenant, the point chiefly disputed after the treaty was signed.

And while the resolution of the Peace Conference stated generally some purposes of the League, declared that it should be open to every civilized nation which could be relied upon to promote its objects, and that it should meet periodically and have a permanent organization and secretariat, almost any structure could be built around those phrases, which indicate perhaps by their silences a fear of going too far rather than of not going far enough.

So the work of preparing the agreement of the League of Nations was intrusted by the Peace Conference to a commission, or, as we would say, a committee; but there were very many advisers, official and unofficial, in and

out of Paris, who were willing, even anxious, to anticipate the work of the committee by the preparation of drafts in advance. The number of such drafts was very great; the number of them which it is necessary to mention is very small.

Before mentioning any of them, I shall allude to what I believe to be the fact, that the work and the utterances of Lord Grey had a deep influence upon the minds of all the official and semi-official draftsmen, even upon those who were unconscious of that influence; the memorandum of Lichnowsky had compelled even the enemies of Lord Grey to admit that his efforts to prevent the war had been unselfish and sincere; the frantic confusion of the diplomatic telegrams of the latter part of July, 1914, through which the threatened tragedy stumbled blindly into reality, had convinced most people of the vital importance of at least some change in the machinery of diplomacy, so that we would be rid of the dangerous absurdity of a telegram about what Vienna had wired to Belgrade, sent by London to Paris, with the hope of averting hostilities between Berlin and Petrograd. Every one who has examined the various colored books of the different governments regarding the events of 1914, has sought in vain to decipher even the exact chronological order of all the despatches; it was Lord Grey's splendid failure which produced in the minds of all the reaction in favor of a system of meetings face to face of the representatives of important countries whenever there was anything important to discuss. Almost every plan for a league of nations had some form for such meetings, large and small, the Assembly and the Council, whether called by those names or by others.

Now, international committees are not unlike other

committees in one respect. As soon as it is determined that a paper is to be drafted, the member of the committee who presents a definite scheme will certainly have many, even, perhaps, most of his ideas accepted.

The history of the Covenant of the League of Nations presents a striking illustration of this principle. If you compare the paper first laid before the League of Nations commission with the final text of the Covenant in the treaty, you will find that the latter is very different from the former in its language; you will find that it contains quite numerous additions of the utmost importance; but you will also find that with the exceptions of one article recast and of one other omitted, everything that is in the first paper appears in substance in the last.

So the first important question to be decided by the commission on the League of Nations, to state it in the language of diplomacy, was: What draft should be adopted as the basis of discussion? And while a decision of this question in effect was made before the commission met, it was not made until a few hours before the time of that meeting.

President Wilson had prepared at least one draft of a covenant some time before he went to Europe. And General Smuts, who was one of the two British members of the League of Nations commission, had prepared, with the collaboration, I believe, of some of the "Round Table" group, what he called "a practical suggestion." By direction of Mr. Lansing, secretary of state, Doctor James Brown Scott, and myself, as legal advisers of the American Commission, had formally submitted a draft early in January, 1919, and in point of time this had been preceded by some suggestions of my own submitted to Colonel House while I was acting as legal adviser of

his mission before the arrival in Paris of the American delegation to the Peace Conference.

Doubtless influenced to some extent by the views of General Smuts, President Wilson prepared and had printed at Paris a new draft of his own, which was reprinted a few days later with some changes and additions, and was subsequently made public at the hearings before the Senate committee on foreign relations. Lord Robert Cecil, who was at the head of the League of Nations section of the British delegation, had prepared a draft of his own, and this was the basis of the official British draft. How much attention Mr. Lloyd George paid to the League of Nations question, I do not know. It always seemed to me that Lord Robert Cecil, although not a member of the British Government, had authority to go ahead "on his own," and proceeded accordingly; but he undoubtedly gave much weight to the views of the British colonial representatives at Paris, whose interest in the League of Nations was profound. Indeed, the question of colonial representation in the League was distinctly understood and agreed to between President Wilson and Lord Robert Cecil before the League of Nations commission first met.

There were only two instances in which I knew that decisions as to policy in the matter of the League were referred to the British prime minister, and from that fact I have, perhaps wrongly, inferred that other decisions were not. Those two instances were the Japanese proposals regarding racial equality and the American proposals regarding the Monroe Doctrine.

Lord Robert Cecil was undoubtedly one of the commanding figures at Paris. With a character of almost austere simplicity he had a winning charm of manner,

and the force which was behind his observations rested largely upon his almost incredible frankness and his obvious sincerity. His mental attitude is an extraordinary combination of the conservative, the practical, and the idealistic. He conservatively felt, wrongly I believe, that the Great Powers would have to be the real directors of the League for it to be a success. He very practically doubted the advisability of Article 10, and opposed the French scheme for an international general staff. But he was an idealist as to a new era in international affairs, he favored the admission of Germany into the League, and he believed in disarmament and arbitration.

As no other delegation except the British had prepared any detailed draft plan at all, the question which was presented in January, 1919, to Colonel House, who was in charge of the whole matter on behalf of the President, was how to reach an agreement upon a draft between the British and ourselves. With this end in view, Colonel House brought about conferences between Lord Robert Cecil and myself during the latter part of January. While those conversations were based upon President Wilson's draft and the British draft, they were not wholly limited by those papers; any agreement reached could only be tentative; my instructions were not rigid in regard to questions having a legal aspect; under such circumstances modifications of view were inevitable and substantial agreement was not found difficult.

The results of those talks were then discussed at a meeting between the British and American members of the League of Nations commission, that is to say, President Wilson, Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, and General Smuts, a meeting at which I was present. Several important decisions were taken at that meeting.

One of them was that owing to the Italian opposition, it was impossible to attempt to abolish conscription. Another was that the plan should contain a general provision, without specific details, for the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice. It was also decided that a new draft should be drawn by Mr. Hurst, the legal adviser of the British, and myself, and that any questions upon which Mr. Hurst and I did not agree should be referred for consideration to Colonel House and to Lord Robert Cecil as representing the two governments.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Hurst and myself, having before us the results of the previous discussions and drafts, did agree upon a composite draft, which was completed on the day before the League of Nations commission first met. This draft, accepted by President Wilson and submitted by him, became the basis of discussion before the League of Nations commission. Thus it marked the end of the first of the three stages in the history of the Covenant at Paris. The second was completed by the text first reported to the Peace Conference, the one President Wilson brought back to this country in February, and the third by the paper in its present form, the form in which it finally became part of the treaty.

This first draft, the Hurst-Miller draft, to give it a name it bore at Paris, was drawn under conditions which made it impossible that it should be wholly satisfactory to anybody. Its acceptance by President Wilson was a great surprise to me, for on the very evening before its presentation by him to the commission, he had expressed dissatisfaction with it and a preference for his own draft with some modifications. Certainly, from my point of view, the text was subject to criticism, both for things

omitted and for things contained; the most important of the former was that it said nothing about the Monroe Doctrine. On this point, at least, my Paris conscience is clear. I had brought up the question of the Monroe Doctrine in the observations which I submitted to Colonel House. I had verbally proposed a Monroe Doctrine clause to Mr. Lansing. Such a clause was contained in the draft submitted by Doctor Scott and myself, and my views in general on the question had been more emphatically expressed in a rather severe confidential criticism of President Wilson's plan, which I prepared in Paris.

This criticism has been made public. A copy of it was obtained at Paris by one of the personnel attached to the American Commission, and was delivered to the Senate committee on foreign relations; and as the paper had been widely quoted from, particularly during the late political campaign, I think it only fair to my associates at Paris to say that it was wholly my own work, and that no one else had even an opportunity to consider the paper during the week in which it was prepared or until after it was printed and delivered.

One other chief objection to the original draft of the Covenant was that it contained a clause regarding religious equality, an article which President Wilson favored, but which was afterward dropped because of the practically unanimous view of the League of Nations commission that it would be utterly impossible to adopt general language in regard to the subject which would not unwarrantedly interfere with the internal policies of certain countries; even in Great Britain, for example, a Catholic is excluded from the succession to the crown. The principle of the article was subsequently applied in sep-

arate treaties with particular countries, looking toward the protection of minorities.

In matter of form, too, the paper left much to be desired; but this was unavoidable under the circumstances and was unimportant in view of the later opportunities for redrafting; and, despite its defects, it was this paper which became the basis of the existing Covenant; which, indeed, with certain notable additions and changes, and after much rewriting and rearrangement, was moulded into the text now contained in the Treaty of Versailles.

The second phase of the Covenant comprised its consideration by the League of Nations commission of the Peace Conference, resulting in the report to the Peace Conference of a draft Covenant on February 14, 1919.

During the period which commenced on Monday, February 3, and ended on Thursday, February 13, the League of Nations commission held ten meetings. This meant a meeting nearly every day and sometimes twice a day. The average length of the meetings was more than three hours, so that, with their other duties, the members of the committee spent a pretty busy ten days, and those who were attending them in their labors were occupied almost continuously, in a very literal sense of that word.

Aside from the Council of Four and the Council of Ten, this commission was undoubtedly the most notable body of the Conference of Paris. Not only was it presided over by President Wilson, but many of the other members were statesmen of world-wide reputation. Among them was Signor Orlando, the Italian premier, who had a most virile and attractive personality. He lacked a knowledge of English, but combined a practical common-sense view with a profound learning in matters of international law, and was one of the impressive figures

of the meetings. Other lawyers of distinction and culture were M. Vesnitch, of Jugo-Slavia, and M. Kramarz, of Czecho-Slovakia. And of the same profession was the brilliant and eloquent but erratic Hymans, the foreign minister of Belgium, who, during his speeches, was sometimes so carried away by his thought that he changed abruptly from English to French. What I saw of Mr. Venizelos did not seem to me to bear out his very great reputation as a statesman, but his opinions were treated with much respect. Mr. Venizelos was responsible for the language at the end of what is now Article 15 of the Covenant, which has been so much criticised here in connection with the votes of the British Dominions in the Assembly. One of the ablest of the debaters was Mr. Wellington Koo, of China, who made one of the really brilliant speeches of the meetings on the subject of the rights of small states. The Japanese delegates spoke comparatively seldom and were perhaps listened to with all the more interest and attention on that account. Nor was General Smuts very often heard, as Lord Robert Cecil usually spoke for the British Government. And the observations of President Pessoa, of Brazil, while impressive, were not very frequent.

But of all the nineteen members of the commission, the one heard least of all was an American. Colonel House spoke only at one meeting, and that was an occasion when the President was away and a few words from a representative of the United States were necessary. But a pilot does not have to talk, if he steers well. And the final agreement of the commission, its rejection of the proposals which would have sunk the ship and its acceptance of those changes which were necessary to obtain unanimity, were due to the confidence which the

representatives of Great Britain, of France, of Japan, and of other less important Powers had in Colonel House, and to the extraordinary influence which he exerted, supported as he was by the authority of the President.

The meetings of the commission lost their original character of informality as they progressed. At the very beginning there were no secretaries present at all. Indeed, President Wilson said to the commission that he hoped the meetings would be informal, as he wanted to be able to change his views without having somebody quote to him what he had said before—a rather curious statement to be made by a man who has been supposed never to change his mind at all. While some of the gentlemen on the commission did not speak English, its proceedings were really more in English than they were in French. The proposed draft of the Covenant, the basis of discussion, was an English paper, and while French translations of the various documents, amendments, and the like, were usually prepared, the time between meetings was so short that a finished translation was almost always impossible, and sometimes it was physically impracticable to have any translation at all.

Of course the members of the commission spoke in French or English, as they saw fit. The experiment of having remarks translated from one language to the other after their delivery, was very soon given up, and, instead, a secretary or attaché sat behind the French and Italian delegations, and translated in a whisper the speeches made in English. A corresponding service in regard to the French speeches was performed for the President and Colonel House, usually either by Mr. Frazier or by Colonel Bonsal.

While most of the members of the commission spoke

sometimes in French and sometimes in English, only the Portuguese delegate, M. Reis, seemed to me to be as wholly at home in one as in the other. The head of the French delegation, M. Bourgeois, the president of the French Senate, spoke frequently, with great deliberation and impressiveness and with equal fluency. His colleague, Professor Larnaude, spoke less often, but took a very active part in the detailed framing of the text, particularly in regard to questions of law. Professor Larnaude's felicity of expression and his diction were wellnigh perfect; his choice of words was in the utmost degree precise; and whether one agreed or not with what he said, it was impossible not to grasp exactly what his beautifully clear language meant.

And while the result of the February meetings of the commission was the adoption of a paper having many similarities to the first draft, it is not to be supposed that the deliberations were at all perfunctory. There was very decided opposition on the part of the majority of the commission to the provisions of the original draft regarding the Council, which made that body little more than a committee of the Great Powers; this opposition carried its point and made the Council what it now is, a body on which four of the smaller Powers are always represented.

The French programme for an international military force or staff of some kind met with very little support from other delegations but provoked a great deal of debate. It was as a slight concession to the French proposal that provision was made for an advisory military commission, and that the last sentence of Article 10 as it now reads was added to the text.

The guarantees of Article 10 represented the ideas of

President Wilson, but he was by no means alone in those ideas. The same principle was expressed in the official British draft; but that draft, as well as the Paris draft of President Wilson, contained clauses looking toward future boundary changes under some form of supervision by the League of Nations; any such idea always seemed to me impossible; it would invite perpetual agitation for boundary changes all over the world, particularly along frontiers where a jumble of peoples of different bloods, of different religious and of different economic interests make impossible any final impartial judgment as to a boundary theoretically correct. And the supporters of such ideas were thinking of eastern Europe only, and forgot that any such principle declared generally would be as applicable to the boundary between France and Spain, or even to that between Montana and Saskatchewan as to any other.

Even when limited to attack by a foreign Power, the territorial guarantees of Article 10, while defensible in principle, went farther than public opinion on this side of the Atlantic was willing to go; and, indeed, the most forcible argument against Article 10, an argument superior in my judgment to that of any critic here, was submitted in Paris by Sir Robert Borden.

I cannot even mention all the other changes of importance made at the February meetings of the commission. One was the dropping of the article regarding religious equality, to which I have alluded, which did not find support from any delegation represented except our own, although the Japanese attempted to use it as a sort of peg on which to hang their proposal for racial equality. And the article about mandates, which is now Article 22, was not written by the League of Nations

commission at all, except for its last clauses. It was a resolution which had been adopted by the Council of Ten on January 30, the history of which has been told elsewhere. While its idea was bitterly opposed by Mr. Hughes, of Australia, and although it was not liked by the French, it did not go as far as President Wilson wished; but he accepted it as being a decided improvement over the former colonial system.

The ending of this second stage in the history of the Covenant marked the beginning of public discussion. The world now had for criticism not an idea but a proposal. This was, indeed, one purpose in completing for the time being the work of the commission. It would have been too much to suppose at that time that its work was final. And while, of course, the paper was not such as any one delegation, or even any half-dozen delegations, would have written, nobody was seriously disappointed with it except the French, and the reason for their disappointment was that the French attitude, speaking broadly, was different from the attitude of nearly every other country. Nearly everybody thought that any league of nations was, after all, a novel experiment, and that the danger of any novel experiment was in going too far. If it was found to work, agreement to go farther would not be very difficult to obtain, but to go too far at the beginning would perhaps wreck the whole scheme. But the French wanted to go farther, very much farther. The French visualized a league of nations as a sort of an extension of the combination of the Allied and Associated Powers by taking in the neutrals. The sole idea to which all French officialdom was devoted, was the idea of safety for France against Germany, and while different views led to great divergence

in French thought as to how that safety was to be obtained, shown most notably, perhaps, by the breach between Clemenceau and Foch, there was no serious element of French political opinion, except the extreme left, which conceived of a league of nations without a background of force, as any possible protection to France at all. It is not difficult to criticise the French viewpoint. It is more difficult not to sympathize with it. The French never abandoned their view at Paris; traces of it may be found in the treaty, even in the Covenant; but they never obtained for it any decided support, for the world at large was of a different opinion then, and remains unconvinced now.

The third and final stage of the drafting of this document was ahead. The opinion of the neutrals, the opinion of America, of the leaders of thought in this country other than President Wilson, was to make itself felt, and the most determined contests over what the Covenant was to contain or to omit were yet to be fought.

The visit of President Wilson to Paris, the first visit of an American president to Europe, had undoubtedly, on the whole, been an enormous success. He had been in Europe two months; long enough to show that his influence was almost unbounded, and that the principles that he had enunciated had sufficient popular support behind them to make them a vital force even in those governmental circles where they were disliked. A draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations, his chief project, had been completed for insertion in the treaty; he left Europe in February, before decision had become strictly necessary on the detailed application of his principles and without having been long enough away from the United States to get out of touch with

the currents of opinion in this country. His decision to leave Paris at that moment, even if it had not been necessary because of the approaching end of the session of Congress, was wise and judicious. No admirer of President Wilson can regard his first visit to Paris as other than a triumph.

In the third stage of the building of the structure of the Covenant there was great difficulty in regard to some of the additions and changes that were made; but much greater difficulty in respect of the proposals which were not adopted. The volume of suggestions which had to be seriously considered was large; various neutral Powers formally submitted their views at great length, but even additions which seemed harmless might raise opposition in some minds; the Covenant had plenty of critics; any changes in the nature of fresh legislation would add more; and, aside from certain matters of detail, the American view-point was generally against changes which were not proposed and supported by American public opinion.

The French proposals for some international force, some staff, or at least some international supervision of national forces were pressed to the end. But they were doomed in advance to be rejected. Neither the British nor ourselves would listen to them, and M. Bourgeois pleaded in vain. The French attitude had no substantial result except the proposed treaties of support by Great Britain and the United States, which seem destined both to fail, as each is dependent on the ratification of the other.

Nor did the Japanese fare better with their amendments for racial equality. Each successive proposal made asked for less than the one before, and finally they

requested simply a few words in the preamble. Their negotiations with us in the matter had been entirely friendly, for, even regardless of our attitude, the Japanese could not succeed. When their final proposal was submitted, at the last meeting of the commission, supported as it was by one of the most impressive speeches I have ever heard, the Japanese called for a vote. Only the affirmative vote was taken, and neither the President nor Colonel House voted. The majority of the commission were in favor of the seemingly mild addition to the preamble. But Lord Robert Cecil, obviously moved, declared formally that he was instructed by his government to refuse to accept the proposal of their ally. The views of the dominions had prevailed. Australia had more influence with London than had Tokio.

There was another and less important struggle over the attempt of the Swiss to obtain a special clause recognizing their neutrality. This the British supported, and even Colonel House consented. The Swiss representative, Professor Rappard, labored eloquently to induce me to advise President Wilson in accordance with the Swiss view; but I feared the effect of such a clause upon neutral and American opinion, and the President maintained his position. While the Swiss obtained a recognition in the treaty of their special position and while the Council has since passed a resolution to the same effect, the Covenant was not changed to meet the opinion of Switzerland.

The most vital amendment, from the American standpoint, was doubtless that accepting the Monroe Doctrine. Regardless of any quibbling about the special language used, any formal declaration by all the Powers of the world recognizing the existence and beneficence of the

Monroe Doctrine was an enormous advance in the status of that policy, and was an advance that had never before even been suggested; nothing but the results of the World War could have made any such declaration even remotely possible.

It was the pressure of American public opinion that compelled the presentation and support of such an amendment by President Wilson.

The attitude of the British toward our proposal was unknown; before the meeting of the commission at which the Monroe Doctrine article was proposed and adopted, no one in the American delegation, from President Wilson down, was informed whether Great Britain would venture an open criticism of America or not. But while the British representatives acquiesced, the French delegation opposed the proposal. They argued that it meant a renunciation by the United States of its interest in the peace of the world, an argument that seemed ungracious in view of the fact that the Monroe Doctrine had not held back an American army from those achievements on French soil which ended at Sedan. At the close of the debate, President Wilson replied to the French in an extempore speech of witching eloquence—a speech made after midnight, which left the secretaries gasping with admiration, their pencils in their hands, their duties forgotten, and hardly a word taken down; the proposal was then adopted.

But the matter was not at an end; for at the next meeting, the last of all, the French sought by amendment to obtain some definition, some description of the Monroe Doctrine that would limit the right of the United States to insist upon its own interpretation of that Doctrine in the future as in the past. The French delegates, hoping

for some advantage for their own proposals, urged such a definition; and at that last meeting I thought for a moment, in despair, that President Wilson would yield to the final French suggestion, which contained only a few seemingly simple words; but he stood by his position through the long discussion, and the meeting and the proceedings of the commission ended early in the morning in an atmosphere of constraint and without any of the speeches of politeness customary on such an occasion.

Another contentious matter was the choice of the seat of the League. A fable which has been printed almost as often as any of Æsop's is that President Wilson, by his self-willed opposition, prevented the choice of Brussels. The fact is that aside from the perfunctory support of the French, Brussels had no adherents outside of Belgium. The British were especially in favor of Geneva, and the opinion that some neutral city was advisable was almost unanimous; this made Geneva and The Hague almost the sole possibilities; and in view of its central position, its climate, and the history of neutrality, of democracy, and of peace that Switzerland presented, the balance swung very heavily in favor of the choice which was made.

Another problem which was to be solved was the choice of the four smaller Powers to sit first on the Council. Clearly, one of these should be a Latin-American country, and that meant Brazil; and one should be a neutral, if the League was not to seem merely a successor to the Allied and Associated Powers; of the neutrals, Spain was the largest and the most natural choice. Belgium was certainly entitled to the honor of one of the two other places. For the remaining vacancy, taking into account geographical considerations, there remained

in theory nine countries from which to choose, but in reality only six—five in eastern Europe, and China in the Far East. In view of the confidence which Lloyd George and President Wilson had in Venizelos, the five states in eastern Europe meant for this purpose only one, and Greece was selected. By the irony of fate, Venizelos has since fallen, and Greece has now been succeeded by China, the only other Power which was thought of for her place at Paris.

The question as to what states should be asked to join the League presented no serious difficulty. Countries with governments not formally recognized by the Powers generally, such as Russia, Mexico, and Costa Rica, were omitted. Otherwise, the invitation was quite general. The immediate admission of Germany was favored by America and Great Britain, but French opposition necessitated postponement; provision was made, however, for a possible increase in the Council, so as to permit in the future not only membership in the League, but also representation on the Council of both Germany and Russia.

Various changes deemed important by influential opinion in this country were agreed to with comparatively little discussion. Some of them, such as the provision that acceptance of a mandate is not obligatory, the statement that each member of the League has one vote and one vote only, and that unless particularly specified to the contrary all decisions must be unanimous, were merely declaratory. But the withdrawal clause was more important, and its insertion was directly due to the feeling in its favor in the United States Senate. The principle was not liked by the French, but it could hardly be expected that any state would agree to be forever

bound; and the vague idea expressed in some quarters that an implied right of withdrawal existed was not approved by the international lawyers, and if accepted would have created a dangerous precedent as to the sanctity of every treaty.

The fear that in the League there might exist some jurisdiction over what have been called domestic questions, though doubtless not justified by the text of the Covenant, was wide-spread in this country. This timidity was not felt by the representatives of the other Powers at Paris, who have as much desire and reason to be unrestricted in such matters as we have; the British, for example, with a very serious domestic question, then acute though less so than now, had no idea that their rights of sovereignty were being infringed; indeed, the absence of such infringement has since been criticised here; but those who want an international agreement recognizing all of our rights and none of those of any other country, will wait as long for such a paper as those who seek for an international court which is certain to decide according to our view; but certainly there was no objection at Paris to almost any sort of declaration which recognized the exclusion of so-called "domestic questions" from the competence of the League.

Just before President Wilson left the United States for his second visit to Europe, one of his leading supporters in the Senate reported to him that there were six matters as to which sentiment in the Senate favored amendment of the Covenant; and this matter of "domestic questions" was thought by the senator to be the most important of all. In order to meet this objection, President Wilson proposed a clause drawn by Mr. Taft and cabled by him to President Wilson on March 18.

In substantially the language suggested by Mr. Taft, the clause was accepted as an amendment to Article 15. Despite its authorship, the lawyers at Paris did not like the qualified wording of the clause, which was subsequently severely criticised in the Senate; more simple and more sweeping language would better have anticipated the efforts of the Senate reservation to meet the difficulties of the question by elaborate enumeration of so-called "domestic questions," difficulties which any such attempt will only increase. To assert, for example, in the vague language of the debates, that the tariff is in its nature a "domestic question," does not get very far; suppose a dispute arises as to the interpretation of a reciprocity treaty; that is clearly an international and, indeed, justiciable difference between states, despite the fact that its decision may touch the sacred ark of the tariff. Even without Mr. Taft's amendment, the provisions of the Covenant followed in principle those of previous treaties of the United States; and in regard to compulsory judicial determination or arbitration of international disputes, the Covenant made no provision at all.

This question of compulsory arbitration, as it may be generally called, was much mooted at Paris. The neutrals supported compulsory arbitration, and, as in the past, many smaller Powers favored it in principle. But to open up such an issue without at the same time discussing all the difficulties presented by the framing of an International Court of Justice was not possible, and no one in Paris believed that all the Powers would agree to compulsory arbitration in any form; recent history demonstrates the correctness of that view, for the compulsory feature of the Root-Phillimore plan has not been accepted, despite the weight of the names behind it;

so that with the addition of a list of cases which were declared to be "generally" suitable for submission to arbitration, the clause of the Covenant providing for the future formation of an International Court of Justice stood substantially as in the earlier draft; President Wilson's plan for American participation in that task has been realized, for when Sir Eric Drummond asked in Paris what American should be a member of the committee on the International Court, the name of Senator Root was proposed, and, accordingly, it was Senator Root who sat as an American representative on the committee of jurists which completed its labors last summer at The Hague, and whose recommendations were in large part accepted by the Assembly in November.

One of the novelties of the procedure of the League of Nations commission toward the close of its sessions was the hearing of a delegation of women leaders from various countries. They urged an extension of the functions of the League along what may be called non-political lines —lines of international co-operation, and to a very considerable extent their ideas are reflected in the present text.

In matters of international concern relating to health, to the suppression of the traffic in opium and of the white-slave traffic, to the supervision of the arms traffic with uncivilized countries, to the preservation of the freedom of transit and of communications, the latter most important addition being the proposal of Colonel House, and generally in matters of international co-operation the League was made the clearing-house of international action. Another addition due to Colonel House was the Red Cross article, which a drafting committee, taking a very liberal view of its powers, inserted.

It may be that the historian of the future, thinking of the nations of the world as aggregations of families rather than as bands of voters led by politicians, will regard these less spectacular features of the Covenant as being more really mile-stones of human progress than its great political tribunals and its contentious clauses.

Even after the commission on the League of Nations had ended its labors, the text of the Covenant was not absolutely finished. The British dominions were concerned about their status as members of the League. It seemed to them that the use of the word "States" in certain places in the text limited their rights, particularly in the matter of eligibility as members of the Council; and this view was correct, for the language had been very carefully chosen in that regard; so the dominions urged that the wording be changed. The question was a difficult one; that the dominions and India should be separately represented in the League had been early conceded; any other decision would have been impossible; and, perhaps now, with a member of his majesty's opposition sitting in the Assembly as a delegate from South Africa, and with Canada openly criticising the wishes of London, no one would deny that it was wise from every point of view; to ignore the importance of Canada as compared with Haiti would be absurd; but while the international status of the British dominions has greatly changed and is still changing, that status could not yet be asserted by any lawyer to be technically that of independent states with a common sovereign. President Wilson yielded to the wishes of the dominions against the views of some of his advisers, and whether they were right or wrong, it is certain that Canada, Australia, and the others will never yield that independence of position

in the world's affairs which belong to them as a combined result of the war and of the peace.

So the Covenant was finished, but it was thus far finished only in English. There were various French translations, but no French text. The heart-breaking labor of making one took several days, and, as a matter of intellectual interest, I recommend to every student of the language of diplomacy the task of putting into French that specimen of President Wilson's English which is found in the preamble of the Covenant; and after the student has finished let him compare the result with the French text of the preamble; that portion of the French text appears in the treaty just as it was written late at night or, rather, early in the morning in Professor Larnaude's beautiful apartment at Neuilly, after all previous attempts at expressing President Wilson in French had been rightly discarded as being, perhaps, accurate in language but certainly impossible in style.

The Covenant has two schools of critics, perhaps three: those who think it goes too far, those who think it does not go far enough, and those who approve of it but who do not like some of the people who wrote it. I am not going to discuss any of the questions raised by those various opinions. But in view of the fact that the Covenant is not very old as an international document, I am going to suggest that there is one test to be applied to such a paper, a test from which the critics of all schools are, perhaps happily for them, free. They do not have to draw a paper with the idea of its presentation to any country for acceptance. But no matter how beautiful a scheme for world peace may appear to its authors, it will be worth little if it is not such that it can be agreed to, and even if it is not perfect it will be worth every-

thing if it prove to be the basis of agreement. Those who framed the Covenant have seen it accepted by the competent governmental authority of nearly every country in the world, and that is the first real test of success. And when I say nearly every country, I include my own; for so far as the Lodge reservations made changes in the League, they were of a wholly minor character, they left its structure intact, and they would have interfered with its workings not at all. Indeed, if any one thinks that there is no art in writing a great treaty which eighty senators of the United States and forty-eight governments will accept in substance as written, I suggest to him to wait a century, or perhaps two, and see how the next attempt succeeds.

Such is something of the story of the making of the Covenant of the League of Nations. That the men who created that paper were working with a noble purpose, with a wish for peace, and with a singleness of heart which is without precedent in the annals of diplomacy, that I know. That what they did has changed the history of the world is common knowledge. But whether their work is lasting, whether it will bring the world nearer to the realization of the dream of the prophet:

". . . and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

no one knows, save God.

XVIII

THE VERSAILLES PEACE IN RETROSPECT

BY EDWARD M. HOUSE

It was but natural that the greatest of all peace congresses should have followed the greatest of all wars.

While the results fell short of public expectations, yet it is doubtful whether more could have been done, considering the conditions existing after the signing of the armistice. Theoretically, "peace without victory" was within the realm of reason, but practically it was not. Civilization must advance further than it has at present, before such a peace is possible. The magnitude of the war was such that its disastrous consequences touched the remote parts of the earth and disturbed every human activity, thus bringing to bear upon the peace many diverse and alien influences. Those who would have had the congress do this or that particular thing were not present, or, if so, were not conversant with its inner workings.

The accomplishments to which favorable attention may be called are:

(1) The forming of an organization for the preventing of war.
(2) The sincere effort to give racial entities self-determination.
(3) The declaration of a policy of trusteeship in regard to mandates.

These parts of the treaty mark a distinct advance in international morals, and if they fail of their purpose it will be because of the refusal of the United States to accept the treaty in good faith and to give it her powerful support—a support which is essential to success. Our people have not passed upon the treaty *per se*, for as yet the question has been almost wholly obscured by the ever-recurrent controversy between the executive and the United States Senate. Those who believe in our government and its purposes look confidently forward to its taking, in due time, its place in the Society of Nations, and assuming, without fear, all the responsibilities which its commanding position in world affairs entails. One cannot have power without corresponding responsibility.

Probably the greatest misfortune of the Conference was that it assembled too late and took too long with preliminaries. This, however, was not the fault of the United States. Had it convened immediately after the armistice, and had it dealt promptly with Germany, the long period of uncertainty, disorder, and suffering might in large part have been avoided. Then, too, no country was willing that its army should be used to police the world, except France, and what France could properly do was limited in more ways than one. Soon after the armistice the American and British troops began to be demobilized, and the orders of the Conference were known to be based merely upon its moral influence, and this influence rapidly declined as the armistice receded into the past. As a result, help from the Conference was despaired of and self-help was substituted. In consequence, numberless little wars broke out, and increased the misery of people whose sufferings were already all but intolerable.

Economic and Financial Clauses

The economic and financial terms of the peace should have been made as soon after the armistice as possible. Delay was the cause of much of the friction at the Conference and since. The failure to do this, combined with the crushing debts and disturbed industrial conditions with which all the belligerents are burdened, is largely responsible for the present chaotic international situation, and, in consequence, there is general distrust, lack of credit, and a disorganized and impossible rate of exchange.

While the United States is the principal creditor and not indebted to any nation, it is probable that our interest in adjusting and placing world finance on a sound basis is greater than that of any other Power. Being the largest producer, it is obviously to our advantage to bring back a normal healthy economic condition everywhere. One cannot have bankrupt neighbors and continue to prosper for long.

After the armistice there was a decided disinclination to grapple with these questions. In order to temporize, both France and Great Britain had recourse to the cry of making Germany pay the entire cost of the war, and there were some financiers of international reputation in both countries who gave credence to the statement that this could be done. It was a mad and wholly unwarranted assumption, but the people accepted it as an easy way out of one of their many difficulties.

In an address to Congress, February 11, 1918, President Wilson said: "There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages." Because of this there was at Paris an avoidance of the use of the word

"indemnity," and the word "reparation" was substituted. But by no stretch of the imagination could "reparation" cover the vast cost of the war in all its ramifications, and the attempt to shift one of its most oppressive burdens by advocating a plan so palpably impossible was a subterfuge unworthy of responsible statesmen.

From a purely selfish standpoint it would have been to our advantage if, after the armistice, we had called a conference of the Allies and had prepared a plan, the leading feature of which should have been a general adjustment of international indebtedness. Under such a process our foreign loans, instead of being $10,000,000,000 would probably now have been $5,000,000,000—all good and interest-bearing. This, in itself, would have reduced our taxes $250,000,000 a year, and with the stimulus which a sound financial situation abroad would have given our trade a different story could to-day be told. As it is, we are owed a nominal sum of $10,000,000,000, the value of which is exceedingly doubtful, and upon it no interest has yet been paid. Sooner or later some adjustment must be brought about; it should have been effected immediately the war was over. Our people would then have recognized that our foreign loans were not made as investments, but in order to defeat the Central Empires. Even now they should understand that these debts cannot be collected except by process of war, unless, indeed, the debtors choose otherwise. Such conditions make for bad foreign relations, and we shall awaken to this when we begin to press for interest payments.

But the failure of the Allied and Associated Powers to readjust their own finances did not end there; they carried this policy through the entire Conference. It would

have been the part of wisdom to have named immediately a fixed sum for Germany to pay as reparation. This sum should have been the maximum she could pay, but not an impossible sum. Then the bankers of the world might, under proper conditions, have underwritten it, and France, Belgium, and Great Britain would have obtained the needed stimulus which would more rapidly have brought their economic conditions back to normal. A part of this sum might have come to the United States, as we, in turn, cancelled a portion of the obligations those countries owed us.

It is well that the economic and financial clauses of the treaty are more or less temporary and not permanent, as are the clauses covering boundaries and racial determination.

Boundaries and Self-Determination

In the matter of boundaries the Paris Conference was confronted with almost its most difficult problem. There was no good way out, and any decision was certain to displease, and in many instances to do injustice.

It was easier to give nationality to races bulking large in numbers than it was to make an equitable adjustment of territory between two or more contiguous states, where it was difficult to decide whether the racial status or the natural boundaries should determine. Italy, in demanding a natural or strategic frontier to the north, has included two hundred odd thousand Tyrolese, who will not be reconciled to the change except through centuries of kindly treatment and good government.

An even more uncertain determination of justice, reached after the United States had practically withdrawn from the Conference, was the shifting of boun-

daries between Bulgaria, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia, the result of which has left much dissatisfaction. It is doubtful whether any adjustment could have been made in this region which would not have left seeds of another war. Those who were present to advocate their claims succeeded in expanding their boundaries to an astonishing degree, but almost wholly at the expense of their defeated neighbors. It requires but little prescience to see that it will take a strong and vigilant League of Nations to hold these turbulent Balkan States in leash.

But in spite of unfortunate mistakes in details, it remains true that for the first time in history Europe enjoys a natural political map or, at least, a fair approximation to it, a map drawn in accordance with the unforced aspirations and the spontaneous affiliations of the peoples themselves. The map of Europe drawn by the Congress of Vienna and changed by later congresses, knew no such principle. Peoples were handed from sovereignty to sovereignty like chattels, the determining factors being the ambitions, the power, and the cunning of sovereigns and their foreign ministers. As they sowed so, indeed, did they reap, for most of the wars of the nineteenth century after 1815 had their roots in efforts on the part of oppressed groups and peoples to throw off alien rule and join congenial political units. Therefore, it was not unnatural that the Paris Peace Conference should have been carried away by the popular demand for self-determination. It was a slogan which stirred into action the dormant dreams of many ancient peoples.

When the great empires east of the Rhine began to totter, fulfilment of the cherished hopes of centuries sprang at once to the fore in the hearts of oppressed races. Some communities did not wait for Paris to act,

but, with a courage born of strong desire, severed the political ties which had bound them for centuries and established governments for themselves in which their several racial entities dominated. It was the gladdest and yet, in some ways, the maddest movement in history. In the endeavor to be free everything else was overlooked. No tribal entity was too small to have ambitions for self-determination. Social and economic considerations were unreckoned with, and the only thought for the moment was to reach back to the centuries when they were nomads and were masters of their own fortunes and desires. The sufferings and hardships of the war seemed to fall from them in this hour of joy, and nothing appeared to matter if once again they might escape from the domination of their overlords.

During the winter and spring of 1918–1919 Paris was the Mecca for the oppressed not alone of Europe but of the earth. Pilgrims came in countless numbers to lay their hopes and grievances at the feet of those in the seats of the mighty. Many were in native costumes, some charming and some otherwise, but all picturesque and lending an air of interest to the great modern Babylon.

There was much that was pathetic in it all. Delegations would appear overnight, and then, after many weary weeks of waiting, would disappear and would be replaced by others. On the other hand, some coming from the ends of the world lingered through the greater part of the life of the conference. Nearly all had hearings, but these were of necessity of a perfunctory nature, and were given less to obtain real information than to be courteous to some sponsor among the Powers. Arguments would at times be made in the native language,

which had to be first translated into French and then into English. When boundaries were described at great length it is doubtful whether any of those upon whom the final decision rested would have known if the speaker, sensing the irony of it all, had taken them a thousand miles afield, and had followed a line in no way pertinent to that which he was supposed to prove.

Much of the time of the Conference was wasted in this grotesque effort not to offend. Of the visiting chiefs and potentates from far-off lands, none made a more profound impression than the Emir Feisal, son of the king of the Hedjaz. He spoke Arabic only, but he had an able friend and interpreter in Colonel Lawrance, who himself was one of the unique characters of the war. The Arabian prince, in his native dress, was a striking figure. He looked not unlike the accepted pictures of the Christ, but there the resemblance ended, for Feisal had proved himself a dangerous foe on many fields of battle, and at Paris asserted himself in a way in which no signs of humility were apparent. He came less like a suppliant than any of the others, for he bore himself with a kingly air and was imperious in his demands. This attitude finally brought about his undoing and landed him in exile.

While many failed to realize their aspirations, yet enough succeeded to change the map of Europe as it has never been changed within the memory of living man. And now that the theory of self-determination has been so largely put into practice, the question is, what will the outcome be? Some are already eager to expand beyond the limits of safety, and others are evincing an unreasonably selfish policy toward their neighbors. There is one thing that seems essential, and that is some under-

standing regarding customs, postal service, and the monetary unit. Without such an understanding, it is difficult to see how these small states can live in comfort and happiness. Many of them are landlocked, and some that touch the sea have no ports adequate to move their commerce. Few, if any, are self-supporting, and a free interchange of commodities is necessary in order to maintain a normal economic life. If a common monetary unit is adopted and there is no barrier to trade, it will probably not be long before some sort of federation will here and there come about. Then, and not until then, will those small states assume a position of importance and wield an influence commensurate with their aspirations.

Limitation of Armaments

The Conference "shunted" the question of the limitation of armaments, and there was no mention of it except in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Germany and other enemy states were drastically disarmed, but there was a careful avoidance of the subject as it related to the Allied and Associated Powers.

There was and is no more crying need than of some general understanding regarding the limitation of armament, for unless and until it comes there can be no security for continued peace, and the Conference could not have done the world greater service than to have reached a satisfactory solution of this troublesome question. The excuse given then was that the League was the proper medium through which it could best be done, but the truth, perhaps, was that most of the European states at the Conference were unwilling to take it up at that time. It is doubtful, too, whether any agreement

could have been reached, for neither France nor Italy were then in a mood to disarm on land, and Great Britain was even less willing to limit her fleet upon the seas.

During the war one heard on every side the cry that something must be done, but the representatives of the great Powers foregathered at Paris sat for the better part of a year, and went away leaving things as they were, relying upon what might be accomplished through the instrumentality of the League. There has been more than enough discussion, but it has brought no result and scarcely a plan worthy of consideration. However, the time is near when this question must have its hearing, for the people of all debt-laden countries are demanding relief, and no relief can be had until account is taken of the expenditures for war. One of the needs of the time is for a voice with an authority so great that it may reach all lands and awaken into action the dormant desires of the masses.

There is no voice to-day which carries so far and which is freighted with so much power as that of the President of the United States. No matter what differences of opinion may exist here regarding our taking part in world affairs, there is but little difference regarding the desirability of a reduction of armaments. A conference of the principal Powers should be called to discuss and provide ways and means to bring about limitation of armaments among themselves, and later to use their influence through the League of Nations to make it world-wide. It is to be hoped that President Harding may do this great and needful thing. Should he succeed in bringing this about he would place himself among the benefactors of mankind and mark the beginning of a new era. Statesmen could no longer sit in seclusion, hidden

behind doors, and formulate policies the enforcement of which would necessitate military and naval strength. A grandiose foreign policy has been one of the fruitful causes of war. Such a policy and militarism are of one warp and woof, and when the one goes the other will likely follow.

In days gone by the jingo and the imperialist appealed successfully to the imagination, and the pomp and panoply of war stirred the emotions, but that day has passed, let us hope, forever. We understand now what such policies entail, and never again shall we submit to conditions which bring in their train so frightful a trail of suffering and death.

Publicity

From the American view-point and that of the smaller nations—for the outlook and interests of both were much the same—one of the mistakes at Paris was the lack of publicity. If the American purposes could have been known, a moral backing and stimulus would have been given our representatives which was almost wholly lacking. This sustaining force might have come from the entire world, and would have had a double effect inasmuch as it would have weakened the opposition and strengthened us.

We had taken the position of overthrowing the old order and bringing a new and different diplomacy into play. "Open covenants, openly arrived at," was one of the popular slogans of the day, and it was clearly to our advantage, as well as our obligation, to carry it through. The failure to do this left us in the attitude of reformers working in the dark. Darkness is conducive to secret covenants secretly arrived at, and what we needed for

success was light—all the light which could properly be thrown about the subjects proposed and discussed.

It may be entirely proper to have conferences in groups of two or more in which no one but those vitally interested may appear, but when the meetings begin to be official and take on an aspect of final decision, then the public should be given the text of the entire discussion. In this way, and in this way alone, may the public of every country know and fairly assess the motives of each participant and bring to bear, if need be, the power of public opinion.

The League of Nations

The outstanding feature of the Paris congress which differentiated it from other congresses was the creation of the League of Nations. This noble conception was the product of no single brain, but was the consummation of the thoughts and aspirations of the forward-looking men of the past and the present. It was the great dream of the centuries which had at last come true.

While the idea was not President Wilson's, yet the power to make it a real and living thing was his. History will give him the credit of using this power to the utmost to create an instrument to make wars less probable.

In fairness to those who opposed the Covenant, as it was made in Paris, let it be said that some were frankly against any such adventure on the part of our government; others believed our interests were not sufficiently safeguarded; and there was yet another group maintaining that there was even a more vital issue involved—that of the right of the Senate to exercise its constitutional functions. It is to be regretted that this last group did

not choose another occasion to battle with the executive for what they declared to be their rights.

It has been said before, but it cannot be told too often, that another such war will overturn what is left of civilization. We have built up a structure the continuation of which is dependent upon co-operation. Its machinery is so delicate that when jarred it all but falls to pieces. We have before us the example of Russia. The sun shines there as it has always shone, the rains fall now as in the past, the soil is there to yield as abundantly as in former years; and yet the jar which came with the revolution loosened the machinery of that great co-operative society, and cold, hunger, and death stalk the land.

Should another such war come, this same thing that has happened to the Russians may happen to us all, but the disorganization will be more complete and the disaster more terrible. We are told that such things cannot occur in free and prosperous America. But we were told that the Great War was unthinkable. "Civilization was too advanced"; "the bankers would not permit it"; "at any rate, the United States had no entangling alliances." But it did come, and we were helpless to prevent its spread. The bankers were as impotent as others, for they were caught in the machinery of war, and carried along by its irresistible momentum. Though unentangled by any alliance, the call of right drew us in, as it would again.

And now, two and a half years after the signing of the armistice, the United States has as yet failed to do the necessary thing to make successful the only instrument which has been devised to save us from the destruction another world war would bring. It is a melancholy reflection upon our right to exist.

The Freedom of the Seas

It is doubtful whether there is anything discernible upon the horizon of international affairs which would sooner quicken a local war into a world war than the unsettled question now known as the freedom of the seas. It is especially provocative of danger to such maritime Powers as the United States.

There has been no agreement upon this subject since the Declaration of Paris in 1856, when privateering was abolished and the rights of neutrals were defined. The Declaration of London of 1909 was never ratified by all the interested Powers; therefore, when the Great War began, it was necessary to hark back to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and conditions since then had made that instrument wholly inadequate for modern usage.

The traditional policy of the United States has been for the protection of neutrals and a more liberal attitude toward the freedom of trade upon the seas. The policy of Great Britain has been the reverse, and at times there has been sharp disagreement between the two nations upon this question. It was never brought before the Peace Conference, however, and in consequence the world is practically without laws governing blockade, capture at sea, contraband, and the use of mines and submarines, for the Germans wiped the slate clean in their violent attempt to destroy both enemy and neutral commerce.

It is quite clear why Great Britain should regard her situation as different from that of other Powers, since in order to live she must keep open her sea communications. Again, she is dependent upon her navy to protect her colonies and dominions, and to keep them in touch with

the mother country. But it is not so clear why she resists the grouping of all the Powers into a pact to keep the seas free in war as well as in peace. Such a pact might prevent her from using her fleet to starve an enemy into submission, or to wield its force to drive an enemy's commerce from the seas, but it would in turn be a protection that would more than compensate her for any loss in these directions. She would not only gain in the security of her food-supply, but her merchant marine might sail the seas in time of war unmolested.

England's conservatism, which has been a bulwark of strength in many a crisis, may some time be the cause of her undoing. The world moves quickly now, both in thought and invention, and many of us who wish this great people well hope to see them look upon this question from a broader point of view.

There could be made a code of sea laws which would remove many of the causes leading to war, and which would materially lessen its horrors. It is fear of the destruction of one's commerce at sea in time of war which has given an impetus to naval armaments. Remove this fear and one of the vexatious questions of our time would be solved.

Sufficient homage has not yet been paid to the intrepid men who, unafraid, sailed the restricted seas during the war and refused to be terrorized by a relentless foe. For the future protection of men like them, and for the safeguarding of women and children who of necessity must traverse a danger zone in time of war, a new and more humane code of sea laws must be made and guaranteed by the governments of the world. It is to be hoped that some time soon Great Britain and the United States may together lead the way in this direction, in

order that one of the shadows still hanging over us may be lifted and that we may at last have the freedom of the seas.

Mandates

The question of mandates is one in which the American people should have much concern. It is not alone a new departure in international ethics, but it is one in which we have an economic interest. Until now, backward countries have generally been controlled or exploited by some Power for selfish purposes, and the good which has come from such control or exploitation has been merely incident thereto. These backward communities have been a constant source of friction between the more civilized states, friction which has often resulted in war.

Until the Paris Conference there had been no attempt to reach a general understanding or fixed policy between the more powerful nations regarding the control or betterment of such states or territories. The system hitherto practised was admittedly so bad that when the Conference came to the disposition of the late German colonies there was a general agreement that a more enlightened policy should be inaugurated. In furtherance of this desire, Article 22 was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and subsequently there was a commission appointed to sit in London during the summer of 1919 for the purpose of preparing the terms of the mandates.

Upon this commission were Lord Milner, who had as his adviser Lord Robert Cecil; M. Simon, French minister for the colonies; Viscount Chinda, for Japan; Guglielmo Marconi, for Italy; and Edward M. House, with the late George Louis Beer as adviser.

Following the wishes of the Allied and Associated Powers, as expressed in Article 22, we divided the mandates into three classes: Form A was to be used for "communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire where their existence as independent states could be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory until such time as they were able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a Mandatory."

The essential features of Mandate A, proposed as a basis for discussion, were that it provided for a cessation of the mandate as soon as practicable; the administration of the government as far as possible by the native elements; that no military, naval, or air forces should be raised or maintained, nor any fortifications be erected or naval bases be established further than a local gendarmerie for the preservation of internal order. The complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship were assumed, and no discrimination of any kind should be made between citizens on the ground of race or religion.

A provision of far-reaching importance was included, which would compel the Mandatory Power to grant to all citizens of states members of the League of Nations the same rights as those enjoyed in the territory by its own nationals in respect to entry into and residence within the territory, and in respect to the acquisition of property and the exercise of a profession or trade.

Further, the Mandatory Power should not attempt to obtain special privileges for its own citizens, and should undertake to insure to all citizens of states members of the League freedom of transit and occupation and com-

plete economic, commercial, and industrial equality. And again, that concessions for the development of the natural resources of the territory should be granted without discrimination between citizens of states members of the League.

The London commission never finished its labors for the reason that the Turkish treaty had not been prepared or signed, and it was the fragments of the Turkish Empire as well as the German colonies which were to come under the mandates.

Mandate B was prepared for those communities not so far advanced in government and civilization as those which were to come under Mandate A, but the provisions were very much the same, except that it gave greater protection to the natives, who would presumably be more ignorant than those coming under Mandate A. Particular care was given to the safeguarding of their lands, and they were to be protected against usury, against traffic in liquor, drugs, and slaves. Another important provision was that in case of disputes between the members of the League of Nations relating to the application or interpretation of the mandate which could not be settled by negotiations, the dispute must be submitted to the permanent Court of International Justice which was to be established.

Mandate C was framed for those countries in Southwest Africa and the Pacific Islands "which owing to the sparseness of their populations, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their contiguity to the Mandatory can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory."

Here, again, even greater care was used to protect the

natives than was given to those in A and B, because of their ignorance and helplessness. Therefore, taking it altogether, the acceptance by the members of the League of Nations of this new principle in the question of control of backward countries is a long step forward. A Mandatory Power now accepts a trusteeship not for the benefit of itself but for the benefit of the natives, and incidentally it must permit other countries to share in the development of the state over which it exercises the mandate.

The fact that hereafter each Power holding such a mandate will be under close observation must have a tendency to promote the best administration possible. The report which must be given each year to the council of the League will in itself stimulate rivalry, and the Power giving the best account of its stewardship will be the one to hold the highest place in the esteem of the world.

Although the council, during its November meeting at Geneva, withheld some of the terms of the different grades of mandates, yet it is reasonable to expect that the essence of what the London commission prepared will form the basis of the agreement made at Geneva.

One of the arguments used by those Americans who favor the acceptance of a mandate by the United States is that it will give us an opportunity to set the pace in giving to some community, struggling to advance, an administration of law and order which will serve as a model for other Mandatory Powers, and which will result in adding to the sum of human progress.

The world at large gave prompt and generous praise to our diplomatic, military, and naval efforts. But we

were not content to let their righteous judgments go unchallenged; in public and in private we have told of our shortcomings in terms so convincing that others have come to see us as we seem to see ourselves. The object of this book is to tell something of the American purposes at the Conference, and let our people form a more deliberate opinion as to "What Really Happened at Paris."

APPENDIX

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF QUESTIONS ASKED AND ANSWERS GIVEN AFTER THE LECTURES IN THE ACADEMY OF MUSIC, PHILADELPHIA

III

THE NEW BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY

December 30, 1920

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPE, OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *What part do the iron-mines play in the Alsace-Lorraine question?*

ANSWER: A very considerable part. The frontier line was drawn in 1871 by the German geologists, with the understanding that they had included all the iron-mines which could be worked profitably, but after the application of the new processes to the phosphoric ore the portion west of the French boundary became more valuable than the part east of the border. Thenceforth the German policy was to get the rest of the iron district. They have now lost it all. Some kind of an adjustment by which France shall agree to furnish iron ore to Germany in return for a supply of coal is one of those necessary economic bargains which ought to be worked out by international agreement as soon as the countries can get together.

QUESTION: *In your opinion, was the question of the German frontier wisely and fairly settled by the Conference?*

ANSWER: Yes, for reasons I have given in the lecture.

QUESTION: *It has been said by some that the President freely consulted his experts and by others that he ignored them. From your experience, which is true?* (Laughter.)

ANSWER: From my experience the first statement is more nearly true. So far as I could see, the President was anxious to have the exact facts before him in every situation. Doubtless, there were a number of occasions when he could not consult with experts at a particular moment, but, in general, the President sought such advice, although he naturally had to use his own judgment whether that advice was to be adopted in any particular case.

QUESTION: *Before the war were the Lorraine iron-mines owned by private German owners? And has the title changed to French public or private ownership now?*

ANSWER: Before the war they were owned by private owners, principally German. In Alsace-Lorraine the French reserve the

right to liquidate enterprises owned in Germany; they have an "alien property custodian" also. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: *How do you justify the giving of the Saar mines to France under that one of the "Fourteen Points" which says "no indemnities"?*

ANSWER: The Saar mines are not an indemnity such as the Germans secured from France in 1871; they constitute reparation and restoration for property destroyed by the Germans in France.

QUESTION: *Is it not true that in five years' time the French mines will again be producing, and France will then have both her own and Germany's coal?*

ANSWER: The French mines will be producing again in five years, but it is not so clear that they will be producing at their pre-war productivity, for those mines were flooded and dynamited in a way that makes it very difficult to get them into good working condition again. Of course, the French will get coal from their mines before the fifteen-year period is up; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that the French were deprived of the coal of these mines during the five years of the war. Any surplus above the losses in coal is credited to Germany on her further account in the way of compensation for the destruction of other property. For all this, the coal-mines were an easily available asset.

QUESTION: *Is any part of the German public debt now a liability of the Lorraine and Saar districts?*

ANSWER: No part of the German public debt is a liability of Lorraine, nor for fifteen years in the Saar. If any part of the Saar or the whole of it votes to return to Germany, it goes back with all the rights and liabilities thereto appertaining.

QUESTION: *You spoke of Mr. Keynes. He infers in his book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," that Clemenceau and Lloyd George bamboozled the President—in your opinion, is this true?*

ANSWER: Mr. Keynes says that Mr. Lloyd George "found it harder to debamboozle the old Presbyterian than it had been to bamboozle him." If Mr. Keynes knew as much about Scotch Presbyterians as we do in Pennsylvania, he would have chosen some one else as an example of bamboozling; and if he knew more about men in general, he would know that such a formula is much too simple

for any personality. The President has in his make-up much of the stiffness and firmness of the Scotch Calvinist, but also something of the canniness. Mr. Keynes also calls President Wilson "slow and unresourceful," and that is certainly untrue. At Paris President Wilson showed himself to be quick and intelligent in grasping and assimilating facts, and quick to use them in debate. I think I have seen more of him than Mr. Keynes, both in Paris and earlier. Mr. Keynes's book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," is in its latter part an able and, in some respects, a sound piece of economic analysis; but economic analysis is not what most people like to read, and in order to get the book read, he wrote some preliminary matter which purported to describe the setting and the personalities of the Peace Conference. On this he could not speak as an authority from his own observation; and the result was a highly imaginative and, in some respects, a distorted picture of men and motives.

QUESTION: *Do you feel that the United States really lost out at the Peace Conference?*

ANSWER: No. The United States, in a territorial or in an economic sense, had practically nothing to gain or lose at the Peace Conference. She was the great disinterested Power at Paris. If the United States had lost out at all, it would have been through failure to realize her programme, as laid down in the Fourteen Points and other principles submitted by President Wilson. It seems to me that the most fundamental points, the major portion of the American programme, were realized; but of course there were some compromises and adjustments. On the whole I do not think it can be said that the United States lost out at the Peace Conference.

IV

POLAND

December 17, 1920

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ROBERT H. LORD, CHIEF OF THE POLISH DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *Personally do you believe that the settlement of the Polish question was the fairest to Poland that could have been reached?*

ANSWER: I am going to speak very frankly and say no. Personally I feel that the Danzig problem was a very grave one and of the most

vital interest to Poland. The new arrangement about Danzig has now been reduced to the form of a definite treaty, which was signed just the other day, and it is a treaty that whittles away some of the rights which the Peace Treaty seemed to have assured to Poland. It leaves the control of the port of Danzig in the hands of a mixed commission, made up of two Poles, two Danzigers, and one neutral; so that Poland will not have secure and effective control over her one and only port. How badly she needs secure control was shown last summer when I was in Danzig. At that moment Poland was fighting for her life against the Bolsheviks. The only means by which war supplies from the outside world could come in to her was through Danzig; but owing to the hostility of the Danzig Germans, and I might add of the British High Commissioner, the port of Danzig was closed to Polish munitions in the very heat of the struggle. If matters had not been settled by General Weygand's splendid victory near Warsaw, that situation at Danzig might have cost Poland her very existence. Furthermore, the feeling shown by the Danzigers at present is just as bad as can be imagined. The Poles in the city are mobbed not infrequently. In short, I think the new arrangement is working very badly.

QUESTION: *You said that taking territory from Germany is very serious business. What do you mean by that?*

ANSWER: There is a popular impression in Germany, although it is not exactly an accurate one, that Prussia has never definitely lost any territory that she has once possessed; that whenever anything has been taken away from her, there has always been a comeback, and she has invariably regained whatever territory she had lost and taken some more into the bargain. One of the most moderate among present-day German politicians, Professor Delbrück of the University of Berlin, declared some years ago that, "all Germany would have to be hewn in pieces before we should allow Posen to be taken away from us." Among all the provinces in the east, Posen is the most overwhelmingly and indisputably Polish in all respects, the one province that Germany would most surely have to give up if she were going to renounce anything. The trouble is that the Germans cannot bear the thought of renouncing anything that once belonged to them; I fear it will be a very long time before they come to regard their new frontiers as definitive, and that means a permanent danger to the peace of Europe. That is why I said it was "serious business" to take territory away from Germany.

QUESTION: *How valuable were Mr. Paderewski's services to Poland?*

ANSWER: Mr. Paderewski accomplished a wonderful service at the start by ending a serious internal crisis, a dispute between Polish parties as to the control of the government. He founded the first government of the new state that was accepted by every one at home and recognized by all the powers. He had so many tasks on his hands, particularly in regard to foreign policy and the great decisions pending at Paris, that I fear he did not find time to devote himself sufficiently to the internal organization of the new state; and some unfortunate conditions developed at home which he would doubtless have desired to avoid had he been able. But he held the country together successfully during the first and most trying year of its new existence. He is an orator of the first rank. He has many times spoken most effectively before the Paris Conference and at the League of Nations meeting at Geneva, and in his speeches before the Polish Diet he was often able to sweep that assembly off its feet by his eloquence. Mr. Paderewski is so obviously a thoroughly high-minded and disinterested patriot that he commands confidence. He was able to win even the warm friendship of Mr. Lloyd George, who was not on very friendly terms with the other Poles; and through the confidence of the British prime minister and President Wilson and M. Clemenceau I think he gained a great many things for Poland that a statesman who was less trusted could never have secured. In general, Mr. Paderewski's services have been of inestimable value to his country, and in his handling of negotiations with the other powers I think he did what no other Pole could have done.

QUESTION: *To what extent does Bolshevism prevail in Poland at the present time?*

ANSWER: It does not prevail at all. It scarcely exists. There is practically no Bolshevism among the Catholic population, which is overwhelmingly in the majority. The Poles are rather ardent Catholics, and that in itself is a strong safeguard against Bolshevism.

QUESTION: *Will the Danzig corridor become a second Alsace-Lorraine as far as Germany is concerned?*

ANSWER: The Germans in Germany doubtless think so, but I do not believe this comparison would be fair. For, as it was finally marked out, the Polish corridor to the Baltic contains a majority of Poles and not of Germans. It is not a case of the majority of the population being held under a foreign rule against their will, as was the case in Alsace-Lorraine.

QUESTION: *What can you say of the frequent statement that the present aims of the Polish Government are imperialistic?*

ANSWER: I should say that the statement in the main is based on inaccurate knowledge of the ethnographic situation. As heard to-day, this charge is usually made with regard to the claims of the Polish Government to certain territories on the east. In that quarter the Poles have claimed a good deal of territory which, according to the statistics of the old Russian Government, does not have a Polish majority. But these statistics of the old Russian Government, like those of the Turks, were in large part simply fabricated for political reasons. Take, for example, the case of the district of Vilna, which is so much in dispute to-day. The Russian census of 1897 affirms that the Poles made up only 20 per cent of the population there. In 1909 the Russian estimates admitted that the Poles were 43 per cent of the population. In 1916 the Germans, who were then occupying this region, took a census and found that 80 per cent of the population were Polish. Last winter the Poles themselves took a census which agrees pretty well with the German one. This case may illustrate how unreliable the Russian figures often are. Unfortunately the Russian statistics, particularly those of 1897, are almost the only data with which the rest of the world has hitherto been familiar; almost all the current ethnographic maps of eastern Europe are based solely upon them, and therefore the rest of the world gets a very false idea of the ethnographic character of much of the territory which the Poles are laying claim to.

V

THE END OF AN EMPIRE: REMNANTS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

January 14, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY CHARLES SEYMOUR, CHIEF OF AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *Do you think that President Wilson promised Premier Bratiano of Rumania to send United States troops to protect the new frontiers?*

ANSWER: The evidence against it is overwhelming. The stenographic notes taken during the session indicate that nothing said by President Wilson could be construed into a promise to send United

States troops abroad to protect frontiers. The allegation is based upon the report of the interpreter Mantoux and a book by a journalist, Doctor E. W. Dillon, called "The Inside Story of the Peace Conference." M. Mantoux, though a brilliant and cultivated interpreter whose work enormously facilitated the progress of the Conference, did not take stenographic notes and his interpretations sometimes failed to give the exact meaning of the original. Doctor Dillon's evidence is subject to suspicion, since his book is based upon gossip and replete with errors of fact. The stenographic report, on the other hand, is worthy of trust. I have heard the President on more than one occasion explain to Clemenceau and Lloyd George that if troops were necessary to protect any troubled area, they must not look to the United States for assistance, for public opinion in this country would not permit the use of American forces.

QUESTION: *What is the history of the clause forbidding the union of Germany and Austria? Who opposed this union and why?*

ANSWER: From the beginning of the Peace Conference the French were inalterably opposed to the granting of any new territory to Germany. They refused to consider the possibility of joining the German portions of Bohemia to Germany, and were emphatic in their denunciation of the plan to join Austria (that is, German Austria) to Germany. They made their feeling so plain that there was not, I believe, any serious discussion of yielding to the demand of the Austrians for annexation, although many if not all of the American Delegation approved such annexation. The prohibition was indirect and secured by the insertion of a clause in the German Treaty to the effect that Germany recognized the absolute independence of Austria. It is not difficult to understand the French point of view which was based on the belief that Germany, weakened by the loss of Alsace and Polish territory might become dangerous if compensated by the annexation of German Austria.

QUESTION: *Do the Austrians want to be united with Germany? Do you think it will be a good thing to have the union?*

ANSWER: At the close of the war probably the majority of the German Austrians would have preferred independence. This was particularly true of the moneyed classes, who feared lest they should be caught in the financial burdens that reparations would impose upon Germany. The Socialists, on the other hand, advocated union, believing that Socialism would triumph in Germany and they wished to share that triumph. As the months passed, and the German Aus-

trians realized how narrow would be their boundaries, and that there was no chance of a Danubian Federation, the movement for annexation gathered strength. At the present moment, doubtless the vast majority favor union, believing that in it lies Austria's sole chance of escape from economic disaster. Personally I have always advocated union if a Danubian Confederation did not enter the circle of practical possibilities. It would assist the economic renaissance of German Austria and thus favor the chance of political tranquillity. I do not believe that the addition of six and a half million German Austrians would render Germany redoubtable. On the contrary, I believe that they would tend to counterbalance the Prussian influence in the German state. Personally they are the most attractive of Teutons, and hold an enviable record in the history of civilization. With the exception of certain aristocratic types they represent liberal ideas and peaceful industry.

QUESTION: *How do you reconcile the landlocking of Austria and Hungary with President Wilson's pronouncement that small nations should have free access to the sea?*

ANSWER: My impression is that the President merely stated that each nation should be guaranteed conditions insuring the possibility of economic existence. On the other hand, he also stipulated in the Fourteen Points that there should be a readjustment of Italian frontiers on the lines of nationality, and he also constantly emphasized the principle of self-determination. In the case of Austro-Hungarian boundaries as elsewhere a conflict of principles was inevitable. Austria could not touch the sea without encroaching on Italian and Jugo-Slav territory; Hungary is shut off from the sea by a broad band of Jugo-Slav territory. It would have been intolerable that Austria and Hungary, in order to touch the sea, should retain sovereignty over many thousand Italians and Jugo-Slavs. But the isolation of Austria and Hungary from the sea, although unfortunate, can be remedied by stipulations permitting them freedom of transit.

QUESTION: *Did not strategy and economic considerations have more weight in decisions than religion, nationality, and self-determination?*

ANSWER: It is difficult to strike a balance, but I should say that the answer is in the negative. Except in the case of the Italian frontier strategy did not count very seriously. There it is true many German Austrians and Jugo-Slavs were granted to Italy, in order to offer to Italy an easily defensible frontier. Economic considerations, of course, played a rôle of enormous importance. No frontier

which produced or perpetuated intolerable economic conditions could be regarded as permanent. The economic welfare of the inhabitants must always be taken into account. For this reason, as I have tried to show, Czechoslovakia and Rumania include a large alien population. But after all the basis of the frontiers was always nationality and the free desires of the populations concerned. It was from the principle of self-determination that the territorial commissions started to study frontier problems, and the burden of proof was always on the delegate who wished to depart from national lines. Religion, of course, did not count except as it forms an element in nationality.

QUESTION: *What justification did President Wilson have for expecting the Allies to abrogate the secret treaties for the sole reason that they had been made previous to our entering the war?*

ANSWER: He may not have been justified in expecting complete abrogation, if he did expect it, but he was surely justified in expecting that they would abrogate those portions of such treaties which conflicted with the Fourteen Points and Wilson's later speeches. For the Allies had agreed in the autumn of 1918 to accept the Fourteen Points as the basis of the peace, and it was fair to assume that such public acceptance implied an abrogation of any previous conflicting agreements. It might have been wiser to demand the abrogation of the secret treaties at the time we entered the war, but such a demand would have been ungenerous and probably mistaken statesmanship; we had not yet begun to fight, and it would have been difficult to formulate at that time our terms of peace. The question of the abrogation of the secret treaties was confused by reason of the fact that the armistice with Austria was concluded without the clear understanding on all sides that the peace with Austria should be based upon the Fourteen Points. As a matter of fact, the two secret treaties that concerned the Hapsburg territories were virtually abrogated, for neither Rumania nor Italy received the boundaries they had been promised, although the latter Power did not come off badly.

QUESTION: *How did the Council of Ten become the Council of Four?*

ANSWER: There has been much gossip and many myths with regard to this interesting development. It has been alleged that it was the work of reactionary interests at Paris desiring to isolate President Wilson and weaken his resolution. A study of the facts shows that it was a perfectly natural development. President Wil-

son left Paris in February, sailing for the United States with the draft Covenant of the League of Nations, and intrusting practical control of negotiations from the American point of view to Colonel House. The latter did not like the organization of the Council of Ten. He felt that it was too large to accomplish work effectively and that too many onlookers and assistants attended its sessions. In the autumn of 1918, when he represented the United States on the Armistice Commission, he had found it possible to accomplish a tremendous amount of work by meeting informally with Clemenceau and Lloyd George, for in such small meetings there were no speeches and work could proceed rapidly. At Paris during the early weeks of the conference, matters lagged. With Colonel House disliking the methods of the Council of Ten, Lloyd George was unwilling to go in to the meetings. Clemenceau was confined to his house by the wound inflicted by a would-be assassin. It resulted naturally that the informal conferences of the three should be revived. Decisions began to be arrived at quickly. When President Wilson returned to Paris in March, he realized that the small informal committee could work more effectively than the larger council, and he followed Colonel House's example. Orlando, as representative of Italy, was naturally invited to meet with the other three, and thus the Council of Four was formed. I do not think that the halo of secrecy which surrounded the work of the Four was necessary or that Colonel House approved of it. It might have been possible to secure the benefits of the small committee, and at the same time give greater publicity to the matters under discussion and the decisions reached.

QUESTION: *Can you suggest any more effective way in which President Wilson might have gathered expert information on boundaries and ethnology?*

ANSWER: I think that the principles of the system which he used were sound: he had organized a staff of men each one of whom was responsible for information on a particular area or topic. Colonel House had seen to it that these men began their investigations in time, that is in 1917. Of course, I am hardly fitted to pass on the qualifications of the experts chosen. A great deal of material was gathered, and on the whole was so organized that the questions of the President could be answered quickly and comprehensively. He asked a great many questions and on most points at issue was surprisingly well informed. I doubt if he would have gained by troubling himself with more detailed knowledge than he possessed. In

contradistinction to Lloyd George and Clemenceau the President made constant use of his experts, and with few exceptions his decisions were based on the facts they furnished.

QUESTION: *Do you believe that Austria should be ruled by the Allied Reparation Commission, as suggested?*

ANSWER: As I have said, I believe complete union with Germany to be the best solution to the problem. If that is not permitted, and it seems unlikely, it is possible that some form of economic union with Germany might help to meet the crisis. If that is forbidden it seems clear that the Allies must take some steps toward aiding Austria if they do not wish to see the reign of anarchy along the Danube. I think that the responsibility of government should always rest upon the Austrians themselves. I do not think that political control should be assumed by any Allied Commission. The Austrians must be made to feel that the problem is their problem, and that they must work in order to meet it. But it is necessary that the prospect of a livelihood should be offered them, and such a prospect can come only through union with Germany, through a Danubian Federation, or through assistance from the Allies. It may well be that the Reparation Commission is the proper body to take control of such assistance, possibly even administering the finances of the Austrian state.

VI

FIUME AND THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM

January 7, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY DOUGLAS WILSON JOHNSON, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF BOUNDARY GEOGRAPHY, AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *In describing the Italian boundary did I understand you to say that the line finally marked out left Italy a very good boundary as it ran up beyond Trieste?*

ANSWER: The line recommended by the American experts and offered to Italy, the so-called "American line," was, in the critical region of the Pear Tree Pass, carefully drawn in such manner as to place under Italian control the whole of the Birnbaum Plateau commanding the pass from the north, and other important highlands commanding the pass from the south. This assured to Italy such effective control of the approaches to the pass that any invasion of Italy through this historic gateway was rendered practically impos-

sible. So far as an invasion from the Fiume region is concerned, the frontier, by following the high mountain backbone of the Istrian Peninsula, dominated the Fiume basin, and offered Italy ample protection against any possible enemy efforts to enter Italy in that region. Thus points of peculiar tactical strength were assured to Italy in order that she might feel safe from any threat from the east. Taking into account the remarkably strong frontier granted to Italy on the north, one can justly say that the whole frontier offered to Italy was strategically and tactically exceedingly strong. (Applause.)

QUESTION: *Why was the American view about Fiume so rigid when it seemed more generous about Shantung or the Germans of Bohemia?*

ANSWER: I am not sure that I should agree with the assumption that the American view regarding Fiume was more rigid than regarding the other cases mentioned. There was a fundamental difference between the Fiume problem and the Shantung problem, or the problem of the Germans of Bohemia. It must not be forgotten that the Shantung agreement was based on a Japanese promise to evacuate Shantung after receiving certain economic privileges similar to those which other nations had enjoyed in China. The Italians made no such offer respecting Fiume. At no time was there any suggestion that if this territory were given to the Italians by the treaty, they would later turn it over to Jugo-Slavia. On the contrary, the arrangements suggested looked definitely toward the future annexation of additional areas to Italy. As for the Germans of Bohemia, the Conference decided to adhere to the historic frontier, although the experts had recommended the elimination from Czechoslovakia of certain German areas, and the inclusion of others which belonged within the natural limits of the new Czechoslovak state. Bohemia constitutes one of the most striking geographical units in all Europe, the geographical frontier following in general the crest of mountain ranges surrounding the central basin. Unfortunately, the Germans extend in large numbers across the mountain crest and down the inner slopes of the barrier to the margin of the central plain. The economic and other relations of the Germans within the basin are largely bound up with the Czechoslovaks in the basin. I can see no resemblance between the grounds upon which the Bohemian case was decided and the arguments advanced by Italy in support of her claim to a frontier which was geographically, economically, and historically unsound.

QUESTION: *Is it true that the Italians aimed to make an Italian lake of the Adriatic?*

ANSWER: That question asks me to assign motives; and this I must decline to do. It was not our province to inquire into motives, but to study the problem on its merits just as it came to us. I can say, however, that the inevitable effect of assigning to Italy the territories on the eastern Adriatic coast claimed by her, whatever the intention or aim, would have been to turn the Adriatic into an Italian lake.

QUESTION: *What was the extent of the President's personal knowledge of the Adriatic problem?*

ANSWER: In answer to that question I will say that the President kept in constant touch with the experts on the Adriatic problem, not only through the memoranda furnished by the experts but in other ways. I can assure you that there was sent to him a voluminous quantity of material, and I want to say that when we had personal discussions with him upon the question it immediately became apparent that he had studied these memoranda most carefully. It is only fair to say that of the details and intricacies of this most difficult problem the President possessed a most astonishing command. (Applause.) I have shown you something of the ramifications of this problem. They were endless and exceedingly complicated. In order to make it easier for the President to grasp them, I set up in his study relief models of the eastern Adriatic coast, models made on a large scale which showed in proper position and proportion every river, mountain, valley, town, and railroad. Thus the President had the actual form of the region before him in miniature. On the models were marked off the strategic, ethnological, and other frontiers, and the President used these models in conferences with his experts and with the representatives of other governments. Whenever we, in our capacity as specialists, thought we had found something that the President ought to know about, and believed we could not get it across effectively in any other manner, we could ask for a personal conference with him. He was, of course, a very busy man, because, unlike the experts who usually had only one problem to consider, he had to do not only with all the territorial problems, but in addition with all the problems bearing on the League of Nations, the economic problems, and many other aspects of the peace. Despite this fact I wish to state that while I repeatedly asked for personal conferences with the President on this and certain other problems, he never failed to respond immediately with an appointment. He had a private wire, and on occasion he would call us at the Crillon to make appointments on his own initiative, or to secure papers, maps, or other documents that he needed in his studies. I

will not forget that in one instance he called me on the telephone late at night in my bedroom, asking for some papers which I had promised to supply him, and which had not reached him with sufficient promptness. You can judge from this that he kept closely in touch with the problems he was called upon to consider.

QUESTION: *Will the principle of self-determination, in your judgment, make for peace in this region any more than it would in Poland?*

ANSWER: I am not an expert on the Polish question, so that I would not like to pass on that comparison. Briefly considering the question in relation to the Adriatic problem, I do not think that the determination of the frontier line on the basis of self-determination alone would make for peace. I am of the opinion, and I think that was the opinion of all the American delegation, that it was wise to violate the principle of self-determination and the principle of nationality in establishing Italy's boundary-lines, in order to get good geographic and good economic frontiers, and frontiers showing reasonable consideration for Italy's strategic security. To have given her a frontier along the base of the mountains, along the racial line, would have been to breed trouble, and to create economic difficulties which would not have proved favorable to the maintenance of peace. I think that a frontier on the natural geographic and economic divide would have much more of a peace-preserving character than would one following the racial boundary.

QUESTION: *What impression did Orlando and the Italian delegation make upon you?*

ANSWER: I must say that they made a most delightful impression. Both Orlando and Sonnino impressed me as very delightful men to meet and with whom to discuss questions. In the discussions they were always most amicable. There were problems that were acute, and which touched deeply upon Italian sensibilities; yet in talking with Orlando I had at all times a great appreciation of his genial, kindly, and sympathetic manner. Of course, at the same time, he maintained a very rigid and unbending attitude, as regarded the demands of his government. If you ask my impression as to his wisdom as a statesman, I will have to say that I believe it would have been possible for him, with a broader view of the destiny of Italy, to take a great moral leadership in Mediterranean affairs, to make friends, economically and in every other way, with the Jugo-Slavs. The occasion offered an opportunity for a fine, strong statesmanship which, it seems to me, was an opportunity that was lost. Sonnino speaks excellent English; he is perfectly charming, and I

never saw him in any discussion with the other members of the Supreme Council, or with the President, but that I felt sorry, when he got the worst of an argument, because he took it so genially. I felt that he ought to have had the best of it, just because of the way he went at it.

QUESTION: *Is Fiume a necessary economic outlet for Hungary and Jugo-Slavia and if so, could not Italy be relied upon to deal fairly with these nations?*

ANSWER: In answer to the first question, "Is Fiume economically necessary?" I say, yes. I think that geographic and physical conditions make it absolutely essential for the economic development of the Jugo-Slav people. I have tried to point out the peculiar physical condition which makes it so. I do not believe that there is any place on the whole Mediterranean coast where one little location is as important as this. If I had the same condition, in a region adjacent to the United States, I should regret to see the United States have control of its only practicable outlet, no matter how good the American people are; and I have a very high opinion of the idealism of the American people. Looking at this problem from the economic view-point: if I come to you and ask you to put some millions of dollars into the development of Fiume, and you, as Jugo-Slavs, are the people primarily interested, you will say to me: "Why, yes, I think it is necessary for our people and our country, and we would like to invest our money and support it. But what can we do, if there is any possibility of Fiume's some day being put under another sovereignty?" You cannot expect one people to tax themselves and put their money into the development of a port, if that port is going to be under the control of a foreign nation, however high-minded and good that foreign nation may be. It is not good business policy.

VII

CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS

December 23, 1920

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ISAIAH BOWMAN, CHIEF TERRITORIAL ADVISER OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *What was really the atmosphere surrounding the relations of the Big Three and also their relations to General Foch?*

ANSWER: As far as the relations of the Big Three are concerned—at least in the meetings with which I had to do—they were extremely cordial. Between Americans and the French and between British

and Americans there was displayed only the very finest spirit in all the commission meetings. Perhaps I may answer the question best by relating several circumstances of a somewhat more concrete nature. Any one arriving at the Peace Conference unaware of the past history of the leaders could not have been in the atmosphere of the place very long before finding out that there were some interesting undercurrents at work. One of these undercurrents that perhaps I may speak of frankly is that some of the Allied leaders had as much to say of other Allied leaders as they had of quite ordinary people. I might refer to one incident which got on the record but it got on the record in a very interesting way, and it did not happen in the way in which it is recorded. There was before the Conference the question of getting Haller's army to Poland. A British representative asked me if I would put the question of transport to General Weygand, the French Chief-of-Staff, who, when I saw him, assured me that by three o'clock in the afternoon, when the Supreme War Council met, he would have his answer ready. General Foch, usually a man of few words, yet who could become very loquacious when he wanted to tire out the opposition, spoke at such length and with such obvious circumlocution that Lloyd George quite lost patience. You must remember that Foch is said not to understand a word of English, but perhaps he found this rather a convenience than a handicap. I suppose that he does know a few words like "damn," for instance, but he does not know many; he is said not to understand a whole sentence. Finally Lloyd George, impatient over the delay, said: "If Foch means this, I understand him; if Foch means that, I understand him, but if he means neither, then upon my honor *I don't know what he means!*" It would have been natural for the Marshal to leave the room and resign as Generalissimo of the Allied armies. On the contrary he did not leave the room; he didn't know what the fuss was all about. Lloyd George was not taken to task. Then the official interpreter, M. Mantoux, an unclassified but real diplomat of sorts, translated as follows: "The British Premier begs to observe that if the Marshal means this he can understand him; if he means that he can understand him; if he means neither the Premier *is at a loss to know just what the Marshal means.*"

Perhaps you will permit me to mention one other occasion.

It was the practice of the Peace Conference to have the leading generals and admirals and some of their staffs meet with the Supreme War Council, when they had to do with matters in the Peace Treaty bearing on military and naval matters. After that portion of the business was transacted the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau,

would say: "Now that the business of the Supreme War Council has ended, the military men and naval experts will please retire." When they had retired only a civil organization was left, the one dealing with the Peace Treaty. On this particular occasion there was discussed the western boundary of Poland. Foch refused to leave the room. Presently Clemenceau repeated the suggestion, there being no other military man or naval man in the room but Foch. Again Foch refused to leave—he simply disregarded the suggestion, as if not hearing it. Finally Clemenceau, having in mind that Foch did not understand English, rose from his chair, went over to President Wilson, and said, "I don't know what to do; he won't leave," and then, perplexed, sat down. Presently he again rose and went over to President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George, saying that as an agreement had been made that the generals were to be there only if there was something in dispute which required their presence, and as Foch did not appear to pay any attention he was at a loss to know what next to do without offending him. Finally Balfour, who always could be depended upon in such emergencies, remarked: "I suggest we have tea." Tea was served but still Foch stayed on. At last Clemenceau spoke to Foch. I don't know what it was but it was effective and Marshal Foch got up, abruptly, and left the room.

QUESTION: *Can you express an opinion of the future in store for the Greeks in recalling King Constantine?*

ANSWER: I have just heard an opinion that is rather illuminating. It came from a man of great intelligence, accustomed to observing events in foreign countries. He told me that the only reason why Venizelos was cast out and Constantine recalled was because he thought the Greek people were in about the same state of mind as the American people at the recent election in this country. Venizelos had gone ahead and done a lot of things which redounded to the credit of Greece, but the people were tired of fighting. There is a peasant class which has been used to the idea of a king and a court, and of having the country run in the old manner. And, of course, you know that during the war Venizelos created a host of enemies by the efficient way in which he ran the country! What Constantine will do or how he will be treated by the Allies is a matter not of record but of prophecy.

QUESTION: *You say that the American standpoint on Bulgarian territory was unsuccessful and that our recommendation to give Danzig*

to the Poles was also lost. Why did the Americans have to make those concessions if they were in the right?

ANSWER: The Americans did not make any concessions. They entered upon the records not only protests but also the specific statement that the Bulgarian settlement invites war. I ask you to consider the helplessness of the American delegation at that time in holding out against the Allied solution of the Bulgarian question. We had not ratified the German Treaty, yet there we were at Paris telling the other Allies how to make peace with Bulgaria. The Americans were discredited by the Senate delay. I think that the answer that Clemenceau made on one occasion will illuminate that question. Mr. Polk commissioned me to secure the opinion of Premier Clemenceau on the Fiume question which was then leading up to one of its most critical phases. It was late in 1919. We had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the Conference was nearing its end. The apparently vacillating policy of our colleagues, toward the Italians, was embarrassing. We wanted to find out where they stood on the matter of signing the memorandum of December 9. I appealed to Tardieu, who reported his chief's answer to be: "The Americans are charming, but they are far away. When they have gone the Italians remain and as our neighbors!"

QUESTION: *Was there not a time when it looked as if the Peace Conference might break up because of the extreme policy of one of the Allies?*

ANSWER: Yes, there were a number of occasions when the Peace Conference might have broken up. Almost anything might have happened with so many nations represented, so many personalities and so many experts—perhaps half a thousand in all! Owing to the fact that President Wilson has been charged on the one hand with outrageous concessions to the Allies and on the other hand that he had always been soft with the Germans, particularly with Bulgaria, let us see just how soft he was! On a certain day three of us were asked to call at the President's house, and on the following morning at eleven o'clock we arrived. President Wilson welcomed us in a very cordial manner. I cannot understand how people get the idea that he is cold. He does not make a fuss over you, but when you leave him you feel that you have met a very courteous gentleman. You have the feeling that he is frank and altogether sincere. He remarked: "Gentlemen, I am in trouble and I have sent for you to help me out. The matter is this: the French want the whole Left Bank of the Rhine. I told M. Clemenceau that I could not consent to such a solution of the problem. He became

very much excited and then demanded ownership of the Saar Basin. I told him I could not agree to that either because it would mean giving 300,000 Germans to France." Whereupon President Wilson further said: "I do not know whether I shall see M. Clemenceau again. I do not know whether he will return to the meeting this afternoon. In fact, I do not know whether the Peace Conference will continue. M. Clemenceau called me a pro-German and abruptly left the room. I want you to assist me in working out a solution true to the principles we are standing for and to do justice to France, and I can only hope that France will ultimately accept a reasonable solution. I want to be fair to M. Clemenceau and to France, but I cannot consent to the outright transference to France of 300,000 Germans." A solution was finally found—the one that stands in the Treaty to-day.

VIII

THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND THE DISRUPTION OF TURKEY

January 28, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY WILLIAM LINN WESTERMANN, CHIEF OF THE NEAR-EASTERN DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *Apparently you believe that the United States should have accepted a mandate for Armenia and sent her soldiers there. Yet, you say we would now be in trouble had we done so. Do you still advocate such a course?*

ANSWER: It is impossible now for the United States to do for Armenia what it could have done at the time of the Peace Conference. Had we then sent 10,000 or 20,000 troops with 500 American officers, and we could have gotten them in, we could have restored the Armenian refugees and maintained order in Turkish Armenia without great difficulty. The Near-East Relief was at that time, as since, feeding both Turks and Armenians, men, women, and children, and the Turks were very appreciative of that fact. We had a moral standing in the Near East such as nobody else had, which would have carried us far. The population of Turkish Armenia, Turk and Kurd, would have welcomed us, and there would have been no trouble with Russia. Now the time is past for a successful political activity on our part.

QUESTION: *You seem to support the Zionist cause. Is not Palestine Arab in population, and is not Palestinian Zionism contrary to the idea of self-determination?*

ANSWER: In Palestine there are six Arabs to every Jew, and the special privilege granted to the Jews there is contrary to the policy of self-determination. The justification for it lies, in my mind, in the fact that the Jewish problem cannot be regarded as a local problem. It is a world problem and the problem of a very powerful people —powerful far beyond their numbers. It must be treated as a world problem. It offers to the Jewish people an opportunity to carry out their idealistic aspirations, necessary for the Jews of the world, and bound to be helpful, rather than harmful, in the tangled situation in the Near East.

QUESTION: *What do you think will be the outcome of the proposed Near-East conference in London the end of next month, and in what way do you think the treaty of Sèvres will be revised?*

ANSWER: The French papers insist that it will not be "revised," but that it will be "modified"—a fine diplomatic distinction. The French would give anything if they could get out of that muddle which they got into by putting Smyrna even under Greek administrative control and attempting, in the Tripartite Agreement, to enforce their Sykes-Picot claim in central Anatolia. No real solution of this entire Near-East problem will ever be found until all the applications of the Secret Treaties are thrown out. The French papers are now urging that the French drop their Cilician adventure and give up that Anatolian territory which they got out of the Tripartite Agreement. In December they suffered a defeat in the territory which is under their mandate. In order to make peace with the Turkish Nationalists they will be willing to modify the arrangement by which the Greeks control the Smyrna district. The Greeks will object to this; but they ought to be glad if they should lose Smyrna. It is costing the Greeks 1,500,000 drachmas a day, which they can ill afford, and they are not getting anywhere with it.

QUESTION: *Can you tell us approximately the cost to France of its occupation? Is it succeeding?*

ANSWER: I judge that means the occupation of Syria. General Gouraud, who has been in command there, made a statement, in December last, before the combined French Senatorial Committees on Foreign Affairs and Finance in answer to a similar question. He said that it had cost one billion francs last year. I doubt that the

French mandate in Syria will eventually succeed. The difficulty is that they can only send in French Colonial troops. These are Mohammedan; and that is dangerous, and they know it is dangerous. Yet the Government seems utterly incapable of the thought of giving it up. I am very much afraid of the outcome of the Syrian mandate, from the French point of view.

QUESTION: *Why do you make the distinction between Syria and Palestine?*

ANSWER: There is no real geographic distinction between Syria and Palestine, and the implied criticism is a correct one. Syria includes Palestine, and has a geographical and an ethnological unity. There is an historical distinction, because of the occupation of Palestine by the Jews in the past and the present Zionist movement. This was accentuated at the Peace Conference because of the British desire to have a buffer state on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. As Syria was to be given to France, historical Jewish Palestine became the natural unit for this political purpose.

QUESTION: *In your opinion is the Zionist state a wise policy and safe for the peace of the Near East?*

ANSWER: The Balfour declaration speaks only of a Jewish Homeland—not of a Zionist state. The Zionist movement and the independent state of Armenia were the two which promised the greatest good in the Near-Eastern situation. The Zionists have made great irrigation plans for the development of Palestine. Their influence and example will be of advantage to all the Near East.

QUESTION: *What will be the effect of Bolshevist control in Russian Armenia? Are the Armenians Bolshevists?*

ANSWER: No, absolutely not! The Armenian people, as well as the Turkish people, though they differ from each other, have nothing in common with the Russian temperament, and especially not with the Russian Bolshevists. The Armenians are extremely individualistic, and therefore non-Bolshevist.

QUESTION: *Is there any connection between the return of King Constantine and the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sèvres? How do you explain that Venizelos was summoned to Paris to discuss the Sèvres treaty?*

ANSWER: They could not keep Venizelos away. You cannot keep that man away, where Greek interests are concerned.

Yes, there is a connection between the return of Constantine and

the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. Greek political leadership has changed. France and Great Britain can now say that they granted Smyrna to Greece because of their confidence in Venizelos. They will probably assert that what they granted to Venizelos they are not bound to maintain for a leader whom they stigmatize as a pro-German brother-in-law of the ex-Kaiser.

QUESTION: *What is back of the project provided for in the Turkish treaty for a possible independent state of Kurdistan, which appears on your map?*

ANSWER: In the Turkish treaty there is a territory south of Turkish Armenia still included in Turkey, which is set off as the district of Kurdistan. There is a provision in the treaty that after a year, if the Kurds desire to form an independent state and so express themselves, the Council of the League of Nations and the Allied Powers will consider the matter. Undoubtedly the provision is connected with the British defensive policy for India. The military line of defense runs across Persia and up to the Armenian mountains. An independent Kurdistan would give them a much better defensive line and strengthen the British control over Mesopotamia. I judge that is the essential reason.

QUESTION: *What is your personal opinion of the merits of President Wilson's recent note, referring the Armenian problem back to the League of Nations on the ground that it has become part and parcel of the Russian problem?*

ANSWER: President Wilson is quite right. The history of the Russian advance over Trans-Caucasia in the nineteenth century and the geographic position of Armenia marks it as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence. Turkish Armenia lies in the pathway of Slavic Russian expansion. Soviet Russia now controls Russian Armenia. I hold no brief for Bolshevism; but we might as well be honest and face facts. Bolshevist Russia has done that thing which we have refused to do—gone in and protected the Armenians. It seems obvious to me that the Armenian question must be looked at primarily in connection with the Russian problem.

QUESTION: *Did the Turks fire first upon the Greek troops at Smyrna or did the Greeks start the massacre without provocation? How many hundred thousand Greeks and Armenians were butchered by the Turks?*

ANSWER: The massacre at Smyrna was seen by hundreds of Europeans and Americans stationed upon the Allied and American ships in the harbor of Smyrna, but nobody could tell who fired the

first shot. An Allied Commission sent out to inquire and report upon the entire situation could not settle the question as to who began the firing.

There is no doubt about the terrible massacres of Armenians by the Turks and Kurds. There were also massacres and deportations of Greeks in Asia Minor. That, however, does not affect the situation. We are not asking whether the Greeks have a right to our sympathy because of the sufferings they endured. The question is whether they can successfully rule over a greater number of Turks in the Smyrna district. The Smyrna massacre makes the answer extremely doubtful. There are about 6,000,000 Turks in Anatolia, who will exert continual pressure to regain control of Smyrna, and about 5,000,000 Bulgarians, who will press down upon the thin Greek coastal area of Thrace. It is not political wisdom to subject the Greek kingdom to the dangers of this combined pressure, in view of the fact that the Smyrna massacres have aroused bitter anger among the Turks against the Allied pro-Greek policy.

QUESTION: *You intimate that it was a mistake that the United States did not declare war on Turkey. Why? What advantage would have been gained?*

ANSWER: We should not have lost anything by declaring war, and would have been in a stronger position on the whole Near-Eastern question at the Peace Conference. When Turkish questions came up we continually met this assertion: "After all, you are not interested in this, because you were not at war with Turkey." Above all, had we been at war with Turkey, we could have sent troops into Armenia immediately after the Armistice and could have done a great deal to help the situation there, because the Turks would gladly have accepted us at that time, either temporarily or in a mandatory capacity.

IX

THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND NATIVES IN TRANSFERRED TERRITORIES

February 4, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY MANLEY O. HUDSON, LEGAL ADVISER TO AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *Have you any comments to make upon the Shantung settlement?*

ANSWER: The disposition of Germany's interests outside of Europe has, of course, greatly changed the situation in the Far East.

The enforced surrender to China of the German concessions at Tsin Tsin and at Hankow was altogether in line with the Allied effort to restore control to the peoples concerned. But the transfer of German interests in Shantung to another foreign Power has been widely condemned as a departure from the general principles of nationality and self-determination. To the Chinese it was a flat contradiction of the principles which the Allies were professing to apply to Europe; to the Japanese it was but a continuance of the policy which so many states had been following in the Far East for a score of years. If this part of the settlement is not to be defended, it can be explained and understood. The seizure of Tsingtao had been effected by Japan in 1914, and at the time of the Peace Conference Japanese troops were occupying the Shantung peninsula. Perhaps the basic parts of President Wilson's programme had not been popularized in the Far East as in the West. At any rate, after the failure of their attempt to get a provision on racial equality embodied in the Covenant of the League, Japan's representatives seem to have attached more importance to their desire that the Treaty should not call upon Japan to withdraw from Shantung, but should recognize her succession to Germany's position. Both France and Great Britain had agreed, at a time when their conduct of the war needed naval cooperation, to support Japan's claim at the Peace Conference. As the time approached for submitting the conditions of peace to the Germans, it was becoming more difficult to withhold satisfaction to Japan's demands, and when the dissolution of the Conference was threatened by the disaffection of the Belgians and the actual withdrawal of the Italians, the Japanese insistence succeeded. A promise was given to President Wilson and Mr. Balfour that Shantung would be completely restored to China within a reasonable time, and the well-known agreement between Japan and China in 1915 had stipulated for conditional restoration. With the recent election of China to a place on the Council of the League of Nations, her government is certainly in a better position to insist on the redemption of that promise. Indeed, it would seem to be another situation like the enforcement of the minority treaties and the supervision over the mandates—where if the League did not exist it would have to be created.

QUESTION: *Will the refusal of the United States to ratify the minorities treaties which you have enumerated with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Greece mean the failure of this part of the work of the Peace Conference?*

ANSWER: I think it will not mean the failure of that part of the work. I think it will go on if the League of Nations lives, whether the United States ratifies these treaties or not. It seems to me that this is a part of the American responsibility which we have not fully appreciated in this country. It was an American President who introduced it, and it was the hope of America that brought about the nationalistic revolt in southeastern Europe. I think, therefore, that we have a very distinct obligation to the minorities in relation to race and religion in each of these countries, whose political future we have attempted to fashion. The Peace Conference itself did not have the decision as to Austria-Hungary, which was taken long before. We dealt with their future by prosecuting the war as we prosecuted it during 1917 and 1918, and we battled for the support of the dissatisfied nationalities in old Austria-Hungary, giving them help to achieve their freedom. It seems to me that we have a distinct responsibility, therefore, to see that the provisions of these minorities treaties are not permitted altogether to go by the board.

What is the United States going to do? I do not doubt at all that some future American Secretary of State will have to appeal to the governments that are signatories and that have ratified those treaties, as John Hay appealed to the signatories in another treaty with Poland when he sought to protect the Jews in 1902.

QUESTION: *Do you consider adequate the provisions for enforcement of the minority treaties by the Council and Court of the League of Nations? Why shouldn't an aggrieved minority be permitted to prosecute its appeal directly? Why was it not made possible for any member of the League to file a complaint?*

ANSWER: It seems to me that this question is based upon a very sound criticism of the scope of these treaties. I have felt all along that it ought to have been made possible for any member of the League of Nations and not simply a state represented on the Council to espouse the cause of the Jews in Poland on terms like those employed on behalf of Jugo-Slavia. The American delegation stood out for enabling any member of the League of Nations to make that appeal, but it was necessary to yield many things, and that was one that was yielded.

QUESTION: *Why were mandates superimposed on people, for instance on Syria?*

ANSWER: The first part of the question attacks the whole mandate system. I suppose the person who asked it would not suggest

that the natives of Southwest Africa should be permitted to govern themselves. I think one might as well have suggested that the American Indians should have been given the government of our continent. A great deal is to be said for that, but with the competition in economic spheres of all sorts I think it is quite impossible for the outside world to keep its finger out of the German Southwestern part of Africa. It is a very rich country and the foreigners who go there are bound to get into trouble with the natives. For territories of that kind I think the mandate system was inevitable. I do not intend to defend the expansion of a system of this sort to countries like Syria, except that the protection of the people demands some scheme of this sort to prevent their exploitation by foreigners.

QUESTION: *The Declaration of Independence declares governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." Does this statement differ from President Wilson's principle of "self-determination"?*

ANSWER: We think President Wilson's principle is looking in the same direction. I am sure we should have as many opinions as we have people here. Self-determination is not a cure-all for map-making. It seems to me to be merely a method. One must decide that he is going somewhere before he needs decide how he is going to travel. It seems to me that self-determination does not tell you where you are going, although it may help along the way. The United States decided for Austria-Hungary in the early part of 1918 as to where they were going, and self-determination was the coach in which they travelled. Personally I find it exceedingly difficult to get any help from such statements as that of the Declaration of our Independence.

QUESTION: *Under what class of mandate was Smyrna given over to Greece?*

ANSWER: Not under any mandate. I am not at all sure that her case does not constitute a departure from the text of Article twenty-two (xxii) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Does that Article go so far as to apply to what was formerly all of the Turkish territory? I think this construction of the terms used in that article is not unsound. Then why is not the mandate applied in the case of Greece? I do not know, but I should be inclined to believe that it was more due to Mr. Venizelos's silver tongue than to anything else.

QUESTION: *What is the present status of any mandate for Armenia?*

ANSWER: A number of Powers were asked to take the mandate for Armenia and they all refused. The United States was asked and the United States refused. Persons who called themselves the representatives of the Armenian Government were permitted to sign the treaty of peace with Turkey. I will leave it to my learned colleague whether that constitutes making it an independent state.

QUESTION: *Will you tell us something of the action and reaction of personalities on this subject of protection of minorities? What was Clemenceau's attitude, for example?*

ANSWER: As to M. Clemenceau's attitude, I was never able to discover that he had any. M. Clemenceau, in my observations of him, was capable of having decided attitudes; he was also capable of as decided neutrality. On the subject of minorities he "sat," and that was all, but if any one is interested in the reaction of personalities I think it ought to be said that it was President Wilson's interest and it was his desire to protect the Jews of Europe, as the American Jews here demand that they should be protected, which made the whole thing possible. It was an American proposition first that something be done for the protection of the minorities, and that proposal had the strong support of certain persons in the British delegation, and it had the very strong support of a few people in the Italian delegation, who had spent a great deal of time in the Balkans. But in the main it was the kind of thing which might have been permitted to go by the board in the Conference like many other matters that came before the Paris Conference. There were many questions which were permitted to fall over to one side. I think that this was not permitted to do so owing to the insistence of the American Jews of whom I was speaking, and the insistence of President Wilson himself. But, in that connection another personality is to be mentioned—Lord Robert Cecil. His father sat in the Congress of Berlin, and it was he who had been responsible for the promise exacted from Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, requiring all those states to protect religious minorities. Lord Robert Cecil took for that reason, as for many others, a live interest in that part of the Conference and did much to forward the work. He would have gone so far as to have allowed an appeal to the League of Nations by any committee of Jews or by any individual Jew or any individual member of any minority.

QUESTION: *How about Ireland?*

ANSWER: It seems to me that Ireland is a place where we have

needed for many years the kind of religious toleration which was aimed at by the Paris Conference in these minorities treaties. If I know anything of the conditions in Ireland my opinion is that they have been more than a little due to the struggle between the religious groups, and I wonder whether the extension of the principle of religious toleration which we have attempted to envisage in those treaties should not be remedial; I wonder whether that principle would not contribute something to peace within the island for Ireland itself. As soon as we talk about the self-government of nationalities trouble arises from the opposition of those who would like to see Ireland united and independent. I know of no place where the practical lines of the doctrine of self-determination or the doctrine of nationalities are more obvious than on the island of Ireland itself.

QUESTION: *Was it actually proposed to the Italians and French that they give guarantees for the German minorities in the Trentino and Alsace-Lorraine respectively, and did they refuse to give them?*

ANSWER: As to Alsace-Lorraine, no such proposal was made. The Alsace-Lorraine question came to the Peace Conference a question settled by the arbitrament of arms. No proposal was made, and I doubt whether one would say that any provision like those which I have described for protecting religious and racial minorities would be necessary; as to the linguistic minorities, I doubt whether any special provision was necessary in Alsace-Lorraine. Instead of the Germans enforcing their demands, and in spite of the German rule, I understand that most of the French population have continued to speak French. As to the Trentino, the suggestion was made to the Italian delegation that guarantees of this sort ought to be given for the 400,000 Germans who are transferred to Italy. The Italian delegation felt that it was entirely inconsistent with its position as a principal power to have any such suggestion made.

QUESTION: *Does not the maintenance of their own schools by the various nationals produce in the new European states poor standards of liberal education—will not such separate schools become the centre of secession agitation?*

ANSWER: In this country the suggestion that we have separate schools has always been met, I think, by the criticism that they would mean inferior standards in those schools. Surely that could not be true among the Germans who are transferred to Poland; the Germans surely would maintain as efficient schools as the Poles. Among the Jews in Poland one may very well say that their schools would probably be less efficient.

X

THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER

January 21, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY JAMES BROWN SCOTT, LEGAL ADVISER TO AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *In your opinion, what amount of actual sincerity was there back of the demand for the Kaiser's delivery?*

ANSWER: Mr. Lloyd George evidently was in earnest, for in December, 1919, just before the opening of the Conference, he went before the country, in England, I understand, with the cry of "Hang the Kaiser and make Germany pay for the war." Mr. Clemenceau appeared to have been in earnest inasmuch as France had suffered extremely. Beyond these two Powers, there was, I think, little desire to see the Kaiser tried. Italy was more lukewarm, as far as I could judge, but was unwilling to disassociate itself from its Allies. Japan positively refused to be a party to it and filed a dissenting opinion repudiating any law or custom by which a sovereign could be tried or should be tried. The United States stood like a rock against the trial of the Kaiser for a criminal offense. As to the resolution of compromise, in regard to which I made a statement, an agreement was had to request the extradition of the Kaiser, to place him before a so-called political court to be tried for an offense against morality and to be punished according to the principles of high political policy. That was quite late in the Conference and by that time, I think, they had taken the measure of Holland and had ascertained that no amount of persuasion would force that devoted little country to violate the principles of international law concerning hostility or its own traditions, and that if force were used Holland would stand against any amount of force that the Allied Governments might care to bring against it. Now, ladies and gentlemen, at the end it was simply an attempt to get out of an embarrassing situation by, may I use a Washington phrase, "passing the buck" from the Allies and Associated countries over to Holland, where the "buck" appears to be at present.

QUESTION: *Did Japan's stand with the United States mean that she disapproved of the Kaiser's trial on the same grounds as those of the Americans?*

ANSWER: The American opinion was more elaborately reasoned.

The Japanese dissenting opinion was very brief but extremely to the point, saying that "it did not believe that there was any criminal law or statute or custom by which the Kaiser could be tried for the commission of a criminal offense, and that Japan was averse on principle to the trial of the Heads of States."

QUESTION: *Did not Mr. Lansing propose an indictment of the Kaiser? Why was not this adopted?*

ANSWER: I think the answer I shall give you is correct, because I have the text here of Mr. Lansing's proposal, and if it be your pleasure, to lay it before this meeting, I wish to read it. It has not been published.

RESOLUTION SUGGESTED BY MR. LANSING AT THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, MARCH 12, 1919[1]

It is recommended that the Conference of the Allied and Associated Governments issue at the time of the signature of a Treaty of Peace with an enemy Power, and annex the same to such Treaty, the following declaration:

Declaration by the Representatives of (name of countries) in Conference Assembled.

The moral right to wage war only exists when there is an imperative necessity to employ force in the protection of national life, in the maintenance of national right or in the defense of liberty and humanity.

War inspired by any other motive is wanton, needless and violate of international morality and justice. It cannot be justified.

Judged by this standard the war which was begun in 1914 was unrighteous and indefensible. It was a war of aggression. The masters of the Central Powers, inflamed by the passion to possess the territory and sovereignty of others, entered upon a war of conquest, a war which in magnitude, in waste of life and property, in merciless cruelties and in intolerable woes, surpasses all wars of modern times. The evidence of this moral crime against mankind is convincing and conclusive.

Restrained by reverence for law which is inseparable from that high sense of justice which is essential to social order, the nations which have suffered so grievously may be unable to mete out through judicial channels retribution to the guilty. But the authors of this atrocious war ought not to pass unscathed into history. They should be summoned before the bar of universal public opinion to listen to the verdict which mankind passes upon the perpetrators of this greatest crime against the world.

Therefore, in the name of those who sacrificed their lives that liberty might live, in the name of the helpless who endured unspeakable atrocities, in the name of those whose ruined and plundered lands bear witness to the wickedness of the accused, in the name of humanity, of righteousness and of civilization, an outraged world denounces as infamous and demands the judgment of the ages against William of Hohenzollern, once German Emperor and King of Prussia, etc., etc.

[1] Minutes of the meetings of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, p. 37.

MR. LANSING'S SUGGESTION OF APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE KAISER. AT THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, MARCH 12, 1919[1]

In view of the official and personal influence which the ex-Kaiser possessed and exercised upon the course and conduct of the war, and in view of the immunity from suit and prosecution which a Monarch and Chief of State enjoys according to the municipal law of every civilized country and also according to the Common Law of Nations, and lest because of this immunity from judicial process the ex-Kaiser escape the condemnation which his misdeeds require, the third Sub-Commission recommends that, instead of attempting to hale the ex-Kaiser before a Court of Justice for which there is no precedent in the accepted Law of Nations, an International Commission of Inquiry be instituted to investigate and to report upon the extent of the responsibility of the ex-Kaiser from the political, legal and moral point of view for the acts of the German authorities, civil and military, in violation of the laws and customs of war committed during the course of the war from the 1st day of August, 1914, to the 11th day of November, 1918.

The International Commission of Inquiry to be instituted for this purpose should be composed of . . . Representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and one Representative of each of the other countries at war with Germany. It should be appointed during the sessions of the Conference; the archives of the German Government should be placed at its disposal, and the report of the Commission based upon a careful examination of the evidence at its disposal should be presented by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments on the 11th day of November, 1919, and immediately made public by each of them, in order that the public opinion of the world thus enlightened and instructed may anticipate the verdict of history and render the judgment of posterity.

MR. LANSING'S SUBSEQUENT SUGGESTION FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. AT THE MEETING OF THE COMMISSION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, MARCH 13, 1919[2]

The Commission on Responsibilities recommends that—

1. A Commission of Inquiry be established to consider generally the relative culpability of the authors of the war and also the question of their culpability as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed during its course.

2. The Commission of Inquiry consist of two members of the five following Powers: United States, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan; and one member each, of the five following Powers: Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, and Serbia.

3. The enemy be required to place their archives at the disposal of the Commission which shall forthwith enter upon its duties and report jointly and separately to their respective Governments on the eleventh day of November, nine-

[1] Minutes of the meetings of the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War, pp. 37–38.

[2] Minutes of the meetings of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, pp. 57–58.

teen hundred and nineteen (November 11, 1919), or as soon thereafter as practicable.

That was submitted by Mr. Lansing. He was Chairman of the Commission of Responsibility, and this was read at a full meeting of that Commission. It was received with a certain amount of goodwill, but when it was understood that it was to stand alone and was not to be accompanied with a spectacular trial—the trial of the Kaiser for a criminal offense for violating the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity—the members of the Commission lost all interest in it and would have none of it. A trial they wanted, and were satisfied with nothing less than a trial, and the members would not be satisfied until their Chiefs-of-Staff suggested that they withdraw from their position. I think, if I may say so, two other propositions were presented to the Commission from the American members, which provided for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, to be appointed by the Conference, to meet and to examine the evidence, and to reach a judgment, and then to present this as a report to the world at large through the public press in order that the opinion expressed in the report should be examined or tested by public opinion. But as that did not involve a trial of the Kaiser, it shared the fate of the Resolution already referred to.

QUESTION: *Did President Wilson ever express himself as to any form of punishment for the Kaiser?*

ANSWER: It is my understanding that President Wilson regarded the trial of the Kaiser for a criminal offense as entirely out of place and as unjustifiable, and that he refused to be a party to it. Because of his refusal the Supreme Council rejected the majority report of the Commission of Responsibility, and as a compromise agreed upon an article according to which the Kaiser, if the Allies could get their claws upon him, should be arraigned for an offense against international morality. President Wilson thought, as I believe, that this was the most that could be permitted, and that it would not be a legal but a political offense and that the punishment should not be a criminal but a political punishment.

QUESTION: *If the Kaiser should by any chance leave Holland in the course of succeeding years, are the Allies bound by the Treaty to try him then?*

ANSWER: I would say to that, that the Allies are not bound by the Treaty to try him now or at any time. They reserved to themselves the right to try him if they could get their hands upon him,

and if when he seemed to be nearing the goal they then wish to try him, it is a right which they reserve, but it is not a duty which they have imposed upon themselves.

QUESTION: *Why did Lloyd George object to the inclusion of President Wilson's express denial that the Kaiser's offense was criminal?*

ANSWER: Well, of course, I am not here this evening as the official mouthpiece of Mr. Lloyd George. Our views would differ somewhat in this matter. I should imagine, however, that inasmuch as Mr. Lloyd George had denounced the Kaiser as a criminal and had made some pointed remarks upon the hustings about the Kaiser's liability that he could not at Paris deny the validity of his own statements. The South African delegates were bitterly opposed to a criminal trial. It is well known that General Botha stood like a rock. He knew, as commander-in-chief of the Boer forces, what defeat was and, I understand, he did not intend to be a party to the signing of a document to try the Kaiser. It is supposed that this rather led Mr. Lloyd George to put up with less than he had hoped to get; it was feared that there would be a protest on the part of the South African delegates.

QUESTION: *Do you regard it as inexpedient that the head of a State should ever be tried by an international court for moral crimes against other nations?*

ANSWER: That question asks my personal opinion, and I am not willing to give it. I think, however, it is best for nations themselves to take care of their chief executives. We do so by apt provision in the Constitution of the United States, and we always adjust our own mistakes with our own punishment. It would be exceedingly disagreeable, and Mr. Lansing said so in the Commission, if our own Chief Executive were tried by an international court; because the United States could not submit that any sovereignty other than the sovereignty of the United States should try its own chief executive. If, however, nations should agree that in certain cases in the future, if offenses be committed in the future, the chief of the State should be tried, then, of course, they have agreed to it. Personally, I think that would be unfortunate, and I hope it will never be attempted.

QUESTION: *Did feeling run high within the Commission because of the disagreement over the question of the trials, and what was the "personal" situation?*

ANSWER: I see Mrs. Scott smile at the question, "Did feeling

run high?" Feeling ran about as high as feeling can run. It ran especially high in the British membership, and it ran especially high in the French members. It ran so high that relations were somewhat suspended, but I imagine they are over that feeling because last summer when I had the pleasure of being in Europe and meeting some of those gentlemen whose feeling was a little high at that time, they seemed to be glad to see me and had apparently forgotten all about it. When I ventured to suggest "the Kaiser" they laughed and said: "Oh, well, you know that is all past."

QUESTION: *What practical effects of the Two Hague Conferences were manifest during the World War?*

ANSWER: The Hague Conferences or bodies called no meeting periodically; they were not self-starters. They have to be summoned, the programme prepared in advance before the members meet and deliberate. The Powers at war were unwilling to have conferences at such time or before any time until victory had been determined one way or the other. The machinery was there before the war and in some periods of the war perhaps it might have been applied, but there was no request on the part of the Powers to make use of this machinery. It was just exactly as if you had your automobile out in front of your house ready to start and there was no starter.

QUESTION: *Could the International Court, recently held at The Hague, function, in part or in whole, as a League of Nations?*

ANSWER: The Court was framed as it has been outlined and drafted by the Committee at The Hague last Summer, and depends for its constitution upon the concurrent and independent separate action of the Assembly of the League of Nations and of the Council of the League of Nations, and therefore it presupposes the existence of the League of Nations. But if the League of Nations should not succeed, it would still be possible to use that method. Why? Because, in the Assembly of the League of Nations, every State is represented upon an equality; in the Council of the League of Nations the large Powers have a preponderance. Therefore, if the League of Nations were not to continue to function, it would be very easy for the Powers, if they so desire, to have their diplomatic agent credited to The Hague with the functions, in so far as the Court is concerned, of the Assembly of the League of Nations; they might organize an Executive Committee of the diplomatic agents, to be composed, if they so chose, in the same fashion as the Council, with

the functions of the Council, as far as the Court is concerned. The project in that way could be put into execution without change,—"without the crossing of a t or the dotting of an i."

XI

REPARATIONS

February 25, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY THOMAS W. LAMONT, ECONOMIC ADVISER TO AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *Is there any way of figuring accurately Germany's capacity to pay?*

ANSWER: There is no absolutely accurate way of determining Germany's capacity to pay. You have to take a great many different factors into consideration; you have to take the material wealth that she has, described to us by her own finance minister in such glowing language prior to the war, and you have to recognize what diminution has come to that as a result of the war; you have to figure on the earning capacity of her average citizen, and very fortunately her own statisticians—and they are not excelled in the world—gave us very good figures as to her pre-war capacity; you have to take the question of exports and imports, of course, and there is no doubt as to that. And after all is said and done, if you have figured on a certain amount each year and have been considering the figures of something like $500,000,000 a year to be paid to Belgium, you will have to take into consideration all these intangible moral considerations that I was attempting to describe a little while ago; you have also to remember that Germans are an industrious people, accustomed to work.

QUESTION: *Is there any political party or group in Germany which favors as prompt a payment as possible of the indemnities?*

ANSWER: I don't know whether there is any political party of that kind or not. I am not sufficiently informed as to the internal political situation in Germany. I can only say that the German financiers who came to Paris—not to Paris itself, but to Versailles—the German financial men were all in one accord with the idea that the sooner Germany knew what she had to pay the sooner she would adapt herself to the situation and the sooner they would be likely to pay it. I have no doubt that even to-night they are figuring on

what kind of proposition they should make to Great Britain and France on the subject as it has been presented during the past week, and there is a great, growing number in Germany that wants the thing settled and settled promptly.

QUESTION: *Did the Allies plan to destroy or to maintain Germany's economic life?*

ANSWER: While, of course, the Allies made no plans to destroy Germany's economic life, there were enough men in France who had ample justification for wanting to wipe Germany off the map; there were enough men there who wanted to see Germany destroyed. They knew somebody had to pay for the terrible damage that had been caused, and they wanted Germany to pay for it instead of themselves. That was not unnatural. But in the course of the Peace Conference, in the clauses finally drawn very carefully, wording was admitted indicating the care and foresight with which the Allies were looking on this question of Germany's maintenance of industrial life. I have quoted one or two things on this point. One is: "The Reparation Commission is instructed to give due consideration to such domestic requirements of Germany as it deems essential for the maintenance of Germany's economic life." I think that answers the question.

QUESTION: *What has Germany paid up to the present time?*

ANSWER: The exact amount I do not know. What the Reparation Commission has figured I do not know. Germany's merchant fleet has been turned over, its fishing fleet and machinery have been turned over; of the initial payment that was to be made, approximating $5,000,000,000, therefore, I presume $2,000,000,000 or $3,000,000,000 would be a fair figure; nobody knows but the Reparation Commission, but a very substantial sum has been paid in.

QUESTION: *Has more live stock been demanded from Germany than she took from her opponents?*

ANSWER: Not so much, according to the figures furnished to us by the experts. Everybody has figured that if the Belgians had demanded from Germany as much as she had taken from them, and demanded the prompt return of it, it would probably interfere so much with Germany's agricultural life that she would be crippled agriculturally. As to the reparations demand on the return of cattle, I regard that demand as reasonable or even moderate.

QUESTION: *Was any attempt made to estimate the damage done in*

France by Allied as distinguished from German military operations? Did the Germans contend that they should pay for only the damage they caused?

ANSWER: In answering the last question: first, no, I don't think so. When the Germans considered our proposals in May, 1919, they did, as I remember it, set up some contention that there ought to be a careful discrimination made, as to whether it was an Allied shell or a German shell that destroyed a certain pig-sty; however, they never made much of a contention about it. Speaking by and large, there has been no attempt to discriminate on that point in the actually devastated districts. Germany swooped through Belgium like a cloud of locusts, and did the real damage, while a very fractional part of the damage might be caused by the retreating Belgian army blowing up a few bridges. Perhaps ungenerously we have not given quite enough credit to Germany for that.

QUESTION: *Will not the greater thrift, industry, efficiency, self-denial, required for the payment of indemnities, mean a greater, stronger Germany when the burden passes?*

ANSWER: I should think so. I should decidedly think so. That is a thing that the Allies had to fix; that is a thing that they had to contemplate. We discussed that a good many times, and certain of the delegates, especially the French, feared that they might push the thing so that they would build up a gigantic machine over there in Germany, a Frankenstein that would ultimately overwhelm them, because of their increased efficiency, but they were willing to take the chance.

QUESTION: *What is your opinion of requiring Germany to pay 12½ per cent in exports?*

ANSWER: I think it is 12 rather than 12½ per cent; however, the difference is trifling. I will answer that in this way: When I first saw that scheme proposed, that is, saw the schedule of payments as set forth, placing an extra tax of 12 per cent on all of Germany's exports, I did not think well of it. I wish, however, to say that it was an attempt to get some benefits from Germany's future increased prosperity, and so they wanted to gauge it—just as at Paris we tried to work on a basis of a maximum or a minimum; if Germany should become tremendously prosperous, France wanted to receive more damage than if she remained in the doldrums. I did not think very well of that tax, however, because it seemed to me it would require German exporters to put an additional 12 per cent to cover that

tax, which would mean higher prices to the importers throughout the world, including the Americans, which would create a sentiment and have some effect against the Allies, throughout the markets of the world. One of the French ministers cabled to me an explanation referring to the term "exports," claiming that that term was a misnomer. They were trying to find another basis for figuring reparation. All they cared for was the total of Germany's exports as a basis, and figuring on an additional 12 per cent. There was no reason why the German exporter should jack up his prices if German exports were $10,000,000 in a given year, and then an additional tax of 12 per cent were laid on. On the whole, it did not strike me as a very feasible thing to do.

QUESTION: *Has Great Britain ever asked that her own debt to the United States Government be cancelled?*

ANSWER: Not to my knowledge. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was reported the other day in the papers as saying that they had sounded out the United States Treasury on the question of certain cancellation of war debts. Of course I have no connection with the United States Treasury and do not know what conversations took place there in that department of this government. However, at Paris there was very frequently a suggestion, perfectly philosophical and practical and not in an entreating tone, that the world would be better off if some of these complicated international balances were cleared up; and some of the British delegates would inquire whether it would be wise for them to write off all the sums owing to Great Britain from these lesser Allies, amounting to $4,000,000,000. At that time we always felt that that was a question beyond our competence; that we could not discuss any question of cancellation of war debts or of refunding debts or anything of that kind; that would have to be left over until a later day for the people of America, through their Congress, to determine in their wisdom. On the general question I may say, with the utmost emphasis, that Great Britain never once proposed that we should do anything that she would not precede us in doing in the way of debt cancellation.

QUESTION: *How did the question of providing food in return for German ships bear upon the work of the Conference?*

ANSWER: Well, that was quite a moot question at one time, the question of providing food in return for German ships. Along in the early part of the Conference that was very much discussed and very heatedly. You will remember that before the armistice the

Allies put in one specific promise, stating that they would try to see that Germany was kept from starving; they did not promise to ship in so many tons of food, but the plan was for Germany to sign the armistice, and then an effort would be made to keep the infants and the children and the people of Germany from starving. I was on the Civilian Armistice Commission. We wanted to undertake to carry out that implied purpose in good faith. It was a very complicated situation, because Germany had to have food, but she had to pay for that food, and the only thing she could pay for it immediately with was gold. She had quite a lot of gold in the Reichsbank. However, the French did not want her to pay out that gold. They did not believe that she was starving. They wanted her to hold on to that gold and turn it over to the Allies for reparation in due course of time. One solution was that Germany should turn over a certain amount of ships in return for food. Some of us, I think Mr. George McFadden of your city and myself, went on a very interesting mission, first to Spa and then to Brussels, trying to have the Germans turn over their ships in payment for food, but the first negotiations on the subject came to naught.

As a matter of fact, because of this contention on the part of some of the Allies that German gold should not be turned over, that led to a very dramatic scene when we came back from Spa and reported that we had been unable to carry out this plan because one or two of the Allies objected to the gold going out. M. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Colonel House asked me to go into the next room and work out some formula—some statement. So we went into another room; they locked us in and we worked out a formula by which a certain amount of gold was to be sent with the ships. It was handed around and Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Colonel House signed it, and it was done.

XIII

THE LABOR CLAUSES OF THE TREATY

February 11, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY SAMUEL GOMPERS, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

QUESTION: *Could the Labor Charter be inimical to the interests of the United States or the working people of the United States?*

ANSWER: No. One of the particular features upon which, with my associates, I insisted was that no conference or recommendation

or convention should recommend to any country or state any condition of labor lower than the standard which already existed in that country. It was the protocol to Article XIX of the report which the Labor Legislation Commission presented to the Peace Conference. Without that protecting provision the American delegation to the Peace Conference would have refused to sign it, and would have submitted a minority report. The labor provision of the Treaty is an absolute protection to the conditions of labor in all form and against any attempt to enforce or propose lower standards.

QUESTION: *Is legislation controlling woman and child labor economically possible in Central Europe under present conditions?*

ANSWER: Until the conditions of Central Europe shall become a bit more normal than they are now, it is doubtful whether all the provisions of the Labor Charter can be enforced. As soon as practicable I think that they will be enforced. There are forty-one nations in the League, forty-one nations who are a part of International Labor. There are five nations which are not a part of the League and of the Labor Organization or the Labor Office: Russia, Turkey, Mexico, Germany, and the United States. We are in splendid company.

QUESTION: *How would international agreements on labor standards affect employers' interests?*

ANSWER: They would help to standardize minimum conditions. We know that in many countries the labor of human beings is now regarded as a commodity; that the human beings performing that labor are regarded as so much machinery; that the human side has been totally ignored. When the workers in those backward countries shall have been raised to a higher standard of economic and social and human life, they will take their part in the world's affairs, and the establishment of a minimum of standards amongst the lowest paid and poorest conditioned workers of the world will help more thoroughly to stabilize standards of life and encourage industry and commerce in every country.

QUESTION: *Would the Labor Charter act in the direction of inhibiting or restricting Bolshevism in Europe?*

ANSWER: Everything that tends toward constructive organization is an obstacle to absolute radicalism of all sorts. Every effort made by the constructive labor movement of the United States makes for the perpetuity of the American Republic. Every attempt suc-

cessfully made to weaken or in part to destroy this conservative constructive force in our American life makes for Bolshevism.

QUESTION: *Does the word "merely" in the declaration "Labor is not a commodity" depreciate the value of the declaration?*

ANSWER: It does not. I am free to say that when there was published in the newspapers the report that the word "merely" had been prefixed to the declaration that the labor of human beings is not an article of commerce, I was much perplexed. The newspapers did not publish the whole preamble nor the entire declaration, but only that the word "merely" had been added as a prefix, and that, more than anything else, prompted me to request that a message be sent to the President at Paris, and the reply which the President returned and the comparison with the text that we have in the United States convinced me that the use of the word "merely" had no effect other than to strengthen the declaration. For instance, if I were to say, "A man is entitled to his rights as a citizen," and then added this declaration, "A man is not merely entitled to his rights as a citizen, but they must be guaranteed to him," that does not weaken the first declaration, but strengthens it.

QUESTION: *What was the attitude of the Japanese and Chinese commissioners concerning the labor provisions—particularly that calling for a forty-eight-hour week and a weekly day of rest?*

ANSWER: The Japanese commissioners abstained from voting. They declared they had no instructions from their government either one way or the other. I don't think the Chinese were represented in our commission.

QUESTION: *What is a "proper standard of living"? Is it the same for any one who works hard as for one who loafs?*

ANSWER: Individually, I should think that the questioner might answer for himself. Speaking as for the people, I should say that a proper standard of living should conform to the American concept of comfort, to the time and civilization in which we live; that changes with every day, with every year, with every decade, and the standard of life as among America's workers to-day compared to the standard of life of ten years ago, will show quite a transformation. There are contributions to our comfort and convenience, to the standards of life, which are now of every-day use and which were practically unknown in the homes of the working people in our country a decade or two ago. It is a condition of constant transition,

and I hope that the standards will continue to increase and improve, and that America shall go onward and forward as the leader in the civilization of the world.

QUESTION: *What was the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau toward the labor provisions?*

ANSWER: Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were ardent supporters not only of the Treaty but of the League of Nations and of the Labor Charter.

QUESTION: *Is it likely that the provisions of the Labor Charter will be applied in the countries under mandatories?*

ANSWER: We have every hope and belief that they will at the earliest possible practical opportunity.

QUESTION: *Of what practical use is "Labor's Bill of Rights" to American labor?*

ANSWER: It is the enunciation of purposes and principles. One might just as well ask: "What is the Declaration of Independence worth to the people of the United States?" It has done much to inspire the American people, and it has done more—it has helped to spread the Gospel of Freedom and Justice throughout the world. It may be questioned whether the provision in the Labor Treaty will have any practical result upon the people of the United States directly. As I have already indicated, its greatest value is to help the people of those most backward countries that they may take their stand in their own battles, and voice the hopes and ideals for self-achievement in their own lives and in their own country. You cannot improve the standards of life among a people in any other country but what it will react advantageously upon the people of our own country.

QUESTION: *Why was not the United States represented by delegates at the first International Labor Conference held in Washington in October, 1919?*

ANSWER: For the very good reason that we had not ratified the Treaty, the League of Nations, nor the Labor Treaty. We were no party to it and not entitled to delegates. We were in this anomalous position: The government of the United States invited other governments to send delegates to Washington to attend the International Labor Conference in October, 1919, and here we were hosts of guests and yet had not the right to say a word or participate in

the conference. I was invited to participate in the conference, I suppose, as the executive officer of the labor movement of our country and as President of the International Labor Commission, and I was given the right to speak but not the right to vote. I attended one of the meetings of that conference at Washington, and upon one of those subjects under discussion I availed myself of my right to speak, and did speak, and at the conclusion of my address, the question was put to a vote and thoughtlessly I raised my hand. Then it suddenly occurred to me that I was trespassing far beyond my rights in that meeting. The indignity of it all was too appalling for me to remain or attend another conference.

The reason that we were not represented there was because we had no right to be represented, because we did not ratify the Treaty, and may I say this: I am deeply impressed by the keen attention which you have given to my address, as well as to the answers which I have tried to give to the questions propounded. I think there is a great service to be performed by the organization which is conducting these lectures. There ought to be a better understanding among the people of the United States of what the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles mean. I decline to accept as final the declaration that the votes cast last November formed a declaration on the Treaty of Peace. (Prolonged applause.) Men have said that the United States is so far away from the other countries. Is she? One hundred and fifty years ago we were far away from Europe. We now travel to Europe from the United States in six days. That, one hundred and fifty years ago, took over seven weeks. We have seen that the United States transferred 2,000,000 of our American boys, with all the accoutrements and necessities of war, across the seas within a year. We know that we can communicate with the other lands and with the remotest parts of the world in a few minutes by cable and wireless. All our industry, all our commerce, all our social, political, and industrial lives are now so intermingled with the world that we can no longer regard ourselves as absolutely apart from the struggles, the progress, and the travail of the world. Instead of the world's affairs being decided without our people, the Government of the United States being unrepresented, we ought to have a vote and a voice and influence, and would have, if the people had but the sense and determination to say that the Treaty shall be ratified by the Senate of the United States.

XV

THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN THE GREAT WAR

March 4, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY ADMIRAL HENRY T. MAYO, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ATLANTIC FLEET

QUESTION: *Why were the British at first doubtful regarding the North Sea Mine Barrage project?*

ANSWER: The particular objection was at first advanced in the Grand Fleet. The commander-in-chief did not like the idea of putting a mine barrage across the North Sea on account of interference with shipping. He thought it might be quite as dangerous to the friend as to the foe. In the Admiralty they were a little doubtful of success because it was a new invention. I think they were somewhat doubtful of our ability to produce the mines in sufficient number. Undoubtedly, having never heard of mine operations by the United States, I think they were rather doubtful of our ability to lay these mines successfully.

QUESTION: *Was there any reason for not rushing naval vessels to Europe as soon as the United States entered the war?*

ANSWER: To answer that question, I think it is necessary to refer to the condition that existed before the war began. The whole desire of the Administration and, no doubt, the country, was to avoid being drawn into the war. Naturally, there was a reluctance on the part of the Administration to take any steps which would indicate fear on their part that they were going to be drawn into the war. Some of us in the Navy were rather disappointed that the conditions were as they then existed, but we were restricted. We would have been glad to have had an opportunity to have gone into it sooner. They did a lot of things that we did not know anything about. However, preparations were not made, except such as could be made in the Navy Department by the various Bureaus without attracting attention. A good many things were done in Washington of which the Department of the Navy was not cognizant, for all of which we are very thankful. After the war began it was the belief of the Navy Department that the United States fleet was the only reserve force which could be depended upon to face the Germans with in case of disaster to the British Grand Fleet, which might

take place at any time, although, of course, it was highly improbable. For this reason, up to the time when we went into the war, and for some time afterward, the desire was to keep our fleet intact until it could be determined just what the course of events would be. The German submarines were being most successfully operated. I think April was the big month, in 1918, of the submarine operation. There was a natural fear abroad, which extended to the United States, that they were going to be even more successful, and there was a fear that after a while supplies of material would fail. There was a feeling that they did not want a single ship over there which would be dependent upon their resources. That was another factor in preventing us from rushing ships over there. When I visited Europe in 1917 I found, especially over in France, that there was very great fear that we would rush men over there without accompanying them with supplies to maintain them. One French official said to me: "You must maintain your own men; you must not send them over faster than you can send supplies." There was one exception, and that exception was General Foch, who said: "What we want is men, men, men"; but he was different.

QUESTION: *How did the British trace the German submarines from the German ports?*

ANSWER: By excellent radio work and by the excellent men assigned to do that work. The German submarines had the habit of reporting at least once a day, often twice, and they supposed that it was impossible for anybody to decipher their code. But the British were very successful in deciphering their code; no matter how many times they changed it, it would only be a few days before they had it. So expert were the British radio operators they would even recognize the operators on the German submarines, and determine what submarine they were attached to. I heard one of those fellows talking, and he said, when he touched the radio: "That is U-151," or "That is U-boat No. 63." After a time their direction finders became so acute that they would determine the direction from which the signals were sent, and got cross-bearings with which to fix the position of the German submarine absolutely.

QUESTION: *Was the disappearance of the "Cyclops" ever cleared up?*

ANSWER: No, not to my knowledge. Nothing has been heard of the *Cyclops*.

QUESTION: *Is it true that President Wilson originated the convoy system?*

ANSWER: Possibly. The convoy system had been advocated by many, and had been opposed by a great many, especially in England. The United States Navy Department was not impressed with the idea at first, seeing the many difficulties. It was realized by them that going in convoy, the convoy would have to go at the slowest speed of the slowest ship, and it was a disadvantage to those who had faster boats. They also thought that it was very difficult to get the number of officers to do the extra work, but these ideas nearly all disappeared when the convoy system was tried. Admiral Sims was very insistent on it in his recommendation; so we tried it and it was finally adopted within a month after the first convoy started. However, I don't know that President Wilson ordered it.

QUESTION: *What effect is the airplane going to have on the battleship?*

ANSWER: If an airplane has a big enough bomb and drops it on a battleship it is going to make it very interesting for the battleship; but I don't believe that we have got to the point where a bomb dropped from an airplane will destroy a battleship or damage her very much, because the bombs will not go through her decks and will not disturb the turret. There is not one built that can go through a turret of a ship. One must drop these bombs from a place where they cannot be fired at from the battleship. General Mitchell, Chief of the Army Aviation Forces, says his planes can drop bombs on battleships without any trouble at all. Possibly they can, but I think it would be a very difficult thing. In spite of the fact that he says that an airplane is a very hard thing to hit, I think he would find it very different if they ran up against a barrage which has an accepted method of dealing with an airplane attack, or if they were disturbed by airplanes on the other side. It is a very difficult matter to drop a bomb from an airplane at a great height that will strike an object even as large as a super-dreadnaught. There are some computations that I heard of a short time ago which were to the effect that a plane at a height of 6,000 feet would have one-half a second of time in which the operator must decide in his mind whether or not he is at the proper point where he must release the bomb in order to make a hit. I do not think that there is any disposition to attempt to underestimate the dangers from an aviation force; on the contrary, their possibilities are realized, and I think it is the purpose in Congress and elsewhere to give it every possible chance to develop, and do everything necessary to be done to get what is possible out of aircraft of all kinds. But I am one of the conservative old cranks who think the battleships are not dead yet.

QUESTION: *How far do you believe it wise for the United States to go in a policy of disarmament?*

ANSWER: If there could be a condition of the lamb and the lion lying down together so that we do without armies entirely, we would arrive at an ideal condition. If nations could be as safe without any armament as you are in the streets of Philadelphia without a gun, I feel then that it might be, and that it would be a desirable condition. But it is impossible. Nations, like individuals, are selfish. They don't trust each other. And until the day comes when they do trust each other completely, armament must continue. This idea of disarmament is not new; it has been considered for over one hundred years. At the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the subject was brought up and strenuous efforts were made to arrive at an agreement on disarmament, or for limitations of arms. However, no conclusion could be reached. No nation wants to give up anything. All through the nineteenth century there were frequent international conferences which succeeded in accomplishing a great deal in ameliorating war troubles and in arriving at international agreements to prohibit the weapons of war, but never any agreement as to the limitations of armament. In 1899, at the instance of the Emperor of Russia, the first Hague Conference was called, with the express idea of arriving at some international agreement for limitation of armament or for the limitation of budgets to be expended for armament. I have recently gone pretty carefully over the reports of the proceedings of that conference, and the discussions were very illuminating. They show that nobody wanted to give up anything that they had. They were perfectly willing to let the other fellow cut down, but they wanted to hold everything they had which would give them an advantage. They arrived finally at the conclusion "That the various nations should seriously consider the subject of International limitations of armament, to be brought up at some future time." In 1907, at the second Hague Conference, this subject was brought up again by the representatives of Great Britain, seconded by the United States and France; the only result was the adoption again of a resolution, saying, "that in view of the material increase in military forces in the various nations, and especially in the expenditures for military purposes," they again recommended that the government seriously consider this subject. I don't think there has ever been any limitation of armament by agreement, except in one case: You remember that history tells us that there was a limitation of the army of Prussia in 1807, at the treaty with Napoleon, when Prussia was to limit her army to 42,000 men.

Nevertheless, in 1813 Prussia uncovered a trained army which was established in spite of the previous agreement. Men had been put in under short enlistment service under which they were trained by the thousands. In 1902 there was an agreement limiting the naval armament between Chili and the Argentine. This lasted for five years. At the expiration of that period it was not renewed, and they proceeded to spend as much money as they could to get hold of and to continue naval armament. In 1913 the subject of a naval holiday between Great Britain and Germany was broached in Parliament by Winston Churchill, and, as shown by his speeches in Parliament, he was perfectly willing to have a naval holiday, providing England could retain all the advantages she had; it was never taken up officially. It is a grand idea, if it were possible for nations to get together and agree that none of them would carry a gun. It would be a splendid thing to do, but they won't agree. If they said that there should be a limitation of armament, when they get together to act on the details of it, they strike so many snags that there is no conclusion arrived at.

QUESTION: *What part did the French navy perform in the war?*

ANSWER: The French, in conjunction with the Italian forces, had practically charge of the German and Austrian operations in the Mediterranean. On the Atlantic and on the North Sea, of course, the British predominated. The French also took part in the convoy operations with their cruisers, and in the patrol of the Atlantic on their own coast, and of course engaged there in mine-sweeping operations. I think the French did everything they could have been expected to do and they are entitled to the very greatest commendation. They worked their cruisers until they were ready to fall apart. They ran very little to torpedo boats, and it was for that reason that they made their first call on us to help them out in that line. Incidentally, I would like to tell you something in regard to that. Admiral Grasset called for small craft and asked that they be rushed. In answering this request our Secretary of the Navy was conservative; he would not definitely say what we could send and when. He did promise, however, that we would do the best we could. In the fall of 1918 I met Admiral Grasset, and in talking to him about naval issues at a lunch one day I said to him: "Admiral, do you remember your request and what you told us in regard to rushing small craft over when the war first began, and we sent them? Tell me how you think it turned out." The Admiral said: "You did far more than we had any idea was possible."

XVI

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

December 10, 1920

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY GENERAL TASKER HOWARD BLISS, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AND COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY

QUESTION: *General, did you say that each nation will maintain its navy? Do you mean that the United States should maintain what it has and stop building?*

ANSWER: No, what I mean is this. If an international Conference should be held and the American representatives should be asked to make a proposition, I think that it would not be wise for them to propose something at the outset that would almost certainly be rejected. I, therefore, should think it better for them to pass over, or defer to the last, any proposition relating to fortifications and navies, because those elements in international armaments are not the most dangerous menace to international peace. Heretofore, nations have not been able to accomplish anything in the way of a limitation of armaments because some one of them has always proposed, and insisted upon, at the very beginning, something that the others will not accept. I think that in this matter the nations must proceed step by step, and the first thing to do is to find out something that is practicable that they will all agree to. They have all maintained that the system of the "Nation in Arms," which was inaugurated by Germany, has been the cause of all the excessive armaments; and that the last war was fought in order to destroy that system. Because, they held, that until it was destroyed in Germany it could not be destroyed elsewhere. If they are now agreed upon anything it is to do something in the way of limiting the excessive land armaments. This, therefore, is the first step that it seems to me ought to be proposed. If, as a result of that, the constant threat of world war can be minimized, then, it is possible, the nations will of their own accord take measures to reduce their expenses in maintaining the other elements of national armaments. I do not think that for an indefinite time to come we need concern ourselves with the question of land fortifications. That is purely a domestic question. Land fortifications will not hurt any one unless some one runs up against them. The fear that now exists, in some countries, of invasion by the army of some other country is

due to the existence of great military establishments on land. It is this which largely causes some of the nations to maintain great navies. They are afraid that an enemy's navy may convoy transports carrying a great army to attack them. If this latter fear can be removed or minimized the question of the navies will take care of itself. Nations will not long maintain navies of excessive strength if they are once relieved of the fear of attack by great foreign armies. To sum it all up, there are three things which constitute the elements of national armaments:

1st. Land fortifications.

2nd. Navies.

3rd. The land military establishments resulting from the doctrine of the "Nation in Arms."

The first two of these are the cheapest and constitute the least menace to international peace. These questions, therefore, in an international Conference to discuss the limitation of armaments could well be discussed last, or left to take care of themselves. But if we cannot come to some reasonable agreement in respect to the overweening land military establishments, there is little hope of accomplishing anything.

QUESTION: *In your opinion do you consider the submarine was an effective means of warfare during the late World War?*

ANSWER: In the last war, I should say, the effect of the submarine was like that of a two-edged sword,—cutting both ways. It was very effective from the point of view of the Central Powers in that it destroyed millions of tons of shipping that could otherwise have been used in the transportation of troops, food-supplies and military supplies of all kinds for the Allies. Its effect was against the Central Powers in that its ruthless use stimulated the passions of the Allies for a more bitter and prolonged war and, ultimately, by creating at least one more active enemy in causing the United States to declare war. In every war new agencies of destruction are introduced. Some of these agencies prove at once so effective that they are immediately adopted by both sides in the war. Some of them prove to be ineffective, adding merely to the bitterness of the struggle, but really accomplishing nothing in deciding the war. Some of them prove to be not very effective while, at the same time, experts in such things are satisfied that by further improvement they may become very effective in the next war. These latter agencies are, therefore, likely to be legalized and developed and their use become habitual in succeeding wars. Even those who think that the submarine was not

very effective in the last war know that it developed possibilities of effectiveness, after further improvement, in future wars and that, therefore, the submarine has come to stay. In the same way, airplanes and tanks developed an increasing effectiveness which has caused them to be recognized as necessary parts of national armaments for the future. Limiting your question to the submarine, I have no doubt that this weapon will be an enormously powerful agency of defense for use by the United States in protecting our coast and harbors against attack.

QUESTION: *With new developments, coming out of this war, such as the submarine and airplane, will their use make it more difficult or less difficult, if we were not prepared in the United States to defend ourselves against an aggressive nation which is better prepared?*

ANSWER: If your question means this: Can the United States safely neglect preparation in time of peace and, in case of sudden attack by a powerful, aggressive and prepared enemy, find some safe agency of defense developed by the recent war? I think that the question should be answered in the negative. So long as war is possible or probable, safety in defense will consist in being equally well prepared with the possible aggressor. At the same time, I think that the last war developed certain agencies for defense that may enable an unprepared nation to more quickly prepare itself to meet an emergency, but these agencies are, for the most part, those that will be developed in a great industrial nation. All of the chemical agencies that are used in modern war can be prepared relatively quickly in establishments that are engaged in peaceful productions. If such establishments exist in great numbers in one country and not in another, they give the former a great relative advantage over the latter. In the same way a nation which, in time of peace, should develop the use of airplanes for commercial purposes would find itself on the approach of war already provided with a very powerful agency for defense. One of the great advantages of Germany in the recent war was the fact that so many of her peaceful establishments could be rapidly diverted to the production of material for war. From this point of view, your question would be answered in the affirmative, provided the United States developed in time of peace the industries which could rapidly supply in large numbers such things as submarines, airplanes, tanks, and chemical products for our defense. Even in that case our safety would have to depend upon our relative isolation, which might give us time to divert these industries to the manufacture of material for war. But if war is to

come, the only real assurance of defense is to be prepared for it in advance.

QUESTION: *How far or by what means do you think we must clear the ground of Bolshevism, before we can go on to a realization of peace?*

ANSWER: If Bolshevism were to be limited to a governmental theory and were to be confined to Russia, I think we could clear the ground right away. Bolshevism is a theory which is propagated in two ways: first, by written and spoken propaganda and, second, by force of arms. When it is propagated in the first way, it can be kept out of a country only by fighting it with a similar propaganda, —by convincing the people that it is not a good thing and that something else is better. It is when Bolshevism is propagated in the second way that it becomes a menace to international peace. If the Bolsheviks of Russia attack another country in order to spread its doctrines, or for any other purpose, that other country must be prepared to resist it by force. And I recognize this as one of the unfortunate things that may delay a general limitation of armaments. But there is no use of talking about stopping by force of arms what you might call a peaceful propaganda of Bolshevism as it comes out of Russia. Armies cannot keep the theory of Bolshevism from penetrating the United States or England or France or from any other country to which the adherents of that theory want to carry it. At one time during the Peace Conference there was some talk of establishing a military sanitary cordon from the Baltic to the Black Sea to stop the progress of Bolshevism. Of course, every one knew that that would not stop the progress of the idea of Bolshevism although it might stop the progress of Bolsheviks. When this idea of Bolshevism penetrates any country and the result of this penetration is to bring on internal disorder, perhaps even revolution, the government of that country may have to fight it by force. In the course of my discussion I have recognized this possibility as one of the things that will require each country to maintain a military force for the preservation of order within its own boundaries. No government can be expected to contemplate the possibility of its own destruction. It must have power to maintain itself, but that is a very different thing from having the excessive armament necessary for international aggression and war. So far as the general question is concerned, our main hope lies in the destruction of Bolshevism from its own internal forces tending to disrupt it.

QUESTION: *Do you not think, General, that treaty arrangements between great powers will be more efficacious in maintaining peace than*

disarmament? That is, an alliance such as existed before 1914? If England had united with France and Russia at the outset, would not that have been more efficacious than disarmament?

ANSWER: If all of the great Powers entered into an alliance for the purpose of maintaining peace, it would doubtless be effective so long as the alliance continued, but who can possibly maintain that, as long as such an alliance existed, it would be necessary to support the present excessive military establishments? As a matter of fact such an alliance has never existed, and there is no reason in history for believing that it can exist. These great armaments existed because of certain national policies which caused the great Powers to be afraid of each other. If these policies can be modified, armaments would undoubtedly be reduced, because no nation will bear the burden longer than it thinks absolutely necessary. So long as nations have mutually antagonistic policies they cannot be united in a common alliance, but they almost certainly will be united in two groups of alliances and that is the thing which I have pointed out as the primary cause of the last war. The nations whose policies were, for the time at least, the more sympathetic with each other united together. And that brought them into two groups whose policies were more or less antagonistic to each other. But assume that such an alliance as your question presupposes were in existence. It is perfectly evident that as those nations differ in wealth and in population some of them—if they are all armed to the extent of their ability—will have bigger armies and navies than the others. When any important question comes up which they must settle among themselves, how can there be any possibility of peaceful discussion of it so long as they are armed to the teeth? We all know very well that in the recent history of Europe the time came more than once when, in the so-called peaceful discussion of some question of common interest and affecting the common peace, Germany placed her sword in the balance and weighed down the scales of justice in her favor. Or, take a more familiar illustration and suppose that I and a half dozen other gentlemen here were to assemble about this table to discuss some very important questions affecting all of us. All of us know that in a fair discussion each one must be prepared to give and take, but suppose that as we sit down at the table you see the handle of a pistol sticking out of my hip-pocket and I see the handle of a butcher knife sticking out of yours, is it not evident that the first question that will be asked will be: "What are we going to do with these arms? will you lay your knife down if I put my pistol down?" If either of us says "No," is it not evident

that there is an end to our discussion? Is it not evident that in an alliance of the great Powers the first question will be: "How can we limit our armaments to such a point that we will have no special fear of each other?" It may be that we will still have our scraps but no one of us would endure that situation very long so long as any one of us had the power to lay his pistol on the table and say: "Gentlemen, there is my final argument." Suppose that Germany and the Central Powers were in such an alliance just before the beginning of the recent war. What would prevent them from saying, if they so desired: "This alliance will not agree to our doing certain things that we want to do; we are armed to the teeth; we believe that we are stronger than the rest of the alliance and can whip it, and we intend to do so." That is exactly what they did do and they, or any other nations, will continue to do the same thing as long as they feel that they are able to enforce their will.

QUESTION: *General Bliss, was any effort made at any of the different peace conferences at Paris to recognize the reduction of national armament to the lowest point consistent with national safety?*

ANSWER: It was recognized in Article VIII, second chapter of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Again it was recognized in the Preamble to the military terms of peace with Germany.

QUESTION: *If one Nation should refuse to disarm, how could you compel it?*

ANSWER: It has not been suggested that the United States should absolutely disarm, but should only limit its armament within reasonable limits. In answer to your question I should say that this question of limitation of armaments is of serious concern to the great Powers alone, which are small in number. The hope of getting the consent of these to some reasonable limitation lies in their utter exhaustion from the last war and the universal dread of a similar one in the future. If any one of these great Powers should positively refuse to consider the question of any limitation of its armament, it would be equivalent to a declaration that it proposes to carry out its national policies by force of arms, if necessary. There would at least be one good result from an international Conference on this subject, even if it did nothing more than to elicit such a declaration from one of the great Powers, and that is this: we would then know which one is to be the next Germany, and we would the more cheerfully pay our taxes to be ready to destroy it. In short, I see no hope except from a common agreement among the five great powers. I

have no specific proposition to advance as to any particular scheme for a limitation of armaments. The main thing that I want to impress upon you is the necessity of promptly holding an international Conference on this subject, composed of the most far-seeing statesmen. There is no doubt that such statesmen want to do something and our main hope is in getting them together while that spirit is strong in them.

QUESTION: *Is not the practical result of your proposition likely to lead to the control of the world by England and America through their navies?*

ANSWER: If the United States and Great Britain wanted to enter into a formal alliance for the control of the world, they doubtless could accomplish a great deal in that direction. Ultimately, it would be the ruin of both of them. If they have the slightest intention of doing what your question implies, you can be sure that they will not put any limitation on their armaments. It is for you, as an American, to say what our attitude on that question shall be. If in the last resort it is our wicked purpose to control the world, there would be at least some financial advantage in doing it with navies alone rather than with the superadded cost of armies. But, speaking seriously, I do not think that there is any danger of navies alone, to whomsoever they may belong, dominating the world. No navy alone has conquered any territory. It has to be supported by military forces to do this. The English Navy by itself has not interfered with the lawful trade of any other country. Nor has the American Navy done so; nor will it do so. And, if there is any one lesson to be learned from the recent world war, it is this: the world as a whole will not endure its domination by any one Power or combination of them. The world will fight to prevent it and destroy that combination just as certainly as we destroyed the combination of the Central Powers whose object, also, was world-domination. As I have already said so often, in one form of words or another, if the great Powers still intend to pursue the phantom of world-domination, there is no hope of limiting the armaments that they think necessary for that purpose. The world will then have to continue the system which has already brought it to the verge of ruin and we can do nothing more than pray God that our civilization will continue to stand the strain.

QUESTION: *General, do you think such a proposition would be received cordially by Europe?*

ANSWER: I do not know how the national leaders, who are influenced by their secret knowledge of their national policies, would receive it, but I am sure that the vast mass of the peoples would receive it cordially.

QUESTION: *In your opinion, don't you think the time will be hastened toward disarmament if the United States should get into this agreement with the nations?*

ANSWER: I am not quite sure what you mean by "getting into this agreement with the nations." If you mean getting into an agreement with the nations in respect to a limitation of their armaments, of course I believe that the solution of the problem will be hastened. None of the great Powers will agree to do anything unless they all agree to do it. If the United States does not enter into an agreement with the other Powers on this subject, there will be no limitation of armaments. On the other hand, if the United States makes such a proposition and demands its fair consideration, I believe that all will accede to it as far as it is possible. In fact, I believe the solution is largely in the hands of the United States. We will hasten it by making the first step toward the agreement. The United States should take advantage of its influence, which is enormous at this moment, to demand that the nations sit down and talk the matter over. We, and the other great Powers, have been spending since the armistice more money on our military establishments than ever before in time of peace. What are we and they doing this for? We are doing it because we still profess to be afraid of each other. If this fear is not, in its entirety, well-founded neither we nor they want to spend so much money for this purpose; if we find that it is well-founded, we want to go ahead with our preparations and spend even more money. If we can have a fair Conference on this subject we and they may find out that it is not necessary to spend so much for such a purpose, and we may rest assured that as soon as the common people should believe that it is not necessary the money will not be forthcoming for this purpose. I believe that it will be possible for wise statesmen of the United States to make some proposition which, when known and understood by the common peoples of the great Powers, will result in its acceptance and in a material relief from present burdens as well as a materially increased assurance of future peace. The United States can materially hasten this movement.

QUESTION: *In view of Germany's constant effort to evade the provisions of the treaty in furnishing coal and rolling-stock, etc., how can you rely on her professions and on her promises?*

ANSWER: In answering that question I shall state, first of all, that I am not prepared to accept the extreme view that there is a constant effort on the part of Germany to avoid the provisions of the treaty, —at least in so far as those provisions concern the subject that we are talking about to-night. The despatches in the daily press, coming from all kinds of sources, are enough to show that, even outside of Germany, there is no unanimity of belief that all of these provisions can be complied with at the time contemplated by the treaty. Nevertheless, in regard to the provisions that at this moment concern us, I am satisfied, from inquiries of all those who are in a position to know, that the provisions relating to disarmament have been carried out as rapidly as could reasonably be expected and, of course, that is the thing of the greatest importance. No one supposes that Germany or any other beaten enemy will cheerfully and gladly comply with onerous conditions of peace. The main thing is to be assured that she cannot fight in order to avoid compliance with the treaty, and her inability to fight depends entirely upon the success of her disarmament. The recent official report made by the French Prime Minister to the Chamber of Deputies shows that this disarmament has been very satisfactorily completed. When you think of the amount of armament that the Germans surrendered at the time of the armistice, the still greater amount that was abandoned by them in the disorganization of their army immediately following the armistice, and the vast amounts now officially reported to have been surrendered for destruction in compliance with the terms of the treaty, and when you think that all German arms-factories are under observation of inter-allied military commissions, it is impossible to believe that there is the material necessary to equip a German army for an international war. The French Prime Minister has reported that the disarmament has proceeded in a satisfactory manner and as rapidly as could be expected. Much of that material was scattered all over Germany and it has been a long process, naturally, to get possession of it in order to destroy it. Large inter-allied military commissions are and have been travelling all over Germany, and it is impossible that anything really worth speaking of has escaped their attention. Of course, I am not now speaking of Germany's failure to comply with any provision relating to reparation or anything of that sort. I am speaking only of her ability to evade compliance with "her professions and her promises" by force of arms, and I think this ability has become a negligible quantity. Of course, Germany is not doing anything in the way of compliance with the treaty because she likes it; I don't know of any defeated

nation that has ever done so. I am amazed that they have made the progress which they have in accomplishing the realization of the military conditions that we imposed on her. It would take a long time merely to read to you what those conditions are. I do not think that the average audience has a realization of what it is that Germany is required to do; and I think that in realizing the particular conditions which make it impossible for her to engage, with any hope of success, in an international war she has done very well thus far. If the Allies are determined to impose their will upon Germany in respect to the other provisions of the treaty—those relating to reparations, etc.,—they have the full power necessary to do so. As I have already pointed out to you, while there now may be millions of trained soldiers in Germany she will have no arms to put in their hands; while the Allies, also with millions of trained soldiers, have a great abundance of all the material necessary for war.

XVII

THE MAKING OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

March 11, 1921

QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY DAVID HUNTER MILLER, LEGAL ADVISER TO AMERICAN PEACE COMMISSION

QUESTION: *Was Clemenceau in favor of the League of Nations or not?*

ANSWER: I would say that Clemenceau was in favor of the League, but without much confidence in it. He believed in the balance of power; but I cannot conceive of a balance of power unless there be power on each side, and one does not like to think of the existence of a balance of power at the present time.

QUESTION: *Do you think that the League of Nations has a real existence without the United States as a part?*

ANSWER: Well, we are writing notes to it about Yap! Whether the League could finally succeed if the United States continued to stay out, I think nobody could answer with certitude. My personal opinion is in the affirmative; I think it is going to last, for the reason that the League of Nations at the present time holds a place in the scheme of things in the world in regard to which this may certainly be said: that place must be held either by the League of Nations or

by something else for which we have no precedent whatever, and no basis for believing in its possibility.

QUESTION: *What do you say to the criticism that the League of Nations is political rather than legal?*

ANSWER: Well, I take it that that question relates to the International Court. The Court is a part of the League. I do not see how in any international structure a court can fill the whole place. I think the court fills a great place in the world, but there are many disputes and questions between countries which are political, and for the adjustment of which there must be some political machinery; so I shall answer the question in the language of Senator Root, who, in speaking of the "political" side of the League, said:[1] "It would be a sad thing if this opportunity for the establishment of such a safeguard against future wars should be lost."

QUESTION: *Would the present occupation of Germany be necessary if the United States had signed the Peace Treaty?*

ANSWER: In my opinion, No. I do not think that the Treaty of Peace has ever really been tried. It was drafted with the theory that the United States would ratify it, and, if they had, I think the situation in Europe and the situation here would be very different.

QUESTION: *Is the League, in your opinion, stronger or weaker to-day than when it first met last fall?*

ANSWER: The meeting of the Assembly last fall did not end until about the middle of December. I do not think that the period which has elapsed has made very much difference. The next phase of the League, it seems to me, will come along two lines—its discussions with the United States of the questions regarding Mesopotamia and Yap, and the situation developed at the second meeting of the Assembly next September.

QUESTION: *Is it true that the French did not want Article X in the Treaty?*

ANSWER: I have tried to describe what France did want in the Covenant. In the discussions of the League of Nations Commission, the French certainly never at all opposed Article X, but rather favored it, and the final clause of Article X, as it now reads, was proposed and adopted on account of the views of the French and with their approbation.

[1] Letter of Senator Root of March 29, 1919.

QUESTION: *How much influence had General Smuts in the formation of ideas for drafting the League of Nations?*

ANSWER: Undoubtedly he had considerable influence, but it is extremely difficult to weigh that influence. You have the general idea of a League of Nations which goes back through a great many minds, and it is almost impossible to say just where any particular idea originated and in whose mind.

QUESTION: *Is it true that President Wilson stood in the way of signing the Peace Treaty with Germany by Christmas,* 1918?

ANSWER: I might answer that question No, but it is fair to go a little farther—whether or not a peace treaty could have been brought about with Germany by Christmas, 1918, is very doubtful. Colonel House wanted to try it and the President did not put any stone in his way at all; but one great drawback was that Mr. Lloyd George would not stay in Paris because the elections in Great Britain were going on; there are different views as to whether it could have been done or not if Mr. Lloyd George had stayed, but it certainly could not have been done without him.

QUESTION: *What part will the League of Nations play in settling the present trouble over Germany's refusal to agree to the indemnity?*

ANSWER: None, I think; it is a question of reparations, and lies between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.

QUESTION: *Is there any way by which the United States can now join the League of Nations without the Senate's ratifying both Covenant and Treaty with Germany? Can the United States adhere to the Covenant separately and be admitted to the League?*

ANSWER: If the other states would consent to a separate adherence it would be possible; I think the French would, perhaps, object, as they have been feeling very strongly in regard to the integrity of the Treaty.

QUESTION: *Was there any objection in the discussions as to the multiple votes of the British Empire in the Assembly?*

ANSWER: None at all. Every one at Paris recognized that the giving of votes to the British Dominions was a diminution of the influence of London, and there was not the slightest objection on the part of anybody.

QUESTION: *Is, in your opinion, the Covenant of the League chiefly English, French, or American in origin?*

ANSWER: Certainly not French, because while the French did make general proposals of principles, they did not make detailed proposals or drafts such as both the Americans and the British did. Referring to the text, I should say that perhaps in volume and, I think, perhaps in importance as well, the larger part of it was American in its origin; but any answer to such a question is difficult and unsatisfactory, for even before the Conference many men in various countries had been working along very similar lines, and had reached more or less similar results.

QUESTION: *Will you explain the difference between the first and the final draft of the Monroe Doctrine section, and what the French objection to it was?*

ANSWER: There was not any first or final draft of the Monroe Doctrine Article because it was maintained substantially as at first proposed; the objections of the French, which always seemed to me rather obscure, appeared to be based upon a fear that the Article meant a policy of isolation on the part of the United States.

QUESTION: *Do you believe that President Wilson failed in Paris?*

ANSWER: How could I believe that such a man failed? A man who showed to the world the moral grandeur of America, and who went out of office broken in health, but with a place in history, as I believe, that few have equalled and none surpassed.

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